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Abstract
This thesis examines the mechanisms of policy change in the hospital sector in three 
countries (England, Sweden and Japan), and argues that pressure on central government 
to respond to public concerns can significantly alter conventional institutional 
arrangements.
By analysing four types of pressure (two mainly political, i.e. local campaigns against 
hospital closure and corporatisation of public hospitals; two mainly technical, i.e. 
quality assurance system-building, and malpractice incidents), the thesis sheds light on 
the fact that, when institutional vulnerabilities are exposed to public criticism, central 
governments exhibit their capacity to reform the hospital sector irrespective of 
institutional constraints. Under these circumstances, the varieties of the institutions in 
the three countries do not matter, as the observed responses were similar.
In order to compare and contrast the ‘responsiveness’ of central government within the 
different ‘logics’ of the respective health care systems, this thesis investigates selected 
parliamentary and unitary states with universal health coverage, each however with 
different degrees of state involvement in the hospital sector: England (nationally-run) as
part of the United Kingdom, Sweden (locally-run) and Japan (predominantly 
privately-run).
By differentiating the types of pressure and examining the saliency of each issue in the 
printed media, it is demonstrated that the responsiveness of government to pressure is 
largely affected by the institutional arrangements in which they operate. However, when 
the saliency of non-redistributive technical issues is high, institutional constraints are 
overcome and institutional choices by government are reversed under heightened 
pressure. The analysis of dynamic policy change questions the constraining nature of 
political institutions on health reforms, and explains how policy convergence comes 
about to an extent that goes beyond path dependency in this predominantly 
profession-driven policy sector.
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Note on Japanese names and 
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Yoshida”, instead of “Yoshida Shigeru”). Hepburn romanisation is used, and a 
macron indicates long vowels, although macrons are omitted from familiar names 
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Chapter One Do political institutions matter to the hospital sector?
1.1. Health policy reforms: to what extent do political institutions matter?
To what extent do political institutions matter in reforms of the welfare state? This is a 
crucial question for understanding health policy reforms, which are embedded and play a 
central role in the welfare state. Health accounts for one of the largest proportions of public 
spending in every advanced industrial economy. Moreover, health systems often share the 
fundamental collective values and solidarity upon which the welfare state was constructed 
(Skocpol and Ikenberry 1983; Esping-Andersen 1990; Rothstein 1998; ter Meulen et al. 
2001; Saltman et al. 2004; Alber 1982; Leibfried and Pierson 2000). Problems and struggles 
surrounding the future of the welfare state can therefore be observed and analysed by 
looking at health policy reforms.
This thesis argues that the responsiveness of central government to public concerns is one of 
the key mechanisms to understanding policy change and the reform strategy chosen for a 
specific policy programme in the hospital sector. As welfare reforms take various forms 
depending on the issues (e.g. service cutbacks and demand for innovation), the thesis proves 
the point by investigating twelve cases drawn from three countries that have been selected on 
the basis of types of problem constellations (four cases each from England1, Sweden and 
Japan).
Examining the difficulty of macro-systemic reforms of the welfare state, various scholars 
have emphasised the ‘path-dependent’ nature of institutions, arguing that “... that particular 
course of action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse; and that
1 Since devolution in 1999, the National Health Service (NHS) was decentralised within the United 
Kingdom. In this thesis, England is the only case to be analysed, as Westminster and Whitehall are the 
main decision-making bodies and are held accountable.
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consequently political development is punctuated by critical moments or junctures which 
shape the basic contours of social life” (Pierson 2000a: p.251). The institutionalist school 
places an emphasis on the design of political institutions, notably the rules of the game. A 
number of studies were conducted to elucidate how “(p)rograms adopted as a simple political 
compromise by a legislature become endowed with separate meaning and force by having an 
agency established to deal with them” (March and Olsen 1984). In health care politics 
literature, similar points have been reiterated. Immergut argued that “by establishing the 
rules of the game, they enable one to predict the ways in which policy conflicts will be 
played out” (Immergut 1992). The ‘lock-in’ effects of institutions in health policy-making 
have been repeatedly highlighted by other scholars as well (Alford 1975; Harrison et al. 
1990; Ham 2004; Wilsford 1994).
In historical institutional analyses, it was demonstrated that political institutions2 decided on 
several occasions the fortune of welfare reforms (Hacker 1998; Immergut 1992; Skocpol 
1995; Rothstein 1998), and drastic retrenchment did not occur, as politicians seeking to be 
reelected want no unpopular policy packages (Pierson 1994). In a parliamentary democracy3, 
voters use elections to select politicians who can deliver what they want, and in turn, elected 
officials, seeking to remain in office, try to respond to the electorate’s wishes. If they do not 
fulfill that role, they are punished by voters, in theory. However, this situation is not always 
so straightforward, particularly in health policy. Unlike tax or immigration, the health policy 
domain consists of different policy subsystems (Jones 1994) and actors playing multiple 
roles (i.e. patients can be customers, voters and tax-payers), and it is unclear whether elected 
officials have sufficient information as to what voters want. This holds true, especially in 
countries with universal health coverage, where the principle of universality is firmly
2 In this thesis, given the complex nature of health care governance, institutions are defined in a 
wider sense (Douglas 1987; Scott 1995). Institutions can refer to the existence o f comparatively stable 
structures and procedures with rather clear membership, jurisdictions, and decision-making.
3 Parliamentary democracy is emphasised here, as presidential systems have different dynamics 
because of a clearer division of power between the executive and the legislature.
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established, and therefore accepted by parties across different political spectrums (cf. United 
States). Thus politicians often have better ideas about what voters do not want (e.g. hospital 
closures or radical retrenchment programmes). Neither do elected officials have sufficient 
knowledge of the medical field. In some countries, the medical professions form a vested 
interest against any reforms that undermine their autonomy, making the most of their 
political clout (Eckstein 1960; Lowi 1979; Mizuno 2003; Hassenteufel 1996). Political 
parties then seek to maintain a system of mutual non-interference among the various policy 
subsystems (Jones 1994: p. 171), relegating decisions to the professions. Yet amid 
non-decision or non-interference, demand for health reforms is gathering pace due to 
demographic and technological changes, concern for rising costs as well as ideational shifts 
from egalitarianism to consumerism (Mattei 2007; Kuhnle 2000; Blomqvist 2004). Therefore, 
there is a tension between much needed innovation in the health services on one hand and 
reluctance to carry out any radical changes on the other. These difficult choices and inertia 
within formal institutions are the main reasons for immobilism of the health reforms. Yet 
while a dramatic shift from taxation to social insurance systems and wholesale privatisation 
of hospitals have not been observed, piecemeal changes are implemented with a 
wide-ranging and long-lasting effect (Pierson 2003: pp. 187-188). To answer the above 
question (i.e. to what extent do political institutions matter in welfare policy changes?), a 
closer look at more dynamic process of policy-making is necessary. In particular, it is highly 
important that this thesis examines different types of problem constellations in the policy 
sector and how they interact with different institutional (both political and medical) logics in 
each health system. Central government with universal health coverage does not react to 
pressure in a similar fashion. This thesis explores this underexamined question with a strong 
focus on how these logics play out under different degrees of pressure, to which central 
government may or may not respond.
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1.2. In search of a more dynamic model of policy change: responsive government?
More dynamic aspects of government activities in welfare reforms have been illustrated by 
some scholars. Government, according to Olsen, is “more in the business of shaping its 
environment rather than adapting to it” (Olsen 1991: p. 130). This point was endorsed by 
some literature (Dohler 1995; Czada et al. 1998; Hassenteufel 1996), examining one of the 
classical cases of many vetoing and resisting reform: Germany. Their findings conclude that 
government has the capacity to shape the environment in which private interests can be 
restructured, steadily if slowly. Referring to the health care reforms, Czada argues that “the 
incremental ‘muddling through’ approach of most health care reforms starts at an early stage 
in the policy cycle, and is, in no way, determined by constitutional vetoes embedded in the 
federal structure” (Czada 2004). In countries like the United Kingdom or in other 
Anglo-Saxon countries, growing concerns over the strategic capacities of government 
frequently resurfaced and were made use of as a lever for reviewing the policy capacity of 
government in the era of governance (Parsons 2001; Di Francesco 2001) Both views counter 
the argument that government’s capacity is being eroded and now ‘hollowed out’ (Foster and 
Plowden 1996; Rhodes 1997; Kettl 2000). Interestingly, this question over the capacity of 
government is applied both to so-called “liberal market economies” (Britain) and 
“coordinated market economies” (Germany) (Hall and Soskice 2001). However, scholars’ 
foci diverge when it comes to the scope of the capacities. The former group emphasises the 
ability to make breakthroughs in the bargaining over reform packages with interest groups 
and stakeholders in a narrower sense, whereas the other strand points out the trend that 
government relies more on expertise and evidence to tackle uncertainty and enhance 
‘government’s abilities to meet the demands of the people’ (Cabinet Office 1999 para 2.4.). 
Therefore, clients, whom government is targeting to satisfy, or control, are different. For this 
reason, it is essential to investigate voices expressed by actors outside the formal 
policy-making arena as well as interplay between them and government.
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The interactive aspect of government activities has been researched by a parallel processing 
system or multiple streams of public policymakers (Cohen et al. 1972; Kingdon 1984). The 
understanding of policy development as a flow of reactions to social trends, opinions and 
problem definitions was also emphasised as a reason for reforms (Hood 1983; Baumgartner 
and Jones 1993; Jones 1994). Health care policy-making was no exception to this, 
particularly from the mid-1980s when governments in post-material, advanced economies 
were subjected to great pressure over social risks and uncertainty. In fact, certain types of 
policy changes in health have been introduced, not through formal political institutions but in 
response to pressures exerted through other policy channels such as the media or court 
rulings (Otten 1992; D’Oronzio 2000; Hallam 2002). In the context of welfare reforms, it 
may be argued that the changes were not necessarily “programmatic retrenchment” policies 
(Pierson 2003: p. 188), and were little controversial, but the implications of some of the 
changes are by no means small, according to some scholars after a decade of reform efforts 
in several countries (Hassenteufel and Palier 2007; Immergut and Kume 2006). Overall, 
direct involvement of the government in health provision was gradually phased out over a 
longer period of time. On the other hand, in parallel with these developments, some policy 
innovations have been implemented with the aim of equipping central government with more 
effective and stronger control mechanisms. Consequently, there is a mixed picture, showing 
the strengthening and eroding of the role of government. To understand these complex 
realignment processes, it is necessary to get to grips with two perspectives about the 
capacities of government: proactive ‘design activities’ for cultivating and renewing 
relationships with interest groups (Dohler 1995; Czada et al. 1998) and activities with a more 
“outreach” approach, for responding to the general public (Parsons 2004). The thesis 
examines more closely the latter function, which can be termed policy responsiveness, of 
central government surrounding the hospital sector reforms.
Policy responsiveness has attracted scholarly attention (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2005; 
Stimson 2004; Wlezien 2003; Schumaker 1975). One school of thought adopts the view that
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governments’ responses to pressures tend to be reflexes (Breyer 1993), while another has 
conducted a comparative study by examining differences in the manner in which different 
institutions respond to external pressure, and how their choices are constrained by 
institutional setups (Alink et al. 2001; Lodge and Hood 2002; Wood 1991). The hospital 
sector is a very interesting case for the exploration of this question, that is, the impact of 
institutions on the responsiveness of government and subsequent policy changes. Given that 
hospitals are popular institutions that play a central role in welfare provision, comparing 
their reform paths in different countries could reveal more clearly the dynamic relationship 
between salient issues among the general public and government policy choices. This will 
then enables a more comprehensive analysis of the extent to which institutional 
arrangements actually constrain their choices.
Based on the definition of policy responsiveness by Schumaker, in this thesis the 
responsiveness of central government is conceptualised as the relationship between the 
explicitly articulated demands of a protest group (Chapter 4) or popular grievances expressed 
in the printed media (Chapter 5, 6 and 7) and the corresponding actions of central 
government which is the target of those demands (Schumaker 1975: p.494). These actions 
include a policy announcement from elected officials, a report from the relevant ministry, 
establishment of an agency or organisation, or legislation. Although Schumaker recognised 
five types of responsiveness (access, agenda, policy, output and impact)4, this thesis excludes 
responsiveness at the pre-policy formulation stage (‘access’) and implementation stages 
(‘output’ and ‘impact’), and focuses on the intermediate standard of responsiveness, in 
particular that covering ‘agenda’ and ‘policy’ responsiveness. Thus, ‘agenda’ and ‘policy’ 
responsiveness can henceforth be labeled simply as ‘responsiveness’. The notion indicates
4 For the other three types, the author defined ‘access responsiveness’ as ‘the extent to which 
authorities are willing to hear the concerns of such a group’, ‘output responsiveness’ as ‘the degree to 
which those in the political systems implement policy-responsive actions’, and ‘impact 
responsiveness’ as ‘the degree to which the actions of the political system succeed in alleviating the 
grievances of protest groups’ (Schumaker 1975: pp. 494-495).
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the extent to which policymakers in the political system place the issue concerned on the 
agenda and/or adopt a policy stance congruent with the claims demanded by a protest group 
or public criticism in the printed media.
For a robust analysis, the health policy domain needs to be dissected. Firstly, the 
policy-making arena has to be broadly split into two. As previous research has indicated, 
policy-making is a dynamic and complex process, in which there is an interaction between 
the formal political arena and the general public. To distinguish between the two different 
types of policy domains, Jones (1994) uses the dichotomy of “subsystem politics” and 
“macropolitics”. As a narrower, formal policy-making arena, where strong tendencies to 
protect interests (locked-in effects) are observed, subsystem politics can be defined as the 
“politics of function, involving the interrelations of bureaus and other administrative 
operating agencies, congressional committee structure, and the interest organizations, trade 
press, and lobbyists concerned with a particular area of program specialization” (Redford 
1969: p.83. Emphasis added, as it needs to be read parliamentary for this thesis). Thus, a 
subsystem is ‘a part of the whole political system that interacts more intensely with its 
participants than with other parts of the political system’ (Jones 1994: p. 164). Macropolitics, 
in contrast, is “produced when the community at large and the leaders of the government as a 
whole are brought into the discussion and determination of policy” (ibid.). Hill also 
distinguished “the more private politics of ‘policy communities’” from ‘the general political 
arena’ (Hill 1984: p. 120). The former is the ‘subsystem politics’ and the latter 
‘macropolitics’. In public policy-making, the processing of new ideas and entry of new 
actors could change the whole landscape (Carmines and Stimson 1986; Jones and Strahan 
1985). This happens more often under certain circumstances for a particular type of policy 
programmes, which is the main focus of this thesis.
In between these two policy-making arenas, political parties are the main actors in all three 
parliamentary systems. Here, the thesis compares and tests the validity of two contrasting
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perspectives: one based on the hypothesis underlining partisan influence on public policy 
(Blom-Hansen et aL 2006; Midtb0 1999) and the other that negates this. The latter focuses 
more on the capacity and limitations of the government, in particular consensus democracies 
with proportional electoral systems (Imbeau et al. 2001; Schmidt 1996; Pennings 2005). This 
point is worth exploring, as health policy, unlike economic policy, tends to require a 
pragmatic approach, rather than a left-right ideological stance, particularly regarding policy 
programmes surrounding the hospital sector (see Perspective 1 in section 1.4. for further 
details).
Secondly, following on from the above-mentioned dichotomy, there are two types of 
principal formal institutions within health policy-making, which have to be separated as each 
interacts with the general public under pressured circumstances: political-administrative 
institutions and medical-collegial institutions. Policy changes occur as a result of party 
competition (Str0m and Muller 1999; Downs 1957; Klingemann et al. 1994; Benoit and 
Laver 2006), but in health policy, this is not the only source of change. The medical 
professions are not simply pressure groups, but rather established actors within health care 
institutions, having their own set of rules (Harrison et al. 1990; Moran and Wood 1993). In 
the book entitled “Accidental logics: The dynamics o f change in the health care arena in the 
United States, Britain and Canada”, Tuohy (1999) explored this by unpacking the 
institutions into three elements (state hierarchy, private market and professional collegial 
institutions), and argued that the three can “generate a distinctive logic that governs the 
behavior of participants and the ongoing dynamic of change”, comparing the degree to 
which health care policy is subject to change in these three Anglo-Saxon countries. She 
underlined the importance of systemic logics within the health sector, as well as the 
institutional mix for decision-making. She argues that professional collegial institutions are 
very solid, and protective of their autonomy, having their own dynamics. The occupational 
autonomy enjoyed by established professions such as doctors has been emphasised by many 
authors in sociology, organisational theory and political science (Johnson 1972; DiMaggio
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and Powell 1983; Parry and Parry 1976). Hospitals are one of the institutions where 
professional autonomy remains robust and resilient. Changing the hospital sector inevitably 
entails adjustment or alteration of the control system over physicians, which is a 
considerably challenging task for elected officials with little relevant information and 
scientific knowledge in relation to the professions (Zweifel 1998). Several works on 
organisations have also demonstrated that the strength of sectoral interests within the 
hospital sector in the United States (Meyer et al. 1990; Scott et al. 2000). A study on 
policy-making in education and health in Britain adds validity to the argument, underlining 
how persistent the rules and norms in the sector might be (Glennerster 1994; Bevan and 
Cornwell 2006). Thus, in order to analyse policy changes in the health sector, the main 
policy domains have to be divided into the two different arenas: logics of the 
politico-administrative and medical-collegial dimensions. This approach leads to the second 
perspective, which emphasises the role of ‘policy communities’ or a ‘policy network’ (Marsh 
and Rhodes 1992; Jordan and Richardson 1987; Smith 1993). When government is 
dependent on the professions’ participation and advice to ensure policy implementation, 
decisions tend to be made within those formal policy circles, without being affected by the 
external pressure (i.e. public concerns). This perspective (Perspective 2) will be examined 
against the possibility that central government may still respond to criticisms in the public 
domain (further details below in 1.4.).
By differentiating the policy-making arenas and institutions, the responsiveness of 
government in hospital sector reforms can be comparatively analysed in a more rigorous 
manner.
Unlike in Tuohy, the third element (i.e. the private market) is eliminated from the thesis by 
way of restricting the selection of country cases to England, Sweden and Japan. All three 
countries have marginal market forces under the universality principle embedded in the 
financing methods. Even though there is more market-like competition in the predominantly
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private delivery system in Japan, the government-controlled fee schedule combined with the 
unchallenged authority of doctors paved the way for the heavily regulated policy arena. As 
the medical professions act to their own logics, the political system has its own in its formal 
procedures and rules which yield certain public beliefs (Kato and Rothstein 2006; Kumlin 
2004). In this thesis, ‘institutional logics’ signify the patterns of thinking and behaviour of 
the policymakers and stakeholders, induced by the institutional designs of a health system 
within a nationally-bound political system (see below and Chapter 3 for further details).
It is worth noting here that the term ‘country (countries)’ is adopted throughout the thesis to 
describe the three ‘administrative jurisdictions’. Yet England is defined as one of the 
constituent “countries within a country” (10 Downing Street 2007), and this is an anomaly, 
as England has no separate elected national body responsible for its central administration, 
unlike the rest of the United Kingdom (i.e. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland). 
Legislative and executive bodies for England therefore reside with the British parliament 
(Westminster) and departments (Whitehall) respectively.
As precedent work on responsive government has concentrated on (1) public opinion and (2) 
the United States, this thesis instead uses the number of newspaper articles as a proxy for 
issue saliency and analyses three health systems with both similarities (all 
unitary/parliamentary systems and universal health coverage) and dissimilarities 
(public/private mix of health delivery and political accountability). The characteristics of the 
political and health systems in the three countries will be detailed in Chapter 3, although 
each will be described briefly here. The English National Health Service (NHS) is 
publicly-run, centrally-controlled and hence the most institutionalised of the three. Due to a 
strong tradition of parliamentary accountability, even after the quasi-market reforms, the 
English government and parliament should be sensitive to popular demands and the 
performance of local hospitals, given their impact on elections, policy pledges and 
ministerial responsibility. Similarly, with an emphasis on democratic accountability at local
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level (county councils), the Swedish system takes a dencentralised approach, with central 
government and parliament (the Swedish Riksdag) playing only a guarantor role to ensure 
the whole population has equal access to good-quality health care. The locus for 
policy-making is thus found at various levels of government and geared towards 
consensus-making among medical professions, local politicians and central government 
agencies. On the other hand, health care in Japan, provided by predominantly private actors 
based on social insurance schemes, is the most diffuse and the least structured. The system 
does not hold politicians in parliament (the Japanese Diet, Kokkai) to account for delivery 
issues, and instead semi-autonomous providers have both discretions and liabilities. 
However, bargaining for remuneration at national level provides government with leverage 
against private providers, who in turn cultivated a special relationship with the de-facto 
single ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as a protector of their privilege.
In summary, despite the commonalities shared by the three countries (i.e. unitary state and 
parliamentary system with universal coverage), a variety of institutional arrangements create 
diverse incentives for each central government, even when they are faced with similar 
problems. This is why the responsiveness of central government is to be tested by three 
perspectives featuring different elements of political institutions (i.e. electoral competition 
and party politics; policy-making style driven by expert opinions; and public concerns and 
criticism expressed in the printed media). The analysis enables us to reformulate the original 
question as follows: what element(s) of political institutions is (are) prompting and hindering 
reforms in the hospital sector?
1.3. Operationalisation: classifying policy types and public concerns expressed in the 
printed media
Although case selection and methodology will be discussed in more detail in the following 
chapter, the table below summarises the four selected empirical cases in order to cover
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different types of policies, based on a combination of pressure level on the two (political and 
medical) institutions.
Pressure on political arena
Low High
Pressure on 
professional 
arena
Low
Case A
Local protests against hospital 
reorganisation 
(local voice through ballots)
Case B 
Corporatisation of public 
hospitals 
(private sector practice)
High
Case C 
Quality assurance system 
(target setting and performance)
Case D 
Malpractice incidents 
(incidents and media frenzies)
Table 1: Classifying policy types within health sector by pressure level
Local protest and quality assurance system-building, both in the left column, are expected to 
generate lower political pressure on central government than the other two cases in the 
right-hand column. The former has only a local dimension, while the latter has a strong 
technical aspect. On the other hand, the impact on the political arena would be great in the 
right-hand column. Corporatisation of public hospitals (Harding and Preker 2000) is 
regarded as a signal of “systemic retrenchment” on a national scale, and malpractice 
incidents can be seen as signs of a failed government. In the medical profession, the two 
cases in the bottom row (quality assurance system and medical errors) are of greater 
significance than those in the row above. Local hospital service cuts and corporatisation have 
more political implications than simply professional autonomy. It is worth noting however 
that each issue type only represents generic classification, and in reality, the level of external 
pressure on the political or medical arena in each jurisdiction should vary according to each 
institutional design, as well as to the scale of planned change and visibility of the issue. 
Public attention can shift the policy arena between subsystem and macropolitics or local and 
national level.
To compare how much attention each case attracts, this thesis makes use of the printed 
media (broadsheet and tabloid newspapers). Newspaper articles are coded into three 
categories: positive, neutral and negative reports about the government and medical
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professions. It is complemented by fifteen to twenty interviews with officials, doctors and 
hospital managers in each country (see Chapter 2 for further details).
Number of articles by keyword, 1990-1999 
(50 or less)
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□  SW Expressen 
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□  JP N ikkanSaccess and hospital ethics and hospital patient safety
care care
Figure 1: Themes covered by newspaper media5, 1990-1999 (50 articles or less)
(Note: FT: Financial Times; DN: Dagens Nyheter; SvD: Svenska Dagbladet; NK: Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun. Tabloids that cover these themes are Daily Mail, Aftonbladet, Expressen and 
Nikkan-Sports.)
An overview of perceived problems in each health system can be captured by the total 
number of articles in the printed media. The two tables above and below indicate the number 
of newspaper articles (broadsheets and tabloids, along the left-right spectrums) in the 1990s 
covering several health-related themes. The first table shows the three major topics (access, 
ethics and patient safety) which received a relatively small amount of attention (fifty articles 
or less), whereas the second table contains more popular themes (freedom of choice, waiting 
lists, and quality) by number in at least one country (an average of more than fifty articles).
5 There are 105 titles (70,815,000 in print) in Japan, 109 titles (18,898,000) in the UK, and 91 titles 
(3,671,000) in Sweden. Four morning papers in Japan include Yomiuri (10,224,066 in print), Asahi 
(AS) (8,322,046), Mainichi (3,976,357) and Nihon-Keizai Shimbun (NK) (3,044,214). The biggest 
sports newspaper (tabloid) is Nikkan Sports (2,046,257 in 2002) (World Press Trends 2003).
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These two tables demonstrate that the saliency profile of a certain issue is rather 
country-bound. This tendency highlights that public concern varies from country to country, 
with more similarities between publicly-run systems (England and Sweden) in general, but 
not in all issues. In addition, differences between countries are much more pronounced than 
are the ideological stances (leftist or rightist) of newspapers. If comparing different types of 
newspaper (broadsheet or tabloid), it can be said that tabloids do not feature many of those 
health issues, except for some sensational coverage of matters such as waiting lists (Daily 
Mail in the UK) and ethics (Aftonbladet in Sweden).
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B  UK T h e  T im es
□  UK Guardian 
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O UK Daily M ail
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Number of articles by keyword, 1990-1999 
(average of 50 or more)
waiting lists hospital care and
quality
jg 210
1  180a
© 150 
|  120
s  90
73
S 60
30
0
freedom of choice and 
health
Figure 2: Themes covered by newspaper media, 1990-1999 (average of 50 articles or more)
Taking some examples from the country-by-country cluster, it can be seen that the Japanese 
newspapers feature quality issues more, while the British and Swedish newspapers devote 
more articles to the issues of freedom of choice and access to hospital care. Whereas in the 
Swedish and Japanese newspapers, ethics attracts a significant degree of attention, patient 
safety is much more salient in Britain and Japan. In addition, waiting lists are perceived as a 
great problem in all three countries (including Japan), despite the fact that the issue has been
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regarded as a problem peculiar to the NHS-type health system. This pattern of issue saliency 
also has to be borne in mind when discussing the ‘latent’ pressure on government. 
Nevertheless, as the Japanese government never had a clear policy on waiting lists in spite of 
the considerable amount of media attention, this endorses the arguments (Wlezien 2003; 
Jones and Baumgartner 2005) that ‘issue saliency’ and ‘importance’ is not the same thing in 
the government’s opinion. Variations in governments’ prioritisation in health cannot solely 
be explained by issue saliency.
This thesis explains the mechanisms of prioritisation by combining the static notion of 
path-dependency, constrained by institutional arrangements and a more dynamic aspect of 
government sensitivity to public concerns. In the course of the investigation, the gap between 
results expected from institutional designs and actual government policy developments will 
be highlighted. As a tool to gauge public concerns, coverage in the printed media is primarily 
used as the most reliable comparative data. The printed media has a relative advantage over 
opinion polls for such comparative analysis, as availability of opinion polls varied greatly 
across countries as did its use and impact on government over time. In contrast, the printed 
newspapers have long tried to mirror the opinions of the general public, more broadly and 
impartially, though often from certain political perspectives. Pressure built up over time on 
central government is more clearly shown by newspaper articles than one-off public 
surveys6.
6 In Sweden, some scholars have continually conducted surveys and opinion polls (Rosen 2002; 
Bjork and Rosen 1993; Anell et al. 1997). The questionnaires were meant to detect the perceptions of 
different actors (politicians, administrators, physicians and patients) with respect to Swedish health 
care. The Federation of County Councils also carried out telephone interviews. In Britain, several 
research and consulting companies such as BMG Research, Ipsos MORI and GfK NOP are now 
contractors for the Healthcare Commission and regularly gather and publish data on patient and public 
satisfaction for the NHS as part of the national patient surveys programme (Picker Institute 2007; 
Baker 2000: p. 166). England seems to have the most integrated feedback system within the 
government NHS scheme. In Japan, public opinion on specific health issues is not commonly used as 
indicator and seldom reflected in policy. Although the Japanese Nursing Association and the Japan 
Hospital Association conduct occasional surveys, these are not widely publicised.
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In the analysis of this thesis, ‘liberal’ broadsheet newspapers, combined with tabloid 
newspapers, are examined to trace views expressed in the printed media with particular 
attention to their reference to government and its actions. Whether the articles treat 
government and its policy in a positive or negative manner will be analysed and counted. In 
addition, there is one further category, neutral reports, with the mere function of informing 
the public of news and events. The three-way separation would be useful to examine whether 
pressure was exerted upon government or on other (non-governmental) actors including 
doctors, managers and local government. The expectations for each case study will be tested 
against the observations of interactions between patterns in newspaper articles (positive, 
negative and neutral) and government responses. Interviews with policy makers, physicians, 
hospital managers and scholars (fifteen to twenty interviews in each country) were used in 
order to fill the gap in information, when a causal link between reporting and government 
responses needs to be clarified (see more details of interviews in Chapter 2).
1.4. Three perspectives for examining the responsiveness of government
Analysis of each empirical case is composed of two stages: “predictions” and “observations”. 
The first part in each empirical chapter is to build up “predictions” of how each national 
government responds. This will be conducted by taking three elements into account, namely 
the nature of pressure type (from low-low to high-high), institutional arrangements of each 
health system, and comparison of issue saliency profiles in the three countries. Using these 
parameters, government responsiveness can be predicted.
The types of pressure will be examined within four different problem constellations.
Case A: Local issue of hospital reorganisation and the subsequent shocking electoral results 
are classified under low-low pressure type, although potentially undermining for political 
institutions and conventional electoral politics in particular. Mobilisation of opinions, 
shifting the issue from subsystem to macropolitics, is carried out by electoral institutions.
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Thus, although the initial pressure is low politically, pressure can mount higher, as the issue 
becomes more ‘important’ for the governing party.
England-A: the local health authority decided that Kidderminster Hospital had to be 
downgraded, with the closure of the A&N unit. The decision coincided with the upgrading of 
a hospital in nearby Worcester, which was promoted by the incoming Labour central 
government.
Sweden-A: the local county council of Norrbotten was divided over the transfer of an old 
district hospital from Boden to the capital city of Lulea. The decision was made internally in 
the district meetings of the Social Democratic Party, which had the dominant position over 
many years.
Japan-A: the city council was originally against the decision of the central government to sell 
the national hospital in Akune city to the local medical association. The governor of the 
prefecture and the council soon changed their stance in favour, as the deal was made 
between the central government and the Japan Medical Association.
Case B: Running public hospitals as corporations has been contested in many countries and 
is ideologically divisive between Left and Right. It is classified under low-high pressure type. 
A large-scale change needs legislation and therefore is expected to create intensive 
parliamentary debates. It is a matter for examination whether or not they evolve into an issue 
for macropolitics, but it is expected to be a test for formal political institutions and their 
capacities.
England-B: A plan to improve productivity in NHS hospitals was suddenly announced by the 
minister. The idea was to give incentives to managers to perform better so that they will be 
freed from central control. Foundation hospitals were however thought by some critics to 
created two-tier system in the NHS.
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Sweden-B: A plan to privatise an acute hospital in order to improve quality had been mooted 
for a while in the Stockholm county council, with the left bloc resisting the idea. As the 
centre right was voted in, they proceeded to carry out the privatisation. The centre-left 
central government was certainly opposed to the idea.
Japan-B: A plan to sell national hospitals across the country was attempted in the 1980s but 
fell through. Central government had to repackage it in the large-scale public administration 
reform, transforming all national hospitals into one agency. Poorly-performing national 
hospitals had fervent supporters in the political Left, but these were negligible in number.
Case C: The development of quality assurance schemes for hospitals creates imminent 
pressure on medical experts, rather than the political circle, and can be characterised as 
typical subsystem politics. This high-low pressure type of policy programme may cause 
friction between sectoral interests, such as the autonomy of the medical profession, and 
public interests, such as patient rights, as advocated by government.
England-C: Performance indications were introduced in NHS hospitals in the early 1980s, 
but had been designed to control budget rather than quality. The proposal of a quality 
measurement for patients came with a league table idea during the Conservative government 
and opposed by the then opposition Labour party. After the change of power, the Labour 
government became a fervent promoter of the idea of star ratings.
Sweden-C: A quality register system had been established within the specialties in the 
medical professions since the 1970s. With support from a central government agency, the 
scheme was legitimised and became a substitute for evaluating the quality of doctors. Central 
government however strongly resisted the idea of a league table or rankings, as they claimed 
that that would undermine the principle of the Swedish welfare state: equal service for 
everyone across the country.
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Japan-C: A need for a hospital quality system was recognised by both the medical 
professions and central government in the 1980s. This demand derived from the complete 
lack of control over quality in the sector, and both needed criteria to reclassify providers for 
further reorganisation of the sector. The American-style third-party inspection was 
introduced without much controversy or even discussion within government.
Finally, Case D: the most memorable malpractice incidents in the late 1990s were selected 
from each of the three countries and compared. Even though the liabilities of such events 
normally fall on the medical professions themselves, and not government, the issue attracts 
considerable public attention, potentially evolving into macropolitics. It is therefore 
classified under the high-high pressure type. Under such circumstances, are political 
institutions capable of quelling public dissatisfaction and controlling policy trajectories?
England-D: the Bristol Royal Infirmary was noted for the higher mortality rate of children’s 
heart operations. This revelation had been made in the past, but it was not until 1997 that 
media coverage began to increase. The outgoing Conservative government pledged that they 
would hold a public inquiry over the matter. Posterior to the general election, the Labour 
government took over the job and set up the inquiry.
Sweden-D: there was no outstanding case of medical malpractice in Sweden, although 
ongoing debate was held as to defects in and improvements to the risk management system 
already set in place since the 1980s. It was the negligence case at a care home that gained the 
greatest media coverage. The responsibility, and therefore the blame, was shared between the 
private company and the municipality to which policy area is devolved.
Japan-D: at the Yokohama City University Hospital, the wrong operations were conducted 
on two patients whose identities had been mixed up. The hospital publicly apologised and 
began an internal inquiry. The main responsibility rested with the hospital, the university,
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and the city which administered the hospital, although questions as to central government’s 
role started to arise.
For each of these cases, the question is posed over and over: to what extent do political 
institutions matter in reforms of the hospital sector? This question will be answered by the 
extent to which central government responded to different degrees of pressure in the three 
countries. To do this, as previously mentioned, three perspectives are used to examine why 
government responded in a certain fashion. The driving force for the response may be fierce 
electoral competition between government and the opposition parties, or a high level of 
public criticism. If central government is election-conscious, as some literature suggests, 
political parties are expected to be the main actors to prompt policy changes or hinder them. 
However, if they did not demonstrate any involvement in a particular policy, although 
changes occurred, the assumption that the political institutions are rather negatively 
associated with policy change should be questioned. On the other hand, if there was no 
immediate response from central government, the reason may be that government relies on 
experts or the medical professions and does not easily respond to the general public or even 
criticism in the media.
Here, in contrast to the definition of institutions as being stable, fluctuating public attention 
has to be taken into account. Therefore, in building up the ‘predictions’, issue saliency in the 
printed media is used. The less attention a certain issue attracts, the greater the chance of 
maintaining institutional arrangements is. Subsystem politics would keep the status quo of 
policy programmes with some adjustments. In order to provide an overview of the context 
and time span of policy developments, the brief chronology is also presented at the 
beginning, before getting into detailed observations.
The second part will then provide ‘observations’ of how central government actually made 
policy choices over time, in some cases in response to criticisms, and the tri-country
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differences in their actions will be compared. In each episode, the events are divided into 
three or four phases, based on critical junctures of policy developments.
There are therefore three competing models of responsive government, summarised below, 
and this thesis aims to detect similar/dissimilar patterns of ‘response’, if any, among 
parliamentary systems over four different types of hospital-related policy programmes.
Perspective 1: Election-conscious government
If party competition and coalitions determine the responsiveness of central government, then 
the stronger the competition is the more responsive government becomes. As Jones and 
Baumgartner (2005:69) argue, “(i)n two-party system, if ideology and partisanship 
correspond, then voting will occur along a single dimension, whether that dimension is 
termed partisanship or ideology. In such cases, in the absence of supermajority requirements, 
the successful policy proposal will be that proposal most preferred by the legislator at the 
median”. Hence, the two-party alternating system in England is better equipped to readily 
respond to the general public (Judge 2004; Schmidt 1996; Richards and Smith 2002) than the 
multi-party consensual system in Sweden (Elder et al. 1982; Lewin 1998) or the 
factionalised single party system in Japan (Yamaguchi 1999; Stockwin 1999; Ramseyer and 
Rosenbluth 1993; Neary 2004; Mulgan 2003)7.
This is purely a theoretical model, as it holds true only to the extent that the 
first-past-the-post electoral rule in England promotes two parties alternating in office. With a 
few exceptions, coalition government has been a rare form, as the single-winning party 
(either Conservative Party or Labour Party) forms the government. However, there is a third
7 The rough guide to the difference among the three parliamentary regimes is Lijphart’s table (1999: 
312-313). The effective number o f parliamentary parties, minimal winning one-party cabinet and 
government duration (executive dominance) from 1971 to 1996 are as follows. Effective number of 
parties (in the order o f the UK, Japan and Sweden) is 2.20, 4.07 and 3.52. The percentage o f minimal 
winning one-party cabinets is 93.3, 31.4 and 41.4. Lastly, government duration is 5.52, 2.98 and 2.73.
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force, the Liberal Democratic Party, which has been advocating a more localised tax-based 
system than that in Sweden. It should also be noted that in Sweden it is not national 
government but county councils that decide and vary taxes for the health service. Moreover, 
elections for all three-tier governments are held on the same day in Sweden. Thus, party 
competition is fiercer than predicted. The indirect mechanism for channeling pressure at 
local level to national level should not be overlooked. In the case of Japan, elections do 
matter, but the main clients to the governing party were not the electorate overall but the 
private practitioners, the Japan Medical Association (JMA). Because of the former electoral 
rules (medium-size constituencies with three to five representatives, each vote having a 
single, non-transferable vote), the governing LDP party candidates were as much in 
competition with each other for votes as with candidates from the other parties (Richardson 
1988). As a result, the LDP candidates cultivated a special relationship with the JMA, and 
the party became a protector of doctors’ privileges (Steslicke 1973).
Therefore, in brief, this perspective underlines the significance of opposition force in the 
form of a political party. This is a model of political party-induced policy change, and mostly 
conducted in the domain of macropolitics, involving the general public through the formal 
political process of elections. Politically-pressured cases (case A: elections against local 
hospital reorganisation and case B: legislation for corporatising public hospitals) fall into this 
category, while the other two cases also require investigation. Hypotheses can be drawn up 
as follows.
-> Perspective 1: Central government in England is the most responsive to the policy 
preferences of the electorate, with the governing party under constant pressure from the 
opposition forces, but also fit to change its stance swiftly. Whereas the impact of the 
electoral cycles on the responsiveness of central government in Japan and Sweden can be 
less direct or skewed.
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Perspective 2: Expert-driven government
In most countries, policies surrounding the hospital sector neither appear in party manifestos 
nor assume a party-political tinge. Elected officials take broad stands on pro-market or 
anti-market ideologies. Therefore, the responsiveness of government is more likely to 
depend on the way in which medical professions and the government collaborate and seek to 
reach consensus in the bargaining process. Although the thesis does not underestimate the 
role of government or parliament as some ‘policy networks’ or ‘policy communities’ 
theorists (Jordan and Richardson 1987; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Smith 1993), in this model, 
the “network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular 
domain” (Haas 1992: p.3) plays the key role in the policy-making process. Here, permanent 
officials in the civil service are normally included in the network and thus the 
‘responsiveness’ of government is geared towards the opinions of the experts within 
subsystem politics, rather than the concerns of the general public, let alone voters. In areas 
where professions directly control service delivery, policy innovation is based on the 
knowledge of elites and administrators (Fimister and Hill 1993). This model is particularly 
applicable to policy programmes that are rather technical, such as the regulation of medical 
professions and quality assurance systems (Case C). Yet for the other three cases (Cases A, 
B and D), it is highly likely that government policy proposals could well be founded upon 
experts or officials’ knowledge, taking virtually no heed of public concerns. Thus, the 
assumption is that administrators are problem-solvers who ‘respond’ only to pressure coming 
from experts and advisors. This suggests closed technocratic policy-making, mostly 
conducted in the subsystem domain. The case in point is Japan, where detailed policy 
agendas are seldom contested at elections, and more drawn up by senior officials, with little 
input in the policy process from interest groups or weak civil society (Peters et al. 2000; 
Schwartz 2003; Wright 1999). The significance and authoritative positions of professors at 
teaching hospitals has also made government submissive to professional networks and 
expertise (Kasahara 1999; Campbell and Ikegami 1998). In Japan, the non-elected officials,
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instead of political appointees, had been officially allowed to answer questions in the Diet 
until 2000 (Neary 2004) with various mechanisms such as government councils to serve the 
machinery of central bureaus (Morita 2006). In health policy, the fee-schedule setting body, 
the Central Social Insurance Medical Care Council (CSIMC) embodies a high concentration 
of authority at national level, involving a few selected members of the powerful medical 
professions.
This model could be applied to England and Sweden, even though in these two countries 
with predominantly public provision, more emphasis is placed on the issue of accountability 
and the function of parliamentary democracy than in Japan. In the case of England, problems 
have been raised over recent years about the executive bypassing parliament (Judge 2004; 
Norton 2003) or the intensifying trend of the professional policy-making model (Parsons 
2001). In Sweden, the central government delegates its functions to semi-autonomous 
government agencies and to the federation of local governments. Its inclusive nature of the 
Commission system, incorporating relevant interest groups and their feedback when drafting 
policy, is well known. Yet the number of those commissions has been reduced, and the 
overall influence is not clear. The Standing Committees are not open, and deliberations on 
bills are often conducted behind closed doors (Larsson 1994; Arter 2004; Petersson 1989). In 
particular, health policy-making at county council level or between the Federation of County 
Council (FCC, merged with Association of Local Authorities and renamed SALAR in 2005) 
and the government agencies creates more scope for an expert-driven approach than a 
formalised process at national level. As a result, this model could also apply to England and 
Sweden. Technical issues such as quality assurance schemes and risk management are 
expected to fall into this category.
-> Perspective 2: No input from the opinions of the general public in government proposals. 
Central government responds to certain policy initiatives proposed by experts (medical 
professions and administrators) from the internal policy-making circles. Actions are
44
restricted to long-term defined problems and consensus among the experts determines policy 
developments. Central governments in all three countries have the capacity to initiate 
policies without formally consulting the general public. Greater responsiveness to experts’ 
opinions and concerns could mean preservation of formal policy-making style and 
path-dependent policy choice. With little input from the elected officials, central government 
in Japan is expected to show the highest response to the inner circle decision-making.
Perspective 3: Public-spirited responsive government
Finally, government could reach out of the subsystem and advocate patient rights in response 
to public concerns expressed through the media. Especially with the emergence of a new 
issue, equilibrium between party positions and the ideological positions of the members 
could be destabilised, contrary to what the party competition model suggests (Carmines and 
Stimson 1986; Stimson et al. 1995). Baumgartner and Jones term this phenomenon ‘issue 
intrusion’, by which they mean “the emergence of a previously unappreciated issue into a 
stable policy-making system” (2005: 68). Government would become more responsive, in 
particular when criticisms of government bodies are prominent (in the printed media). This 
implies that the choice of policy instruments could be made beyond institutional constraints.
Even though the expert-driven model (Perspective 2) also allows of issue intrusion, the 
difference between this and the public-spirited responsive model (Perspective 3) consists in 
the role of government and the significance of actors outside the arena of a subsystem. In the 
former, government adopts a rather passive role (except for the role of keeping the cheque 
book) in the technical domain in particular, behind the medical professions, preferring 
subsystem politics to macropolitics. On the other hand, in the latter, government proactively 
adjusts or readjusts its policy programmes according to public concerns, those who are 
excluded from the ordinary bargaining process. Therefore, the issue attention cycle, rather 
than electoral competition or problems of the health system, leads to government policy 
change or possibly the reversal of its original stance. Of the four cases, two (A and B) where
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there is pressure on political institutions are those where formal political institutions 
(elections and legislative processes) are challenged. For all the other two cases (building-up 
of hospital performance measurements and malpractice incidents), ‘issue intrusion’ is 
evident. Thus, this model will be closely examined by looking at how central government 
(governing parties) responded to public criticism, expressed in the printed media.
Perspective 3: The emergence of a new issue and pronounced negative reporting on 
government initiatives can drive policy change, shaking the equilibrium within the 
subsystem. New policy initiatives from central government take a more outreaching 
approach, underlining stronger commitments to the interests of the general public (e.g. 
patient safety and patient rights) and less focus on the interests of the privileged.
Main actor(s) To whom is it/are 
they responsive?
Main arena Country
case
Empirical
case
Model 1 Political parties Electorate
(votes)
Macro-
Politics
England
Sweden
Case A 
Case B
Model 2 Professions/ 
Civil Servants
Experts 
(vested interests)
Subsystem Japan Case C 
Case D
Model 3 Relevant
ministries/ministers
General public 
(public concerns)
Macro-
Politics
All/
None?
Case C 
Case D
Table 2: Summary of the three perspectives and empirical cases
This research is not designed to examine and reveal the causal mechanism of public opinion 
and government policy per se, but to probe into the way in which policy changes occur in the 
interplay between government and public concerns, and the degree of stability of policy 
subsystem, protected by institutional frameworks within health care systems. By discerning 
different types of policy programmes on two (political and medical) dimensions, it 
illuminates conditions under which central government in the three countries responds to 
external pressure by altering its policy preferences in response to public criticism. In order to 
test the validity of the three hypothetical models mentioned above, vulnerabilities of central 
government to pressure within three different institutional arrangements need to be mapped 
out. This aspect will be looked at in Chapter 3.
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1.5. Organisation of the thesis
As seen above, and as a way of unravelling the almost intractable research question (to what 
extent do political institutions matter in reforms of the welfare state?), this thesis seeks to 
solve a more specific puzzle, adjusted to fit the study of the unitary state: how responsive is 
central government to reform pressure in the hospital sector? As an introduction to the 
background to this research and the case study, the next chapter explains the choice of 4 x 3 
case study (neither large-N nor small-N) and interview methods adopted for this research, 
followed by more detailed comparisons of the tri-country health systems in Chapter 3. The 
four empirical chapters, 4 to 7, use the two-stage format, with predictions at the beginning 
and are tested against observations through each episode. The concluding chapter (Chapter 
8) summarises the findings, comparing four empirical results across three countries and 
providing the conclusion to the question posed by this thesis: to what extent do political 
institutions matter in health policies surrounding the hospital sector? Analysing the 
explanatory power of the three perspectives (election-conscious, expert-driven and 
public-spirited government), the primary focus will be on the third perspective, as this is the 
model envisaging both the incremental and radical change of conventional institutional 
designs, contrary to the institutionalist arguments. As mentioned above, although Perspective 
2 can also bring about convergence of policy programmes across countries beyond 
institutional differences, it accentuates more profession-oriented and thus less government 
engagement in the hospital sector, while Perspective 3 indicates the opposite. Thus, the 
thesis argues that the public-spirited responsive model is increasingly a valid model, with the 
heightened activities of regulation surrounding the sector.
Using a medium number of cases from three countries, findings of the thesis also have 
implications for the literature on the welfare state. When the saliency of non-redistributive 
technical issues is high, institutional constraints are overcome and institutional choices by 
government are reversed under heightened pressure. Therefore, if great changes can be
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observed in this predominantly profession-driven policy sector, the constraining nature of 
political institutions on health reforms has to be critically reviewed, in particular the role of 
veto players in the coordinated market economies (i.e. Japan and Sweden). The 
public-spirited responsive model could explain how policy diffusion and convergence across 
different countries come about beyond path dependency, under a certain condition. The next 
chapter explains the research methods adopted for this research and provides a brief 
explanation of each empirical case.
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Chapter Two Case study, selection of cases and interviews
This chapter explains the choice of cases, research methods and interviews. Each empirical 
case will be detailed and placed in the context of the three perspectives of responsive 
government set out in the previous chapter. The chapter’s purpose is to answer the three 
questions: why this medium-sized case study (4x3) method was selected, how the interviews 
were conducted and, above all, what each case represents and will be mainly tested for.
2.1. Tri-country comparison: parliamentary/unitary state with universal health 
coverage
The research question (how responsive is central government to reform pressure in the 
hospital sector?) led essentially to case-oriented qualitative research, given that the complex 
policy domain necessitates close-up examination of policy changes over time (1990-2006). 
A detailed qualitative method was adopted to explain the similarities and dissimilarities in 
the way in which central government in the three countries reacted to different pressure in 
the same hospital sector. As Yin argues, a specific advantage is endowed upon the case study 
method when “a ‘how’ or ‘why’ question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, 
over which the investigator has little or no control” (Yin 1989: p.20).
Additionally, a large volume of literature comparing various health systems and their 
performances (equity, equality and finance) have been using the small-N methods for a 
better understanding of the causal mechanisms of policy changes and central government’s 
capacities, which can be both empowered and constrained by political institutions (Immergut 
1992; Saltman and Otter 1992; Moran 1999; Tuohy 1999; Freeman 2000; Giaimo 2002)8. 
Yet the majority of research tends to concentrate on the performance of health systems per se,
8 Countries compared in similar in-depth tri-country comparative studies include France, Switzerland 
and Sweden (Immergut 1992), Finland, Sweden and the UK (Saltman and von Otter 1992), the UK, 
the US and Germany (Moran 1999; Giaimo 2002), and the UK, the US and Canada (Tuohy 1999).
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or tries to explain the differences in the reform paths influenced by historical events and the 
subsequent health politics deriving from funding methods. In such studies, as federal/unitary 
states or presidential/parliamentary regimes with funding schemes (social insurance, 
tax-based and private insurance) were included in the case study and compared, the study 
can only produce findings on the general trend. For instance, federal states have more veto 
points in their political system which could conceal reforms, or a government with a social 
insurance system encounters more difficulties in containing health costs. In contrast, this 
research targets only unitary and parliamentary regimes with the specific aim of probing into 
the ‘responsiveness’ of central government to different types of pressure in health 
policy-making. As federal states vary from country to country, central government in unitary 
states can vary widely in the instruments used to control local actors or government agencies. 
Naturally, unitary states are not free from possible tensions between the different levels of 
government. The three parliamentary regimes in this thesis also share a common feature, 
although there is a difference in the compositions and power relationships between the upper 
and lower houses. Weak bicameralism exists in the UK, whereas strong bicameralism is 
found in Japan9 and unicameralism is practised in Sweden (Longley and Olson 1991; 
Tsebelis and Money 1997). Despite this distinction, the executive-legislative relationships in 
all three countries should be clearly demarcated from those in France, Finland and the US 
where there are directly-elected presidents. Electoral dynamics in presidential systems make 
a great difference in health politics, as concerns about health among the general public are 
often picked up by presidential candidates as well as political parties10. A focus on the three
9 The House of Councillors in Japan has rarely demonstrated its power to stop legislation until 
recently (e.g. the postal privatisation bill was blocked, which led to the dissolution of the House of 
Representatives, and a snap election in 2005). Yet, in most cases, it functions in a similar fashion to 
the British equivalent, the House of Lords. If the two houses disagree on matters of budgets, treaties, 
or designation of the prime minister, the House o f Representatives can insist on its decision. In all 
other decisions, the House of Representatives can override a vote in the House of Councillors only by 
a two-thirds majority of members present.
10 For example, in the presidential election in France in 2007, candidates from the two major parties 
raised the hospital issues in their manifestos (e.g. “The Presidential Pact” (Le Pacte Presidentiel) for
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parliamentary regimes can help elaborate on the point of electoral pressure on governing and 
opposition parties as a source of government responsiveness.
More importantly, the three countries all enjoy universal health coverage, unlike the US. The 
principle of universal coverage provides a strong platform on which debates in the public 
domain (i.e. in the printed media) can be translated into a policy choice by government. On 
these grounds, a strong commitment by central government is equally called for in the three 
countries, above and beyond institutional variations. The study method of using four cases 
for the three countries therefore is chosen to compare across countries as well as examine if 
similar problem constellations (i.e the same pressure level) provoke similarly high or low 
responsiveness from central government.
Certainly, differences should not be overlooked between the three countries in the way 
health systems are organised. The methods for financing health care (the tax-based system in 
England and Sweden, but social insurance schemes in Japan) and the provision types 
(centrally/publicly-run in England, locally/publicly-run in Sweden, and the predominantly 
private system in Japan) play an important role in shaping the institutional capacities and 
vulnerabilities of central government. These different roles of similar, polity type 
(unitary/parliamentary regimes) governments in health service provision yield strong 
comparability. In contrast to a large-N study, this method may lack generalisability. 
However, this helps towards a detailed analysis of variations in institutional arrangements 
that can affect the ‘responsiveness’ of central government, which has not been closely 
examined in political science literature.
Segolene Royal o f the Socialist Party (PS), and “Propositions” by Nikolas Sarkozy o f the Union for a 
Popular Movement (UMP).)
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2.2. Four problem constellations with brief summary of each case
In order to analyse and compare the responsiveness of central governments in three countries, 
four problem constellations were selected as ‘cases’. The definition of a case in this thesis is 
broader than that of Eckstein, who noted that “a ‘case’ can be defined technically as a 
phenomenon for which we report and interpret only a single measure on any pertinent 
variable” (Eckstein 1975: p.94). As Flyvbjerg argues, “ ‘generalizability’ of case studies can 
be increased by strategic selection of critical cases” (Flyvbjerg 2001: p.77)11. He defines 
critical cases as those that “achieve information which permits logical deductions of the 
type” (Flyvbjerg 2001: p.79). The four cases were selected from each country around the 
same period (1990-2006) to showcase four types of pressure on political and medical 
institutions. Although the three countries did not opt for exactly identical policy programmes 
or undergo the same incidents, each episode represents one of the four problem 
constellations with the greatest coverage in the national printed media. Therefore, even 
though the scope of generalizability might be restricted, the combination of selecting critical 
cases from each country and controlling the variables of political institutions enables a robust 
comparison across the three countries in this complex policy domain. By systemically 
drawing up the predictions and observing the outcomes of each episode, the impact of 
institutional variations in political and health systems on the responsiveness of central 
government will be tested. In the process of these tests, the causal mechanism of different 
‘responses’ will be explained, using the possible three perspectives: (1) electoral competition 
between political parties channels the pressure into central government (Perspective 1), (2) 
expert-oriented central government proactively sets the agenda and carries it out irrespective 
of criticism among the general public (Perspective 2), or (3) the degree of public criticism 
directed at central government in the media instigates responses from central government 
(Perspective 3).
11 “Crucial cases” is the term used in King, Keohane and Verba (1994: p. 209).
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The table below shows the issue that each case represents and the policy choices government 
can opt for. Subsequently, the three hypotheses will be applied to each case.
Policy issue Potential policy provisions Pressure
Market <- -> Government Medical/
Political
dimension
Government
role
(general)
None- leave to 
market
Limited
regulation of 
private provision
Mix of regulation 
of market and 
public provision
G’vt as 
health care 
provider
Hospital
reorganisation
12
(Chapter 4)
Leave to 
market/ 
individual 
hospitals
Leave decisions 
to local 
councils/local 
providers
Mix of g ’vt 
decision and 
local health 
providers
G’vt in 
charge as the 
main
stakeholder
Low/Low
Service
delivery
(Chapter 5)
Private
marketplace -  
insurance and 
private 
provision
Mixed
marketplace -  
private and 
publicly- 
subsidised 
providers
Managed 
competition -  
mix of public 
entities and 
private provision
Public
provision
Low/High
Performance
evaluation/
accreditation
(Chapter 6)
Leave to 
market/ranking 
(reputation)
Mixed system of 
private
evaluation and
government
scheme
Arms’ length 
body evaluates 
performance
G’vt
assesses
performance
High/Low
Malpractice
management
(Chapter 7)
Leave to 
individual 
hospitals and 
courts
Leave to medical 
association’s 
regulatory body
Set up a 
public/third-party 
body
G’vt
committee 
inquires and 
judges
High/High
Table 3: Potential policy provisions for government in the hospital sector
(Sources: (May 2005) p. 134. Adapted to each case study by the author.)
12 In England, the word ‘reconfiguration’ is often used, which signifies shutting down hospitals, 
cutting services or merging local health units. In Japan, the words ‘togo (merger)/saihen 
(restructuring)’ are often used, while in Sweden, ‘sammanslagning (merger)/omstrukturering 
(restructuring)’ did not appear in national newspapers as often, since each decision is a matter for the 
local county council.
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Case A: low/low pressure type (Chapter 4)
Problem constellation: local hospital reorganisation and protest votes
Local health service delivery is constantly under review and discussion, as medical 
technologies, demography and economic situations incessantly change. Thus, reorganisation 
of a local hospital is necessary, but generally elicits a negative response from local residents, 
as it often signals a reduction in bed numbers. It may stir a local protest campaign, although 
the impact of such an action is normally restricted to a rather fixed local sphere. Nonetheless, 
if local people were successfully mobilised for election, locally or nationally, such a local 
political campaign could influence the decision of national government. As institutionalists 
suggest, unpopular welfare retrenchment is a difficult task for any government (Pierson 
2000b). That being the case, government normally opts for an incremental change, targeting 
one hospital after another, instead of a radical overhaul of the system. Moreover, government 
attempts to introduce such plans as innovation, not simple cutbacks, claiming that 
reorganisation of local hospital services only brings benefits, both in terms of economic and 
public health gains for the local population (Raftery and Harris 2005; Farrington-Douglas 
and Brooks 2007). Nevertheless, from a patient’s point of view, any local service 
reorganisation poses the risk of lost access and convenience, and generates a sense of 
unfairness in terms of equity in a universal national service. The difference is whether local 
people can mobilise themselves against such proposals from government or its relevant 
bodies.
Pressure: political dimension (electoral institution)
Negative feedback via the ballot box has the potential to undermine the existing policy 
programme, sometimes therefore prompting government to propose concessions or reverse 
the original plan. As the main pressure is exerted through a local campaign and the
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subsequent electoral battles, this case examines how (local) pressure on the political 
dimension would cause national government to respond. One assumption is that when a 
constituency seat is at stake, the competitive political party system swiftly brings pressure to 
bear at governing party (or party bloc) level, prompting a change in government policy. 
Hence, the competing hypotheses are Perspective 1 and Perspective 3.
Competing perspectives: Election-conscious or public-spirited government?
According to these two perspectives of responsive government, one could predict that 
government responds either to voters - (Perspective 1) as the governing party (or parties) 
readjusts its position and strategies to avoid further damage while fending off pressure from 
opposition parties, - or to public criticism regardless of structured party competition 
(Perspective 3). This is a test of whether local voices are effective in the influence they have 
on government responsiveness to the public through party competition or other recourses.
Timescale: period of electoral campaigns surrounding local hospital issues
Each episode starts at the point where the local campaign was launched and ends with the 
recent electoral campaign, if the issue is still contested at those elections or the same people 
(local or national politicians) are involved. In the Japanese case, the campaign was at the end 
of the 1980s, slightly early for this study, and also a one-off incident of re-election for the 
city council. For the other two countries, the political parties survived and continued to 
contest seats at various levels of government. The cut-off point, for England and Sweden, 
therefore, is 2006.
Case B: low/high pressure type (Chapter 5)
Problem constellation: infusion of market mechanisms into public hospitals
Public hospitals were known as unfriendly towards patients, inefficient and deficit-ridden. 
Inducing market competition and creating a level field for health providers in the public,
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private and independent sectors became a government flagship policy in a number of 
advanced industrial economies. Alongside this development, an attempt was made to change 
the role of government from direct service provider to regulator via corporatisation of public 
hospitals. Given the scale of the challenge to the traditional values of public ownership in 
health and the implications of the change, this policy can be considered to be “systemic 
retrenchment”, rather than “programmatic retrenchment” (e.g. Case A). Systemic 
retrenchment is a type of reform that “trigger(s) particular causal chains that facilitate 
program cutbacks later in a sequence” (Pierson 2003: p. 188). Government therefore 
normally takes a cautious approach. Nonetheless, the government’s ability to push through 
its agenda is contingent on the formal political institutional setups. Thus, if there are no 
major ‘veto players’ (Tsebelis 2002) or if it is a case of ‘majoritarian democracies’ (Lijphart 
1999), government can push its own idea through.
Pressure: political dimension (executive legislature)
The benefits of de-bureaucratisation are often emphasised in order to dispel public anxiety 
about the roll-back of government. The frequently used justification is that improvements in 
the productivity and service quality of public hospitals can be made by more autonomy for 
clinicians and mangers. Although this type of argument is often welcomed by the medical 
professions, the shift from direct service provision is seen as a retreat by government in 
particular from the left, i.e. away from the role of defenders of the welfare state. In a 
universal health care state, any threats to equal access to services and solidarity cause 
political debates and division between government and the opposition. As the main tensions 
arise between the executive proposing the more enterprise-style hospital and the legislature 
in an attempt to safeguard the rights of the general public, this case examines how each 
legislature would cope with the pressure and could commit national government to 
responding to various voices.
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Competing perspectives: Election-conscious, expert-driven or public-spirited
government?
With the expected high saliency of the issue, macropolitics, rather than subsystem politics, is 
likely to be observed. Therefore, perspectives should not only be focused on the formal 
political institutions, but also on the timing of elections and arguments in the media. Hence 
the most likely competing hypotheses are Perspective 1 and Perspective 3. However, 
Perspective 2 (elite-driven government) may still be applicable to Japan, due to the lack of 
party politics and the weak opposition in the policy domain. In the other two countries, 
government (i.e. the governing party) may be responsive either to the electorate (Perspective
1), if the issue is expected to be at stake for the coming election, or to public criticism 
(Perspective 3), depending on how the political climate evolved as the issue was presented to 
and debated in the relevant legislature.
Timescale: from embryonic stage to central government’s decision/reaction
Each episode starts with the background to the formation of the ideas, as they vary from 
country to country (e.g. free-standing foundation hospital in England, privatisation of a local 
acute hospital in Sweden, and agencification of the national hospital in Japan). It ends with 
the time when the ideas were passed and became laws, with the exception of Sweden. Only 
in the Swedish case, where the decision for privatisation was made at county council level, 
was there a time lag until central government came back with its response. And yet, in the 
two other countries, the issues continued to be highlighted in the printed media and provoke 
public criticism. Therefore, for England and Japan, the cut-off point is also 2006.
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Case C: high-low pressure type (Chapter 6)
Problem constellation: performance evaluation or accreditation of hospitals
The issue of quality assurance concerns the medical professions greatly, whereas the general 
public and the political class tend to regard the matter as technical, relying on the experts (i.e. 
the medical professions). A peer review style is normally adopted as a format favoured by 
medical professions. Professional autonomy would be protected while their interest in 
clinical innovation would also be enhanced by cross-referencing the performance of 
individual doctors with the clinical results of their patients. In some countries, such a scheme 
was successfully built up, and evolved into accreditation of hospitals, but such was not the 
case in all three.
A need for a nationwide quality assurance system was already recognised by government 
and medical professions in the 1980s, primarily due to government sensitivity to economic 
austerity (Pollitt 1985). A variety of schemes had been developed in the three countries. In 
recent years, clearer goals and targets have been set for hospitals. Differences may exist, but 
the common feature is that government seeks to seize the opportunities to develop or sharpen 
its monitoring tool to control the medical professions or hospital managers through clearer 
goals and targets and benchmarking exercises.
In building up a quality assurance system or target-setting for hospitals, a clash of interests 
emerges between patients and medical professions. While patients demand shorter waiting 
times, better quality care and readable league tables about doctors’ skills and reputations, 
doctors may defy the trend, claiming that medical services are, unlike soap and cars, 
immeasurable, especially by the layperson outside the field. Government had to strike the 
balance between these opposing demands.
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Pressure: medical dimension (professional autonomy)
Compared to the previous two cases, elected officials share little burden for building up such 
a quality assurance scheme where the saliency of the issue is low. On the other hand, the 
medical professions can be faced with pressure. This is typical subsystem policy-making, 
where expertise is necessary and decisions could therefore be delegated to a closed circle of 
experts.
However, building up an external (third-party) review system may require a stronger 
political will. Unlike peer-review type monitoring, the effort to set up such a third-party 
review system may be resisted, and might depend on central policymakers’ motives for 
reform and support from the general public. In other words, external pressure is crucial in 
causing ‘serial shift’ (Jones 1994) in the policy arena. Once performance indicators begin to 
be widely publicised, public awareness may be enhanced, which would possibly lead to the 
establishment of clearer standards or even the ranking of hospitals. Although issue saliency 
is expected to remain low due to the technicality involved, media coverage surrounding the 
issue may attract public attention, potentially transferring the polity programme to a more 
controversial and politicised arena. The responsiveness of central government may rise 
accordingly.
Competing perspectives: Expert-driven or public-spirited government?
Thus this technical matter could be controversial in the public domain, instigating responses 
from central government. Under the high/low logics where professional knowledge is 
heavily counted on, to what extent can the “epistemic community” (Haas 1992) be disturbed 
and central government respond to public criticism? The competing hypotheses are therefore 
Perspectives 2 and 3. Does a conventional policy-making style, closed to the general public, 
determine the government’s policy choice, or does government respond to opinions 
expressed in the printed media?
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Timescale: from the Initial stage of constructing a performance evaluation scheme to 
the latest government interventions up to 2006
Each episode starts with the origins of each performance evaluation system, as they vary 
from country to country (e.g. league tables in England, a purely clinical benchmarking 
system in Sweden and a third-party inspection and accreditation system in Japan). Different 
phases describe the different trajectories of each evaluation scheme. Each episode ends with 
the point at which the most recent government interventions occurred in response to public 
criticism, with the exception of Japan. Only in the Japanese case was a completely private 
scheme of ranking hospitals launched by several publishing and media companies. As the 
impact of such publications was not negligible, they are included as a parallel development 
outside the government scheme. The cut-off point for all three countries is therefore 2006.
Case D: high-high pressure type (Chapter 7)
Problem constellation: malpractice incidents and media frenzies
This case is primarily concerned with the issue of a risk management system among health 
professionals, based on collegiality. Under a climate of media frenzies featuring malpractice 
incidents at hospitals, strong pressure will be placed upon the professions to review risk 
management. In some cases, it is not solely the credibility of the medical professions but also 
the competence of government, as a guarantor of public services, that could be undermined. 
The impact of the events is expected to be extensive in both the political and medical arenas. 
Under such highly-charged circumstances, the shift from subsystem politics to macropolitics 
is inevitable, raising public concerns and causing social unrest, with central policymakers 
forced to respond. The question here is: do government strategies vary depending the on 
institutional designs of each health system, or do they take a similar shape? Eventually, the 
government’s responsiveness to public safety will be tested, as will the robustness of the 
control system by mutuality of professional body.
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Pressure: political and medical dimensions
Given the nature of the issue (patient safety at risk), it is highly likely that central 
government reacts and attempts to intervene or, under heightened public saliency, even 
redesign the risk management system. Nonetheless, the choice of actions remains unclear. 
Under the high-high type of pressure, the effectiveness of political institutions in controlling 
the course of policy development is questionable. In addition, the responsiveness of central 
government may be affected by the working relationship between the medical professions 
and government as well as by eroded public trust in both actors in the health sector.
Competing perspectives: election-conscious, expert-driven or public-spirited
government?
Given the above, all three hypotheses need to be investigated. In other words, the impact on 
policy choice by party competition (Perspective 1), the supremacy of expert opinions 
(Perspective 2) and criticism from the general public (Perspective 3) will be comparatively 
examined. Was policy choice altered by pressure deriving from party-political competition 
or settled by proposals from the experts in the field? Or if not, did government respond to 
public criticism, disregarding its institutional arrangements to a greater or lesser extent? 
Media attention will be probed more closely than the other three cases here. The number of 
articles per day, rather than year, was counted, up to the highest point of saliency.
Timescale: from the outbreak of each Incident to the last year when public criticism of 
central government was recorded
Each episode starts with the outbreak of the corresponding incident. Given the central 
importance of media frenzies, each episode follows the event up to the disappearance of 
public criticism of central government over the issues involved. This means that for the 
English case, the cut-off point was 2005, for Sweden, it was 2002, and for Japan, 2004.
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From case A to case D, all the related articles from the selected printed media were classified 
into four categories (positive/neutral/negative to government and non-government). In 
particular, the proportion of articles carrying comments critical of central government and its 
policy was counted against the other three categories and contrasted between the three 
countries. In this way, the level of pressure exerted upon government, through comments 
from the public, was compared and the responsiveness of each government was measured 
against the other two.
2.3. Main sources and semi-structured interviews
As previously noted, the primary data used are articles in the printed media. The main 
sources were searched mainly via internet services (Lexis-Nexis, Nikkei Telecom21, 
Mediaarkivet and PressText for England, Japan and Sweden respectively), although some of 
the articles (e.g. in regional newspapers) with difficult access were gathered from the 
libraries (British Library, Health Services Management Centre (HSMC) Library at the 
University of Birmingham, Diet Library in Tokyo and the University of Stockholm Library) 
or in the towns studied in each country (i.e. Lulea, Kagoshima and Kidderminster).
England Japan Sweden Total
Academics 5 4 4 13
Civil servants 2 7 3 12
Elected officials 2 2 9 13
(Former ministers of Health) (1) (-) (3) (4)
Hospital managers 5 5 2 12
Doctors 4 4 2 10
Media/PR 0 1 1 2
Total number of interviews 
(total number of persons)*
18(15) 23 (21) 21 (20) 62 (56)
Table 4: Interviewees by type of profession
*Some interviewees hold multiple posts as civil servants and medical practitioners, or surgeons and 
managers. In Japan in particular, a hospital director must be a qualified doctor. The total number of 
interviewees is therefore the figure in brackets.
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In some cases, however, the printed media was not sufficient for linking the level of public 
criticism (expressed in the printed media) to government decisions. In order to complement 
this information, semi-structured interviews were undertaken in all three countries. The 
interviews were conducted over a three-year period, from June 2004 to July 2007.
In the first round of interviews, conducted in England, the main interviewees were academics, 
chief executives of hospitals or primary care trusts and politicians, who provided a great deal 
of information about both reconfigurations of health service provision and the consultation 
process of applying for foundation hospital status (Chapter 5), as well as the post-electoral 
effects of the Wyre Forest/Kidderminster case (Chapter 4).
From July 2004 onwards, a second round of interviews was undertaken in Japan, first with 
doctors in the area where hospital reconfigurations caused some controversy, and then with 
academics and civil servants. In March/April 2005, several interviews were carried out in 
Lulea, Norrbotten in Sweden in order to find out more about the emergence of a new 
political party pitted against hospital reconfiguration in the area, and their impact on the 
policy. From May until October 2005, given considerable variations in the predominant 
provision types across Japan, more detailed interviews were conducted in provincial areas of 
Japan. The prefecture of Kochi has a disproportionately large number of private beds, which 
led to a controversial decision to merge two public hospitals, each operated at different levels 
of government (prefectural and municipal), whereas Iwate relies heavily on public 
(prefectural) hospitals, which generated pressure on the prefecture. The interviews confirmed 
that politicians at national level (both Houses in the Diet) had virtually no influence on such 
service provision issues. However, this does not mean that central government was absent 
from the policy process. The decision relating to the use of PFI (Private Finance Initiative) in 
the new hospital in Kochi was taken in conjunction with central government’s Regulatory 
Reform Committee. This proved the claim that rural areas depend on central government’s 
support, legitimation for the project and intervention.
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In order to highlight the lack of political accountability in the Japanese health system, 
internet-based and paper-based surveys were conducted in all 47 Japanese prefectures, 
enquiring about governors’ (and other main stakeholders’) perceptions of the Japanese health 
system. This survey was conducted from October 2005 to March 2006, with research funds 
obtained from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) 
of Japan. There were two reasons for conducting this online survey. Firstly, no precedent 
work examined whether political accountability played any role in health delivery policy in 
Japan, while most literature has repeatedly emphasised the dominance of the closed 
policy-making style of the governing LDP, the JMA and the MHW. As a result, ministers 
were accountable to the interest groups, rather than for the working of the national health 
system. Secondly, in spite of the statute, it was questionable as to how much discretion and 
responsibility governors in each prefecture had in reality over decisions on health provision. 
Although the total number of respondents was not high, the perceptions of elected officials at 
prefecture-level (i.e. Governors) were revealed through the survey, which ascertained certain 
aspects of institutional arrangements in the Japanese health system. The significant finding 
was that the health delivery system in Japan is only very loosely associated with elected 
officials, political parties and ministers, and there is no political accountability within the 
system. The survey results are located in the appendix.
From April to August 2006, interviews were conducted in Sweden, while in the capacity of a 
visiting research student at SCORE (Stockholm Centre for Organizational Research). In 
addition to further interviews in Norrbotten (Chapter 4), both national and local politicians 
and civil servants were interviewed concerning the privatisation of one prominent acute 
hospital in Stockholm, performance evaluations of the health system and malpractice 
reporting systems (Chapters 5, 6, 7). In addition, there were discussions about the possible 
abolition of the county council model and the restructuring of health regions at the 
government committee. In the summer of 2006, additional interviews were undertaken in 
England, with a clear focus on foundation hospitals, performance system-building and
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malpractice (Chapters 5, 6, 7). Furthermore, in order to fill in some gaps in the information, 
data mining was also carried out in Kagoshima prefecture for Chapter 4 as well as several 
further interviews in the Tokyo/Yokohama area for Chapters 6 and 7.
Twelve cases (four sets of problem constellations in three countries) used here are all 
individually designed to examine the ‘responsiveness’ of central government to various types 
of pressure and public criticism. As each case is selected with this specific purpose in mind, 
this thesis as a whole seeks to analyse the changes in the role of government in health 
provision in the three unitary/parliamentary states, all with universal coverage. Therefore, it 
is very important to note that “cases” are defined as policy issues relating to health provision. 
As previously mentioned, although “cases” were selected based on the four distinct problem 
constellations (hospital closure, introduction of a market mechanism into public provision, 
performance system-building and malpractice incidents leading to a risk management 
system), an individual case is contextualised in each country. It is possible that some policy 
issues are very closely interrelated or even overlap (e.g. performance indicators may 
encompass safety in hospitals), depending on the health systems and perceptions of policy 
makers. For instance, hospital accreditation in one system can be closely linked to the 
increase of malpractice incidents, whereas the same accreditation issue in another system 
may have sprung out of discussions on the regulation of providers. As Baumgartner and 
Jones argue, serial shifts may occur and result in radical policy changes, in this thesis, in the 
degree of government involvement in the health provision. Thus, although ‘responsiveness’ 
will be measured in this thesis by the subsequent decisions taken by government in reaction 
to certain events or criticism, policy issues in the four cases can influence one another, and 
there are cases where each should not be examined separately. The main purpose of the 
interviews was to complement possible schisms or overlaps between individual cases.
Using materials from the printed media and semi-structured interviews, the analysis of a 
medium number of cases reveals the patterns of how and why central government in the
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three countries responded to pressure to solve different sets of problems in the hospital sector. 
Consequently, the results as a whole address the main question: ‘to what extent do political 
institutions matter in welfare state reforms’, by illuminating the conditions where the 
vulnerabilities of central government are exposed and therefore institutional constraints had 
to be overcome by governments’ own initiatives or interventions.
The next chapter looks at institutional arrangements in the three health systems, in order to 
sieve out capabilities and vulnerabilities of central government vis-a-vis various kinds of 
external pressure.
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Chapter Three Institutional designs of the three health systems, 
and vulnerability of central government to external 
pressure
This chapter outlines institutional features of health systems in the three countries in order to 
predict the policy responsiveness of government in the face of different pressure types. The 
key mechanisms for activating a response from central government will be mapped out with 
a particular focus on vulnerabilities and capacities, which are embedded in each institutional 
arrangement. For the thesis, the three perspectives need to be operationalised in relation to 
these institutional characteristics.
The first section looks at the basic financial structure of each health system so as to underline 
various arrangements and demonstrate whether or not central government has direct control 
over the finance. Financial resources or the lack thereof in a health care system is of primary 
concern for central government, and therefore it is the major internal source of pressure for 
reform. The extent to which financial resources are at the disposal of central government 
therefore matters considerably. Although this thesis maintains that the financing method is 
not the only element that decides the response of central government, the capacity of central 
government depends on the way that the financing method is controlled and should not be 
overlooked.
The second part will examine the institutional designs on two dimensions: 
politico-administrative and medical-collegial (hereafter referred to simply as the political and 
medical dimensions respectively). On the political dimension, questions have to be answered, 
namely: why do political parties in one country exert pressure on central government through 
electoral competition, while in other countries they do not? (Perspective 1). Party 
competition over health issues is classified as prominent or feeble. On the medical dimension, 
different types of professional autonomy of the medical professions will be featured. This 
chapter describes the relationship between government and the medical professions, with a
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particular focus on how much is delegated from central government to the professions, 
agencies, committees and private actors (Perspective 2). This also sheds light on why 
ministers in one country are held accountable, but not in others. The level of delegation in 
the decision-making process is classified as high or low. These above-mentioned questions 
have to be viewed in light of vulnerabilities to external pressure, including public criticism 
(Perspective 3).
These elements enable or force government to respond to pressure, which derives from 
within the formal decision-making (i.e. subsystem) arena and/or outside it (i.e. in the 
macropolitical domain). Lastly, given such characteristics, the chapter sums up the 
vulnerabilities of central government to party-political pressure (perspective 1) and public 
criticism (perspective 3), and the rigidity of formalised policy-making in central government 
and by experts (perspective 2).
3.1. Financing methods of the three health care systems and the power of central 
government
This section sketches out the basic financial arrangements for the three countries, with a 
particular emphasis on the degree to which central government can utilise this instrument 
which is at its disposal.
3.1.1. Variations in financing methods
Health spending in the United Kingdom constituted 7.5 per cent of GDP (OECD 2004).
Some 85.9 per cent of funding for the NHS came from general taxation, 12.1 per cent from
National Insurance contributions and 2.0 per cent from patient copayments (Office of Health
Economics 2004). In Sweden, total spending on health amounts to 8.8 per cent of GDP in
2004, of which roughly 84 per cent was derived from public sources. Seventy-four per cent
of public health care costs were met by county council tax finance, 15 per cent from central
government grants, 10 per cent from other sources and 4 per cent from patient charges, with
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the remainder coming from mixed sources. Health expenditure in Japan accounts for 7.8 per 
cent of GDP (OECD 2004), which is not very different from the other two countries. 
However, the financing source for medical care takes three different forms: taxes (income, 
corporate and consumption taxes, general revenues of government), health insurance 
premiums, and co-payments (see the Appendix for more details). Despite this hybrid use of 
“single-payer” and “all-payers” elements, it is strongly geared towards the former as the 
national government itself is by far the largest single insurer. Government-Managed Health 
Insurance (GMHI) is designed for the small-business sector, and given more attention than 
Society-Managed Health Insurance (SMHI) for large firms or Citizens’ Health Insurance 
(CHI) for the non-employed. On the payment side, outpatient care is covered by a 
fee-for-service, whereas inpatient care is paid by patients through a mixture of per diem and 
fee-for-service. As a result, 20-30 per cent of the total fee is paid by patients as co-payments.
The three health systems are therefore financed through central taxation (England), local 
taxation (Sweden) and predominantly social insurance contributions (Japan) respectively. 
Central government in Britain has direct control over finance, while in the other two 
countries it is constrained by decisions of local government (Sweden) or private actors 
(Japan). Yet these characterisations need further examination, as the politics of the hospital is 
not solely determined by how it is financed.
3.1.2. Finance as a tool of government
The National Health Service in England, as the term reveals, is a national service for which 
the Secretary of State for Health is accountable to parliament. It is based on the principle of 
providing universal health services to all in need (Webster 1996). The English system 
therefore demonstrates a number of characteristics that can be described as hierarchical with 
strong political instruments concentrated at the centre (Hollingsworth and Hanneman 1984). 
This is reflected in the financing system. As shown above, funds for the NHS are determined
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by voting in Parliament, and it is the statutory responsibility of the Secretary of State for how 
those funds are expended. Fixing a global budget for health services as well as resource 
allocation of health budgets to regions is managed by the Department of Health. Accordingly, 
Members of Parliament (MPs), as representatives of their constituencies, can raise questions 
in parliamentary debates with regard to the operation of the NHS organisations, and the 
Secretary of State must answer those questions. There are also investigatory bodies called 
the Public Accounts Committee and the Health Committee, which can demand facts and 
figures from the Department and the relevant NHS bodies. NHS bodies are the Secretary of 
State’s agents, as they have barely independent sources of revenue, but a statutory duty to 
balance their budgets (Ham 2004 p. 170). For the strong financial control at the centre, it can 
be said that the ultimate power still rests with central government (E-12). This was clearly 
exhibited in the instance where the Prime Minister pledged to increase the budget for health 
up to the level of that in neighbouring countries within five years, in order to fend off 
pressure exerted by the media (BBC News 2000).
Swedish health care is also primarily financed through taxes, but collected locally rather than 
nationally. County councils13 have the right to levy proportional income taxes on their 
populations to finance these services. Accordingly, political responsibility rests with the 
county council, not the Riksdag. In 2003, the total cost for the county councils was SEK 149 
billion, of which approximately 92% was directly connected with health and dental care 
(Landstingsforbundet 2004b).
In such a decentralised system, the power reserved for central government is limited to 
setting overall goals and policies by legislation. However, there is some scope for central 
government to ‘navigate’ county councils (S-4). During the 1990s, the government limited
13 There are eighteen county councils, two regions (Vastra Gotaland and Skane, created in 1999) and 
one special municipality (Stockholm).
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the level of income taxes levied by the local authorities twice, first during the period 
1990-1994 by banning municipalities from increasing taxation, and again in 1997-2000 
through sanctions on those municipalities or county councils that imposed increased taxation 
(Socialstyrelsen 2002). As the Health Act stipulates that the government has the right to 
secure equal health care service for the entire country, it has every right to put ceilings in 
place, for example on the maximum annual out-of-pocket payment of patients (S-4). 
Additionally, government can give incentives for county councils or municipalities to work 
on some policy agendas by subsidies and state grants, which are financed through national 
income taxes and indirect taxes. One recent example is the national project to reduce waiting 
time (Landstingsforbundet 2004a; S-5). As one senior official put it, because of a strongly 
established local autonomy, ‘central government cannot tell county councils what to do, but 
there are ways around it’ (S-4).
In Japan, government uses monies to incentivise all types of providers through centrally 
controlled fee-schedule setting. It has been rather successful in the process of achieving a 
universal health service across the country and containing the overall spending level 
(Campbell and Ikegami 1998). It is on this stage that the power of the JMA has been exerted 
over many years. In the negotiation process of the fee schedule setting, the JMA nominates 
all eight members directly or indirectly for the Central Social Insurance Medical Care 
Council14. Behind this main arena however, final-stage bilateral negotiations normally take 
place between one official from the MHW (merged with the Ministry of Labour in 2001) and 
one JMA representative. Therefore, the ministry can take charge of the situation.
14 Of which five are doctors (including one representing hospitals), two dentists and one chemist, 
named by their respective associations. The right to appoint the hospital representative used to lie with 
the Japan Hospital Association, but passed to the JMA in 1963. Dentists and pharmacists have their 
own associations, although they all coalesce with the JMA, for the sake of unity and to gain leverage 
against the government. The Central Council consists o f twenty members altogether, eight from 
among providers, eight from the payers’ side (four insurers, plus two from the Union federations, and 
two from Nikkeiren), and four members representing the public interest (academics or journalists).
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As a health system based on a social insurance system, the payer also has a role to play, 
albeit rather limited, unlike the Continental European countries which have similar funding 
methods to Japan. Large firms are united under the national employers’ association 
(Nikkeiren) on the one hand, and the labour peak organizations (Rengd) on the other. The 
Federation of Health Insurance Societies (Kenporen) under Nikkeiren is charged with 
promoting their interests (e.g. to limit the amount of cross-subsidisation of old-age health 
care). Local government associations are responsible for the Citizens’ Health Insurance 
scheme, while small business representatives are keen to defend its stakes, opposing hikes in 
the contribution rate in Government-Managed Health Insurance (Campbell and Ikegami 
1998 pp.33-34). Nevertheless, the social insurance organisations, compared to the medical 
association, had a weaker voice vis-a-vis government, and have been in a relatively 
unremarkable position in the health policy-making arena. Therefore, despite the plethora of 
health provider types and the strong political clout of the JMA, the centralised funding 
system of the Japanese health care service has been one remarkable feature, demonstrating 
that central government has effective means for controlling private practitioners. 
Nevertheless, this is not directly applicable to managing the reform process, even among 
public hospitals. Non-national public hospitals are under different jurisdictions: hospitals at 
prefectural and municipality level under the Ministry of International Affairs and 
Communications (MIC), and teaching hospitals under the Ministry of Education (MEXT), 
not under the MHLW. Yet central government always detects pressure on its resources. 
Even though local public hospitals are run by local taxes and subsidy, they are normally 
heavily dependent on ‘tax grants’ (Chihokofuzei)15, which are transferred from central 
government. Different rules are applied to teaching hospitals, but it can be safely argued that
15 This system has been adopted since 1954, and from the fiscal year of 2000, its composition is as 
follows: 32% o f the total income tax, 32% of the liquor tax, 35.8% of the corporation tax, 29.5% of 
the VAT and 25% of the cigarette tax. This is a block grant, so each local government (both 
prefectures and municipalities) can decide how to spend it.
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central government, if divided between jurisdictions, has always retained the financial 
means to influence the shakeup of service delivery.
Therefore, in every country, although there is a room for political interventions by financial 
control, it is not the only mechanism that central government can employ. Moreover, the risk 
of central government receiving blame and pressure for interventions varies considerably, 
depending on institutional designs and the resulting vulnerabilities. This is why political and 
medical institutions are highly important in determining the responsiveness of central 
government.
3.2. Political dimension
3.2.1. Party competition over health issues
In England, the NHS has provided a very important electoral battleground on a national level. 
Health always ranks high in the list of voters’ concerns. The Conservative and Labour parties 
both presented major proposals in their manifestos as to how to reform the NHS. Although 
Labour is the founding father of the NHS, the Conservatives have never shown themselves to 
be openly hostile to the principle of the NHS, particularly with regard to it being a 
free-of-charge service at the point of use. Moreover, the Conservative Party has claimed 
several times that the NHS will be ‘safe in our hands’(Klein 1985), recently dropping their 
proposal of introducing a passport system which allows the holder to jump the queue (TG, 
October 4 2006). Despite fierce competition between the parties, the differences between the 
parties’ proposals have become increasingly trivial, as both attempt to reform and modernise 
public services, converging on more ‘freedom of choice’, greater ‘efficiency’ and more 
‘patients’ rights’. Differences are highlighted in issues such as the abolition of performance 
targets, or more power to matrons in MRS A control. The third party, the Liberal Democrats, 
pushes its agenda to decentralise the NHS and give more discretion to local councils, 
following the Swedish model. In summary, the two major parties have a rather solid
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consensus over the basic principle of the NHS (publicly-funded system, free at the point of 
use) rather than competing with each other, as electoral rules put pressure on and require 
them to capture the ‘middle ground’ of the electorate, as the Downsian model suggests 
(Downs 1957). Thus, electoral pressure is enormous, and the issue is very much prominent, 
seen as a ticket to become the governing party, although the ideas are not necessarily 
divisive (pro-market versus anti-market).
In Sweden, according to recent polls on elections, most voters claimed that hospitals, schools 
and elderly care are the most important policies, and more than 80% commented that the 
hospital issue matters greatly (Oscarsson 2002). Under the Swedish multiparty system, 
different ideas spring out of parties to underline their distinctiveness in the field. Most 
prominently, the Liberals have been proposing the family doctor system since the 1970s, and 
have held ministerial posts during the non-socialist government, although they did not gain 
votes for their policy initiatives. Other non-socialist parties agree with this platform, as they 
(Moderates, Centre, Christian Democrats and Liberals) normally form a ‘pact’ in the run-up 
to the elections. Hence there is still a strong tendency to divide the health issue clearly into 
left-bloc (anti-market agenda) and right-bloc (pro-market agenda). Since the mid-1970s, the 
possibility of a change of government has prompted parties to promote their distinctive 
policies. The four non-socialist parties are united on the more reforming side than the 
socialist bloc on the defensive side. After the county councils became responsible for 
delivery in 1982, local hospital duties were discharged from parliamentary parties. A county 
council is permitted to try out its different policies on the ground at its own discretion for 
varying taxes. Therefore, the health issue is a major and visible component in the electoral 
battlefield, although the health policy of a party is reserved for each branch in a county 
council. The same parties in different regions cannot agree on how to handle pragmatic 
issues such as mergers and privatisation in their own counties (S-6). It is a complicated 
matter as elections are held on the same day for all three tiers and a considerable amount of 
electoral pressure is exerted on national parties which are virtually not responsible for health
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policies. As a result, party policies across the three levels are made not only coherent, but 
also deliberately vague, except for flagship policies (family doctors).
In Japan, for a number of years, the JMA was indeed the single largest contributor to the 
LDP and its candidates. With its politically active wing, the Doctors’ League (Ishi Seiji 
Renmei), endorsed candidates and fielded former doctors especially for the House of 
Councillors. The LDP’s policy-making apparatus, the Policy Affairs Research Council 
(PARC), served as a glue, while the LDP prefectural leagues mediated local interests by 
formulating policies and lobbying (Nakano 1997). In health policy, the formalised and 
closed relationship fostered “welfare expert” politicians. Prior to the recent change in the 
electoral system in 1994, a medium-sized district system, known as both the 
multi-member-district (MMD) and the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) was used. Under 
this system, where they were highly likely to compete with each other inside the party, the 
LDP politicians had strong incentives to secure support from one of the powerful interest 
groups such as the JMA, while the JMA could in turn exert its influence over the candidate 
who returns to the Diet as the welfare expert politician. Welfare expert politicians were 
expected to take the ministerial portfolio and play the role of broker between the Ministry 
and the JMA, mainly on the issue of the fee schedule. As a ministerial post was awarded 
based on the number of reelections, “welfare expert” politicians, with strong and stable 
backing, had a higher chance of eventually taking the premiership16.
With only a few exceptions, national Diet politicians barely even spell out health policies at 
election times or in the press, let alone mention hospital issues. Health delivery policy has 
never been regarded as an electoral matter. In the absence of political accountability for 
health and public provision, LDP politicians often represent the interests of private 
practitioners, not publicly-run (national, regional or local) hospitals, for the aim of being
16 Ryutaro Hashimoto (Minister for Welfare, 1978-79; Prime Minister, 1996-98) and Jun-ichiro 
Koizumi (Minister for Welfare, 1988-89, 96-98; Prime Minister, 2001-06) are the examples.
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reelected. As a result, electoral institutions appear to be effectively disconnected from 
hospital issues. Yet after the new electoral rule (mixed system with plurality and 
proportional rule) was enacted from the 1996 election onwards, the ties between the JMA 
and the LDP have been increasingly diluted as the power of the LDP has waned and 
competition between the two largest parties (the LDP and the Democratic Party) has become 
more apparent (Nikkei 4 June 1999; 13 August 2003). Accordingly, under the Koizumi 
coalition government from 2001 to 2005, the issue of out-of-pocket payment became more 
openly discussed in the run-up to the elections for both the lower and upper houses, but has 
never decisively affected the results.
3.2.2. Political liability of health ministers
The English health system is still primarily based on “command-and-control” from the 
centre. Yet the creation of the NHS Management Executive in 1988 and relocation of the 
NHS Executive to Leeds in 1992 helped create an identity of chief executive separate from 
the DH (Greer 2004). This marked the watershed in the separation of the management 
function from the overall directing function, bringing about proposals outlined in the 
Griffiths Report of 1993. The input of the new professional body of mangers into the central 
policy-making community complicated the situation, but the division of labour between the 
Permanent Secretary and the Chief Executive of the NHS Executive was pinned down in a 
statement by the Banks Review commissioned by the DH. It maintained that the former 
advised ‘the Secretary of State on the discharge of all the duties of his or her office’ whilst 
the latter was ‘the Secretary of State’s principal policy adviser on all matters relating to the 
NHS’ (Department of Health 1997: paras 1.7 and 1.8). However, even after the managers 
became important players in the domain, the Secretary of State remains the person 
responsible for setting out overall policy goals. Ministerial accountability remains evident 
from both credit-claiming activities for particular policy achievements and efforts to avoid 
blame when problems occur (Ham 2004).
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In order to achieve effective implementation of national policies, a more directive approach 
was adopted by the Blair government through targets and performance evaluation (Barber 
2007 ; E-15). However, the responsibility for policy decisions rests with the ministers, as 
often revealed by their memoirs (Royal Institute of Public Administration 1980).
The decentralised Swedish health system does not put a strain on the national government 
directly or point fingers at them. Instead, decisions are made through informal meetings with 
the FCC (now SALAR) and the Swedish Medical Association (SMA) or through political 
party machines, in discussions with representatives of all three tiers of government (e.g. 
managing committee, Verkstallande utskott). Particularly when the Social Democratic Party 
is in office, policy formulation tends to be carried out through this form of coordination 
across different tiers, outside of formal cabinet meetings (S-15). Moreover, the Swedish 
agencies, such as the NBHW, are not answerable to the minister in charge alone, but directly 
responsible to the entire cabinet (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). Such pressure is not normally 
placed on relevant ministers at the centre, but shared with the chief executive of the agency 
and local councillors holding the portfolio in the committee. Larsson argues that ‘a minister 
is not responsible to a great extent when things go wrong in the bureaucracy. The 
directors-general are first in danger of losing their jobs. (...) In most cases the minister 
comes across as the person who tries to sort things out’ (Larsson 1994: p. 179). Pressure is 
therefore dispersed with a high level of delegation to agencies as well as local government, 
but not disjointed completely. Unlike the English case, the problem is not the extreme 
liabilities of elected officials at the centre or in parliament, but the risk of falling into a 
blame-shifting game which may hamper reform efforts.
In Japan, the degree of delegation is high, as central government has basically held onto a 
laissez-faire policy, allowing each prefecture (i.e. governors) to decide the level of provision 
(the number of hospital beds) and respecting the discretion of private practitioners or 
university professors over many practical decisions. Technical decisions are often delegated
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to experts in the councils, commissioned by the MHLW. With regard to ministerial 
responsibility, the Ministers of Health and Welfare take neither blame nor credit formally. 
Given the quick turnover of ministers17, policy formulation must rely heavily on civil 
servants in the relevant ministries. As a result, the influence of each minister over health 
policy has inevitably been limited, but blame has also been shifted easily to someone more in 
charge, particularly the medical professions or individual hospital managers (who are also 
doctors). This trend began to change after the end of LDP dominance in 1993. A 
drug-induced HIV case by contaminated needles18, of which over many years the MHW and 
some senior doctors had been aware but negligent, instigated a minister’s apology. In 1996, 
the then non-LDP Welfare Minister Naoto Kan officially apologised to the public, ‘creating’ 
the word ‘accountability’ in Japanese politics for the first time (Van Wolferen 2001). 
Whether or not the claim can be proved, that was at least one of the memorable incidents in 
which a change of parties in government created possibilities for opening up conventional 
subsystem politics.
3.3. Medical dimension
3.3.1. Historical developments in the government-doctor relationship
In Britain, the Royal College of Physicians of London was established as early as 1518. The 
authority of the College was limited with the formation of other bodies such as the Royal 
College of Surgeons and the Society of Apothecaries which broke away in the late 18th and 
early 19th century. However, the state did not interfere in these professional groups, trusting 
the discretion of each particular domain within the profession. The licensing system has been
17 In between 1970 to 2006, there have been 39 ministers, in contrast to 15 each for the UK and 
Sweden. The average of more than 1 minister per annum is noteworthy.
18 Through use of unheated blood products on haemophiliac patients, the HIV virus had been passed 
on for many years, while pharmaceutical companies and doctors were conscious o f the risk. Civil 
action was taken against both the companies and the Ministry of Welfare and Health for negligence. 
One clinician was found innocent, while a welfare officer was convicted in 2001.
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controlled by the profession, with a list on the official Medical Register administered by the 
General Medical Council (GMC). Even though the GMC must report to the Privy Council, 
virtually all supervision has been done by the professional associations.
Self-regulation in medicine has also been maintained through the activities of the British 
Medical Association (BMA). In the late 19th century, a majority of the members of the 
College of Surgeons were private entrepreneurs in general practice, with only a very small 
proportion working in public service and the voluntary sector. The surge of private 
practitioners brought about the newly-formed Provincial Medical and Surgical Association 
in 1832, which later became the British Medical Association.
At the beginning of the 20,h century, hospitals were typified clearly by the patients’ ability to 
pay. In municipal as well as voluntary hospitals, patients were treated for free, whereas 
charitable hospitals applied a means test before admission. In public hospitals, the medical 
superintendent and his staff were on a salary, but in the voluntary sector, including teaching 
hospitals, consultants were not. Although it was necessary to have a hospital base for a 
medical career, incomes were drawn from private practice outside hospitals. Private practice 
became an imperative part of the activities for hospital specialists (Abel-Smith and Pinker 
1964: pp. 384-404). The significance of keeping individual autonomy in the NHS stemmed 
from this practice.
In the post-war period, the medical profession has been organised into several trade unions. 
Even though the medical profession is predominantly represented by the BMA, with roughly 
70 per cent of medical practitioners, channelling their opinions to government takes diverse 
forms with frequently conflicting points. The General Medical Services Committee (GMSC) 
and the Central Committee for Hospital Medical Services (CCHMS) are the two bodies 
which reflect the division within the profession. The former represents general practitioners 
working in the NHS, while the latter speaks for the hospital specialists. They are closely 
associated with the BMA, but not directly elected within the structure. On the GMSC, seats
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are even given to the Medical Practitioners Union (MPU), which is a rival body to the BMA 
(Garpenby 1989: pp. 117-118). This has caused an open rift between the two groups: general 
practitioners and hospital consultants, but the divided structure without a single trade union 
helped the profession maintain freedom in its negotiations with the state, each representing 
different interests without being tied to formal decision making. The BMA registered as a 
trade union under the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, although it has been reluctant to do so. 
It has dual status: a professional association and a trade union. Rival trade unions exist on 
top of the MPU. These include the Junior Hospital Doctors Association (JHDA) and the 
Hospital Consultants and Specialists Association (HCSA). However, the BMA occasionally 
coordinated with the HCSA and the MPU vis-a-vis government, in an attempt to exert its 
influence over the profession as a whole.
The elite medical profession is also organised in the form of Colleges. In addition to the 
Royal College of Surgeons of England and the Royal College of Physicians of London, the 
Royal College of General Practitioners (1952), the Royal College of Pathologists (1962) and 
the Royal College of Psychiatrists (1971) were also founded. At the negotiation table with 
the DH, the Royal Colleges play an important role in matters such as terms of service and 
remuneration.
In Britain, the state regulation of medicine dates back to the Medical Act of 1858, when the 
forerunner of the General Medical Council was created with responsibility for the licensing 
of doctors and supervising education and disciplinary matters. The GMC administers the 
registration of medical practitioners and the Medical Register, and supervises undergraduate 
medical education in Britain through formal inspection and recommendations. Its authority is 
granted through an Act of Parliament. Formally, it is a sub-committee of the Privy Council, 
is not a public authority or standing committee under the DH, and is funded by doctors on 
the register. The GMC has been granted a high degree of autonomy. Specialists in England 
are certified by diplomas issued by the Royal College of Physicians and the Royal College of
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Surgeons, although they are not compulsory for doctors to claim their specialist status or to 
obtain a consultant post in the NHS. However, due to this activity, separation between 
specialists (consultants) and generalists (GPs) has emerged over time. The semi-autonomous 
characteristic of the GMC has led to criticism over the concentration of doctors among its 
members, and the resulting favourable treatment when “disciplining” their fellow doctors.
In Sweden, the College of Medicine (Collegium Medicum) was established in 1663, with 
privileges granted by the Crown. The College was even allowed to propose fee schedules for 
medical practitioners working in the capital (Garpenby 1989: p. 42). Other bodies, such as 
the Society of Surgeons (Societas Chirurgica), were also founded, and the College never 
succeeded in controlling the overall professional group, as was the case in Britain. However, 
the College became an agent of government, which in turn gave the College members 
official titles and prominent positions in public administration, and responsibility for 
granting doctors the status of public servants. The College of Medicine was changed into a 
regular public administrative unit in 1813, which eventually became the National Board of 
Health (Medicinalstyrelsen) in 1877.
In rural parts of Sweden, district medical officers (provinsiallakare) slowly grew in number, 
as securing such a post was the only way to obtain a position in public service, due to 
demographic and geographical reasons. In 1773, medical officers became salaried public 
servants, with the central state administering the organisation. A steady growth in the 
number of these posts was recorded under the scheme of central or local government. Even 
after the voluntary sickness funds emerged in 1870, the coverage remained low, with only 13 
per cent of the population being insured as of 1925 (Ito 1980: 45). The majority of the people 
living in the countryside also ensured that the style of public service bargains has never been 
called into question. The working environment was also favourable to doctors in the public 
sector. Consultants had total clinical autonomy in district hospitals, run by a county council.
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Responsibility for managing the hospital also lay with the senior doctor (styresmannen), not 
with the administrator (sysslomannen) (Garpenby 1989: p. 45).
The first acute hospital in Sweden, the Serafimer Hospital (Serafiemerlasarettet), was 
founded in 1752, with support from the medical profession and contributions from private 
individuals, similar to voluntary hospitals in Britain. Nonetheless, in order to highlight the 
difference, the leading figures of the medical profession were all on the College of Medicine, 
which acted as a government agent (Garpenby 1989: p. 46). The individual autonomy of 
doctors to practice outside the hospital or receive money from patients in private rooms 
remained intact, and a preferred option for the government.
The transformation of a professional body (the College of Medicine) into a public agency 
(the Board of Health) inevitably affected the nature of self-regulation. In particular, the 
capacity of quality control of medical practitioners was transferred to the state agency 
(Bjorkquist and Flygare 1963: 41-42). A new professional body, the Swedish Medical 
Society (Svenska lakaresallskapet, SMS), was formed in 1807. Its activities were restricted 
exclusively to scientific matters, and it developed an amicable relationship with the public 
authority. The district medical officers became full employers for the doctors, and the first 
trade union, the SMA was formed in 1903.
The SMA accepted the membership of the Swedish Hospital Doctors’ Association (Svenska 
lasarettslakarforeningen) as late as 1950, accounting for nearly 90 per cent of the whole 
profession. The SMA became a single trade union, joining the peak organisation for 
professionals (SACO, since 1975 SACO/SR19) after the late 1940s (Lakartidningen 1971: 
5933-43). Within the SMA, the expansion of medical schools increased the power of 
students, and consequently the position of junior doctors. The Junior Doctors’ Section
19 SACO stands for the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (Sveriges Akademikers 
Centralorganisation), while SR represents the National Federation of State Employees 
(Statsjanstemannens Rikslbrbund).
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(Sveriges Yngre Lakares Forening) began playing a significant role. The creation of a peak 
organisation, SACO, was also instigated by one of many organisations set up by younger 
academics. However, the SMA’s involvement in industrial action together with other 
professional groups created difficulties, due to diverging interests from other sectors.
Outside the SMA, there are some bodies such as the scientifically-oriented SMS, and the 
Socialist Medical Group (Foreningen Socialistiska Lakare). The latter played a major role in 
negotiations with the government in the 1940s, when the SMA was hardly recognised by the 
government (Garpenby 1989: p. 124).
The licensing system in Sweden generally rests with public authority. Responsibility was 
given to the National Board of Health (today’s NBHW) in 1915, without resistance from the 
medical profession. A medical student must register with the NBHW at the end of his/her 
study and examination. When it comes to registration of specialists and postgraduate medical 
training, however, the profession is more committed. The compromise agreed between the 
NBH and the SMA was that the former takes a degree of public control, while the latter 
continues to issue the licence. The FCC rejected this, claiming that supervision that is of 
such importance to the public should not be left to an independent trade union organization 
(Garpenby 1989: p. 199). In 1960, an Act of Parliament transferred the control of specialist 
registration from the profession to the NBH. In terms of disciplinary measures, the Medical 
Responsibility Board (halso- och sjukvardens ansvarsnamnd, HSAN) was created in 1980, 
its responsibility separated from that of the NBHW, and it now stands as an independent 
agency. The committee is made up of nine members: a legal chairman, one from the county 
councils and three from the peak trade union organisations, four from different political 
parties, acting as laymen. Alleged clinical errors and the professional misconduct of any 
health care worker are subject to investigations by the HSAN, who decides on disciplinary 
action, ranging from a warning and temporary suspension to recommendation to the NBHW
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that the license be withdrawn. The SMA is represented through one union seat of the 
SACO/SR.
In Japan, medical practitioners had long been divided. Until the Meiji Restoration, there was 
a division between Western medicine and Chinese medicine (Kanpo), and after the 
Restoration, it was still deeply divided between elite university graduates and those qualified 
by apprenticeship, or between private practitioners and hospital-affiliated physicians. These 
divisions fragmented medical society, but later became the basis for the strong voice of 
private practitioners (JMA), a bargaining partner with government, and of that of university 
hospitals as a controlling mechanism for human resources. Following the Meiji Restoration, 
the new government began promoting the establishment of a system of medical care based 
on Western medical science and technology. Kanpo was discouraged and the system of 
censure enforced in 1876 denied recognition to practitioners of Kanpo who hugely 
outnumbered the practitioners of Western style medicine20.
The first associations of doctors of Western medicine sprang up regionally. The Tokyo 
Medical Association (Tokyo Ishikai) was formed in 1886, consisting of graduates of Tokyo 
Imperial University. On a national level, the JMA originated in the Greater Japan Medical 
Association (Dai-Nippon Ishikai, GJMA), which was officially formed in 1916 under the 
leadership of Shibasaburo Kitazato, first Dean of Keio University’s medical faculty and a 
prominent figure in both the scientific and organizational histories of Japanese medicine. 
This membership was restricted to the ranks of private practitioners who were graduates of 
universities and medical technical schools, and thus its activity was directly linked to 
securing and protecting their status as a professional group. The GJMA already took the 
initiative and drafted a bill which was introduced in the Lower House of the Imperial Diet. 
The bill demanded the restriction of licenses to graduates of universities and medical
20 20,5000 doctors were practising in Kanpo, whereas only 6,400 were practising Western medicine.
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technical schools, or to those who pass a national examination. It also called for compulsory 
participation.
After World War II, it was reconstituted as a voluntary professional organisation in 1947, 
under the auspices of the United States Occupation authorities. The National Medical Care 
Law (Kokumin Iryoho) of 1942 stated that its objective was “to work for the achievement of 
improved medical care and guidance of health, and to cooperate with national policy for the 
improvement of the people’s physical strength” (Iseikyoku 1955). Among the presidents of 
the JMA, Dr Taro Takemi (1957-1982), a cousin of the then Prime Minister Shigeru 
Yoshida, became heavily involved in political activities as one of the key players in health 
care administration and policy in post-war Japan.
The power of the JMA rested on its claim to represent all healthcare providers, although in 
reality it became a mouthpiece only for private practitioners, not for doctors employed by 
hospitals. Membership enrollment is on the decrease, although it accounts for roughly 60 per 
cent of all physicians. Physicians’ specialty organisations are not very well organised. 
Likewise, salaried doctors have no organisation despite differing views and interests from 
those in private practice (Campbell and Ikegami 1998 pp. 27-28). Through the prevalence of 
private practitioners over hospital-based doctors, its voice is dominant with regard to fee 
schedule negotiation. The Japan Hospital Association had a seat represented at the fee 
schedule negotiation (Cl) until 1963, but the JMA, infuriated by the Hospital Association’s 
stance in agreement with the government, began appointing its own preferred representation. 
Dentists and pharmacists normally ally with the JMA to achieve the similar goal of 
protecting their autonomy.
Set out by the American Occupation in Japan, medical schools were standardised into 
six-year university level programmes, with mandatory national licensing examinations. The 
MH(L)W administers the examination, according to the Medical Care Law of 1946 (Art. 10). 
The licence is not subject to review and renewal, and therefore, once acquired, is lifelong.
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When it comes to human resources, professors at teaching hospitals wielded power over their 
medical staff, and over where their students obtain their posts. With authorities in each 
clinical department, the close-knit, family-like network was nurtured. Consequently, 
specialties were divided further into subspecialties according to an autonomous unit of a 
clinical department, and this became called Ikyoku-sei (medical personnel management 
system based on clinical department).
Disciplinary measures are taken by the Medical Ethics Council (Id5 Shingikai, MEC) if 
clinical errors are reported. The MEC has the power to revoke the licence, or put restrictions 
in place in cases where there are questions about a doctor's fitness to practice. The MEC is 
responsible to the Ministry, and thirty members including the Presidents of the JMA and the 
Japan Dentist Association are appointed by the Minister every two years. Half of MEC 
members are physicians and surgeons. Yet in the past, the MEC normally waited for judicial 
verdicts for such cases before deciding to sanction doctors and demand closures of their 
clinics or hospitals. Therefore, the whole process takes a few decades before the issue is 
settled.
In summary, although the three countries had a distinctive history of doctor-state 
relationships, irrespective of the professional autonomy in registration or appointment, 
central government in all three countries possesses a government arena for deciding 
disciplinary measures when the system goes wrong. The next section looks more closely at 
the implications of different professional autonomy in the three countries.
3.3.2. Different types of professional autonomy
As they constitute a knowledge-driven sector, the influence of the medical professions over 
health policy is not determined solely by financing arrangements or the status of doctors 
(whether they are publicly employed or not). Thus, professional autonomy is the key 
intervening factor which affects the dynamic relationship between central government and
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the general public. This section summarises different types of ‘autonomy’ and their 
implications for the scope that central government has for delegating decisions and shifting 
blame. The aim is to highlight the standing of the medical professions vis-a-vis government 
and the general public, mainly for the cases where high pressure was exerted on the 
medical-collegial dimension (Chapters 6 and 7).
Enjoying respect for their scientific knowledge and skills, the medical professions generally 
have a significant amount of discretion over management as well as clinical decisions (E-l, 
E-2, J-5, J-15, S-13 and S-17). At the same time, the government’s regulation of the medical 
professions also has a long history, shaping the perceptions of the general public towards the 
role of the state in health care. Garpenby defined three different types of professional 
autonomy: clinical, collective and individual. “While clinical autonomy is the main concern 
of scientific bodies, it is individual autonomy that occupies the interest of trade union bodies. 
Occasionally they overlap in concern for various issues, and there is no clear-cut borderline 
between them (...) Collective autonomy can be described as the freedom for the medical 
profession as a collective to regulate and control certain aspects of the health care system -  
for example clinical standards, ethical standards and professional conduct” (Garpenby 1989:
11). As a result, if effectively implemented, collective autonomy can restrict the clinical 
autonomy of individual professionals. For instance, if the medical association as a peak 
organisation agreed to establish control by public authorities or clients, this could mean that 
clinical autonomy would be eroded and succumb to control by government. Most professions 
prefer peer-group control, since it leaves more room for manoeuvre. Consequentially, 
bargaining through organised interest representation with government can undermine the 
individual autonomy of clinicians.
As seen above in the previous section, the medical professions in England and Sweden have 
had greater collective autonomy than their counterparts in Japan, whose activities’ primary 
focus was to extend individual autonomy to freedom to set up their own clinics while
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maximising incomes. Of England and Sweden, the latter achieved comparatively more 
coherent and transparent interest representation, and a consensual approach to government. 
Patient complaints procedures and disciplinary mechanisms involve the participation of 
elected officials as well as government agencies. On the other hand, the former sustained a 
long tradition of pure collegial-style self-regulation. Although the professional group in 
England has formal recognition from central government, and is in a position to brief the DH, 
take part in informal discussions at the preparatory stage and to be consulted formally, its 
autonomy has not been tied down to the public authorities. Its representation is also clearly 
separated from other trade unions, in contrast to that in Sweden where the SMA is formerly 
recognised along with other trade unions, and involved in a more formalised consultative 
pattern with government. Therefore, the English medical profession overall retains its 
sectoral uniqueness, and special representation, while its Swedish counterpart is more 
accommodated in the general patterns of public service bargains. The style of monitoring by 
government also reveals the difference. In England, since the creation of the NHS 
Management Executive in 1988, managers with a business ethos were brought into the health 
services (e.g. chief executives of the NHS trusts), as a mouthpiece for government and 
patients. In Sweden, the county council model keeps electorally chosen representatives at the 
interface between the general public and central government.
In sharp contrast to these two publicly-run systems, in the absence of central government’s 
unified approach to service provision, doctors in Japan are treated both with great respect for 
their noble vocation and expertise, and with disapproval for their overt political activities in 
pursuit of self interest. Links with the Liberal Democrats often tarnished their reputations. 
The unique personnel management system by the clinical department not only contributed to 
the consolidation of collegial medical institutions, but also insulated itself from both 
government policy and the general public. Although this was justified by the cause of
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scientific progress, the ‘great white tower (Shiroi Kyoto)21' became the symbolic term to 
describe the hierarchical and paternalistic network with the professor of the clinical 
department at the helm, involving corruption at times. In addition, the freedom of choice 
which patients enjoy intensified competition among providers. This does not help nurture a 
sense of collectivity among the doctors. As a result of unitomisation of professional interest, 
the organising of private practitioners in the form of the JMA was devoted to a great extent 
to protection of individual autonomy, rather than clinical and collective autonomy. This was 
unlike counterparts in England and Sweden. In exchange for the JMA’s electoral support for 
the LDP, a beneficial package was agreed by both camps at the fee-schedule negotiations, 
and non-interference from central government was also agreed upon.
Drawn upon three concepts of ‘autonomy’, it became clear that the degree and nature of 
professional autonomy vary greatly. The enshrined tradition of clinical autonomy in England 
confers advantages not only on the medical professions themselves, but also on central 
decision makers, acquitting them from involvement in difficult decisions or, on the other 
hand, taking policy initiatives without “appearing to be infringing medical autonomy” (Klein 
2001: p.66). In Sweden, collective autonomy is firmly established within formal 
decision-making, as is local autonomy in county councils and municipalities through 
democratic participation and taxation. This heightens the recognition given to the 
professional group in the formal setting, but also commits them to the decision, potentially 
weakening individual autonomy. In Japan, the JMA, in perpetual conflict with the MHW 
over payment, allied itself with the long-term governing party LDP. The tripartite 
fee-schedule bargaining and doctors’ informal but robust networks created solid institutions 
of its own, leaving no clear line of accountability for the electorate, as the policy-making
21 It was originally written by Toyoko Yamazaki for the newspaper-owned weekly magazine, 
Sunday Mainichi from 1963 to 1965, and became a national hit. It was published as a book in 1965, 
and then made into a film in 1966. Several versions have been made and remade for TV drama series 
up to date.
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process was closed to the general public. Protection of professional autonomy in Japan, 
however, was a double-edged sword, as closed and rigid subsystem policy-making without 
sensors to the external environment could blur and undermine central government’s 
sensitivity to public criticism.
England Sweden Japan
Emphasis on 
autonomy 
(emphasis on)
Clinical autonomy Collective autonomy Individual autonomy
Agents sensitive to 
external pressure
NHS managers Gov’t agencies/ 
county councils
Individual doctors
Table 5: Professional autonomy, and actors exposed to external pressure
3.4. Institutional designs of the three health systems and political sensitivity of 
central government to pressure
Institutional arrangements of the three health systems can be summarised in the following 
table.
England Sweden Japan
Financing method Centralised Decentralised Centralised
Party competition Prominent Prominent Feeble
Political liability of 
ministers
High Low Low
Who monitors the 
professions?
Managers Local politicians/ 
Gov’t agencies
Patients
Political sensitivity at 
the centre 
to external pressure
High Medium Low
Table 6: Political sensitivity at the centre to external pressure
As previously examined, central government in Britain is highly sensitive to the voters, but 
also has resources and a chain of command in place. Simultaneously, it is vulnerable to any 
fiascos or public criticism at the ministerial level. On the other hand, although the 
counterpart in Sweden can be sensitive to the voters’ wishes, the pressure comes via party
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competition at local level, or through government agencies. In Sweden, the party stance on 
health issues varied, but was announced more clearly than in England.
For instance, introducing more family doctors has been promoted by the Liberal Party since 
the 1970s, while privatisation is embraced by the Moderate Party. In addition, pressure can 
be diffused among many actors in Sweden and therefore public criticism is rarely targeted at 
ministers directly. Ministerial responsibility is not as clear-cut as in England, and directors of 
the agencies are more likely to receive criticism. In sharp contrast to the two publicly-run 
systems, central government in Japan demonstrates low political sensitivity to ordinary 
voters, except to the voices of private practitioners. Since professional autonomy is high and 
the government adopted a laissez-faire policy on health provision, the primary and only tool 
for central government is a strong grip on finances at the centre. The authority and 
responsibilities for health provision are even shared among three different ministries within 
government (Health, Education and Home Affairs). This blurs the accountability of ministers 
even more and creates an obstacle to reforms. Pressure on cost containment is the only 
prominent issue about which central government shows concerns in Japan. All the other 
medical issues are delegated to either experts or private practitioners (i.e. individual hospitals 
and clinics). The medical professions are therefore likely to be held responsible for the 
failings of the system.
This chapter highlights the characteristics of each health care system, with a strong emphasis 
on institutional vulnerabilities, in particular political sensitivity at the centre. Vulnerabilities 
of central government to external pressure go hand in hand with their capacities to intervene 
and adopt new policies. When redistributive policies are at stake (hospital reorganisations in 
Chapters 4 and 5), a government with a centralised financing system (England and Japan) is 
expected to be faced with greater pressure than that with a decentralised financing system 
(Sweden). Nevertheless, ways of responding to the pressure vary, because pressure is 
received at the centre via different institutional logics. In Japan, for example, where the
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health secretary had not been challenged over issues of health provision, and political parties 
never compete over hospital policies, it becomes logical not to be politically sensitive, and 
therefore responsive, to matters at the centre. In addition, the primary goal of central 
government was to control the fee schedule centrally, and the matter was not affected by 
public concerns as long as the medical professions were satisfied.
In contrast, a central government with a decentralised financing method (Sweden) is not 
exempt from external pressure, as the health system is monitored by local politicians who are 
in turn assessed by voters at election time. Pressure deriving from local people (service 
recipients) is expected to intensify policy debates between political parties even at national 
level. Institutional arrangements in the Swedish system are therefore designed in such a 
fashion that public criticism would be directed not at central government, but at elected 
officials at local level. The institutional logics render the government of Sweden moderately 
responsive, in particular in redistributive (retrenchment) policy programmes. The 
responsiveness of central government for these types of policies (Chapters 4 and 5) can thus 
be predicted based on the attributes set out above.
What about non-redistributive technical policy programmes (i.e. quality control 
system-building and its failure, as discussed in Chapters 6 and 1)1 Under this type of 
pressure, and due to the nature of the issues, professional autonomy is challenged more than 
the political system per se. Thus, if there is no interaction between political institutions and 
policy choices, different kinds of professional autonomy, described in the previous section, 
are expected to remain robust, determining the policy directions of each country. Yet it is 
necessary to probe the possibilities of political institutions affecting the choice. Political 
sensitivity at the centre then is a good indicator for our predictions, as it suggests whether or 
not elected officials in central government are vulnerable to external pressure within each 
institutional arrangement. Although great or constant public attention is not expected to be 
directed at issues such as quality assurance system-building or the failure of risk
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management, the significance of those matters in the hospital sector and for the government 
as a guarantor of universal health care signify that there is high potential for politicisation.
Based on the institutional designs highlighting the vulnerability of central government to 
external pressure, the next chapter begins with the first empirical case, and examines the 
validity of each of the three perspectives (election-conscious, expert-driven and 
public-spirited government).
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Figure 3: Funding mechanisms of the three health systems (England, Sweden and Japan)
The English Health Care System after 1999
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The Swedish Health Care System (1999)
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95
The Japanese Health Care System (2000)
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Chapter Four Electoral shock after public hospital reorganisations: 
how local is central?
To what extent are health institutions vulnerable or resistant to a type of pressure that has 
only a local dimension? How local voices in unitary state trigger responses from central 
government has not been fully examined, for example, ‘save hospital’ campaigns in the three 
countries and how each central government responded to the electoral shocks in their various 
forms. The question is whether pressure of the low-low type could ever make an impact on 
health policy and induce any policy changes by central government.
In health care, reforms can be carried out in the form of small adjustments or accompanied 
by organisational restructuring (Greer 2004; Ruggie 1996). These reforms are often 
presented as better rationing and keeping up with new technology (Cohen 2004; Krieger 
1986). Yet when changes are made to service provisions, the policy is bound to cause 
conflicts (Greenaway et al. 2007). This is what the proponents of the new politics of the 
welfare state argued. When reorganisation of hospital services has to be implemented, visible 
service cuts or hospital closures are normally averted. The actual implementation process is 
also preceded by several carefully-chosen deliberation processes, from consultation to local 
council committee meetings. Yet no matter how cautious the policymakers are, service 
changes at local hospitals can be seen as the government rolling back direct provision, 
thereby causing dissatisfaction. One way of showing discontent is the mobilisation of local 
people to mount a political campaign.
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From the government’s point of view, local protests could be dismissed as a form of 
“HIMBYism” (Hospital in my backyard)22. Yet if a clear voice of dissent is shown by a vote, 
it cannot be quickly ignored, and particularly not by the governing party/parties. Therefore, 
as Perspective 1 suggests, the responsiveness of government is likely to be determined by 
such electoral pressure.
How does central government then cope with this type of pressure, channelled through 
political (i.e. electoral) institutions? In this chapter, the most salient cases in each country 
have been selected and the impact of electoral campaigns against hospital service cuts on the 
responsiveness of government has been analysed. First of all, predictions are built up based 
on each country’s institutional arrangement. In this chapter, electoral competition 
(Perspective 1) and public criticism (Perspective 3) form the basis for the competing 
predictions, i.e. the first set of predictions is based on different types of party competition 
and health issues at election times. Different electoral rules in each country provide political 
parties with distinctive incentive structures, within which central government is pressured to 
respond. The second set of predictions is based on the level of criticism towards central 
government in the printed media. The number of articles is shown year by year, and the 
articles are divided up into four categories (positive/neutral/negative reporting vis-a-vis 
government, and the remainder, which deal with non-governmental actors (e.g. the medical 
professions)). The second predictions are based on the data. The third section tests how the 
issue develops in each country with the primary emphasis on central government’s response. 
In the conclusion, the plausibility of the two different perspectives will be assessed using the 
results of the tri-country cases.
22 The word is coined from “NIMBY” (Not in my backyard) by the authors o f the IPPR report, The 
Future Hospital: The Politics of change (Joe Farrington-Douglas with Richard Brooks, 2007). 
Although NIMBYism refers to local campaigns against unpopular facilities such as wind farms and 
social housing, HIMBYism is local action to retain a hospital.
98
4.1 Predictions
4.1.1 Policy type (low-low) and predictions based on electoral competition 
(Perspective 1)
As controversy surrounding hospital reconfigurations is restricted to the catchment area, the 
issue tends to be geographically bounded, attracting little attention from the national media 
until the political campaign becomes more widely mobilised. Thus, the pressure level is 
considered to be low on both central government and the medical professions. In theory, 
restructuring hospital services in a locality does not destabilise the whole hospital sector or 
undermine the autonomy of the medical professions. The only concern however is that 
elected officials know this policy might be unpopular among their constituents. The 
opposition parties are likely to criticise the policy severely. This case is a test of the pressure 
on the politico-administrative dimension, and especially on the party-political dimension.
The policy programme in question here is the role of government in direct health provision 
and changes to the method of tackling allocative efficiency and equal access. As consultants 
in large hospitals in all three countries generally claim, the concentration of resources is 
necessary if highly specialised operations with more experienced clinicians are to be 
successful. This would only be possible at the expense of local general hospitals, which local 
residents are likely to object to. This background is common to all three countries, but when 
it comes to the involvement of government in actual hospital reconfigurations, there are 
variations. For instance, individual ministers or parliamentarians are held accountable for 
decisions over such hospital matters in England, but not in Sweden or Japan. The 
government involvement in each country can be summarised in the table below.
If Perspective 1 (election-conscious government) is right, a health system with clear political 
accountability and severe party competition is expected to be the most sensitive to a local 
campaign. Therefore, England is predicted to be the most responsive to local voices,
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followed by Sweden. Even though the English system allows each constituency to express its 
voice through a general election, in Sweden each county council, which is closer to local 
residents than national government, should be responsive to their voices. Both governments 
therefore should be responsive in their distinct ways.
Market -> Government
Left to market 
competition 
between hospitals
Decisions made by 
local councils/local 
providers
Mix of government 
decision and 
involvement by local 
health providers
Government takes 
the initiative as the 
main stakeholder
Sweden Japan England
Table 7: Government involvement in hospital reconfigurations
The difference between England and Sweden is also found in the party system. In Sweden, 
under a multiparty system, it is uncertain which party would support local residents against 
hospital closures (e.g. the locally-minded Greens, Centre Party, trade-union supported Left 
Party, or Liberals in favour of more family doctors). Pre-electoral pacts between different 
partner parties in each bloc (left and right) make policy pledges of such kind difficult.
Central government in Japan would be the least responsive to the electorate. In addition, the 
three political systems operate in distinctive fashions when it comes to taking in local 
people’s voices through ballot box. Japan simply does not possess the element of 
party-political competition over the hospital issue. Although when national hospitals are at 
stake, a local Diet member might react, especially members of the opposition parties. 
However, LDP candidates would have no motivation to do so, as they tend to represent the 
interests of private practitioners. Party politics under the SNTV electoral rule discouraged 
any national parties from focusing on such local issues. On the other hand, the medical 
professions (e.g. the JMA) are expected to play a large role, since they are key actors and 
supporters of the LDP.
Hence, from Perspective 1, it is difficult to estimate which of the two countries (England or
Sweden) would be the most responsive to local people’s voices at central level. The English
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case is problematic, as institutional designs show both vulnerability and resilience to 
pressure. Parliamentarians are responsible for health services in their constituencies, 
channelling local voices to central government. But simultaneously, policy decisions are 
taken centrally or within the NHS body. Additionally, the final decision of hospital 
reconfigurations is often referred to the Secretary of State (E-2). Therefore, while it is easy to 
predict that candidates from the opposition parties attempt to mobilise those voices against 
the proposal, there is a hard choice to make for the MP from the governing party or the 
potential alternative. As a result, the natural opposition party, the Liberal Democrats, would 
most consistently support such local issues. Either way, the electoral rule in England has a 
high threshold for such single issues to come into play.
In summary, according to Perspective 1, predictions for each country are as follows:
Perspective 1: predictions based on electoral competition__________________________
England: a local hospital reorganisation would definitely affect the general election 
campaign, and competition would become fierce among the three parties. The more severe 
the competition, the greater the responses of central government would be. The most likely 
supporter for local protests would be the Liberal Democratic Party.
Sweden: a local hospital closure would no doubt become a matter for political parties, but 
possibly only at county council level, which is responsible for hospital policy. As in 
England, the harder the electoral competition might be, the more chance that central 
government would come up with a response. Yet the multi-party system in a decentralised 
polity makes it more difficult (than in England) to discern whether or how parties would put 
pressure on central government. The effectiveness of party competition in drawing out 
government response is therefore questionable.
Japan: a local hospital reorganisation would not become a party-political matter. Although
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local voices might be carried to central government by local government or a directly elected 
governor/mayor to central government, it would depend on the strength of local leadership. 
With weak opposition parties, it is unlikely that electoral competition would be decisive in 
provoking a response from central government. Instead, the medical associations, the 
ministry (as the local hospital was a national hospital) and local stakeholders would seek 
pragmatic solutions.
Hence, based on this perspective, it is expected that the government in England would be 
directly hit by an electoral attack due to its clear political commitment at the centre. 
Likewise, in Sweden, the issue is also highly likely to pose a problem for the elected officials, 
if not senior officials. The difference between the two countries lies in the level of 
government that would face pressure. Central government is safe from direct electoral shock 
in Sweden. Lastly, hospital policy in Japan would not constitute an electoral issue, and thus 
national politicians expect no challenge on such matters. The opposition parties had been too 
weak to affect central government’s decision to any great extent. Therefore, unless local 
government was united against government decisions, there would be no obstacles.
The table below shows the possible policy choice of central government as a response. The 
low-low pressure type suggests non-decision (i.e. continuation) or a slow-down of policy 
implementation. Negative feedback from local people and the aftermath of electoral shock 
might raise questions as to how the political system and medical services should be further 
reorganised to avoid further challenges to institutions. Therefore, responses may vary, in 
particular the type of policy options. They range from the most directly-affected (‘decision 
of no-response’ and ‘specific policy amendment’) to the least affected (‘restructuring of 
polity’). In between the two are broader policy changes, which suggest more local 
consultation and less political intervention so that the same electoral shock would not happen
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again. These policy options can be a good guide for measuring the responsiveness of central
government.
Purposes Types of response Policy details
Demonstration that 
government decision was a 
well-informed one
Decision not to respond
No U-tum/no concessions
Demonstration of 
‘responsiveness’
Specific policy 
amendment
Policy U-turn or small 
concessions (Increasing the 
number of beds in a new/merged 
hospital)
Institutionalising 
consultation process
Specific but broader 
policy change
Circulating guidelines for hospital 
reconfigurations
Relegating responsibilities 
to other actors for future 
disruptions
Broader policy change
Setting up a body to carry out 
rigorous analysis to justify further 
mergers and closures
Alteration to the whole 
political system
Restructuring of polity
Redrawing catchment areas, 
centre-local government 
relationship
Table 8: Possible actions and policy responses by central government
The three cases selected each had the highest number of articles written about hospital 
reorganisation in their respective country’s national media. The next section deals with the 
chronology of each episode, followed by alternative predictions on the basis of issue saliency 
and public criticism towards central government (Perspective 3).
4.1.2 Timeline of each episode
England Sweden Japan
1980s
1984: Ten-year Plan for 
Norrbotten county. ‘Health and 
Hospital care in Norrbotten 
County Council in the 1990’s’.
1985: Basic Plan announced 
for Reorganisation and 
Rationalisation of National 
Hospitals and Sanatoriums. 
Akune Hospital becomes the 
very first target for the 
sell-off.
1987: a campaign to keep the 
hospital launched jointly by 
Prefecture/City.
1988: The City (council), 
approached by the local JMA. 
Later, position changed in 
favour of the government
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plan.
1989: White Paper, Working 
for Patients published. 
Self-governing NHS trusts 
and GP fundholding 
introduced.
1989: Local people’s “Save 
hospital” campaign, calling 
for dissolution of the council. 
Transfer of national hospital 
to a JMA-run private hospital. 
But victory for local 
campaign, as the majority 
voted for re-election of the 
council. Yet no candidate 
running on the anti-closure 
ticket.
1990s
1996: Three Worcestershire 
Health Authorities merged to 
form a single WHA. The PFI 
scheme suggested rebuilding 
the Worcester Royal 
Infirmary.
1990: Consultation launched for 
SHSTF, SKTF (local 
government officers), SKAF 
(Municipal Workers’ Union), 
and SACO/SR.
Sell-off and closures of 
national hospitals 
(government plan) not 
proceeding as originally 
planned.
1997: Blair promised the 
flagship PFI hospital in 
Worcester. In response to 
this, ‘Save hospital’ campaign 
launched by Labour MP Lock 
and Dr Taylor
1992: Reports ‘Hospital care in 
Transition’, ‘Contents of 
Hospital Care’ and 
‘Organisation of Hospital Care’ 
published.
1998: the Second March of 
the campaign
1994: One-quarter of the county 
council seats gained by 
Norrbotten Healthcare Party.
1999: the PFI contract for 
WRI.
1999: The new Sunderby 
Hospital opened.
2000s
2000: 19 seats at the local 
election won by Health 
Concern.
2001: Wyre Forest seat won 
by Dr Taylor, defeating junior 
minister Lock.
2003: “Keeping the NHS 
local”
2005: Dr Taylor reelected. 2006: Healthcare Party 
launched jointly for the national 
election, but failed to win a seat. 
Regional parties remained 
strong in parts of the country.
Table 9: Chronology
This chronology also shows the ‘timeline’ by which this thesis signifies the period covered 
by each episode. Each episode starts with the background, followed by the launch of local 
campaigns and ends with the recent electoral campaign, if the same or similar issue is 
contested at the following elections or by the same people (local or national politicians). In
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the Japanese case, the event occurred in the last year of the 1980s, which is a slightly earlier 
period for this study. Also it was a one-off incident calling for the sacking of local 
councillors and for re-election. For the other two countries, the political parties survived and 
continued to contest seats at various levels of government. Therefore, for England and 
Sweden, the cut-off point is 2006.
4.1.3 Predictions from issue saliency and public criticism to central government 
(Perspective 3)
The level of issue saliency in each comtry is demonstrated below.
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Figure 4: Issue saliency (broadsheet) (Sources: TG/DN/AS)
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England
Sweden
Figure 5: Issue saliency (tabloid) (Sources: Daily Mail/Expressen/Nikkan Sports)
Figures 4 and 5 indicate how often newspaper media covered the hospital reconfigurations 
and the subsequent local/political campaigns. Search terms used for each case were the 
names of the local area plus ‘hospital’. The number of articles in the national printed media 
is used as the indicator of issue saliency of the campaigns in the three countries. The 
common features and trends can be described as follows: (1) the case has an overall profile 
of low visibility; (2) attention cycles correspond with election time (only once in the 
Japanese case); and (3) highest peaks for each country correspond to the expected level of 
impact on political systems: England, Sweden and Japan.
The Japanese case represents a one-off shock where a local petition called for the dissolution 
of the local council in 1989, while the Swedish case witnessed several stages until it reached 
its peak ten years later in 1999. In England, an independent candidate with a ‘save the 
hospital’ platform won a seat at the national parliament in 2001. The English case presents 
relatively low visibility for such a rare and nationwide event, while the Swedish case 
received constant attention despite its local focus. This fairly good attention in Sweden, 
though, was partially the result of similar local campaigns spread out across the county
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councils, and the Norrbotten case was often referred to as a pioneering campaign in those 
articles.
The comparable data was made with the focus on public criticism of central government. If 
government responded because of the cumulative effect of public criticism, their data might 
more precisely reflect the responsiveness of government than institutional attributes, in this 
case party-political competition.
100%
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30%
20%
10%
0%
England Sweden Japan
Figure 6: Proportion of negative reports vis-a-vis government
A total of 36% in England, 21% in Sweden and 33% of articles in Japan account for 
criticism or negative comments relating to government and its decisions over service cuts or 
of hospitals. The figures are fairly similar in England and Japan, although the decentralised 
system in Sweden had almost twenty percent fewer articles on central government appearing 
in the printed media. Non-Govemment/Others in Sweden include county councils and other 
local actors. Neutral and positive reporting dealt mostly with electoral battles, featuring 
manifestoes of the candidates’ party or campaigns themselves. The prediction based on this 
alternative perspective can be constructed as shown in the box below. Predictions are made 
on the basis of comparative data of public criticism, namely, that the higher the proportion of 
public criticism towards central governments, the higher the chance that they reacted. This is
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■ Gov-Negative
I! Gov-Neutral 
0  Gov-Positive 
□  NonGovt- Others
also the way of looking at central government’s involvement in the case, as once they 
become engaged, their action inevitably generates more coverage of the pros and cons.
Perspective 3: predictions based on issue saliency and criticism_____________________
England: from the perspective of public attention, the issues surrounding local hospital 
reorganisation became highly salient at the election of 2001. Half of the attention was paid to 
central government and roughly 40% of that was negative. Although 40% is not high, at the 
peak of attention and criticism, it is possible that government responded.
Sweden: public awareness of local hospital reorganisation was constant and fairly visible, 
although not very salient overall, as demonstrated by the low-low pressure level. Yet similar 
electoral campaigns in other parts of the country sparked attention from 1999 onwards. 
Although the impact of criticism of the government, coming from different parts of the 
country, is difficult to predict, the low ratio of criticism (21%) possibly means that central 
government displayed little responsiveness.
Japan: public attention was short-lived but acute. Half of the attention was directed at central 
government, with one-third of the total articles (33%) negative. This was unusual, given that 
central government normally had little to do with the policy matter, especially when it had 
such a local dimension. At the peak of public criticism, it is possible that government 
responded.
In this alternative set of predictions, the reactions of the Japanese government are more 
similar to those of the government in England, than are those of the Swedish government. It 
is necessary, however, to see the party-political effects on policy choice in each episode 
before concluding that Perspective 3 better explains the responsiveness of government.
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The next section introduces the episodes in each country and how government actually 
responded to the shocks. Each episode describes how political parties fought electoral battles 
on hospital issues, and how that affected government decisions. The episodes are divided 
into phases by patterns of changing public criticism.
4.2 England: Kidderminster Hospital
4.2.1 Background: NHS mergers and the future of the hospital in doubt sell-off
The District General Hospital was originally known as Blakebrook Hospital, built on the site 
of the old union workhouse (Hoggarth 2002 p.6). Kidderminster Healthcare NHS Trust was 
formed in 1993, as part of the ‘third wave’ of NHS Trusts under the 1991 Health and Social 
Care Act. It covered a wide range of health care, from acute and mental to community 
services, for a population of approximately 130,000 in Kidderminster and the surrounding 
areas in the neighbouring counties such as Shropshire and Staffordshire. The main purchaser 
of the service was the new North Worcestershire Health Authority formed in 1994. The 
Kidderminster Health Care NHS Trust was designed to provide an integrated service: 
hospital, community and primary care. Good working relationships between consultants and 
general practitioners (GPs) was conducive to successful recruitment of senior medical staff 
during national shortages and a reduction in emergency admissions (E-l)23
In 1996, the three Worcestershire health authorities (North Worcestershire, Bromsgrove and 
Redditch, and South Worcestershire) were merged into a single Worcestershire Health 
Authority (WHA). At this time, fiscal problems came to the fore and needed to be resolved 
quickly. Deficits approximated £9 million. With a total underlying debt of £17 million, the 
merger of Worcester Trusts seemed imminent in order to reduce administrative costs. In his 
first report, Dr Brian McCloskey, Director of Public Health, noted a need for changing the
23 In 1997, the hospital was awarded the Charter Mark for its service excellence after meeting the 
targets. This was one of three in the West Midlands.
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provision of acute hospital services across the county. Elsewhere in the country, cutting back 
on hospital services was not new, and had already begun under the Thatcher government in 
the 1980s. To balance out the need for financial reconstruction and modernisation of services, 
the PFI schemes were introduced in the NHS in 1992, mainly for the construction of new 
hospitals. Four years later, the health authority proposed a rebuilding of the Worcester Royal 
Infirmary using this PFI scheme. The NHS Trust signed a PFI contract with Catalyst 
Healthcare Ltd. for the distribution of ‘beds’ and specialties for Worcester city.
In February 1997, the Strategic Review of Acute Health Services published a discussion 
paper for consultation over the next 6-9 months. Accordingly, nine Review Groups with 
wide membership were established to find a consensus. Senior consultants, local authorities 
and other interested parties all participated. In the run-up to the electoral campaign in 1997, 
the leader of the Labour Party, Tony Blair, paid a visit to Worcester, a town in the West 
Midlands of England. In his speech there, he endorsed the plan for a new hospital in 
Worcester, stating that the project would be carried out as soon as possible once his party 
formed a government. Trying to win back the middle electoral ground, Labour sought to 
appeal to some of the floating voters, primarily middle-aged women in the 
Conservative-dominated constituency24. Thus, from the outset, fierce electoral competition in 
the area played a part in the background to the reconfigurations.
24 The Guardian (8 April 2003) also wrote ‘"Worcester woman" has become a shorthand term for a 
traditional female Tory voter from so-called middle England, who was won over by Tony Blair's New 
Labour in the 90s’.
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4.2.2 Episode and Analysis
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Figure 7: Number of reports critical of government and medical professions 
(The Guardian, 1992-2006)
(Phase 1: 1997 - early 1998; Phase 2: 1998-2001; Phase 3: 2001 onwards)
Phase 1: local protest -‘Worcester at the mercy of Kidderminster’- (1997-early 1998)
The Labour government came into power, successfully swinging two seats in the region, 
Worcester and Wyre Forest, both won by approximately 7,000 votes25. By October 1997, it 
became clear that the District General Hospital in Kidderminster would be severely affected 
by the outcome of the Review and decisions by the Health Authority. Facing the risk of 
losing a local hospital, the campaign to save it was launched under the leadership of the local 
MP David Lock, Michael Brinton (of the local carpet manufacturing family) and the then 
chairman of the League of Friends Dr. Richard Taylor. Lock expressed his outrage at the 
potential service reductions in his constituency, stating “there is no medical or financial 
reason for doing this. They are just carving up the service between Worcester and Redditch 
to the detriment of my constituent”(Hoggarth 2002 p.l 1). At a public meeting held in the
25 In 1992, Labour was defeated by 6,000 votes in Worcester and by more than 10,000 votes in Wyre 
Forest.
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Town Hall on 1 November 1997, all the political parties showed their support to save the 
hospital. The then Labour MEP David Hallam also took part in the meeting. As the public 
outcry intensified, the rift grew wider between the two sides, with the community (backed up 
by all-party support) on the one hand and the health authority on the other. The health 
authority, as an agent of central government, was the main target for local people’s anger.
The same month, the Worcester Health Authority agreed to consider seven options, one of 
which was put forward by Kidderminster Trust. Simultaneously, the campaign and ‘save our 
hospital’ march attracted the support of 5,000 people -  with 66,000 signatures on the petition. 
By spring of 1998, the Worcestershire HA had issued its report ‘Investing in Excellence’ after 
a three-month consultation. Pressure was brought to bear on central government, and the 
report was published immediately after the meeting of MPs in Worcestershire with the 
Minister of Health, Alan Milbum. The report emphasised the need for an increase in and 
upgrades of services, such as day-care and outpatient facilities, a new walk-in centre, 
state-of-the-art e-links with other hospitals, a minor injuries unit and a rehabilitation and 
recuperation service(Raftery and Harris 2005 p.30).
However, this did not quell local people’s frustration. In March 1998, 12,000 marched for the 
second time. The Worcestershire Branch of the BMA made its voice of dissatisfaction clear. 
Subsequently, several reports were produced for Wyre Forest District Council: ''Building on 
Excellence’ (King’s Fund) and ''Casting Care Aside’ (London Health Emergency, Lister 
Report). The former report essentially supported the Health Authority’s plan, whilst the latter 
criticised it for the following reasons. Primarily, the Health Authority took no account of the 
specific health needs of the hospital’s catchment population and never mentioned the 
possibility of job losses by reducing the number of beds from 300 to 35. MORI poll was also 
commissioned by the Community Health Council (CHC), Wyre Forest District Council and 
Kidderminster Hospital League of Friends. The results showed clearly that local people were 
against the Health Authority’s plan, and especially cuts to its emergency service. In May, the
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County Council motioned no confidence in the HA. Faced with this uprising, Wyre Forest MP 
Lock promised to broker a compromise, as did Conservative MP Christopher Gill from 
Ludlow, where people were also affected by the change at Kidderminster. People in mostly 
rural South Shropshire depended on the hospital services in Kidderminster.
A joint letter from the CHC and Wyre Forest District Council was sent to the Health 
Secretary of the time, Frank Dobson, threatening that the CHC might seek a Judicial Review. 
After a series of meetings, the HA offered some compromises. It proposed to increase bed 
numbers from 35 to 100 and retain inpatient surgery and a doctor-led A&E department at 
Kidderminster. Based on the King’s Fund Report, the bed number was increased to 140 with 
a computer link to consultants in Worcester. However, local people turned down the 
compromise. Lock was disappointed at the failed attempt of his brokerage, and showed his 
support for further campaign, pressing for direct communication with the Health Secretary. 
The HA chief executive Archer-Jones denied singling out Kidderminster, claiming “we 
cannot sustain three district general hospitals, so inevitably the smallest one with the smallest 
population must be the vulnerable one.” The CHC chairperson, Pauline Davis, stated in her 
reply that “Kidderminster General Hospital is an excellent hospital and the most efficient in 
the county. We feel that Kidderminster Hospital is being sacrificed for PFI in Worcester and 
in Dudley- we seem to be squeezed in between the two. Worcester needs a new hospital but 
not at the expense of Kidderminster” (Hoggarth 2002 p.35).
Phase 2: local mobilisation and the formation of a local party (1998-2001)
Despite all these efforts, on 11 June 1998, the HA decided to proceed with the plan. Yet 
gradually some supporters of the campaign changed their position in favour of the
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government-proposed plan26. In July 1998, local MP Lock resigned as a vice chair of the 
Save Hospital Campaign Committee. Appointed as an under-secretary to the Lord 
Chancellor in December 1997, it was reasonable for him to resign as a member of the 
government, especially when the CHC decided to take legal action against the government 
body Health Authority27. Yet the then government official commented that it was 
“unfortunate that his action was seen as a betrayal to his constituency” (E-2). The campaign 
gathered some momentum with support from the opposition parties. Liberal Democrat MP 
Simon Hughes and then Conservative Shadow Health Secretary Ann Widdecombe paid a 
visit and met members of the Kidderminster Health Care Trust board.
Later in 1998, forty thousand signatures were collected and delivered to Downing Street, 
although this did not yield any results. Health Minister Alan Milbum announced that 
Kidderminster Hospital would be cut from 300 to 120 beds, and there would instead be a 
consultant-led emergency centre staffed by nurse practitioners. In addition, telemedicine was 
proposed for Kidderminster, with an extra £1.4 million of investment. Clinical changes were 
anticipated over the next three to five years. In March 1999, the Secretary of State Frank 
Dobson visited Worcester to celebrate the signing of a PFI contract. The PFI full business 
case was approved by the NHS Executive and the HM Treasury. In response, the campaign 
took the decision to go into politics, under the name Health Concern.
In the May 1999 District Council elections, their candidates won 11 seats: seven in Wyre 
Forest and four in South Shropshire. Labour lost its overall control in Wyre Forest, which was 
seen as a blow to the government. The Conservative MP for Ludlow, Christopher Gill, won 
the Adjournment Debate in Parliament, and argued strongly against the project. In the
26 Dr. Butcher took part in the new Wyre Forest Primary Care Trust, while the Medical Director of 
the hospital Dr. Udeshi was promoted to the Board o f the new Worcestershire Acute Hospital NHS 
Trust in 2000.
27 A written judicial review was requested, though rejected in December 1998, as was an oral 
application in January 1999. The third attempt in May also ended in failure.
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meantime, the issue was largely neglected in the national media. Government officials sought 
to solve the issue by meeting halfway. Health Minister John Hutton visited Worcestershire in 
June 1999, and met people from Health Concern. Requests from the delegates included the 
following five points: effective local representation, patients treated to include those with a 
length of stay of up to five days, consultant cover for the local emergency centre to include a 
medical presence during the active day period, a research exercise to evaluate novel service 
changes such as telemedicine and ambulatory care and independent monitoring of service 
provision. The Minister in his November reply dismissed the figures presented to him as 
wrong28. His letter said ‘I am concerned that some of your worries may have been based on 
incorrect assumptions. In particular, your population figures and the current bed numbers 
quoted are incorrect. Whilst the total number of beds within Kidderminster General Hospital 
is around 300, these include beds in Tenbury Wells, which will remain, and inpatient adult 
psychiatry which is to be reprovided... leaving around 200 staffed beds (in use) at 
Kidderminster Hospital.’ Consequently, Health Watch (with former Kidderminster GP Dr. 
John Ball as chairperson) was established locally to commission research in order to obtain 
objective data.
Earlier in August, Lock issued a public statement in which he explained his change of stance 
on the hospital issue. “The campaign against any change was misconceived from the start 
and never had any informed support. I believe my duty as a Labour MP was to promote what 
was right and medically defensible, not to follow the latest popular whim or chase a populist 
agenda. That principled approach has led to criticism but now the plans are unfolding, 
supported by local GPs and the hospital consultants themselves, public opposition to the 
changes is dropping off, even the health campaigners accept that nine out of ten people will 
continue to be treated at Kidderminster”.
28 Letter to Health Concern, 1 October 1999 (Pollock et al. 2000).
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In the consultation document issued in November 1999, the merger of three acute trusts in 
the county was proposed and acquired support from both clinicians and Health Concern. As 
a result, three Worcestershire Acute Trusts merged -  Kidderminster, Alexandra and 
Worcester Trusts Community and Mental Health Services formed one Trust across 
Worcestershire in April 2000. The Project Manager, a former managing director of Austin 
Rover and an ex-chairman of the Heartlands and Solihull NHS Trust, Harold Musgrove, was 
appointed as Chairperson, with Ruth Harrison as Chief Executive of the new Worcestershire 
Acute Hospitals NHS Trust. On the Trust board, former chairman Nicholls of the District 
Council became a non-executive member, and withdrew his support from the campaign after 
the success of Health Concern.
Phase 3: Kidderminster shock, small readjustment of policies, and new agenda of 
‘keeping the NHS local9 (2001 onwards-)
Following this amalgamation, the reconfiguration of services at Kidderminster hospital was 
hastened by 18 months in September 2000, not April 2002 as had been originally planned. 
The new Worcestershire Acute Trust Board stated that it would be better to ‘get the merger 
over and done with and give everybody the opportunity to get his or her fair share of the 
facilities in the new (PFI) hospital’. (Raftery and Harris 2005: 22-23). At local elections in 
May 2000, Health Concern continued to contest more seats in the District Councils, and 
gained 19 seats (Figure 8). Nonetheless, as scheduled in September 2000, Kidderminster 
A&E Department closed, and around 200 acute surgical and medical beds moved to 
Worcester. Six maternity beds, 24 rehabilitation beds, 20 day-case beds, mental health beds 
and outpatient departments remained on the site.
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In the general election of June 2001, Dr Richard Taylor, retired consultant physician of 
Kidderminster Hospital, won the Wyre Forest seat as an Independent candidate supported by 
Health Concern, with the backing from both the Liberal Democrats and locally based Liberal 
Party. He defeated the former junior minister, John Lock, and became the second 
independent MP after World War II29. This was quite a shock to the whole British electoral 
institution, where the system was based on two main parties, alternating in government. As
29 The first independent MP is former journalist Martin Bell, who seized the Tatton seat in 1997. As 
a friend, Bell helped Dr Taylor’s campaign.
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an immediate reaction from Westminster, Dr Taylor was appointed a member of the 
parliamentary health select committee, as the Conservatives gave up one allocated seat for 
him. Criticism in the printed media surged after the election, as the shock result in 
Kidderminster highlighted ‘a huge gulf between government and public’ (Butler 2001) over 
the way changes are made in the NHS. In the midst of the Kidderminster shock, central 
government responded, although not directly to the issue of the downgraded hospital in 
Kidderminster, but in order to change the rules of the game. The government claimed that it 
would give more power to local councils to monitor and scrutinise local service changes, and 
set up an Independent Reconfiguration Panel to adjudicate contested issues. In May 2002, 
Health Concern took control of the District Council. Accordingly, planning for a treatment 
centre came under discussion with Wyre Forest PCT in June 2002, followed by its 
construction in November 2002. Since the establishment of PCTs across Worcestershire, 
commissioning of health services was widened. The government agreed to give 20 beds back 
to the hospital and install a new surgery unit costing 14 million. Despite some positive 
developments, the original plan of the PFI-built Worcester Hospital was never suspended, 
and the Kidderminster and District General Hospital was downgraded, with some minor 
changes. The political action - sending a local representative and medical professional to 
parliament - was not particularly effective in delivering a locally-favoured solution. 
“Winning elections, especially in modem British politics, and especially for reformers of 
public services, is barely even a start.”(Beckett 2002)
In spite of the limited effects on Kidderminster hospital itself, the campaign did have some 
nation-wide impact on government policy. In February 2003, ‘Keeping the NHS Local’ was 
published by the Department of Health as a precursor to the launch of the Independent 
Reconfiguration Panel in April 2003 which was set up in order to ‘take the politics out’ of
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reconfiguration (Farrington-Douglas with Brooks, 2007: 4 1)30. The report was ‘the direct 
result from Kidderminster shock’ (E-3). Around the same time, Dr Taylor held a national 
seminar for other prospective Parliamentary candidates who have contested hospital 
reconfigurations in their areas. Politically, there is no doubt that it had a significant impact 
on a national scale, and the ‘K-word’ (Kidderminster) became very well known in political 
and NHS management circles (E-4). Even though no other cases followed suit in the same 
fashion as Kidderminster -  i.e. local campaigns against hospital closure leading to a 
successful campaign to send individual candidates to a parliamentary seat - there have been 
some candidates standing at regional and local level (Scottish Parliament and Northern 
Ireland Assembly in 2003, and Enfield Council in 2006). When the government’s hospital 
modernisation plans, using the PFI, attracted severe criticism, they were shelved for fear of 
‘Kidderminster-style political revolts’ (TG, 24 September 2004). However, the limited 
damage to the whole political system was a sign of the resilience of the political institutional 
design, with party politics succeeding in putting the issue back into formal institutional 
channels. In parliament, Taylor also broadened his policy expertise, away from this single 
issue (E-5), and won another election in 2005, albeit with much fewer votes31. The number 
of articles covering the general election increased, but criticism directed towards government 
did not arise.
Nonetheless, from 2006 onwards, public criticism surged once again. This was because the 
government’s planned budget cuts for the NHS began to affect some hospitals in the country, 
and accordingly Kidderminster-type protests were launched locally. In places such as 
Redditch, Ludlow, the Forest of Dean, Huddersfield, Nuneaton, Haylo, Nottingham, 
Banbury, Huntingdon and Stroud, petitions were gathered against the hospital cuts and
30 The Independent Reconfiguration Panel, a non-departmental advisory body, was established in 
April 2003 to “provide advice to the Secretary of State for health on contested proposals for health 
service change in England” (http://www.irpanel.org.uk/).
31 Dr. Taylor in an interview admitted himself that ‘campaigns to save local facilities were driven in 
some part by emotion’ (BBC December 2005, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/health/6207278.stm).
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reconfigurations. In defence of this development, the then Labour Party chair, Hazel Blears, 
and the Health secretary, Patricia Hewitt, drew "heat maps" showing where reorganisation 
was proving controversial and could cost Labour seats (BBC News 2006). The weakness of 
the English health system on the party-political dimension was repeatedly revealed. 
Moreover, the Labour Party members’ cautious attitudes demonstrated the fear of repeating 
the Kidderminster shock in each constituency.
4.2.3 Responsiveness in England
The responsiveness of central government was secured by the electoral shock in Wyre Forest 
(Kidderminster), as rightly predicted by the election-conscious government model. The 
Liberal Democrats fully supported the independent candidate Dr Taylor during the campaign. 
After the election, even the Conservative Party gave up a seat in the Health Committee to Dr 
Taylor. Therefore, the opposition parties congratulated him on defeating the Labour Party 
candidate who was serving as a junior minister. Simultaneously, the robustness of the formal 
institutions was clearly shown after he entered Westminster. As an individual MP, Dr Taylor 
had to rely on the Liberal Democrats for advice and information. His identity as a 
single-issue candidate did not always help him, and he had to broaden his policy expertise. 
Soon after he was elected, he started to claim that his mission was not simply to ‘save the 
hospital’ (E-5).
Given that there was only a minor increase in the number of beds at the Kidderminster 
hospital, the impact of the electoral result on the specific policy amendment was small. 
However, politicians’ hesitance to support local hospital reconfigurations was intensified, 
and the ‘K-word’ became a buzzword among NHS managers, civil servants and elected 
officials as a stark reminder of such a local revolt. The government implemented broad 
policy change to its plans for local hospital reconfiguration with its ‘Keeping the NHS local’ 
report. This was the direct result of the Kidderminster shock (E-3).
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Therefore, political institutions proved robust and resilient. Yet the vulnerability of the 
English health system to electoral pressure remained present, yielding the government 
response of broad policy change and promoting more risk-averse behaviour among the 
elected officials. Moreover, the hospital reconfiguration issue was not easily taken out of 
party politics. The result showed that the policy responsiveness of central government can be 
secured quite effectively through the ballot box, irrespective of the low-low pressure with 
only a local dimension.
4.3 Sweden: Sunderby Hospital
4.3.1 Background: decentralisation and debate over the merger of two local 
hospitals
Norrbotten County lies in the northernmost part of the country. Since the early 1980s, 
demographic changes such as a decreasing population and an ageing society stimulated 
discussions about the future of hospitals in the towns of Lulea and Boden. Lulea is the 
county capital, with 73,000 inhabitants, whereas Boden is traditionally a military town 
dependent on the two large employers (the army and the municipality, which runs the 
railway industry and hospital). By the end of the 1980s, forty-seven percent of men and 78 
percent of women were employed by the public sector. There were seven general hospitals in 
1960, which was reduced to six in 1970. At that time, the issue of concentrated resources had 
been a matter of discussion in order to keep up with technological advancement as well as to 
maintain the level of care with an insufficient number of doctors. As the garrison town, 
Boden was given precedence over other towns as potentially the best location for a special 
care hospital (Lindqvist 2000). However, as the military base continued to shrink, the 
population decreased by 2,000 over a period of ten years. The Swedish state railways moved 
out of town, as did the post office administration. The newspaper of the social democrats, 
Norrlandska Socialdemokraten (NSD), was relocated to Lulea. On the other hand, 
Norrbotten’s capital Lulea attracted investment and grew thanks to the SSAB steelworks and
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university (Lulea University of Technology). Therefore, tension had already existed between 
the two cities prior to the issue of the merger of two hospitals rearing its head.
On a national level, healthcare policy had also been extensively reviewed and discussed in 
parallel with public-sector reform since the 1980s. But since the 1982 Health Care Act 
established a popularly-supported decentralised health system, political accountability has 
rested with county councils. Not only financial responsibility but also resource allocation 
decisions were all devolved to elected officials at county council level. County councils were 
to make decisions according to the needs of the residents. Thus, little scope was left to 
national political parties for developing practical ideas over health provision. However, as 
soon as the model was established, it soon became evident that hospital service provision 
required further changes for reconstructing its finances and tackling staff shortages. 
Inefficient resources, prolonged waiting lists for certain operations and lengthy 
hospitalisation of elderly patients began to be recognised as major problems (Petersson 1991; 
The Economist 1988; Dagens Nyheter 1991). The lack of physicians in primary care became 
conspicuous, as did geographical difference. In many county councils, resources were 
previously distributed to clinics according to the length of queues, which provided 
disincentives to tackling the situations, and actually worsened them. The central hospital in 
Boden suffered from insufficient specialist doctors, physiotherapists, occupational therapists 
and trained nurses (Cervantes 2005 p. 14). These are the contexts for discussion of the merger 
issue in Norrbotten.
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4.3.2 Episode and Analysis
Phase 1: responsive parties split between cities over local hospital merger (1989-1994) 
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Figure 10: Number of reports critical of government and medical professions 
(‘Bodens lasarett’ and ‘Sjukvardspartiet’, Dagens Nyheter, 1992-2006)
(Phase 1: 1989 - 1994; Phase 2: 1994 - 1998; Phase 3: 1998 - 2002; Phase 4: 2002 )
In Norrbotten, the ten-year plan for the county had been under discussion since 1984, and was 
published under the title of ‘Health and Hospital care in Norrbotten County Council in the 
1990s’32. It set out the target as better health without increasing costs (Carlsson and Myrlund 
1999 p.7). Local newspaper NS (October 26 1989) wrote that ‘doctors want a big hospital, but 
politicians prefer to keep two district hospitals’. Subsequently, a committee was set up to 
produce a report in October 1990. The committee was made up of the main stakeholders, 
including the Swedish Association of Health Officers (SHSTF)33, Swedish Union of Local 
Government Officers (SKTF), Municipal Workers’ Union (SKAF), Swedish Confederation of 
Professional Associations (SACO/SR) and four doctors. In their publication, ‘Medical Quality
32 Halso- och sujvarden i Norrbottens lan infor 1990-talet (in Swedish)
33 The Swedish Association of Health Officers is the representative body for nurses, midwives and 
medical laboratory technologists in Sweden, and has 112,000 members.
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and Safety’(Norrbottens lan Landstinget 1990) they proposed that a single hospital between 
Lulea and Boden would be conducive to health developments in the region for many reasons, 
such as resource concentration for high technologies, economic efficiency and recruitment of 
doctors. Nonetheless, the following remittal debates demonstrated that people were not 
necessarily welcoming towards the recommendations. Trade unions in Alvsbyn and Boden 
and the Left Party in Boden expressed their wish to keep the hospital in their town, while their 
counterparts in Lulea preferred otherwise. Amidst rumours that people in Boden were 
betrayed, 5000 residents of the town gathered for a protest march by torch light (NSD 16 
November 1990). Under such highly controversial circumstances, a survey was conducted by 
the Central Bureau of Statistics in collaboration with Lulea University of Technology to test 
the level of support for the plan among local people. The results however exhibited people’s 
rather lukewarm welcome for the new hospital idea. To the question ‘is it necessary to have a 
new regional hospital in Norrbotten?’, 39.1% responded in the negative. As for the location, 
those who replied ‘yes for Boden’ accounted for 28.4%, while 12.5% said ‘yes for Lulea’, 
13.9% ‘yes, in between these two cities (Sjukhuset mittemellan)’, and 1.9% ‘somewhere else’ 
(Statistiska Centralbyran 1991). It clearly showed that the issue was highly divisive along the 
geographical boundary and that it would be difficult to reach a consensus among the local 
residents.
The subsequent year of 1991 saw continuous arguments in the County Council, with sharper 
divisions growing within both Social Democrats and Leftists. Although the majority in the 
council supported the proposal from the executive committee to have a single hospital, 
motions were put forward by two Social Democrats (Toivo Hofslagare and Hans Rolfs from 
Boden), one Liberal (Gote Pettersson from Lulea) and one Leftist, who was also a doctor 
(Tomas Kanter from Lulea). Parties and interest groups (mainly trade unions) were divided 
into two camps along the geographic areas (i.e. Boden vs. Lulea) and faced a stalemate until 
late 1992. The County Council-commissioned inquiry produced four reports in late 1992. The 
first report ‘Hospital Care in Transition’(Norrbottens lan. Landstinget 1992a) emphasised the
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significance of competition and quality improvement. The second report ‘Contents of 
Hospital Care’ (Norrbottens Ian. Landstinget 1992c), spelled out the different roles and 
functions that each hospital should play in terms of both care and the medical profession’s 
training, suggesting that the integrated enterprise is not just a local matter, but intended for the 
whole region. The third report ‘Organisation of Hospital Care’(Norrbottens lan. Landstinget 
1992d) argued the merit of having the single emergency hospital. The last report ‘Main 
Functions of Hospital Care’(Norrbottens lan. Landstinget 1992b) described possible activities 
at the regional hospital. Yet, reactions to the reports were mixed, and the reports could not 
solve divided opinions. No single document could put forward a convincing case.
In addition to this, the non-social democratic newspaper Norrbottens-Kuriren (NK) 
independently conducted the survey among local residents on this new hospital issue in 
February 1993. The survey discovered that 51% responded negatively to the new single 
hospital, whereas 25% answered ‘yes’ and 24% said ‘do not know’ (NK February 8 1993). 
Among the positives, 30% said ‘a hospital in Boden’, 22% ‘a hospital in Lulea’ and 31% ‘a 
hospital in between (Sjukhuset mittemellan)’. Even though the survey had a very small 
sample of a hundred people, it indicated that (1) the plan was unpopular overall and (2) 
support for Boden appeared greater. Interestingly, the compromise for a site between the two 
towns had already been suggested as the most popular answer.
In order to reach a consensus and make a decision, the only possible way was to solve 
disagreements within the Social Democrats. With the initiative taken by the chairman of the 
district party, Anders Sundstrom, a compromise was made. Though an alternative site at 
Porso (near the university) was proposed, Sunderbyn, half way between the two towns, was 
selected formally as the best place for a new hospital at the party congress in Kalix (16 April 
to 26 May 1993, Socialdemokratiska partiets ditriktsstyrelse). The transfer of hospitals had 
wider implications for the local labour market, and Sundstrom strongly supported the plan for 
the regional development (S-l). In June 1993, this proposal was passed with a majority of
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seven (39 in favour, 32 against). This was a close call, given that the Social Democrats had 40 
seats (out of 71). The Centre Party, a traditionally agrarian political group, was opposed, on 
the grounds that the party supports real local people’s voices (S-2). Christian Democrats on 
the other hand insisted on supporting the plan, as it saw a potential opportunity to attain the 
party goal of replacing the old public hospital model with their new one, which would be run 
by a voluntary organisation. Other political parties were all divided on this issue based on the 
constituency. Therefore, the issue was divided, Boden versus Lulea. In particular, the 
governing SAP was tom between local interests. Out of 40 members in the council, 27 voted 
for the Sunderbyn plan, while 13 supported Boden (Carlsson and Myrlund 1999 p. 18). This 
was a result of political parties trying to respond to local voters in the decentralised health 
care model, with party cohesiveness disrupted by their allegiance to the respective local 
communities, which led to the deadlock.
Phase 2: emergence of a new party as the second largest party (1994-1998)
The handling of the issue was further criticised by local politicians, residents and even by the 
national media (DN, 20/21 September 1994). Criticism was targeted primarily at the way in 
which the issue became dominated by internal decision making mechanisms of the dominant 
Social Democratic Party, and not openly discussed in the county council. The sense that 
local voices were neglected angered local people and led to the subsequent formation of a 
new local party based on this single issue (S-19). Kenneth Backgard stood up and founded 
Norrbotten Sjukvardsparti (NS). In the 1994 county council election, NS obtained 19 seas 
out of 71 at the county council election, accounting for one quarter, making it the second 
largest political group in the assembly. The success of the NS was partially boosted by 
informal support from the Left and the Greens (S-3). On the other hand, the ‘establishment’ 
party in the region, Social Democrats, lost 6 seats, as well as its single majority position.
The emergence of this new party shook the political map and changed not only the attitudes 
of the SAP but also that of other parties. The NS was as much a threat to the SAP as to the
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non-socialist parties, such as the Cente and Moderates. During the session in 1994, 
hospital-related bills were all shelved because each was objected to by opposition parties. 
The question became whether they should hold a referendum on this issue and ask for local 
people’s verdict. On 25 November, voting was carried out. NS and the Centre Party were the 
two proponents of the referendum, but threatened by the risk of losing the referendum, SAP 
had been all united against the idea, except for 3 members. By this time, threatened by the 
triumphant result of the NS, the SAP essentially decided to stand in unity for the new 
hospital plan. In 1994, the SAP came btck to power at national level. The mediator, who 
succeeded in uniting local SAP groups together through tough times, Sundstom34, was made 
the Secretary of State for Employment. Eventually, construction of Sunderby Hospital was 
given the go-sign, and started in 1995.
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Figure 11: Electoral results (Norrbotten: Riksdag (%) (1994-2006))
The new hospital was inaugurated in September 1999 with praise for its very modem, 
environmentally friendly and patient-lriendly style. The brochure chooses a careful
34 Later in 1996, he became Secretary of State for Enterprise, Energy and Communications from 
1996 until 1998, and after the election in 1S98, he was appointed Secretary of State for Health and 
Social Affairs. But he remained in the position only 20 days, and resigned to become a CEO of a 
regional bank, Pitedalens Sparbank (AftonblaJet, October 26 1998).
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description of the Sunderby Hospital as a ‘local hospital for Lulea and Boden and a regional 
hospital for all of Norrbotten’(Norrbotten County Council 2002). Failing to deliver its 
promises, it seemed that the raison-d’etre of the NS was lost. The party lost eight seats at the 
1998 election, and the Left Party returned came back as the second largest.
However, the hospital issue did not disappear from county council elections. Similar 
movements had already begun in different parts of the country, as each had its own separate 
root. It was no surprise given that the country was hit heavily by economic downturns in the 
early 1990s, and most county councils suffered similar financial problems (S-4). Yet it was 
also clear that people in the North were more sensitive to the closing down of a hospital, due 
to geographic reasons (remoteness from hospitals) and demographic (rapidly greying 
population). In the same year as the NS was established, the healthcare party was formed in 
the neighbouring Vastemorrland.
The health party, on a similar platform, stood for election to the county council and municipal 
assembly (Hamosand) and won 8 and 6 seats respectively. They continuously kept the seats 
(7 and 5 in county councils and 7 and 6 in the municipal assembly) in two consecutive 
elections (1998 and 2002). Their debut and constant presence in the former SAP heartland 
signalled the end of the SAP reign in the Northern part of the country. The SAP lost more 
than 10% of the votes at national and local level since 1994, although a small comeback was 
seen in 2006. Nonetheless, with the average of 15-20% of votes constantly going to the NS at 
county council level, the established seven-party system appears to have been shaken at local 
level.
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Phase 3: similar local parties and the county council model in question (1998-2002)
Furthermore, with the creation of two regions (Skane and Vastra Gotaland), healthcare parties 
gained seats at the first election in 1998. In municipal elections in Simrishamn (Skane), the 
party (led by Gerd Holm) became the third largest after the Moderates and SAP with 9 seats 
(18%), whilst in Vastra Gotaland, the party called Healthcare Party: People’s Will (led by a 
former Centre Party politician, Rune Lanestrand) obtained 6 seats for the regional government 
(149 seats in total) and 3 seats in the municipality of Vanersborg (DN, September 21/22. 
1998).
The emergence of similar parties gradually but clearly altered SAP dominance, and also 
raised the question of the county council model of health care provision. In Simrishamn, the 
Healthcare Party in effect caused a change of administration with Social Democrats losing 7 
seats, bringing them from 19 to 12, and the Moderate Party becoming the largest with 16 seats. 
In Vastra Gotaland, more dramatic change was to occur. It was the case of Vastra Gotaland 
that came to light in the national newspapers from 1998 onwards. After the election, with the 
Healthcare Party holding the pivotal position, the two blocs (centre-left SAP-led camp vs. 
centre-right Moderate-led camp) numbered 74 and 75 respectively. Since the Centre Party
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Landstinsget (County)
refused to form an administration with the Healthcare Party, the new regional government 
began as a minority administration of the left-bloc (SAP, Left and Greens). However, it 
collapsed within two months when the proposed budget was rejected by the Healthcare Party. 
As the SAP leader (Roland Andersson) resigned his position as chair a change of 
administration occurred (DN, 24 October, 9-10 December 1998). The regional government 
was formed by the non-socialist party bloc (borgerlig) plus the Healthcare Party. The whole 
system of two-bloc politics at the county council was in a critical condition, as patterns of 
local politics surrounding hospital issues exhibited the breakaway from traditional left-right 
politics (DN, 9 September 1999). In May 2000, the fragility of the centre-right party 
administration led to another fall of government, and this time the SAP came back to power 
together with the Centre and the Liberals, reaching out beyond traditional bloc politics (DN, 
May 13 and 19 2000). A spokesperson for the Liberals and former parliamentarian, Eva 
Eriksson, commented that as a social liberal party, the Liberal Party would stay in coalition 
with the centre-right alliance, but at regional and local level, things are not necessarily the 
same (DN, 28 May 2000). In some other parts of the country, local SAP politicians began 
voicing their complaints about chronic deficits in acute hospitals in their areas and blamed the 
central government for those (DN, 24 July 2000).
The two regions (Skane and Vastra Gotaland) were the guinea pigs for testing a potential 
model to replace the county councils, combining health issues with regional development. At 
the beginning of this experiment, the Healthcare Parties held the pivotal role, which was not 
welcomed by mainstream party politicians, who raised concerns about the 
politically-accountable health system. The main concern was about the possibility of blocking 
any hospital reconfigurations in the region and undermining professional autonomy in clinical 
decision making. A change in the structure of health governance began to be regarded as 
imminent (S-5). For such regional restructuring to take place, central government needs to 
take initiatives. Party-political pressure, despite being channelled indirectly through the 
county council, was effective in putting the polity agenda back on centre stage.
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Phase 4: out of electoral cycle and the rise in public criticism (2002 onwards)
In the absence of issue saliency, pressure on government faded away one election after 
another, up until 2002. In Norrbotten, the NS embarked on a new agenda against the 
concentration of hospitals in the town centre. Once again, boosted by support from the Left 
and Greens, it won seventeen seats, returning as the second largest party. Healthcare parties 
also spread even more widely. Following the largest party in Norrbotten (23.1 per cent), 
similar parties notched up some votes in Varmland (17.4 per cent), Gavleborg (6.9 per cent), 
Vastemorrland (6.6 per cent), Vastra Gotaland (3.7 per cent), Dalama (2.1 per cent) and 
Uppland (0.4 per cent). In other counties such as Skane, Ostergotland, Stockholm, and 
Vastmanland, efforts did not yield much result. Just as in Vastra Gotaland, the Healthcare 
Party in Varmland became a coalition partner of the Moderate-led administration. The 
manifestos of these parties claimed that they are not committed to either of the two political 
blocs (‘obundet’), but in most cases, they found natural allies with the centre-right bloc, being 
critical of the government’s program of centralising resources into large hospitals.
In Norrbotten, at the national parliamentary election of the same year, NS collaborated with 
the regional anti-establishment party Norrbottensparti, based in Kiruna. Although the party 
did not succeed in passing the four per cent threshold to enter the Riksdag, it obtained nine 
per cent and became the third biggest party in the region. Joining a sister protest party for the 
government policy, the NS raised the hospital issue as part of the territorial inequality 
(between rich and poor areas). “Social Democrats in crisis” got the headline of an article, 
featuring the decline of the party in Norrbotten (DN, 30 January 2003). In 1994, the SAP 
held the single majority in the county as well as 11 of 14 municipalities in the region. In 
2002, the percentage of votes went down from over 50% to 38.3% for the county council, 
and the number of municipalities with its majority was reduced from II to only 3. From 
2003 onwards, criticisms began to be heard about the county council model. The Healthcare 
Party in Stockholm pledged to abolish the county council (DN, 19 May 2005). In May 2005,
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NS leader Backgard started to gather support from the other six parties across the country to 
form a national party for the Riksdag election in 2006. The platform of the party revealed a 
mixture of policies, from right and left (DN, 30 May 2005). The party criticised central 
government’s Stop law proposal (stopping public hospitals from being sold to for-profit 
firms, Chapter 5), but was not entirely in favour of privatisation either, as the party claimed 
that large county council hospitals should be kept public. In addition, the party manifesto 
included not only hospital matters, but also a proposal for tax reduction (decrease of VAT 
for petrol down to 6%) and maintenance of the defence industry, aiming to obtain votes from 
dissatisfied voters in sparsely-populated areas (DN, 3 August 2005).
The NS was bom out of a protest against local hospital closure in Boden, but as time went by, 
the party’s scope was expanded to encompass other grievances in rural areas, where a radical 
transformation of the employment scene occurred over the previous decade. Successive 
formation of similar parties across the country was not a coordinated effort, but shook 
traditional SAP-strongholds, including Norrbotten and the newly created super region Vastra 
Gotaland. It revealed how hospital issues could mobilise votes and erode traditional party 
support from local level. Each party was driven by its own aim of saving their local hospitals 
at county council level. Thus, pressure was contained within each county, never directly 
exerted upon central government. In an attempt to join the similar parties across the country, 
Backgard (the leader of the NS) faced the problem of justifying the aim of the national 
campaign. Eight county council-based parties (Norrbotten, Dalama, Gavleborg, Sormland, 
Skane, Stockholm, Uppland and Vastemorrland) agreed to contest a seat in the parliament 
together in 2006. Yet the two most influential healthcare parties in Varmland and Vastra 
Gotaland, with the experience of governing in the county council, opted out. This was a huge 
setback to the nationwide campaign of like-minded healthcare parties. The possibility of 
sending a member to the Riksdag virtually disappeared at this time.
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As concerted efforts among these small healthcare parties failed, their challenge to the 
established parties became negligible. Media attention on the parties was also scarce and 
sporadic. Although it was the first attempt to forge a national alliance on the hospital agenda, 
by 2006, government had already been committed to creating smaller clinics to remove 
pressure from large hospitals and tackling waiting times.
Therefore, the unremarkable result of the 2006 election for the Healthcare Party was 
somehow predicted. It only received 0.21% of the votes nationally, after the extreme right 
Swedish Democrats (2.93%), former leftist leader-led Feminist Initiative (0.68%). Yet at 
county council level, each party still held on to the balance of power. In Ostergotland, the 
local hospital party called Vrinnevilistan managed to receive 12 seats and is now playing a 
pivotal role. In Dalama, Healthcare Party has come into council with 3 seats. Also in Vastra 
Gotaland regional government, the healthcare party kept 6 seats and had kept a pivotal role. 
Similarly the party holds 4 seats in Vastmanland, 5 in Gavleborg, and 6 in Vastemorrland. In 
Norrbotten, the NS lost 4 seats but still holds 13 seats35.
Therefore, those healthcare parties have continued to challenge the established parties at 
county council level. Whether or not each of those campaigns succeeds in keeping their local 
hospitals is an issue, but with the new Moderate-led government, there is a high chance that 
the restructuring of the county council model will be reviewed. Electoral pressure carried by 
the emergence of Healthcare Parties ushered in the revision of the whole regional structure 
of health governance. In 2003, the government appointed the Responsibility Committee 
(Ansvarskommitten), to discuss reorganisation of regional and local governments. The main 
objective is to reduce the number of county councils, which are the main health purchasers in 
the country. De-politicisation of the health service planning process was also envisaged 
alongside the reform plan (S-5). SMA, the main union federation LO (Landsorganisationen)
35 Swedish Election Authority’s website: http://www.val.se/.
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along with some centre-right parties (especially Moderates and Liberals) advocate the 
elimination of that layer of government entirely. Some claim responsibility of the hospital 
sector should be transferred to central government, as is the case in Norway. The committee 
has been reviewing the structure of government and the division of responsibility for all 
public services, with a special focus on healthcare, and is due to report in 2007 (Ministry of 
Finance 200336). There is a strong case for reducing the number of county councils to 
perhaps half a dozen or fewer. Interestingly, from 2002 onwards, issue saliency (i.e. the 
number of articles) of the healthcare parties slightly increased and were detached from the 
electoral cycle. This was partly due to the fact that the NS began negotiating with other 
healthcare parties to launch a national campaign. Accordingly, more criticism was targeted at 
the lack of funding and initiatives from the centre, to which central government showed no 
response.
4.3.3. Responsiveness in Sweden
Given the indirectness of pressure applied through the county council, it is highly difficult to 
determine whether electoral pressure shaped the responsiveness of central government to 
criticism from the general public. Electoral competition indeed put a strain on government 
policies, but not directly. In this case, public criticisms were mostly carried by those fresh 
new political parties, run by local people, rather than the printed media. Criticism was also 
not so much about what central government did as the limited capacity of government. In 
other words, it was the lack of a coherent national hospital policy that the Healthcare Party 
was attacking. As a result, electoral shocks produced panic reactions from mainstream 
parties and the following cautious approach to hospital closedowns in each county, but not 
the overhaul of hospital policy. Local politicians claim that they were all aware of the risk of
36 Ministry o f Finance (2003) Kommittedirektiv, Dir. No. 10, Stockholm. The final report stated that 
the reforms will transform the country into six to nine regions with one to two millions inhabitants 
each, and at least one university with research capacity and one university hospital (DN, 26 February 
2007).
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losing their seats if they supported such unpopular policies, and some hospitals were closed 
down only under extreme financial constraints (S-3). Under the decentralised system, where 
local politicians have to be accountable for hospital issues, pragmatic politics has to take 
over the significance of the cohesion of political parties.
The case demonstrated that political pressure from the locality was contained in the county, 
and did not influence policy direction of central government nor cause immediate response. 
Yet the pressure intensified the argument about the county council model and sparked 
discussions about more effective hospital reforms without political interventions. With 
relatively lower threshold of entry to electoral contests in Sweden, local elections therefore 
functioned as a signalling mechanism of conveying dissatisfactions of local people and 
challenged the capacity of central government in health care provision. Formal (electoral) 
institutions successfully filtered and stopped the pressure at local level, and public debates 
about the possible restructuring of a territorial unit (i.e. abolishment of the county council 
mode of health provision) continued.
4.4 Japan: Akune Hospital
4.4.1 Background: the very first national hospital for sale
As previously mentioned, the Japanese fragmented health system consists of plural providers, 
which compounds the issue of political accountability. In particular, hospitals do not 
normally constitute an electoral issue at any level of government. Yet, an anomalous case 
took place in the late 1980s, when a national hospital was transferred to the JMA, as part of 
the government rationalisation plan. In the mid-1980s, the government decided to privatise 
or close down national hospitals, and the Akune Byoin (Akune Hospital, renamed as Akune
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Citizens’ Hospital) was the very first one to be sold. Akune lies in Kagoshima prefecture, the 
southern-most prefecture on Kyushu37.
Rural areas in Japan are typically known as “hoshu-okoku (conservative kingdoms)” (i.e. 
safe seats for the LDP). Medical service provision has been disproportionately concentrated 
in the Western part of the country38. The number of health care facilities, including dental 
clinics, per 100,000 people in Kagoshima was ranked third (15.5) in 1981, against a national 
average of 7.8 (AS, 19 December 1982). Therefore, it was hardly surprising that the area 
became a hotbed of vested interests of private doctors and was selected for the first wave for 
bed reduction, given that there is no political accountability in the system. By the time Prime 
Minister Nakasone embarked upon neo-liberal reforms in the early 1980s, Kagoshima had 
been one of the most lavish spenders on health in the nation.
Since medical services for all those who are over 70 years old became free of charge in 1973, 
health costs soared nationally. By the end of the decade, the LDP pamphlet “the 
Japanese-style Welfare Society”39 came to emphasise the negative side of the Swedish and 
British welfare state as a bad model leading to economic malaise and social decadence. As 
the popularity of the LDP bounced back and the stable majority of the LDP was secured, the 
proposed Health and Medical Service Law for the Aged was submitted to the Diet in 1981. 
Inter-ministerial agreement on the National Health Insurance reform was also reached 
between the MOF, MHW and Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Second Ad Hoc Council on 
Administrative Reform thus deliberated between 1981 and 1983 under Nakasone. Under his
37 Japan is geographically made of four primary islands (Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Shikoku), 
and administratively forty-seven prefectures (1 “D5”, 1 ‘T o ”, 2 “Fu”, 43 “Ken”) Kyushu is the 
southern-most of the four main Japanese islands.
38 The situation is described as “Seiko-Totei”, meaning a higher density o f facilities in the West, 
lower in the East.
39 The Japanese-style Welfare Society (the Liberal Democratic Party Research Series, the LDP 
Public Relations Committee Publication, 1979).
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leadership, three public corporations40 were privatised. Free medical care for the elderly 
came to an end in 1983, as out-of-pocket payment was re-introduced.
In parallel, the Medical Care Law was amended in December 1985, followed by the Health 
and Medical Service Law for the Aged (amendment) in 1986, the Laws aimed to reform the 
medical services provision structurally. “The Basic Plan for Reorganisation and 
Rationalisation of National Hospitals and Sanatoriums”41 was also published by the MWH 
in March 1985. This signalled the end of the expansion period, with a clearly established 
restriction of the ‘standard number of beds’ for each district. The governor in each prefecture 
was granted the discretion to decide whether the number of new hospitals or new beds 
should be restricted in the ‘oversupplied’ areas. Against this backdrop, the privatisation of 
the national hospital became contested.
In May 1983, the cabinet agreed on ‘measures to implement administrative reform’, 
whereupon the MHW drew up its 10-year “Basic Plan for Reorganisation and 
Rationalisation of National Hospitals and Sanatoriums” in 1985. The plan stated that within 
ten years, the number of national hospitals and sanatoriums would be reduced from 239 to 
165, after merging 40 and transferring 34 hospitals42. In September 1987, a bill entitled 
‘Special Measures for Reorganisation of National Hospitals’ (Reorganisation Act) was 
passed. Akune National Hospital in Kagoshima became the first target to be sold off. Akune 
Hospital was founded as one of the National Sanatorium Corporations during the war. As the 
number of tuberculosis patients decreased, the hospital became more of a general hospital, 
with two surgical wards and one general medical ward (45 beds for tuberculosis, 150 beds
40 Japan National Railways (JNR), Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT), and the Tobacco and 
Salt Monopoly Corporation).
41 In Japanese, the plan was called “Kokuritsu-byoin/Ryoyo-jo no Saihensei/Gorika no 
Kihon-hoshin”.
42 The Ministry of Health and Welfare (9 January 1986).
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for general patients). It was constantly managed under an annual deficit of 200,000,000 JPY 
(roughly 1 million GBP43).
Akune-city had 29,000 residents, of whom 18% were over 65 years old (1985). Even though 
Kagoshima prefecture was known for the large number of hospitals per capita in the country, 
only 3 hospitals existed in the city, compared to 16 in the neighbouring city of Kawanai 
(population 72,000). Additionally, the high proportion of elderly residents (one in six, 
compared to one in four in the overall prefecture) in the city exacerbated local people’s 
apprehension that they would be deserted not only by the young but also by government 
which should provide national hospitals in rural areas.
4.4.2 Episode and Analysis
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Figure 13: Number of reports critical of government and medical professions 
(‘Akune Byoin’, Asahi Shimbun, 1985-1999)
(Phase 1: 1987 - 1988; Phase 2: Jan - Oct 1989; and Phase 3: Oct - Dec 1989)
43 1 GBP =200 JPY (MS, 17 April 1989).
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Phase 1: city council’s U-tum and launch of ‘save hospital’ campaign (1987-1988)
At the outset, Kagoshima was united at both prefecture and city level against the government 
plan to sell off or merge the two hospitals in the prefecture (Akune and Shibushi). The 
Governor of Kagoshima, Kamane Kamata44 launched a campaign to put pressure on 
government to retain the hospitals. However, later in 1987, following the detailed procedures 
and conditions set out in the new Reorganisation Act, the Izumi area JMA branch (President 
Yoshiomi Hanakita) pressed the city council to seal the transfer deal. Negotiation between 
the two parties then began. The move was precipitated by anti-JMA doctor and Independent 
(later Liberal League) Diet member Torao Tokuda’s potential move to open his own clinic at 
the national hospital site. The JMA needed to preempt the move, and its natural allies, 
conservative local councillors, had to take action to stop any other providers entering the 
local market (AS, 7 December 1989). Accordingly in June 1988, Akune city council 
performed a U-tum and passed the resolution in favour of the JMA plan with a huge majority 
(21 in favour, 2 against) on the condition that the new hospital maintain comprehensive 
services, and would expand the facilities. The city decided now to press government to 
swiftly sell the hospital to the JMA local branch. The committee leader in the council, 
Kuniyoshi Beppu made a statement that ‘what local citizens want is a comprehensive 
hospital as soon as possible. Now that the condition is met, there is no need to go against the 
plan/ (Minami-nihon Shimbum (MS), June 26 1988)
Feeling betrayed by the U-tum of the council’s own internal decision, the campaign against 
the transfer was launched in August 1988. By 27 August, the group led by the trade union of 
the hospital (leader Yasunori Oota) succeeded in gathering petitions from nearly 70% of the 
electorate in the city (14,332, or 66.54% of the total 21,538) (MS, 29 August 1988). The 
MHW commented that ‘transfer is decided based on local people’s will, and how they reach
44 After Kamata stepped down as governor in 1989, he ran for the House of Councillors as a Liberal 
Democrat candidate and served there for two terms.
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the consensus is their own matter, not that of the government.’ (MS, 4 September 1988) 
Comment appeared in the regional newspaper’s column criticising the local JMA’s ‘arrogant 
attitudes’ for sneakily presenting its plan as if it had already been agreed and accepted by 
local people (MS, 19 September 1988). On 27 November, the ‘Save hospital’ campaign 
group was officially founded with 700 members, and set up its office inside the hospital. The 
leader of the group was the former local junior-high school teacher Fujio Sekimoto. Yet the 
following day, the tone of the regional newspaper column was different, and critical of the 
campaign group. The article underlined the fact that if all local people wish for was ‘a 
comprehensive hospital with high and new technology’ and aim to secure good quality care 
in the region, they should not cling on to the idea of maintaining “the national hospital” (MS, 
28 November 1988). The city mayor Katsuki Shinhatsu had a brief discussion with the 
MHW, but announced that his position would be ‘wait and see’, in anticipation of a good 
result from the negotiation between the MHW and the JMA. This de facto go-sign from a 
local people’s representative further infuriated the ‘save hospital’ campaigners. Fujimoto 
commented that ‘the city council as well as the mayor is only the mouthpiece of medical 
association, and does not represent local people’s voices’. (MS, 9 December 1988) Soon 
after this, the campaign group decided to appeal to the council to enact an ordinance (jyorei) 
to press for a local referendum over the issue. Given the lack of strong opposition parties, 
and strong ties between the LDP and the JMA, U-tums by the city assembly and the mayor 
were not surprising. It was a typical policy development based on the tripartite deal between 
the JMA, the LDP and the MHW.
Phase 2: ineffectiveness of government persuasion and support from opposition party, 
and transfer dividing the community (January -  October 1989)
In response to the launch of the local campaign in January 1989, the MHW held a local 
meeting to explain its plan to begin the transfer from 1 October. The campaign group 
assembled and criticised the way the government handled the issue and made a deal behind
closed doors. At the local meeting, the MHW noted that ‘national hospitals are under direct 
jurisdiction of government and should not be subject to a local referendum’, in contradiction 
to their previous stance (‘the decision rests with local people’s own agreement’). (MS, 28 
January 1989) The Diet members in the opposition also began responding to the matter. In 
February, the Socialist group from the Diet paid a visit to Akune city to see the hospital, and 
promised that they would act to put pressure on government. The MHW declared its 
intention not to make any U-tum, on the grounds that the other JMA hospitals in the 
prefecture all had good records and the government had no budget to sustain the facility. In 
the same month, 800 residents joined the demonstration in the street.
The petition for a local referendum continued until mid-March, and gathered 13,266 
signatures, which is 60% of the total electorate (the necessary threshold is 20%). In May, the 
special committee, consisting of all the 23 councillors, was set up, and discussed the matter 
of the referendum, but 21 voted ‘no’ to the idea, with only 2 in favour. The reason was the 
same as that of the MHW. That is, the national hospital is under the MHW’s jurisdiction and 
therefore not an appropriate issue for a local referendum (MS, 9 May 1989).
In the Diet committee of social affairs, as promised, the Socialist Party Kiichi Murayama 
posed a question to Welfare Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, over the transfer. The Minister’s 
response was the same as that of the previous minister: “steady steps should be taken to 
realise the plan while making efforts to hold discussions and consultations in the local 
community” (MS, 26 May 1989). This meant that the pressure from the opposition party just 
met a rebuff from the governing party.
Since the appeal for local referendum was turned down by the council (i.e. local people’s 
own representatives), the campaign decided to recall the council. One third of the electorate 
(7,380 signatures) is necessary for such measures to put into effect, and the campaign began 
gathering signatures again for a month from 24 July. The petition with 9,700 signatures 
(8,855 of which were accepted as legitimate) was submitted to the city electoral commission
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on 29 August. Nonetheless, prior to this, on 9 August 1989, the agreement between the 
MHW and the Shusui area JMA branch was finalised, which said the transfer would be 
enacted from 1 October. The MHW officially repeated its stance that local people’s wishes 
are represented by the council (MS, 11 September 1989). In response to this government 
action, patient groups also took legal action against the government at Kagoshima District 
Court, and asked for provisional disposition of their rights ‘to be treated at the Akune 
National Hospital after October, 1989’. It was dismissed, however, for there was to be no 
downgrading of quality of care after the transfer (MS, 30 September 1989). The hospital was 
eventually re-opened as a private enterprise on 1 October, while protestors continued to 
demonstrate in front of the hospital. Twenty-four workers out of 104 remained in the hospital 
under its new ownership, and the remaining 80 were transferred elsewhere.
Phase 3: sacking of the council and fresh local election (October -  December 1989)
The hospital was therefore transferred without any actual consensus among local people. A 
petition with 8,713 signatures (142 were deducted after a dispute caused by an opposition 
group’s appeal) calling for the dissolution of the local council was officially upheld on 10 
October, and the date for a local referendum on whether to sack the council was decided on 3 
December. In the Diet committee, Socialist party Diet member (and later Prime Minister) 
Tomiichi Murayama once again posed to the Secretary of State for Health Saburo Toida 
questions concerning his predecessors’ broken promises that there would be enough 
consultation and consensus among citizens when implementing the government’s ten-year 
national hospital reorganisation plan in 1985. Toida strongly held on to the government’s 
original claim that there was an agreement with the city assembly, the mayor, governor and 
provider (JMA) (Minutes from Budget Committee, House of Representatives, 12 October 
1989). His position was that democratically elected councillors, the mayor and governor 
formally and fully represented local people’s voices.
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At this stage, as the hospital ownership was already lawfully transferred to the JMA, the 
point of the recall was not directly related to the hospital issue, but to the issue of distrust of 
the legitimacy of the local council and democratic process in general. A local referendum 
was held on 3 December, with 56.5% in favour of sacking the city councillors (turnout 
74.37%, NK, 4 December 1989). The measure of calling for the sacking of the council had 
been rarely used, and this was the first time in 21 years. Twenty four seats were up for grabs 
in the city council election, which was held on 24 December. Of twenty-four incumbents, 
twenty-one were conservative, and opposed to the call for sacking.
Although the victory of local campaigners did not affect the LDP at the centre, the central 
government was severely hit by the prospect that local people were in favour of the 
re-election. Public criticism was targeted at both government and the JMA, and concentrated 
on the closed-door deal making between the two, which ignored the voice of local people. 
Nevertheless, by the time the election campaign began, opinions among the ‘save the 
hospital’ campaign group had already been split into two. One camp changed its mind and 
subscribed to the view of the council about the transfer, having realised that the new hospital 
would be better equipped than previously. The other group was still furious about how such 
an important decision (i.e. the closedown and sell-off of a national hospital) was made 
without a full public consultation. In the run-up to the election, seven of the councillors 
decided not to stand, whereas fifteen new candidates decided to run against the incumbents, 
which was almost twice as many as the number from the previous election (eight). The two 
leaders of the ‘save the hospital’ campaign, Fujio Sekimoto and Tomosaburo Takeda decided 
not to select anyone to run against the incumbent over the hospital issue, prioritising the 
unity of the local community. They thought that the sacking of the council already 
undermined community feelings by stoking up antagonism, and that their mission was 
completed by winning the referendum for re-election. As a result, more than half of the new 
candidates were in favour of the sell-off of the hospital. Among those seven candidates, four 
were elected, and most incumbents were also re-elected, except for two (AS, 25 December
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1989). Thus, although newly elected councillors numbered ten, which was the highest in 
local history, it had nothing to do with the previous hospital campaign. The sell-off was not 
the main issue, which called the meaning of the original dissolution into question (MS, 26 
December 1989). Overall, the political accountability of the former councillors was not 
challenged at all, and the ‘save the hospital’ campaign lost its momentum before the 
re-election. The turnout also decreased by 3 per cent (from 90.61% to 87.74%).
Incumbent New Turnout (%)
Elected/Candidates 14/16 10/15 87.74
Previous - 8 90.61
‘Save the hospital’ 
group
- 4/7
Party composition Ind 13, Soc 1 Ind 10
Table 10: Electoral results (Akune city assembly, Total 24 seats) (25 December 1990)
Without the involvement of political parties and without any ideological clash, the divided 
camps could not be sustained for any length of time. There was strong sentiment among 
local residents in such a small town that they needed to rebuild trust, rather than prolong the 
hostile mood. The regional newspaper commented that ‘the overriding tone of the campaign 
was how to mend the broken ties in the community, especially among family and friends in 
everyday life’. The real intention of conveying local discontent to the central government 
was diverted by the recourse that campaigners had to rely on, which was the call for the 
dissolution of their own representation. This generated a hostile mood within the local 
community. Therefore, the “benefit” of the campaign was viewed rather negatively among 
themselves. However, their risk-taking approach to the detriment of the community bond 
paid off in terms of hospital service provision. The government swiftly responded to the 
acute criticism, convincing the JMA to increase the volume of service. In the course of the 
dispute, it was decided that the number of beds would be increased from 155 to 195, doctors 
from 6 to 19 and nurses from 59 to 107 (Nikkei Healthcare March 1999: 64). One year after 
its reopening, JMA local branch President Hanakita noted that ‘due to strong resistance to 
the transfer within the community, the hospital tried so hard to perform well to prove the
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decision was right... The local citizens’ hospital management council is now installed within 
the hospital, and we would like to continue to serve local people’s interests’ (MS, 1 October
1990). The handling of the issue was criticised the following year, but the issue saliency was 
zero.
4.4.3 Responsiveness in Japan
In political terms, the campaign did not see much electoral competition, except for the 
involvement of the opposition party. Government interpretation of the ‘local decision’ and 
‘consensus’ changed frequently. Yet the government ‘responded’ to the criticism by 
promising to offer better services after ending its national ownership, although not through 
direct dialogue with local residents. It assumed that local government, as a democratic 
institution, should represent local people’s voices. Without clear accountability in the health 
system in Japan, a pragmatic move by the government left conflict entirely within the local 
community, dividing it between the council members and the electorate. Thus, a public 
outcry paid off by exerting effective pressure on central government, leading to concessions 
from government in policy terms. However, the lack of potential alteration to the parties in 
government, combined with no public accountability, gave no teeth to the local electoral 
institution. Surprisingly, local councillors were irresponsive to the voters, unlike in the 
Swedish case, which demonstrated the weak link between policy and elected officials in the 
midst of no party competition. At national level, however, changes to the LDP’s reign started 
to show. Issues more controversial than the hospital issue, e.g. corruption and insider trading 
(known as the Recruit scandal) in 1988, and the introduction of VAT, led to the historic 
defeat of the LDP in the upper house election on 23 July 1989.
However, contrary to the comment made by one government official that the ‘recall of the 
city assembly and the hospital issue belong to two completely separate dimensions’, the 
campaign was a blow to the ministry’s handling of the policy (AS, 7 December 1989). The 
government target of the ten-year plan was never met afterwards, partly because of a more
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cautious approach after this incident and similar protests that followed (J-l). The local JMA 
hospital manager decided to provide a wider range of clinical specialties, and maintain a 
large number of beds to assuage local people’s anger. Moreover, the word ‘shimin’ (citizen) 
was symbolically inserted into a new name for the hospital before it was founded. The 
intention was to send out a clear signal that an emphasis was being placed on local patients’ 
voices. As a policy outcome, the local campaigners succeeded in retaining local services and 
even having them expanded. Against predictions based on Perspective 1, the case 
demonstrated that even where no electoral competition existed, government policy can be 
severely affected. Public action, made through all the other recourses such as petition calling 
for sacking of a local council or legal action, can create disruption in the institutional 
arrangements, and government needs to respond to these, even though each action does not 
necessarily succeed in fulfilling its goal. The subsequent slowdown of the government’s 
retrenchment policy was caused by such actions outside the formal political processes.
4.5 Comparing results from the three countries
Judging from the pressure type (i.e. low-low), it was predicted that institutional arrangements 
would not be undermined and that the responsiveness of central government would be 
generally weak. However, depending on the institutional logics, institutional vulnerabilities 
were exposed by the emergence of a new, single-issue, hospital political party or one-off 
local campaign to sack councillors. Accordingly, the responsiveness of central government 
was clearly observed, although the form of the response varied greatly, from specific policy 
amendment (i.e. increased number of beds in Japan and England) to alteration of the whole 
political system (i.e. territorial restructuring in Sweden).
This low-low pressure type was a test to examine whether or not an effective response from 
central government was secured by electoral competition. The result was mixed. England 
was predicted to be the most responsive of the three countries to such electoral shocks, due 
to the clear political accountability of parliament to health provision and fierce party
competition over the issue. The political class in England was considerably vulnerable to 
external shock deriving from local hospital reorganisations. The result demonstrated that the 
institutions were both susceptible to and robust in the face of such pressure. As an individual 
MP and a former junior minister, Lock was tom between his position in the government and 
his loyalty to the constituency, as he became the focal point of the blame. The electoral 
victory of an independent candidate, supported by the Liberal Democratic Party, was a 
catalyst for a shift in the tone of the policy from an interventionist approach from the centre 
to a more local, people-friendly approach which promised more delegation to the local NHS 
Trust. Policy changes such as ‘Keeping the NHS local’ and smaller hospitals were made, 
while elected officials and NHS managers became more risk-averse towards hospital 
reorganisations.
As for public attention, the issue became salient at every general election. Criticism of 
central government stayed constant, at around 30 to 50 per cent of the total number of 
articles, from the 2001 election onwards. This demonstrates how the “Kidderminster shock” 
lingered on in political circles as well as in the public domain. Concerning the impact on 
political institutions however, this was little. Dr Taylor MP had to rely on the Liberal 
Democrats in parliament for information and expertise. Strongly sustained by the plurality 
electoral rule, the two main parties still manage to fend off new entrants with similar 
single-issue tickets. Members of the two parties also became more sympathetic to local 
people’s interests in their own constituencies. Party political competition in the formal 
institutions proved robust and resilient in the face of external shocks. Therefore, there was 
high responsiveness from central government in England (E-l and E-13), and the response 
was primarily driven by electoral competition.
In the other two countries, the link between electoral results and policy response from central 
government was less clear-cut, partly because the electoral campaigns were held at local 
level rather than the centre. However, the difference between Sweden and Japan is
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remarkable, highlighting the two distinctive institutional logics. In Sweden, the role of 
politicians was critically reviewed after the shocks provided by new healthcare parties, but 
specific policy redirections did not follow from central government. Although the elected 
officials in Japan affected by this protest campaign were few and far between, central 
government responded in collaboration with the JMA, who purchased the hospital from 
them.
Sweden was expected to be as responsive to electoral pressure as England, but at local level. 
Here, local anger was aimed at local councillors, especially the long-established governing 
party in the region of Norrbotten, the SAP. Thus, the shock caused by the emergence of the 
new Healthcare Party first brought the local groups of the SAP into disarray, but 
subsequently united them against the new party. In order for this local shock to be 
transformed into pressure on central government, another step was necessary. It was the 
formation of several similar local parties across the country, including those in the two 
newly-created super regions that gradually and finally brought the hospital issue to a wider 
audience. Local campaigns, each organised separately, spread out across the country, from 
rural to urban areas, and in some county councils, these parties started to hold the pivotal 
role as a new political force, normally helping the non-socialist bloc but undermining 
traditional left-right two bloc politics in Sweden.
The electoral system in Sweden, with proportional representation and a four-year cycle for 
all three tiers of government, was conducive to the emergence of small, single-issue parties, 
as protest votes were gathered, particularly at county council level, which primarily deals 
with hospitals (S-2, S-4 and S-5). For central government, however, the delegation of health 
issues to local politicians had functioned as a safety cushion over many years when SAP 
dominance was the norm. The problem of governing health became greater, as these 
single-issue protest parties did not disappear after just one election, but gradually and 
steadily undermined the power of the SAP, particularly in their heartland.
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On the one hand, responsiveness at county council level can be detected in policy and party 
politics. County council officials and politicians became much more cautious of mergers and 
closing down local hospitals. Threatened by the emergence of healthcare parties across the 
country, the Greens and the Centre Party redefined their roles as local champions, keeping 
their distance from the usual left-right bloc politics. On the other hand, central government 
had been passive rather than responsive, as it had only indirect means with which to affect 
health care policies, due to local autonomy enshrined in the county council model. Therefore, 
central government embarked on revamping its incapacity to respond to the electorate by 
proposing more earnestly than ever to review the structure of the polity.
Even though it is difficult to recognise direct policy implications for central government 
thrown up by new parties, the hung parliament in the Vastra Gotaland regional government 
showcased questions about how health systems should be organised to make more effective 
policy decisions. The proposed restructuring of the county council model was one possible 
solution in response to political pressures that have been observed in Norrbotten and Vastra 
Gotaland. Interestingly however, the united Healthcare Party ran for the Riksdag election in 
2006. Despite the poor result of the party at national level, the county council model is now 
seen even more as a source of strain on the political system, and questioned nationally. As a 
result of a locally accountable system, the policy responsiveness of central government could 
hardly be observed, but pressure is eventually brought to bear on the centre through 
combinations of issues such as territorial inequality. It can be argued that central government 
responded to public criticism over its inability in the health delivery domain, but not mergers 
or closures. Electoral competition still offers a better explanation in the Swedish case, 
despite little responsiveness.
In the third case, Japan’s central government was predicted to be the least responsive, 
because of the lack of accountability and an absence of political competition. In the case of 
Akune Hospital, the clear voice of local residents, who called for the sacking of the council
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and fresh elections, did not affect the original decision of central government. However, 
contrary to the prediction based on election-conscious government (Perspective 1), the 
unprecedented upheaval of a local council over a single issue made a large impact on the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare. The subsequent election itself did not have any impact, as 
the local community sought to amend rifts between local councillors and the electorate, 
rather than find an alternative political force over the already-resolved local hospital matter. 
This was partially a reflection of the institutional design without political accountability in 
the Japanese health care system. No blame was placed on elected officials or ministers at the 
centre, even though the hospital was under the ownership of central government. Instead, the 
local councillors were accused of ignoring the voices of the electorate, which led to the 
rarely-used procedure of dissolution of a local council by direct petition.
Nonetheless, the deal between the Ministry and the JMA was heavily criticised. Although it 
did not make headlines in the national media, it caused embarrassment for the government, 
as local campaigns culminated in the call for their own city councillors to be sacked, because 
they were seen as government puppets. Central government, including ministers, repeatedly 
claimed that the decision was totally dependent on local people’s will. This embarrassment 
explains the swift reaction of both the JHW and the local Medical Association, who decided 
to expand hospital facilities to assuage protesters. As the absence of an institutional channel 
to carry local voices (i.e. elections) was exposed, this “petition” shock indeed affected the 
original government plan of selling out other national hospitals (J-l). The pace of 
retrenchment of national hospitals was reviewed in the mid-1990s, and led to other series of 
policies such as hospital classification systems (Chapter 6) and Independent Administrative 
Corporations (Chapter 5). Therefore, it can be argued that in Sweden and Japan the policy 
responsiveness of government to electoral competition was much more subtle and indirect 
than the election-conscious model (Perspective 1) suggests. Nonetheless, pressure was 
brought to bear on central government in both cases, beyond the difference in institutional
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arrangements. The key point was that in both cases, when institutional vulnerabilities were 
exposed by whatever means, central government took action.
The majority of protesters in all three countries were non-party political amateurs, posing a 
wider political question about distrust in the democratic process, although their single-issue 
platform was much more narrowly focused on their local hospital. All three campaigns 
resorted to formal, political, institutional device, namely the ballot box. In addition, the 
responses all had similarities. Governing parties in all three cases did not choose to make 
U-turns, while the opposition parties supported the campaign. This not only shows some 
limitation in the low-low pressure type in drawing radical policy change from the centre, but 
is also counter evidence to the proposition made by previous studies on the welfare state. 
Government can force its plan through with robust and resilient formal institutions, 
overcoming disruptions rather quickly, despite the tendency to avoid political risks after the 
shocks.
Furthermore, the difference between the three cases was that in England and Sweden, but not 
in Japan, the electoral campaign by political parties reached the level of the national 
parliament. In this sense, institutional logics (i.e. public provision and the accompanying 
political accountability and the strength of party involvement in health provision) influenced 
the choice of actors who decide which channel to choose in order to exert pressure more 
effectively on central government. Nonetheless, the fact that, in the end, local parties sought 
to challenge Riksdag seats in order to gain more influence at national level, contradicts the 
Swedish decentralised model with its local tax-varying power.
Overall, therefore, predictions based on electoral competition proved powerful in explaining 
the responsiveness of central government in England and Sweden, but not that of Japan. For 
Sweden, as predicted from their institutional logics, electoral competition was fierce, but 
pressure on central government came through an accumulation of such pressure from 
different parts of the country. When pressure reached the centre, the hospital issue was also
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transformed into a much broader polity (rather than policy) issue which the central 
government could tackle with its remit. For Japan, electoral competition between major 
political parties did not exist at all, which was within the predicted parameter, yet central 
government responded to local protests and criticism highlighting an undemocratic process 
of decision making. However, the local protest was effective in direct policy terms, because 
the formal decision process excluding local people was clearly revealed and challenged. 
Both the Swedish and Japanese cases present a paradox. The politically accountable Swedish 
system made central government non responsive to local elections, as the formal institutions 
protect central government from such pressure, whereas the politically non-accountable 
Japanese system rendered central government responsive, as the lack of such a measure in 
the institutional design was revealed. In other words, both governments responded when 
their respective institutional vulnerabilities were exposed. This also applies to the result in 
England, where the causal link was much simpler and more straightforward.
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Chapter Five Corporatising public hospitals: responsive
legislature?
As in the previous chapter on local hospital reorganisation, this chapter deals with a 
politically highly-charged problem constellation, that is, corporatisation of public hospitals. 
In political science, privatisation is a popular theme for analysing formal political institutions 
and their impact on policy decisions (Bortolotti and Pinotti 2003; Persson and Tabellini 
2001; Tsebelis 2002). Yet privatisation in the hospital sector, as a sub-category of the 
welfare state, has not been comparatively studied in detail. In order to avoid popular protests, 
while at the same time improving efficiency and modernisation of services, government 
tends to choose gradual infusion of private sector practices into public hospitals. Thus, big 
bangs such as full privatisation and a shift from a tax-based to a social insurance system are 
normally eschewed by parliament and government. As a result, the method takes various 
names such as “corporatisation”, “autonomisation” (Preker and Harding 2003) or 
“privatisation continuum” (Saltman et al. 2007). Nonetheless, even with this cautious 
naming and approach, political pressure from various comers is inevitable. Moreover, in 
hospital sector reforms, unlike economic policy, historical developments and the 
commitment of each political group to a particular policy stance are as important as partisan 
ideologies (Hall 1989). The general public would also protest against such a symbolic move 
of welfare retrenchment and relegation of state responsibility. The issue then stirs debate in 
parliament and attracts public attention. Therefore, the sectoral characteristics need to be 
borne in mind, and institutional logics in each health care system need to be carefully 
examined.
Using low-high pressure, (low pressure on the medical dimension and high pressure on the
political dimension), the cases are designed to examine whether party-political aspects
(electoral pledges and party ideologies regarding the privatisation issue) affects the
responsiveness of central government more than public criticism. Low-high pressure is a test
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of whether central government is institutionally equipped to embark on such reforms, 
persuading opponents and transforming public provision of health. The tri-country cases 
analyse how policy ideas, each different in degree and scope, but all along the same line of 
the ‘privatisation continuum’, came into being and were implemented, and to what extent 
caused controversies in the public domain (at national level in England and Japan, and at 
local level in Sweden). They also examine to what extent central government was responsive 
to public criticism when the issue was highly salient in the printed media.
5.1 Predictions
5.1.1 Low-high pressure type and predictions based on electoral competition 
(Perspective 1)
Privatisation in the hospital sector is a problematic and controversial issue for central 
government, especially when government is committed to universal health provision with an 
emphasis on equal care and access. The fear is that once the private sector takes over the 
national or public sector hospitals, services will be shifted from sparsely populated areas to 
urban and wealthier areas. Thus, equal access will be lost as soon as government retreats 
from direct provision and stops playing a guarantor role for equal care. Accordingly, 
legislature can be divided over such a controversial issue. Even with high party cohesion, 
securing a majority of party members would not be overly easy.
Concerning institutional arrangements, Sweden possesses a ‘quasi-federal’ health system 
that allows each county council to introduce changes to delivery and organisation, based on 
their political decisions, while England has a centrally controlled system, with the majority 
of the parliament consisting of the governing party. Therefore, in theory, government in 
England can push through its policy changes fairly easily. By contrast, the national hospitals 
in Japan accounted for only eight per cent of the total provision, and thus may not face 
pressure as high as the other two governments. The impact of changes to national hospitals
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may be marginal, but could potentially change the rules of the game in the healthcare market 
and set the trend for other types of hospitals in Japan (J-3, J-4). Also, the governing party, 
LDP, was supported by private practitioners rather than hospital doctors. Introducing 
private-sector practices into public hospitals is therefore expected to attract considerable 
attention in the media in all three countries for different reasons and in different contexts.
Despite all these differences, it is institutional capacities, that is, how each legislature is 
structured technically, that determine the outcomes for this type of policy programme. This 
case study could therefore demonstrate the extent to which government operates under 
majoritarian rule. A symptom of an archetypal majoritarian political system, the governing 
party in Britain usually has a clear majority against the opposition, which helped the 
government when the notion of corporatising well-performing hospitals came on to the 
agenda. By wielding the power of its majority position, government can push through even 
controversial bills. The English political system possesses few veto points and has a large 
institutional capacity for bringing about reforms (Tsebelis 2002). In contrast, the Swedish 
political system has a number of stakeholders, whose ideas may diverge from the direction of 
central government. Yet this does not necessarily mean that governing by number does not 
apply in Sweden. The two-bloc politics in Sweden often takes a majoritarian form (Lewin 
1998; Steinmo and Tolbert 1998). The left bloc (SAP, Green and Left) versus the 
non-socialist alliance (Moderate, Liberal, Centre and Christian Democrats) is almost a fixed 
formula, with pledges made prior to elections. Severe disagreements between the two blocs 
can be much more pronounced than in England. Majoritarian rule is often the case in Japan, 
where the semi-permanent governing position of the Liberal Democrats in both the upper 
and lower houses of the Diet secures the smooth passing of proposed legislation. In Japan, it 
is a matter of consensus procurement within party factions, and not across different parties.
The degree to which parties advocate the idea of a privatisation continuum in the hospital 
sector varies greatly. In England, the general public's attachment to the NHS as a historical
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institution makes it difficult to touch the principle of the system. It poses a problem for both 
the left and right wing. Similarly, the Swedish welfare state model has been popular among 
the electorate, but the system was founded during the long reign of the SAP. Thus, the 
non-socialist bloc became a group of ‘established’ opposition parties, and has kept its record 
of criticising inefficiency in the predominantly public health system and proposing a number 
of changes including family doctors and private clinics through its promotion of ‘choice’ 
agenda (Blomqvist 2004). The Japanese health system in the post-WWH era saw a gradual 
decline in public provision and an ever stronger voice from private practitioners under the 
aegis of the LDP. Furthermore, university hospitals, which were renowned for clinical 
excellence, were under the control of the Ministry of Education separate from the MHW. As 
a result, with no restrictions on patients’ access to any providers, the relative significance of 
the national hospitals was justifiably played down. Patients could easily switch to teaching or 
larger private hospitals, as public hospitals (both national and local) were generally 
considered to be poorly performing, heavily-subsidised institutions.
Market 4 Government
Private marketplace 
-  insurance and 
private provision
Mixed marketplace -  
private and 
publicly-subsidised 
providers
Managed competition -  
mix of public entities 
and private provision
Public provision
Japan England Sweden
Table 11: Potential policy provisions for government involvement in the hospital sector
If Perspective 1 (election-conscious government) is true, a health system with clear political 
accountability and severe party competition is expected to be the most responsive to the 
demands of the electorate. Nonetheless, political institutional features also have to be borne 
in mind, as they affect the willingness of actors in government to respond to such external 
pressure.
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Perspective 1: predictions based on electoral competition
England: from the point of view of party competition, the English case would be the most 
responsive. However, even though party competition over privatisation of the NHS has been 
intense between the Conservative and Labour parties, both had a record of advocating public 
provision. Any policy choice may be considered as a path towards privatisation, or the 
breakup of the NHS by opponents. Labour would find it ideologically more difficult to tackle 
a two-tier hospital system within the NHS, yet the executive needs to strike a balance 
between its modernisation agenda and consensus among its own members. Thus, the issue 
would be difficult for government to handle. Yet with the majority in parliament, the 
government has the capacity to carry out its reform plans without responding to external 
pressure. The responsiveness depends on the mobilisation of the opposition parties, 
especially if an election is approaching.
Sweden: changes to the way hospital services are delivered are a matter of local discretion at 
county council level. As the Social Democratic Party was in power both at national and local 
levels of government, privatisation would not be a possible policy choice. Therefore, a 
change of governing blocs (left or right) at the county council can generate pressure for a 
more radical policy change, and pose a problem for central government. Tensions may arise 
when the composition of the party differs at national and county level. The privatisation of 
hospitals would not be acceptable for their leftist partners. Electoral competition therefore 
could instigate a response from central government.
Japan: national hospitals had been a source of concern for central government because of 
low productivity and economic deficits. With an abundance of other types of providers, the 
Liberal Democrat-led coalition government would see the policy package as favourable to 
their agenda of slashing bureaucratic dominance. Thus the LDP government could carry out 
reforms without many obstacles in either House, although there would be strong opposition
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from the relevant ministry. As public hospitals account for a small proportion of the total 
provision, popular support for retaining public hospitals would be narrowly confined to the 
socialist and communist parties, and trade unionists. The impact of party competition on the 
responsiveness of government therefore would be minimal.
The table below shows the possible actions of and responses from central government. The 
low-high pressure type suggests some reactions to the government’s reform policy agenda of 
corporatising public hospitals. Negative feedback from opposition parties and the public 
might raise questions as to how the political system and medical services should be further 
reorganised. Whatever the opposition claims, however, government can proceed to reform 
the sector or even stop some initiatives of local government. Therefore, responses may vary, 
in particular the choice of policy options. Compared to the previous chapter, variations are 
much more subtle, as the impact of external pressure on government decisions is much more 
difficult to establish. In broad terms, there are three options: a ‘decision of no-response’, 
‘specific policy amendment’ and ‘policy reversal (interventions by means of local 
decisions)’. These policy options can be a good guide to measuring the responsiveness of 
central government.
Purposes Types of response Policy details
Demonstration that 
government decision was a 
well-informed one
Decision of no-response No U-tum/no concessions
Demonstration of 
‘responsiveness’
Specific policy 
amendment
Small concessions
Demonstration of 
‘authority’
Specific but broader 
policy change
Interventions/policy reversal
Table 12: Possible actions of and responses from central government
The next section presents a brief chronology of each episode, followed by issue saliency.
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5.1.2 Timeline of each episode
England Sweden Japan
1990s
By early 1990s: Market 
solutions (global budgeting, 
purchaser-provider split, 
DRG system, etc) 
introduced in Stockholm 
and several other counties.
1996: The Administrative 
Reform Council set up by 
LDP PM himself. 
Agencification of national 
hospitals proposed.
1993: Sale of St Goran’s 
and Sabbatsberg (later 
closed) in Stockholm on 
agenda.
1997: Some reservations 
voiced by PM over 
national hospitals 
becoming Independent 
Administrative Agency.
1994: Corporatisation of St 
Goran’s granted.
1998: Basic Law for 
Reforming Central 
Administration tabled. 
Bill passed in June.
1995: SAP government 
attempts to return the 
ownership back to council, 
but fails.
1999: Plan to transform 
national hospitals into the 
IAI postponed until 2000.
1999: Sale of St Goran’s to 
Capio completed.
2000s
2000: SAP-led central 
government’s intervention. 
‘Stop Law’ passed. Further 
sale of emergency hospitals 
to for-profit organizations 
banned ‘temporarily’.
2000: MHW 
announcement. The 
process of transforming 
the national hospitals into 
the single body IAI 
begins.
2002: Health Secretary 
Milbum’s ‘Foundation 
Hospital’ plan announced. 
Rift emerges over the issue 
between Chancellor and 
Health Secretary.
2002: The Independent 
Administrative Agency 
National Hospital 
Organization Act passed.
2003: Health and Social Care 
Bill put forward. Eighty 
Labour backbenchers table a 
motion. Sixty-two Labour 
MPs rebel. Community 
Health and Standards bill 
passed with only 35. PM 
invites 38 top-rated NHS 
trusts to apply for 
Foundation status. 
Opposition from Trade 
Union and the BMA. Half of 
the government peers oppose 
the Bill. Health and Social 
Care Bill passed with 
majority of 17 in November.
2004: Voices against the 2004: The IACNH
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extension of the Stop Law 
expressed by local SAP 
politicians and medical 
staff.
founded.
2005: Greens agreed with 
the government on the law. 
Stop Law extended in June.
Table 13: Chronology
Each episode starts with the background to the formation of the ideas, as they vary from 
country to country (e.g. free-standing foundation hospital in England, quasi-privatisation of a 
local acute hospital in Sweden and agencification of the national hospitals in Japan). With 
the exception of Sweden, the episode ends at the point where the ideas were passed and 
became law. Only in the Swedish case, as the decision to privatise was made at county 
council level, was there a short time lag before central government made any response. And 
yet, in the other two countries, the issues continued to be highlighted in the printed media 
and cause public criticism. For England and Japan, therefore, the cut-off point is also 2006.
5.1.3 Predictions based on issue saliency and public criticism of central 
government (Perspective 3)
The level of attention given to this issue was greater than that given to the previous ‘local 
hospital’ cases, albeit for three distinctive reasons. The search term used for the English case, 
‘foundation hospital’, appeared in nearly 400 articles for 2003, in which the government was 
faced with the greatest rebellion from its own backbench since taking power in 1997. The 
articles discuss the contents of foundation hospital schemes, but are mainly devoted to 
intra-party ideological splits between pro-market government and anti-market backbenchers 
(E-2). For the search term ‘Independent Administrative Corporation for National Hospitals’ 
(Dokuritsu Gyosei-hojin Byoin) in Japan, a fairly large number of articles were counted 
(almost 60 at the peak), although these articles seldom carry criticism. The IACNH was 
introduced as a wholesale public administration reform (national hospitals and national
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universities), as a measure to slim down the state and cut down on civil servants, which was 
generally regarded as popular among the electorate.
The third Swedish case, a gradual process towards the privatisation of St Goran’s Hospital 
(Sankt Gorans Sjukhus) 45 attracted little media attention at national level, but the level of 
attention gradually intensified as it became the main electoral battleground for the 
Stockholm County Council. Frequent power shifts from left to right after 1980 in Stockholm 
pushed this “market” agenda forward gradually (S-6, S-7). The three cases indicate that both 
hospital and political systems in the three countries have different ‘conflict’ points, 
according to their institutional logics.
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Figure 14: Issue saliency (broadsheet) (Sources: TG/DN/AS)
45 St Goran’s Hospital is an acute hospital in Stockholm employing around 1,100 (medium sized 
hospital by European standards).
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Figure 15: Issue saliency (tabloid) (Sources: Daily Mail/Expressen/Nikkan Sports)
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Looking at the breakdown of article types (positive, neutral and negative treatment of 
government and non-government bodies (including NHS executives, hospital doctors, etc.)), 
it can be clearly seen that there is huge variation. First of all, the principality of central 
government in the matter varies greatly. In England, the government is undoubtedly the main 
actor as a legislature, as 94% of articles referring to the government shows (DH, parliament 
and senior elected officials in the Labour Party). In Sweden, even though the privatisation 
issue falls within the jurisdiction of the County Council of Stockholm, the national 
government is mentioned quite frequently (70% of the total number of articles). In contrast, 
the Japanese government appeared in only 30%.
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Figure 16: Proportion of negative reports vis-a-vis government
Articles that criticise government decisions or actions also vary in number. In England, they 
account for 38% of the total number of articles, whereas in Sweden the figure is 35% and, in 
Japan, less than half of that at 13%.
Predictions based on Perspective 3 are as follows.
Perspective 3: predictions based on issue saliency and criticism_____________________
England: The issue attracted very much media attention in a short space of time (2002-2004). 
Ninety-four per cent of the articles referred to central government, of which negative reports 
about central government accounted for more than a third (38%). As predicted, this is a very 
controversial issue for central government. As the period did not overlap with the year of the 
general election, high issue saliency was not derived from party competition, but 
corresponds to the great interest in the public domain. Therefore, the government is expected 
to be responsive when criticism reaches its peak.
Sweden: Saliency was constant but low. Given that the issue was delegated to the local 
county council, central government could have been saved from public attention and
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; :
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criticism. Nonetheless, the proportion of articles mentioning central government was 70%, of 
which critical articles accounted for 35%. This indicates that a large proportion of negative 
reports was targeted at central government. When criticism reaches its peak, the central 
government would be expected to respond.
Japan: Saliency was high, but the central government was mentioned in only 30% of the total 
media coverage, with little criticism (13%). After the passing of the law, the level of public 
criticism dropped immediately. Not only was party competition missing, but public criticism 
was almost absent. There was no point in time when pressure was high enough to make 
central government respond.
This chapter will examine how responsive central government was to public criticism over 
the privatisation agenda in the hospital sector. Policy ideas were introduced at the relevant 
level of government (either central or local), and the main arena was parliament 
(Westminster and Diet) and county council (of Stockholm), in England, Japan and Sweden 
respectively. The reactions of central government (and the Riksdag) will be looked at in the 
Swedish case only. The responsiveness of central government in the three countries will be 
tested by comparing the two predictions based on different perspectives. In other words, it 
will be examined whether party competition in parliament determines the responsiveness of 
government (perspective 1), or whether public criticism shapes the responsiveness of the 
legislature (perspective 3).
The next section introduces each episode and how central government in England and Japan 
acted, and how their counterpart in Sweden reacted to Stockholm county council’s decision. 
Each episode is accompanied by brief descriptions of the background against which the 
policy was introduced and eventually implemented.
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5.2 England: Foundation Hospitals
5.2.1 Background: modernisation agenda of the Labour government
Marketisation of the NHS began under the Thatcher Conservative government, with an 
initial focus on primary care. Drawing on the general principles expressed in the White Paper 
Working for Patients (1989), the NHS and Community Act (1990) introduced what became 
known as the ‘purchaser-provider split’ of the ‘internal market’ in health care. The 
organisational structure of the NHS continues to evolve as purchasers, both health authorities 
and GPs, merged in different ways to form more effective purchasing consortia. On taking 
power in 1997, the Labour government issued a White Paper The new NHS -  Modem and 
Dependable. It outlines plans to develop the idea of ‘integrated care’, replacing the ‘internal 
market’. GP fundholding was abolished in favour of a return to the health 
professional-oriented model rather than a competitive market model. Health Authorities 
became responsible for Health Improvement Programmes, involving the assessment of local 
health needs and the strategic planning of health care. Primary Care Trusts made up entirely 
of GPs and community nurses were established in 2000, and gradually assumed 
responsibility for the direct commissioning of health services, drawing up long-term service 
agreements with NHS trusts. ‘Cooperation’ and ‘partnership’ were emphasised instead of 
‘competition’. Yet the lack of funding in the NHS continued to be recognised by government 
officials, the NHS executives and health professions.
In 1998, a strong voice calling for more funding for new hospitals came from the chairman
of the BMA Council, Sir Alexander Macara. He claimed that “without consultant expansion
all the worthy aspirations about reducing waiting lists and engaging the profession in
managing and developing the service were empty rhetoric”(Beecham 1998). He criticised
what he saw as the new government seemingly repeating the same mistake, i.e. chronic
under-funding in the NHS. The then Secretary of State for Health, Frank Dobson, submitted
a memorandum to the PM Tony Blair on the same issue, claiming that ‘if the NHS aspires to
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be first-class service, the under-funding situations have to be overturned’ (E-2). With the 
outbreak of a malpractice scandal at Bristol Royal Infirmary in 1999 (Chapter 4) as well as 
the winter crisis and increased waiting lists in 2000, the government was required to 
introduce more radical reform plans for hospitals. Against this background, the idea of 
Foundation Trusts came into being, and was introduced by Dobson’s successor as Health 
Minister, Alan Milbum.
5.2.2 Episode
Foundation Hospital
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Figure 17: Number of reports critical of government and non-governmental actors
(The Guardian, 1998-2006)
(Phase 1:2002; Phase 2: May -  November 2003; Phase 3: 2004 onwards)
Phase 1: policy emulation and rift within the cabinet over the degree of independence
A blueprint for foundation hospitals was presented in 2002 by Alan Milbum. He became the 
prime driving force for advocating competition between hospitals for the improvement of 
services without drastically changing the whole structure of the NHS. While his predecessor 
Dobson was more cautious of private finance initiatives, Milbum was ardently in favour of 
the PFI as a method of financing new hospital buildings as a junior minister under Dobson.
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In January 2002, Milbum announced his plan to allow the top "three star” hospitals to be 
turned into ‘foundation hospitals’, i.e. not-for-profit trusts which would be free to set pay 
levels (TG, 15 January 2002). Milbum’s intention was “to genuinely free the very best NHS 
hospitals from direct Whitehall control to let them do the job they have proven they can do” 
(TG, 22 May 2002). His policy adviser Paul Corrigan later revealed that the ideas were 
borrowed from Sweden and Spain (TG, 15 June 2006). Foundation derived from the name of 
the Fundacion Hospital in Alcorcoran, the Madrid suburb visited by Milbum in July 2001. 
Yet the difference is that whereas the Spanish hospital is owned by the state and run by 
private management, foundation hospitals in England would remain under public 
management, accountable to local electorates, and freed only from bureaucratic management 
and direct control from Whitehall. Foundation Trusts were defined as “independent health 
care corporations with the responsibility to provide services to the NHS but with the freedom 
to carry out any type of business” (Atun 2007: p.258). It also was an effort to create a level 
field for public and private providers which were to become eligible for foundation status. 
Foundation Trusts are subject to regulation, not directly by government, but by the 
independent Monitor (established in January 2004).
Soon after the idea was presented, the unions and the Labour backbenchers began 
campaigning against the plan. Former health minister Dobson questioned if there is any need 
to franchise management for a better quality of care, and criticised the government’s project 
as a way to create a "mixed economy" in the health service. David Hinchliffe, Labour 
chairman of the Commons health select committee, argued that the plan to let private firms 
take over the management of failing hospitals would mean the government was following the 
same policies as previous Conservative governments: the path towards privatisation and 
breakup of the NHS. John Edmonds, general secretary of the GMB union, also expressed 
concerns. However, his plans were welcomed by some, such as Nigel Edwards, chief 
executive of the NHS confederation and representing hospital managers, and Ian Bogle,
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chairman of the BMA. Milbum reassured the opponents by commenting that “this is not 
privatisation in any way, shape or form.”(TG, 16 January 2002)
Further warnings were issued, and severe criticism of two-tier systems was raised, from 
those such as Adair Turner, a former director general of the Confederation of British 
Industry, and a member of the prime minister's forward strategy unit, and Professor Allyson 
Pollock, chairman of the Health Policy & Health Services Research Unit, School of Public 
Policy, UCL. They view the Foundation Trust as having an adverse effect on equity (Pollock
2003).
In July 2002, the difference in stance of the Secretary of State and the Chancellor became 
clearer. Alan Milbum and Gordon Brown were at odds over the financial status of the new 
foundation hospitals, as the chancellor resisted Milbum's plans to allow them to raise funds 
on the open markets. Even though there was a consensus between the two on the findings of 
the Wanless report that funding health care from general taxation is both fair and efficient, 
the cabinet was divided over the extent to which the monopoly of public healthcare provision 
should be broken. As the campaign was stepped up, the row became ever more heated, 
turning into one of the greatest disputes over the direction of a public sector reform 
programme.
At the Labour party conference in September 2002, Prime Minister Blair himself declared 
that he strongly supported the idea, “despite tensions with the Treasury which is concerned 
that allowing hospitals independence in financial affairs will mean that central control over 
public finances will be lost” (Guardian, 29 September 2002). Alongside foundation hospitals, 
DH’s plans for hospital closures were revealed to be based on the list proposed by the Royal 
College of Physicians. This report added more impetus to backbenchers’ opposition 
campaign. They were terrified by the possibility of repeating Kidderminster, which might 
have risked their seats in parliament (Chapter 3). One Labour MP commented 'we cannot 
have Kidderminster played out all over the country. We have not yet managed to convince
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the public that the loss of local services can be justified by building larger hospitals 
elsewhere.' (Observer, 6 October 2002) On the other hand, shadow health secretary Liam 
Fox rejected government’s plan as lukewarm, and claimed that all hospitals in the country 
should be free to become "foundation hospitals".
The rift between the Chancellor and the Secretary was resolved through brokerage with the 
Prime Minister, in favour of Brown’s stance that the record of semi-autonomous foundation 
hospitals’ borrowing should appear on the government balance sheet. In the autumn, former 
secretary Dobson became a focal point of Labour backbench rebellion over the direction of 
policy changes in health (Foundation Hospitals) and education (top-up fees and specialist 
secondary schools). On 11 December, Milbum published a guide to NHS Foundation Trusts, 
and advocated his proposal in the House of Commons, which made reference to all the 
points that opponents raised against the plan.
“NHS Foundation Trusts will usher in a new era of public ownership where local 
communities control and own their local hospitals. NHS Foundation Trusts will be part of 
the National Health Service, providing NHS services to NHS patients according to NHS 
principles—services that are free, based on need, not ability to pay. They will be subject to 
NHS standards, NHS star ratings and NHS inspection. They will be owned and controlled 
locally, not nationally. Modelled upon cooperative societies and mutual organisations, these 
NHS Foundation Trusts will have as their members local people, local members of staff and 
those representing key local organisations, such as PCTs. They will be its legal owners and 
they will elect the hospital governors. In place of central state ownership, there will be 
genuine local public ownership. Subject to Parliament, NHS Foundation Trusts will be 
guaranteed in law freedom from Whitehall direction and control, so that we can genuinely 
unleash the spirit of public service enterprise that so many NHS staff share. By putting staff 
and public at the heart of this key public service, these NHS hospitals will have the freedom
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to innovate and develop services better suited to the needs of the local community.” 
(Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 11 December 2002, Column 271)
Milbum emphasised that he would not make any concessions to proposals that would allow 
ten or more successful NHS hospitals to be released from Whitehall control. In quashing the 
opponents’ argument that the foundation hospitals would create a two-tier system, Blair said 
that every NHS hospital in England will be ready to break free from Whitehall control by 
2008 (May 4 2003). Despite these pro-campaigns, more than 80 Labour backbenchers tabled 
a Commons motion with signatures of at least 80 English Labour MPs opposing the 
proposals. The Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Bill was 
published on 13 March 2003, heightening tensions. On the 7th of May, after a critical Labour 
amendment was defeated by 299 votes to 117, mostly Labour as well as Lib Dems and 
nationalists, the main motion was carried by 304 to 230, with approximately 30 Labour MPs 
joining the Tories, but many more abstaining. The government majority of 74 was arguably 
won by the votes of Scottish and Welsh Labour MPs whose constituencies are not affected 
by the bill (TG, 8 May 2003). In spite of securing success, Milbum stepped down as a 
Secretary of State in June at the government reshuffle, citing difficulties of balancing his 
famiy life and his career as a reason.
Phase 2: broken party cohesion, rise of rebels and passing of controversial bill (May -  
November 2003)
Upon his succession to Milbum, John Reid faced ever more fierce attack from rebels 
opposing the proposals, despite concessions. This issue became divisive, not between 
government and opposition in parliament, but within the governing party itself. In July 2003, 
the report stage of the bill (Community Health and Standards) saw 62 Labour backbenchers 
join forces against NHS foundation hospitals. The government’s 164-vote Commons 
majority collapsed to 35, the lowest since Tony Blair won power in 1997. A breakdown of 
the 62 rebels’ profiles indicates how strongly MPs in the labour heartland opposed this idea.
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Rebels 
(lab/total seats)
Safe Labour seats 
(swing 10%+)
3-star hospitals 
(per 1 million, 2002)
London 11 (55/74) 10 0.98
South East 3(35/117) 1 0.63
South West 3(16/51) 3 3.27
East Anglia 1 (7/22) 1 2.62
East Midlands 5 (29/44) 3 2.40
West Midlands 8 (43/59) 7 1.52
Y’shire & Humber 10 (47/56) 9 3.64
North West 9 (59/70) 8 1.93
North 5 (32/36) 5 2.79
Wales 5 (32/38) 4 -
Scotland 2 (56/72) 2 -
Table 14: Profiles of rebels on Labour backbench
With a few exceptions, most of them are elected from Labour strongholds, and in Yorkshire 
and Humberside, their previous careers are typically old Labour, ranging from teacher, trade 
unionists, local councillors to engineers. Hospitals in the region seem to be successful in 
meeting the targets, and in fact, the highest concentration of three-star hospitals can be found 
there. This echoes the findings of Benedetto and Hix and evinces their action was based on 
the ideological stance, rather than practicality of constituency politics (Benedetto and Hix 
2007). As Figure 16 above shows, negative reports about government policy consistently 
accounted for nearly 35 percent, and the rebels in the backbench were echoing their voices.
However, the Prime Minister defied opposition and invited a further 38 top-rated NHS trusts 
to apply for foundation status. Twenty-five hospitals had already been shortlisted for 
foundation status. Nonetheless, this move was also criticised as a premature decision by both 
politicians and the King’s Fund health research think tank. The volatility of the star ratings 
was not given full consideration. Four of the candidate hospitals for foundation status were 
forced out of the running in July after CHI (Commission for Healthcare Improvement) 
decided they were no longer good enough to qualify for the top grading.
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In September 2003, more criticism and protest were voiced from trade unions and the 
medical profession. At the TUC conference that year, Dave Prentis, leader of Unison46, 
ridiculed suggestions made by Health Secretary Reid that foundation hospitals could be 
renamed. He argued that they should simply be called ‘private hospitals’. A motion, carried 
unanimously, rejected the notion that Foundation Trusts would democratise the NHS and 
would be a form of common ownership. The BMA chairman, James Johnson, noted that 
Foundation Trusts threatened the fundamental principles of the NHS. He also pointed out 
that such plans were at odds with ministers' ambitions to set up a primary care-led NHS. An 
announcement was then made by the chairman of the Commons health select committee, 
Labour MP David Hinchliffe, to step down at the next election. He explained his decision 
was partly based on disagreements with government over the policy.
As the Health and Social Care Bill reached the committee stage in the House of Lords on 7 
October 2003, the government announced the list of the second wave of hospitals applying 
for foundation status. In addition, 25 trusts in the first wave were consulting their local 
communities before the final step of the application process, scheduled for December. A 
month later, four Labour peers voted with the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and 
crossbenchers to reject the health and social care bill, forming a majority of 50 (150 against, 
100 in favour). Only 94 of the government's 186 peers turned out to offer their support (TG, 
7 November 2003).
The issue of Foundation Hospitals became a focal point for illuminating the schism between 
government and its parliamentary party. A lot of criticism was targeted at flaws in the 
majoritarian decision-making without a mandate on the issue, and at ‘elective dictatorship’ 47.
46 Unison is the Britain's biggest union, with membership of main health workers.
47 The former Lord Chancellor, Quinton Hogg, coined this phrase in his speech (21 October 1976) 
"Elective dictatorship". The Listener: 496-500.
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The idea was never put to the people through the ballot box, as it was introduced after the 
2001 election, or even consented to by its own party members.
Despite all the forces joined against the plan, on the final day of the parliamentary session, 
19 November 2003, the controversial Health and Social Care (Community Health and 
Standards) bill scraped through with a government majority of 17, and was cleared for royal 
assent. A few days later, a leaked memo revealed that the DH had circulated private plans to 
respond in the event of a defeat in the Commons on Foundation Hospitals by introducing 
many of the proposed freedoms through an executive order. This press notice indicated that 
the government intended to use existing powers to give extra freedoms to applicants, 
regardless of the voting results of the bill (TG, November 21 2003). This phase revealed a 
certain characteristic of the procedure. While parliamentarians can be tom between 
constituency and party loyalties, the government as a whole has the capacity as well as the 
tools to sweep aside their opponents and carry out their plan.
Phase 3: establishment of Foundation Hospitals, continued criticism and wider 
implications (2004 onwards)
The first wave of Foundation Hospitals came into being on 1 April 2004. Gradual changes 
through the introduction of foundation hospitals were observed. Major issues were the new 
financial system, called “payment by results” (PbR) and its implications for staff and the 
whole NHS and private sector. Mr Reid described the decisions on the first trusts "as a major 
step towards decentralisation". He emphasised local input by saying that the hospitals would 
"respond more quickly and directly to the needs of NHS patients and for the first time will 
give local people a say in how their local hospital is run" (TG, 1 April 2004).
The decision-making process continued to be criticised with another controversial policy on 
university tuition fees. Criticism came from various sources, but mainly from within the 
Labour party itself. Leader of the Commons Peter Hain argued that the foundation hospitals
policy stirred up controversy, partly because Labour MPs and party members were not 
involved in its development. Neither tuition fees nor foundation hospitals had been through 
the party’s policy-making process (TG, 10 March 2004). The former environment minister 
Michael Meacher argued that voters were disillusioned because they had no opportunity for 
dissent, and the only cure for apathy was to cut the prime minister’s power (7 January 2004). 
Another commentator in The Guardian wrote that ‘in the Commons, a glass wall now 
protects politicians from the public’, and emphasised that the ‘Commons majorities still 
provide the basic underpinning of power’ in deciding a lot of issues (24 April 2004). This 
view was echoed the following year by the question ‘[w]hen the two main parties agree, 
what hope is there that a different point of view will be heard?’ (14 July 2004).
From July 2004 onwards, the mixed results of creating foundation hospitals came to the 
media’s attention. Even though the level of coverage of the issue decreased quickly, the 
feedback kept up a constant level of criticism of central government. Firstly, two of the 
foundation hospitals were downgraded from three-star by the Healthcare Commission, 
raising a question mark over what would happen to the autonomy gained. The hospital would 
not be stripped of its status immediately if the trust responded effectively, claimed the 
regulator, who ultimately had the power to withdraw foundation status. This failure of the 
star-rating system led the Healthcare Commission chairman, Sir Ian Kennedy, to comment 
that he ‘was determined to change’ the star rating system which he had inherited from the 
government (TG, 21 July 2004). The following month, it was revealed that foundation 
hospitals had been poaching thousands of nurses and doctors from developing countries with 
a shortage of medical staff. The government promised to close loopholes (TG, 26 August
2004).
By the end of the year, the first survey of the 20 Foundation Hospitals, conducted by The 
Guardian, indicated that even those chief executives who were initially in favour of their 
hospitals receiving foundation status were dissatisfied with their limited independence. Some
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even answered that the red tape was increased with supervision by a plethora of regulatory 
bodies (TG, 4 December 2004). The traditional approach of interference from the centre was 
exemplified when the chief executive of the Bradford Teaching Hospital was sacked by the 
Monitor. Since the foundation hospitals cannot be bailed out by government, when they do 
run at a loss, the regulator had to step in to ‘prevent Tony Blair's policy of promoting 
self-governing hospitals becoming tainted by the risk of bankruptcy’ (TG, 15 December
2004).
The government reacted to complaints from executives about red tape and announced its 
intentions to cut down on administrative costs and meddling. William Moyes, chairman of 
Monitor, said ‘we will continue to work closely with the department, the Healthcare 
Commission and the Foundation Trust Network to ensure that trusts are able to make best 
use of the freedoms that their new status brings.’ (TG, 18 December 2004)
In 2005, it was revealed that the foundation hospitals paved the way for the private sector, as 
some critics warned at the time of the legislation. Major issues were concerned with PbR and 
its implications for staff in both the NHS and private sector (TG, 7 January 2005). A 
government plan for a second wave of independent sector treatment centres (ISTCs) was 
announced by John Reid to double the private sector’s share of the NHS market to about 
15 % (TG, 26 January 2005). The article warned of the risk of destablising the NHS. It also 
pointed out that the use of more ISTCs is potentially a radical departure from NHS 
orthodoxy, which failed to provoke debate and attention, implying privatisation by stealth. In 
addition, the Healthcare Commission warned that a feared two-tier service would arrive, 
with independent foundation hospitals attracting patients from less successful establishments 
that remain under government control (TG, 6 July 2005). As to the handover of a new NHS 
treatment centre in Birmingham to a private company, The Guardian criticised the 
government for ‘breaking up the NHS’ (TG, 23 September 2005). The debate has moved on
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to the next important agenda: how far the private sector should be allowed to penetrate the 
NHS marketplace (TG, 26 October 2005).
In 2006, the Monitor watchdog revealed that only 75 out of 170 acute hospital trusts would 
be able to apply for foundation status by 2008. This meant that the then Prime Minister's 
pledge in 2003 was now broken (TG, 1 June 2006). Furthermore, the pro-market thinktank 
Reform published a report estimating that more than 100,000 NHS employees would lose 
their jobs under the PbR (TG, 12 April 2006). As the effects of the introduction of the 
Foundation Hospitals gradually came to light, central government and its record were subject 
to heavy criticism, to which government did not respond.
5.2.3 Responsiveness in England
The government revealed its majoritarian style of policy-making and large capacity to 
achieve policy goals in spite of opposition and resistance. Even after the establishment of 
Foundation Hospitals, the level of criticism of central government did not show any signs of 
decline. It was the ramifications of the policy that sustained the constant level of criticism of 
the government (35-40% of the total media coverage), despite the fact that the issue saliency 
dipped. Overall, this shows that the government took control of the agenda, and wielded its 
power against any opposition. The responsiveness to public criticism was only shown when 
the intra-party split over the issue brought some concessions to the government’s original 
plan.
Although creating foundation hospitals in England was highly controversial and politicised, 
contrary to the prediction based on Perspective 1, it was not inter-party competition, but 
intra-party schism that generated the risk of failing to pass the proposed bill. The bill was 
passed thanks to formal, institutional capacity, along with the Labour Party’s huge majority. 
The government’s response was limited to small concessions in the plan. Criticism from 
outside parliament did not have a major effect on the government’s decisions, although
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divided opinions within society at large were echoed in some backbenchers’ strong 
opposition to the plan. Therefore, despite high issue saliency, decisions were made rather in 
the domain of subsystem rather than in macropolitics. Under the stable majority, the 
expert-driven style of decision-making was carried out within the circle of policy advisors, 
health ministers and civil servants.
Government officials knew the high threshold to make changes in the hospital sector in the 
NHS. Thus, when policy ideas were proposed by Alan Milbum, the timing and the wording 
were carefully chosen. The rhetoric underlined the significance of the ‘safe-in-our-hands’ 
discourse in the politics of the NHS, while the timing was between general elections. It was 
claimed repeatedly that introducing foundation hospitals should not be equated with 
privatisation. However, the core feature of PbR, under which money will follow patients to 
the hospitals of their choice, is that it is meant to heighten competition among providers. It 
was also stated that foundation hospitals were directly accountable to the independent 
regulator of NHS Foundation Trusts (Monitor), to the overview and scrutiny committee of 
the local authority, and to primary care trusts, but not to the DH (Klein 2003; Department of 
Health 2002a). The Monitor licenses and monitors them, decides what services they should 
provide, and dissolves them if necessary. Yet the genuine independence of the regulator was 
questioned, as well as the importance of local voices. Therefore, a large proportion of the 
criticism of central government was concentrated on a particular aspect of the majoritarian 
process of decision-making in Britain. However, this case displayed the robustness of the 
formal institutions, which prevented criticism from having an impact and exposing 
instititutional vulnerabilities. As a result, and contrary to predictions, neither party 
competition nor public criticism affected the response of central government. It exhibited its 
competence to carry through its policy plan without responding to public criticism (Norton 
2003; Judge 2004).
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5.3 Sweden: Privatisation of St Goran’s Hospital and counteraction from the centre
5.3.1 Background: the left-right contest and gradual marketisation
Public responsibility for health care in Sweden, which dates back to the mid-eighteenth 
century, has deepened and prospered after the World War II (Saltman and Bergman 2005). 
With hospitals under a long spell of social democratic reign at all three levels of government 
(national, county and municipality), a radical step towards marketisation was rather 
inconceivable. However, since the end of 1980s, conspicuous problems such as prolonged 
waiting times and lengthy hospitalisation of the elderly encouraged the introduction of 
reforms (Petersson 1991; Dagens Nyheter, 30 November 1991; The Economist 1988). These 
incremental policy developments paved the way to the privatisation of even some acute 
hospitals.
Throughout the 1980s, the conventional cross-party consensus on a uniform and equitable 
medical service across the country had been eroded, as intra-party organisational ties 
between the centre and localities weakened (Thomsen 1998; Widfeldt 1999). Although the 
main thread running through the centre and localities was the SAP and its internal policy 
coordination across different levels of government, the left bloc began to be defeated more 
often. The power of the Social Democrats (SAP) was waning, and the number of cities where 
the SAP had a majority decreased from 125 to 74, while they also lost their majority in five 
county councils, including Stockholm (Montin and Elander 1995: p.25). The quasi-federal 
health system, inscribed in the 1982 Health Care Law, was inevitably affected by the wider 
social change, destablising the political balance of national and local governments.
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Figure 18: balance between Left and Right (Parliament and Stockholm County Council)
Health policy in Sweden was influenced by changes in government and consequently 
ideological (pro- or anti-market) stances. Compared to England, this shift was more 
pronounced, and an exemplary case at county council level can be found in Stockholm. The 
figure above shows both national and local (Stockholm) electoral results and how frequently 
the two blocs obtained a majority in the Stockholm county council48. Remarkably, some 
policies introduced at local level, such as private clinic practice, were embraced rather than 
reversed, even by the SAP, particularly when the method proved popular and improved 
accessibility (S-10). As a result, in Stockholm and other large cities, the family doctor 
system survived, and has played an entrepreneurial role in mitigating the considerably high 
demand on hospital care. In this way, Stockholm has been a precursor to national change.
One example was the Stockholm Model (Stockholmsmodellen) (Culyer 1991). A series of 
planned market models were introduced in Stockholm County in 1988. Such reforms include
48 Stockholm County, consisting of 26 municipalities, comprises 1.8 million inhabitants.
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the diagnosis related group DRG49, introduction of market principles such as the fixed 
payment system, purchaser-provider split, and increase in choices by diversifying service 
providers. Former restrictions on hospital choice were practically removed, and competition 
among hospitals and clinics increased accordingly. The Stockholm model was inspired by 
the British quasi-market reform, as the main aim of having several mechanisms was to 
change the mindset of hospital managers and ensure cost-effectiveness (S-5, S -ll). The 
payment method was based on incentives and also dependent on competition between 
different health care providers. Patients were granted the guarantee of seeing a doctor for 
certain illnesses within three months. The health care board would be punished for not 
meeting this target, and would have to pay for the treatment in another hospital. Hospitals are 
reimbursed by DRGs, for which the maximum fee for each treatment was capped (Lundback 
and Staib 1998: p. 147). The Stockholm model began questioning the basis of the health 
systems in Sweden: publicly-operated providers and a non-competitive tax-based financing 
method (Saltman and Bergman 2005: 263).
These changes were not only constrained to a particular county council. In 1991, the 
non-Socialist Bildt government came to power during an economic depression. The coalition 
partners of the Moderates were the Liberal, Centre and Christian Democratic Parties. The 
Moderates wanted to achieve their goal of deregulation of private practitioners, while the 
Liberals would realise their family doctor model after a series of negotiations with the FCC 
(S-7; S-8). Accordingly, the two bills were passed (the Family Doctor Act (Lag om huslakare 
1993: 588); Act on Freedom to Establish Private Practice (Lag om lakarvardsersattning 1993: 
1651) in 1994. Some county councils introduced more private primary care institutions in the 
period. Nonetheless, after the return of the Social Democratic Party in 1995, these bills were 
withdrawn. In June 1995, instead, the new act on primary health care organisation was
49 These developments were principally owed to research undertaken by Spri (Swedish Institute for 
Health Services Development), which began to study the use of prospective payment of hospitals in 
the United States, with such steps being emulated in Sweden (Lundback and Staib 1998: p. 146).
180
produced, and declared that the focus had to be shifted from hospital care to primary care as 
well as from market-driven competition to cooperation (S-9).
In the centre-right coalition at both the council in Stockholm and the national government, 
the common platform was a ‘radical renewal of the public sector’. Using the Public 
Procurement Act, competition for council contracts was promoted by creating provider 
pluralism and cooperation between public and private healthcare. An acute ward at 
Sabbatsberg was closed down in 1993 as part of the coordinated policy at both national and 
local level. As a result 1,400 employees from the hospital had to be accommodated at St 
Goran’s. It was in this context that the sale of two emergency hospitals (St Goran’s and 
Sabbatsberg Hospital) to private corporations came on to the agenda (DN, August 23 1993).
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(Phase 1: 1998 - 2000; Phase 2: 2001 - 2006)
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Phase 1: privatisation, and government’s legislative counteraction -  introducing the 
‘Stop Law’ (1998-2000)
From the early 1990s, St Goran’s Hospital had been at the centre of the political debate. This 
was partly because of the frequent change of power in Stockholm county council. In 1994, 
the conservative Stockholm County granted St Goran’s a company structure (‘public firms’, 
offentlig agda aktiebolog). The then Commissioner for Finance (the leader of the council 
administration) and the leader of the Centre-Right coalition Ralph Ledel was one of the 
initiators for this large step towards privatisation with strong support from healthcare 
professionals (S-7).
However, in the same year, the Social Democrats returned to government at both county 
council and national levels, and decided to restructure the hospital into a more traditional 
structure. The new county council leader Bosse Ringholm (later becoming the Finance 
Minister in the national government) wanted to transfer the hospital back to county council 
ownership once again. However, he had to back down due to strong opposition from hospital 
staff and the union (Kommunal) (Lofgren, 2002). In 1995, the county council gave the staff a 
choice between working in a different council-run healthcare establishment and staying in 
the company. Ninety-six percent of the employees chose to stay in the company. St Goran’s 
hospital remained in the ownership of Capio AB50, but as a public corporation with the 
county holding all the shares.
The non-socialist party bloc (not including the Centre Party) came back to power in 1998 in 
Stockholm, which gave them a signal to proceed to the next step and a mandate for further 
change, that is, transformation of the limited company into a privately-owned company. The
50 Capio is the largest healthcare company operating throughout Europe (eight countries including 
England and Scandinavian countries) (www.capio.com). Capio was formerly owned by the Swedish 
equity fund, Bure, but became an independent company in 2001 and has a majority o f foreign owners 
(Ohrming and Sverke 2001). The exercise appears to have been a success. St Goran V s  has always 
been one of the more efficient hospitals, and it continues to operate at a cost level o f at least 10% 
below its most efficient public counterpart in Stockholm.
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coalition came to power with its clear message: ‘Focus on Care’, which was written in their 
common election manifesto (DN, 12 September 1998). The possibility of further 
corporatisation was also suggested, but the possibility reignited a debate as to whether 
profit-seeking organisations can provide equal and accessible care to everyone as non-profit 
organisations do. Yet the county council administration led by Ledel moved quickly to 
finalise the process of selling the hospital, feeling ‘the need to act swiftly because of possible 
change of government at the next election’ (S-6). Operation of the hospital, but not the 
building itself, was sold to Capio in 1999 (DN, 8 May 1999). The annual value of the 
contract initially was around £70 million51. On the other hand, the Stockholm County 
retained ownership of the hospital building and collected rent through the county-owned 
property management firm Locum AB (Pedersen 2005: p. 188). Therefore the hospital itself 
remained in theory a part of ‘public provision’, although it was slightly too radical for the 
centre-left government, who feared a spill-over effect (S-10/S-12).
The purchaser-provider split was maintained, and was meant to give professional managers 
more freedom to run hospitals, away from politicians’ interference on the production side 
(S-12). In the run-up to the subsequent election in 2002, the four other emergency hospitals 
(Norrtalje, Karolinska, Sodertalje and Soder Hospitals) and the remaining major hospitals in 
the area (Huddinge, Danderyd and St Erik) became enterprises. Moreover, not only in 
Stockholm, but also in the southern-most county of Skane, the Moderate-led council 
corporatised two hospitals, a decision which was reversed with the return of the SAP 
government. These cases demonstrated how the coming of the right wing coalition could 
mean a push towards the ‘private continuum’.
Against this call for more privatisation, the national government (Centre-Left party coalition 
led by SAP) could not help but to react immediately, and stepped in (Saltman and Bergman
51 www.sll.se.
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2005). Although Liberal Party leader Leijonberg, before the special debate in parliament on 
the 23rd of September, defended his party’s position that for-profit hospitals would only 
contribute to the improvement of services (DN, 16 September 1999), Persson and Engqvist 
claimed that there was a great risk that for-profit organisations would abuse the system. 
Leijonberg played this down by stating that those organisations would be checked by county 
councils with regard to their revenues, and would be inspected by the NBHW, and 
furthermore, that patients with freedom of choice would give the verdict. In response to a 
couple of sell-off plans in larger cities, the government proposed a new law to forbid 
emergency hospitals from being handed over to for-profit private companies (DN, 29 
November 1999). In the meantime, in July 2000, Stockholm County Council established a 
forum where public and private hospital representatives could meet with civil servants.
The coalition partner, the Greens, expressed its concern over the SAP’s intention to impose a 
ban on privatisation (DN, 14 September 2000) on the grounds that the national government 
should not interfere in local decisions over such matters. Moreover, Thomas Julin, a member 
of the Green Party and the government’s Social Affairs Committee, argued that there was no 
strong reason why county councils can decide to close a hospital down, but should not be 
allowed to privatise it. This created a rift between the Green Party and the then Social 
Minister Lars Engqvist. The Greens eventually agreed with the government on the condition 
that it was a temporary solution and would be reviewed in two years’ time (DN, 19 
November 2000). In the end, this so-called ‘Stop Law’ (stopplag)52 was enacted in 2000 
with its lifetime originally intended to be just two years53. Engqvist explained his chief 
motive for this law in the Riksdag, arguing that the Moderates had a ‘hidden agenda’ for 
preparing a system shift, with private hospitals paving the way for private insurance
52 Lag om inskrankning i landstingens ratt att overlamna driften av akutsjukhus till annan 2000: 440. 
The English translation is “Restriction over County Councils’ right to hand over operation of 
emergency hospitals to others”.
53 Government proposals regarding for-profit hospitals can be found in government reports (Sjukhus 
med vinstyfte prop 2000/01: 36 and prop 2002/3:9).
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companies. The establishment of for-profit acute hospitals would lead to the acceptance of 
queue-jumping54 and eventually cause the collapse of a publicly-funded system (DN, 19 
November 2000). Nonetheless, this act does not have retroactive power, so it is now 
impossible to bring the hospital back into a traditional, public-provision structure. In addition, 
the SAP and the Leftist Party were by this time not entirely against the use of private actors 
outside the acute and emergency care services. Despite all the ideological rows, St Goran’s 
Hospital had “a reputation for being one of the more innovative hospitals”, being “rated 
highly by the public and regarded by the staff as being a more rewarding place to work than 
it used to be.” (Rae 2005: p.22). More than half of the primary health care centres in 
Stockholm were already run by private companies. Approximately only 3% of the total 
health care expenditure was attributable to private health care in Sweden (European 
Observatory 2001), thus proving that the entire finance structure has kept its public provision 
system. Stockholm County Commissioner Ledel claimed that shorter queues and good 
performance at St Goran’s Hospital made a nonsense of the government’s decision to ban 
private actors in acute hospitals. Likewise, the Moderate council member Chris Heister 
commented that central government and SAP minister Engqvist were ‘scared to see how 
successful the private hospital is’ (DN, 8 December 2000). The issue was driven by a clear, 
party-political division. Winning the election, the non-socialist party bloc at the Stockholm 
county council realised what the parties pledged. To counteract this move, the central 
government intervened beyond conventional institutional constraints. Issue saliency peaked, 
but the level of negative criticisms did not reach so high. The reaction from central 
government therefore was not driven by public criticism, but its ideological stance over the 
issue, directly affected by long-term party political competition.
54 There is a common term to describe this advantage as sour cream (graddfiler).
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Phase 2: Mixed messages - government U-turn and extension of ‘Stop Law’ (2001-2006)
The saliency of this issue waned rapidly after the law was enacted, but criticism became 
louder as PM Persson was caught using a private hospital for his own treatment (DN, 11 
May 2001). In the election year 2002, the Social Democrats in Stockholm pledged to stop 
competition-driven hospital management. Instead, they promised to shift more specialists 
into walk-in centres (nara sjukvarden) (DN, 3 February 2002). Shortly before winning the 
2002 election, Persson commented: ‘I do not want to put the nation’s health on the stock 
exchange’ (Hoge 2002).
In February 2003, Social Minister Engqvist announced that for-profit private actors could 
enter the market of hospitals. He stated in the medical journal, Dagens Medicin, that certain 
hospitals should be publically operated and owned, while other public hospitals can certainly 
be run by contractors. This was greeted with some scepticism by the opposition parties, and 
refused by the governing partner, the Left party. The Liberal Party’s former Social Minister 
Konberg pointed out that these proposals constituted the SAP-led government’s U-turn over 
the Stop Law, but also argued that Social Democratic Party’s anti-privatisation stance is 
deeply rooted, and that the public should take care over whether SAP would actually carry 
out its proposals (DN, 11 February 2003).
Some criticism of the government came from within the SAP. The county council and 
municipality spokespersons (Lars Isaksson and Ilmar Reepalu respectively) posted an article 
warning that the Swedish welfare state model would collapse if government continued to tax 
more to spend more. While emphasising the importance of keeping and improving the 
universal welfare model (den generella valfardsmodellen), they predicted that quality and 
service would suffer from chronic resource deficiency in the future (DN, 6 July 2004). When 
the extended Stop Law was announced, a critical voice was raised from local SAP politicians, 
as well as medical staff unions, through the remiss process. Paul Hakansson, chairperson of 
the SALAR Board of Health and Welfare and County Council politician in Linkoping
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commented ‘it is out-of-fashion’, underlining the problem in the government proposal to 
separate ‘primary care’ and ‘emergency care’ (DN, 31 August 2004). Some in the 
professional union (The Swedish Association of Health Professionals, Vardforbundet, and 
the Swedish Municipal Workers’ Union, Kommunal55) criticised the fact that the 
government’s attempt was rather feeble in driving away for-profit organisation in the health 
sector56. However, as the Greens agreed with the government in March 2005, the Riksdag 
passed the law on 15 June (the law took effect on 1 July), banning the sell-off of emergency 
hospitals to for-profit organisations. The Social Minister Ylva Johansson claimed that “the 
law is not about whether to accept entrepreneurship in the health sector or not, but about 
saying no to private actors in emergency hospitals”, reassuring the parliament that 
entrepreneurs were on the steady increase. (DN, 15 June 2005). She also insisted that the 
Centre-Right alliance would like to make a systemic shift to a market-oriented hospital 
system. The Centre Party spokesman Kenneth Johansson argued against the government, 
stating that ‘it is an unnecessary stop law to restrict freedom .... It has long-term negative 
effects’, and revealed that the alliance instead had a plan to propose a ‘start law’ to make it 
easier for staff to take over. Towards the election in 2006, the alliance (non-socialist bloc) 
campaigned for the ‘start-law’ as an alternative to the government policy.
5.3.3 Responsiveness in Sweden
The privatisation of a public acute hospital was a product of left-right party competition at 
county council level. Since 1985, Stockholm County has seen alterations of power between 
the right and the left at every election. Within the county council model of the Swedish 
health care system, the policy was supposed to reflect the electorate’s choice. As a result, the 
highly liberal-conservative area of Stockholm, with the mandate for change, went ahead with
55 Kommunal is Sweden’s largest trade union, having 570,000 members. In 2002, it merged with the 
Swedish Agricultural Workers’ Union. It is affliated to LO, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation.
56 These opinions can be found in remiss statements (Kommunal, LO, and Federation o f County 
Councils and Municipalities).
187
the controversial privatisation plan. A frequent change of government in Stockholm paved 
the way for a gradual shift from public to corporation, and corporation to private entity (S-6, 
S-8). However, the result showed that central government ‘reacted’ to the non-socialist 
bloc’s initiatives by showing its authority over local government. Fearful of ripple effects, 
the SAP-led government decided to step in and passed the temporary legislation. The central 
government responded when its institutional vulnerabilities (i.e. weaker position of central 
government vis-a-vis local autonomy) were exposed by severe electoral competition in 
Stockholm, followed by Malmo. The government’s intervention met with strong opposition, 
not only from the general public, but also from its own coalition partner, the Greens, who 
argued that central intervention impinged on local democracy. Even though the governing 
parties finally came to agree on extending the life of the law, this fed back to the 
fundamental question of whether the directly-elected county council model should be kept as 
the best model for managing health care provision, based on the principle of solidarity. This 
case illustrates rather clear left-right politics played out between central and local 
government. Beyond its quasi-federal structure in Swedish health care, party competition 
between the left and the right required the national government to show its muscle to stop 
further privatisation. Although the issue saliency was not so high overall, the government’s 
indecisive policy stance later on attracted criticism. This politically contentious case proved 
that political institutions matter in three ways. Firstly, the supremacy of central government 
in a highly decentralised health system was revealed. Secondly, the left-right divide over the 
issue of health provision drove the central government to respond. Thirdly and paradoxically, 
there was no response from government to public criticism. The national government 
‘reacted’ to policy change made by the opposition parties at local level. Responsivenss was 
shaped by party competition, channelled through tensions between central and local 
government. Although the level of public criticism of central government was quite 
remarkable (35%, as the English case accounted for 38%), given its local nature, criticism 
made little impact on responsiveness due to the robust structure of the formal political
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institution. As in the English case, the issue did not turn into macropolitics, in spite of its 
controversial nature at national level. In this sense, the national government was responsive 
to party competition (across different levels of government), but not to public criticism.
5.4 Japan: agencification of national hospitals
5.4.1 Background: marginalisation of public hospitals
Japanese public hospitals have been marginalised by long-term absence of planning and 
dominance of the JMA in health policy-making (see Figure 20 below). The informal political 
alliance between the JMA and the LDP was the major driving force for determining medical 
policy direction, which reduced the importance of public provision. The proportion of 
private sector hospital beds increased from 25% to 67% between 1955 and 1993 (Ministry of 
Health and Welfare 1955-1993). On the other hand, there were some government initiatives 
to boost private provision. In 1960, the Medical Finance Corporation (Iryo Kinyu Koko) was 
established. This quasi-government agency was set up to help private-sector medical 
institutions through low-interest loans for capital investment. This was one amongst many 
policies of the LDP, characterised by Pempel as ‘creative Conservatism’ (Pempel 1982). 
Public providers lost a special function within the entire health delivery system, in which 
patients were allowed to move freely from one hospital to another.
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Figure 20: Variations in the way health services are delivered
In addition, public hospitals have been under bureaucratic control in different jurisdictions 
between three ministries: Health and Welfare (MHLW), Education (MEXT), and Internal 
Affairs (MIC). They all became deficit-ridden providers, constantly in need of government 
subsidy. As the role of public hospitals was not clearly defined, national, local, quasi-public 
and private hospitals have had overlapping functions. Under such a high level of segregation 
among different jurisdictions, reorganisation of the whole provision became a difficult task 
without external forces or strong pressure to coordinate between the bureaus. Since the 
mid-1980s, financial concerns of the system came high on the agenda of the national 
government, and rationalisation of health care provision began to be tackled. Nonetheless, 
the original ten-year plan (“The Basic Plan fo r  Reorganisation and Rationalisation o f 
National Hospitals and Sanatoriums,,) proved ineffective, as it met with strong popular 
resistance at the initial stage (Chapter 4). The government was forced to reconsider the plan.
In the absence of an ideological battle or incentives to build accountability within the system, 
the British-style agencification of the national hospitals, along with the national universities,
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was put forward as an answer for the government. The agenda was accompanied by the 
popular cause of achieving ‘smaller government’ and slashing inefficient and 
change-resistant bureaucracy.
When the coalition government of three parties (LDP, Japan Socialist Party and Harbinger 
Party) collapsed in the autumn of 1996, Ryutaro Hashimoto called for a general election to 
restore the LDP-led majority in the Diet57. He returned as Prime Minister of a single minority 
government with an informal collaboration with the two parties. To win back public support, 
Hashimoto flagged up an ambitious reform package, including VAT tax reform (increase of 
the tax rate from 3% to 5%), and six major reforms (fiscal reconstruction, financial 
deregulation, social security, education, decentralisation and public administration). Among 
these reform pledges, public administration reform was one of the key agendas to woo public 
popularity, as corruption within the civil service was causing public distrust from the early 
1990s. Hashimoto aimed to transform the government, weakening bureaucratic control and 
strengthening the power of political parties and the Prime Minister. As soon as he had the 
mandate, he set up the Administrative Reform Council (ARC) and took the chairmanship, 
inviting big business leaders, journalists and academics to the Council. Therefore, it was in 
this wider context of public sector reforms led by the LDP, that national hospital reform was 
debated and handled rather than in its own right, as an independent issue of health policy.
57 It was the very first election at which the new electoral rule was implemented.
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Figure 21: Number of reports critical of government and non-governmental actors 
(‘Dokuritsu-gyosei-hojin’ and ‘Kokuritsu bydin’, Asahi Shimbun, 1998-2006)
Phase 1: policy emulation of agencies and wholesale public reform (1998-2002)
Chaired by the Prime Minister himself, the ARC after November 1996 looked to the British 
practices of agencification, and decided to emulate them and rationalise national hospitals as 
part of public administrative reform. The concept was to divide every central ministry into 
two functions (policy-making and execution) in order to slim down the whole organisation 
while enhancing performance and productivity. The ARC proposed that these mechanisms 
should be applied not only to hospitals and schools, but also to museums, national parks, and 
the meteorological and aviation agencies, covering 56 agencies in total. It was a 
comprehensive restructuring of central administration, covering the whole range of policy 
domains and therefore involving whole sections of the ministries.
The final report of the ARC meetings was submitted on 3 December 1997. As the reform 
was one of the LDP’s electoral pledges under Hashimoto, it was given a lot of attention by 
the media. Yet it was the scale of the whole restructuring of public administration that makes
(Phase 1: 1998 - 2002; Phase 2: 2002 - 2006)
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the issue salient, not because of a particular focus on national hospitals. When the plan was 
made clearer in May 1997, some criticism was voiced. Agencification was an idea adopted 
by Hashimoto’s special advisor, the former Minister of Construction (LDP), Kiyoshi Mizuno. 
He wrote that “at the time of writing the manifesto, there was no translation for this term, 
and I had to explain to party members” (Nikkei BPnet 2006). One column in Nikkei 
Shimbun questioned “the necessity to emulate Thatcher’s experience of agencification”, as 
Japan already had a long history of quasi-state agencies and corporations. Mizuno knew that 
there had already been similar ‘agencies’ (e.g. Japan Patent Office, the former Food Policy 
Bureau) and admitted that that was precisely why he thought the idea would be accepted by 
civil servants as well as the LDP and Socialist Party, who was the coalition partner. 
Therefore, this type of criticism of government had no impact. Other criticism pointed out 
that much clearer accountability had to be established, because new agencies were likely to 
be satellites of central ministries into which bureaucrats could parachute after their 
retirement (so-called Amakudari, or “descent from Heaven”) (NK, 10/11 May 1997; 1 
August 1997). These criticisms lingered on in the printed media. However, the response 
from central government was only visible in the proposal for a review of the personnel 
management system (Minutes appendix on ‘reform on civil service system’ August 1997). 
The responsiveness was low, given that the issue had already been on the agenda and one of 
the main reasons for starting the whole public administrative reform.
Furthermore, in November 1997, Prime Minister Hashimoto expressed reservations over 
whether all the national hospitals should be Independent Administrative Institutions (IAIs). It 
was suggested that hospitals with laboratories and technically advanced treatment (e.g. 
National Cancer Centre, National Cardiovascular Centre and National Sanatoriums) should 
remain under ministerial jurisdiction (Minutes of the 36th ARC meeting, 12 November
1997).
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As the Basic Law for Reforming Central Administration was tabled in the Diet on 17 
February 1998, the government’s handling of national hospitals attracted some media 
coverage. Asahi Shimbun criticised the fact that the government only put off dealing with the 
main structural problem, and was rather fixated on the original report made back in 1986. 
The plan was set out primarily to rationalise national hospitals by mergers and acquisitions. 
Ten years later, the government was using this wholesale administrative reform to 
accomplish its original objectives, leaving no time and space for discussions. In the debate, 
scarce attention was paid to socio-economic changes, which occurred during that decade, or 
to directions in health policy, the article pointed out. On the contrary, too much focus was 
placed upon fiscal burden. The ARC proposal did not provide specific answers to the reasons 
why some hospitals remain in the hands of government and others do not (AS, 22 March 
1998).
There was some lukewarm opposition in the run-up to the House of Councillors election in 
1998, but the bill was passed on 9 June. Articles (36 to 42) set out definitions of the IAIs. 
Even though the upper house election does not directly affect the executive power of the 
government, Hashimoto admitted defeat after losing the majority in the House of Council to 
the opposition, and resigned in July 1998 after only one year and a half in the position. Keiz5 
Obuchi succeeded him as prime minister and formed the LDP government.
After the bill was passed, it soon became clear that the main opposition came from central 
ministries. Surveys conducted by the cabinet office revealed their hesitation to transform 
their organisations into the IAIs. Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Teijiro Furukawa, a key 
player in the decision making, provided political advice that the selection of IAIs needed to 
be widely consulted and they should all be enlisted. His instructions signalled further 
difficulty in carrying out the reforms (J-2). Most ministries were very negative about 
implementation of the bill and transfer to IAIs (AS, 30 September; 3 November 1998). The 
MHW also expressed concerns that performance-oriented IAIs were not fit for running social 
services such as national hospitals.
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Gradually, the original plan of rationalisation was watered down. Under the title of ‘giving 
up on my diet, deciding to be rather stout’, one article described the usual ‘emasculation’ 
process of reform, with growing opposition from both ministries and the governing party 
itself. The LDP stressed that economic growth should be the priority (AS, 3 November 
1998). More agencies, not privatisation, were proposed by the Liberal Democratic Party 
Administrative Reform Promotion Headquarters. In the course of negotiations, the number of 
government organisations, originally considered for sell-off or abolition, declined in number 
from 25 to 15 (AS, 23 December 1998). The program outline for amending the Cabinet Law 
was drawn up by government in early 1999. Around the same time, the Japan Federation of 
Medical Workers' Unions (FMWU, Nihon-Iroren)58 issued a public statement against the 
government plan (AS, 27 January 1999).
In April, the government also decided to postpone its plan of transforming national hospitals 
into independent agencies by one year59, on the basis that transfer of a large number of staff 
would require more time. New staff would not be considered to be public servants, thereby 
not being given the right to strike and also contributing to downsizing of the public sector. 
On this issue, the Japanese Communist Party was opposed to the transfer, claiming it would 
lead to degradation and downsizing of services.
In October 1999, an administrative inspection and audit conducted by the then Management 
and Coordination Agency (Somu-cho, now part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications) revealed that half of all national hospitals and sanatoriums were operating 
under deficit. On 18 November, the MHW provided a briefing on the plan to announce the 
creation of just a single body, the Independent Administrative Corporations of national 
hospitals, rather than a myriad of separate bodies. From 226 in November 1999, it would
58 As of 1999, national hospitals had approximately 45,000 workers, and the FMWU had 32,000 
members.
59 As for the national universities, the decision as to whether transfer would be carried out was 
postponed until 2003.
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merge and close down until 2004, at which point there would be 153 hospitals and 
sanatoriums across the country. The plan was agreed by Cabinet in December 2000, with 
some amendments such as the introduction of an assessment system for each hospital, rather 
than the entire agency. This was a compromise between the LDP’s Public Administration 
Promotion HQ and the Ministry. The former adopted a stance against one large agency on 
the grounds that management and budgeting might become loose and create many loopholes, 
whereas the latter wanted to keep it that way in order that the budgetary process would give 
room for adjustment between hospitals in the black and those in the red.
In the meantime, the LDP-led coalition government had become very unpopular among the 
electorate, principally due to Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori’s gaffes, and the scandals of his 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Hidenao Nakagawa60. This caused a government reshuffle just 
before the large-scale reorganisation of the ministries. Mori brought several party 
heavyweights back into his cabinet to boost public confidence in government. Hashimoto, 
the leader of the LDP's largest faction and the former Prime Minister (January 1996 to July
1998), was appointed minister in charge of administrative reforms and head of the Okinawa 
Development Agency. As Mori commented, Hashimoto was the best person for the job, 
since he was the architect of the streamlining of government ministries and agencies (Kyodo, 
6 December 2000). Hashimoto’s role was exhibited by his skills in striking the compromise 
between the blueprint and the MHW. The then Deputy Cabinet Secretary (non-elected civil 
servant) Furukawa also remained very influential, as the PM delegated decision-making 
power to him (NK, 12 December 2000; AS, 20 December 2000). The old-style 
policy-making process between the LDP (welfare-expert) politicians and civil servants in the 
subsystem smoothed the final stage of negotiations, and this revealed both the strength of the
60 Soon after Mori took office, he made a remark that Japan is still a ‘divine country’ centred on the 
emperor. Chief Cabinet Secretary Hidenao Nakagawa had to quit his job amid a scandal over an affair 
and links to a right-wing group. Both incidents led to the plummetting o f support for the government 
in the opinion polls.
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bureaucracy and the limit of ‘party government’. On 6 January 2001, the reformed ministries 
and agencies started their operations. The MHW was merged with the Ministry of Labour 
and became the MHLW.
Pressure for reorganisation of national hospitals was high on the agenda, but the issue kept a 
low profile in the printed media until the establishment of the IAIs. Instead, the politics of 
agencification was conducted in the conventional subsystem domain, and the deal was struck 
between senior elected and non-elected officials. In addition, inter-party competition did not 
affect the decisions of government, although intra-party factional competition and the 
welfare-expert politicians played a significant role. Public criticisms were raised, but 
generated no response.
Phase 2: (re)surfacing of old and new problems and concerted efforts to remedy 
inter-ministerial divisions (2002-2006)
In 2002, major criticism was targeted at unchanged practices of ‘amakudari’ (an appointment 
system) even posterior to the establishment of IAIs. Since it was one of the primary reasons, 
and the cause of the government undertaking such a large-scale reform of public 
administration, the revelation undermined the result of the reform. Moreover, it became clear 
that the financial situation surrounding hospitals had worsened generally. According to the 
Japan Hospital Association, 66% of all providers were in the red, and from January to June 
2002, twenty hospitals became bankrupt, which a record speed (AS, 14 April 2002). 
Nonetheless, by that time, there was no popular support for saving poorly performing 
hospitals. With little public attention or criticism, the Independent Administrative 
Corporation National Hospital Organization Act was passed in December 2002. The law 
took effect in April 2004, as the National Hospital Organization became a single 
Independent Administrative Agency.
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After the national hospitals became an IAI (IACNH), the saliency of the issue showed a new 
pattern while the level of public criticism sank. Those criticisms included both old and new 
problems (hidden for a long time), such as constant staff shortages and simultaneous lay-offs 
of non-permanent personnel. Since the creation of the IACNH was thought of as the first 
step for further privatisation, different kinds of problems surfaced to the attention of the 
media, as they had to be faced with similar pressure which other private or university 
hospitals had already experienced. Non-permanent personnel launched campaigns to raise 
awareness of unfair contracts and redundancy policies (10 October; 11 November 2003; 4 
February 2004). In addition, a staff shortage problem in the health sector became more 
widely recognised (17 February 2004). Nonetheless, many structural problems had already 
been pushed outside the responsibility of the central government. Therefore, no ministers 
were pressurised to answer for them. In March 2004, a different management style between 
public and private hospitals was highlighted to indicate organisational weaknesses of the 
former national hospitals. The percentage of management teams recruited from the private 
sector was 47.1 in the private hospital sector, whereas it was only 1.2% in the public sector. 
Performance-related payment was introduced for more than 30% of private providers, 
whereas the figure was a mere 8.2% for public providers. Still the payroll costs accounted for 
49.6% of total revenue in the private and 58.9% in the public sector (AS, 8 March 2005). 
The article pointed out the problems not only of the inflexible and uncreative nature of 
formerly public hospital organisations even after the change, but also the national fee 
schedule, which had always been unfavourable to costly services such as cancer treatment. 
The issue demonstrated the legacies of public hospitals and indirectly criticised the 
government’s pay policy for having left these structural problems behind.
With the recognition of the need for a level playing field for public and private providers, 
illegal practices among doctors also came to light and underlined the deeply rooted staff 
shortage problem. In September 2003, numerous doctors at university hospitals, and 
qualified postgraduate medical students in particular, allegedly had been receiving
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remuneration from private clinics or public hospitals in return for ‘registering their names’ 
without actually providing any services (Kohoku Shimpo, 21 September; AS, 10 October 
2003). This illegal act continued, as each provider desperately needed qualified doctors as 
their full-time consultants to notch up some points for the pay schedule. The government 
responded to this scandal, and in January 2004, the MEXT conducted surveys and inquiries. 
Its findings illuminated the prospective chronic problem of insufficient doctors within the 
Japanese health system. A shocking revelation showed that out of 79 teaching hospitals, 51 
(i.e. 1,161 doctors) were involved in this illegal act. As an immediate response, the three 
relevant ministries (MHLW, MEXT and MIC) set up a liaison committee to tackle the 
insufficient manpower at hospitals (Sankei, 23 December 2003; Shikoku Shimbun, 1 
February; AS, 4 April 2004).
The issue of the lack of doctors, particularly paediatricians, also hit the IACNH (AS, 6 April 
2006), echoing the problem which struck other public hospitals (AS, 17 February 2004). As 
the saliency pattern figure shows (Figure 20), the more attention the IACNH attracts, the less 
pressure was put on the government. Direct criticism was now shifted to the IACNH. 
However, with news of scandals featuring the lack of human resources in hospitals across the 
country ironically erupting, central government was under heightened pressure, and required 
to strengthen its grip over the sector in a more coordinated fashion across divided ministries. 
It was neither due to party competition nor to the level of public criticism, but to the 
scandalous nature of the issue (the shortage of doctors, risking patients’ lives) that 
underlined long-term collective problems for central government. The establishment of the 
IACNH helped to push the problems out in the open, and under the new set-up, central 
government became more exposed and vulnerable to pressure. Therefore, in the process of 
transforming national hospitals into a government agency, the responsiveness of central 
government was not visible. This was not only because the reform was carried out behind the 
popular cause of ‘slashing bureaucratic government’, but also because of formal political 
institutions, which were not affected by public opinion. The formal policy-making channel
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was only open to the policy circle (the LDP’s PARC and ministries) (Mulgan 2003). Thus, 
specific problems within the public sector hospitals came to light only after the agency was 
founded. Interestingly, responsiveness increased accordingly, as central government’s role of 
monitoring the agency became clear.
5.4.3 Responsiveness in Japan
The case of agenficying national hospitals has shown that even though the Japanese health 
system presents a certain complexity with the coexistence of multiple providers at different 
levels, the central government played a pivotal role, and led the reform without much 
responsiveness to public criticisms. Although private hospitals had been known to perform 
better, the impetus for reform derived from financial concerns rather than a marketisation 
agenda. At the time of the policy announcement, a great amount of criticism was heard, but 
quietened quickly. The impact of the criticism was minimal. The final compromise evinced 
the importance of the formal political institutions with no viable opposition but factional 
politics within the LDP. Policy expert and former Prime Minister Hashimoto played a broker 
role with the MHLW in finalising the process of agencification. Therefore, weak political 
opposition in parliament, combined with the marginalised significance of national hospitals, 
could explain the overall absence of influence coming from parliament. The outcome 
confirms that the reform of the fragmented hospital system in Japan was further accelerated 
by its decision-making which was closed to the general public. As a result, a pragmatic 
solution of deregulation and equal footing for public and private hospitals was chosen. These 
were both congenial to the LDP’s policy stance. Nonetheless, this approach of minimal 
government intervention in health delivery began to be viewed critically, as structural 
problems such as a scarcity of doctors and nurses in rural areas started to put a strain on 
regional figureheads (i.e. governors) and medical professionals (Yomiuri, 30 September
2006). Government (i.e. three responsible ministries) became highly vulnerable to the issue 
saliency itself, as the lack of problem-solving capacities began to be raised. Agencification
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paradoxically underlined the role and responsibility of government without much discussion 
of accountability. Even though the inter-ministerial collaboration only started in 2004, high 
responsiveness to public criticism began to be seen.
5.5 Comparing results from the three countries
Judging from the pressure type (i.e. low-high), it was predicted that political institutions 
would be challenged by this of privatisation. It is a highly charged issue, as it signals a 
roll-back of the state and raises the question of accountability. Does government’s capacity 
to achieve such a policy programme simply depend on political institutional characteristics 
or more dynamic relationships between the general public and government? The three cases 
indicated that the legislature of all three countries have a tendency to be responsive neither to 
electoral competition nor public criticism. The outcomes were affected by the formal rules of 
the game (i.e. consensus procurement among governing parties, politico-administrative 
relationship or centre-local government relationship).
Perspective 1 (election-conscious government) could only partially explain the 
unprecedented reaction of the Swedish Social Democrat-led central government to the local 
decision to privatise its acute hospital. There has been clearer left-right politics over the 
health domain in Sweden than in the other two countries. In England, the idea of Foundation 
Hospitals came during the mid-term, thus without the need of being put to the electorate, 
while in Japan, the issue was tackled within the wider-ranging and more popular agenda of 
reorganising public administration, including central ministries. Combined with the lack of a 
viable opposition force, the issue of agencifying the national hospitals did not become a 
party-political matter, as predicted from their institutional logics.
As for Perspective 3, none of the three was responsive to public criticism. It was only the 
Japanese case that showed the increasing sensitivity of government in accordance with the 
mounting issue saliency. Yet this occurred only after the establishment of the IAIs. Through
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agencification, vulnerability within the institutional designs (i.e. the lack of political 
coordination) was exposed, and government’s formal responsibility began to be questioned.
With those few and partial exceptions, formal political features were fully exhibited by all 
three cases. Given the formal institutions, central government can strategically carry out its 
plans without much interaction with the electorate or criticism from the general public.
Of the three governments, the government in England was predicted to show the greatest 
capacity to push its own ideas forward under the majoritarian parliamentary regime, with 
fierce party competition at polls, and divided opinions over the NHS, despite consensus 
between the two major parties over the basic principles of the NHS. In particular, neither of 
them claims to radically change the financing method (i.e. general taxation) or the popular 
“free of charge at point of use” system. The result indicated that the Labour government did 
not touch upon these aspects, but the issue created a row not only between the government 
and party backbenchers, but also between cabinet ministers over the degree of independence 
to be given to Foundation Hospitals. It evolved into an intra-party struggle, but government 
managed to push the bills through with the collapse of its majority from 164 to 35. Criticism 
was targeted at the fact that the agenda was never endorsed by the electorate, raising the 
question of democratic deficits. This proved the point that formal institutions could be robust 
enough to fend off criticism, contrary to the main argument made by proponents of new 
politics of welfare states. Government can make controversial reforms and still survive 
criticism. This result was not predicted by the two perspectives based on electoral 
competition and public criticism. However, under such circumstances with a stable majority 
in Westminster, the ‘elective dictatorship’ (Norton 2003) rendered this government 
‘unresponsive’.
Sweden has decentralised policy-making, with a clearer left-right division over hospital 
politics than its English counterpart, which created the possibility for frequent policy 
changes and the use of the private sector at local level. Because of local autonomy and
202
discretion over health provision, the capacity of the central government to intervene in local 
decisions was restricted. In sharp contrast to the SAP-dominated Norrbotten County Council 
in the previous chapter, Stockholm County Council has had the largest shares of the 
non-socialist. The gradual shift in ownership type from county council hospital to public 
corporation had been taken with care by the right wing coalition every time they came into 
power, and finally in 1999, given the mandate for change, the Moderate-led council 
transformed the acute St Goran’s hospital into a private company. Contrary to convention, 
the SAP-led central government intervened and passed a law to stop such acts (i.e. 
operations of for-profit providers in acute hospitals) in any other areas in the foreseeable 
future. It was an exceptional measure (S-16), but exhibited the extra capacity of central 
government to intervene in the name of saving the Swedish welfare model. Yet judging from 
criticism of central government and the ‘Stop Law’, it is questionable whether this decision 
reflects responsiveness to the general public. It proves, instead, that the left-right division 
between the central and local governments could cause much the same effect as the 
‘joint-decision trap’, although in this case it was overcome by central government’s decisive 
action (Blom-Hansen 1999).
In Japan, predictions based on institutional arrangements proved right. There was no 
ideological baggage or clearly defined roles for national hospitals. As a part of the 
large-scale public administration reforms, the issue was not treated with special attention to 
hospital provisions. The date of implementation was delayed alongside resistance from the 
Ministry. Then, the welfare-expert/former Prime Minister played a brokering role between 
the hesitant bureau and politicians. As a result, even though the national hospital reform was 
designed as a programmatic retrenchment which could not be achieved from 1985 to 1995 
(Chapter 4), the whole package was presented as part of a rationalisation of the inefficient 
bureaucratic state. Without clear accountability for national hospitals, the policy 
responsiveness of government was never called into question. Rather, attention was paid to 
the battle between the LDP and each ministry, and the consensus-making process. However,
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with national hospitals released from government control, the establishment of the IACNH 
changed the scene. Problems such as staff shortages and the poor performance of the former 
public institutions began making headlines, and government (i.e. the relevant ministries) had 
to take action. These matters highlight the weakness of the institutional arrangements, 
namely the lack of a problem detector and coordination between divided ministries within 
the Japanese health system.
This case (low-high pressure) thus indicated that overall, institutional vulnerabilities were 
not exposed in the process of passing legislation, due to formal political institutions 
structuring actors’ behaviour within certain parameters. All three cases showed 
governments’ capabilities to push politically divisive ideas and pass the legislation. 
Exceptionally, the Swedish case underlines the importance of partisan politics in activating 
central government’s response, beyond formal institutional rules.
In other words, the three governments were responsive to public criticism, to a minimal 
degree. In England, criticism was concentrated on ‘democratic deficits’, although this was 
the recurring theme, including electoral reforms, to which central government did not give 
any clear commitments. Other criticisms included the possibility of Foundation Hospitals 
breaking up the NHS. It was argued that infusion of more market mechanisms and 
competition would yield a two-tier system. However, this idea has been embraced by both 
the Conservative and the Labour Party, through the agendas of competition and quality 
improvement. In Sweden, the main criticism was not targeted at privatisation itself, since 
there was a clear mandate for it at local government level, but rather at central government’s 
unprecedented interference in local democracy. T o  save the Swedish welfare state’ or 
‘protect local autonomy’ became the two competing arguments, and the former was chosen 
by central government to show its authority. Therefore, even though the central government 
did not overturn the decision taken by the Stockholm county council, it negated the will of 
the local people, indirectly bypassing the controversial Stop Law. In Japan, critiques noted
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that the government plan did not reflect the reality. A variety of provider types has already 
existed in the market, as has the concept of agencies. Hence, policy emulation based on the 
British experience without much reflection on the local context was criticised. However, as 
discussions proceeded, with more popular slogans of slashing big government and the vested 
interest of bureaucrats (including the privilege of secured post-retirement jobs), criticism was 
targeted at the central ministries, who resisted the original plan and bargained hard to gain 
concessions. Therefore, once again central government was not very responsive to criticism, 
and instead ended up making minor concessions with the ministries. Little responsiveness 
was observed throughout these cases, proving the robustness of formal political institutions.
Nonetheless, once the legislation was passed, and saliency subsided, different patterns of 
responsiveness began to be seen except in Sweden. Institutional vulnerabilities in each health 
system once again attracted attention in the media. Public criticism secured much higher 
responsiveness from central government. Under the low-high pressure, in England and Japan, 
neither electoral competition nor public criticism led government to respond, but experts 
drove decision-making ahead, with little interaction between government and the general 
public. In Sweden, competitive party politics yielded responses from central government. As 
a result, the overall responsiveness to public criticism under low-high pressure was 
extremely low for all three countries.
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Chapter Six Construction of a quality assurance system: 
pressure-free zone for government?
This chapter focuses on the policy area where the medical professions are expected to have 
more control and discretion. Performance measurement began to be widely used in the 
public sector in the early 1980s, in the Anglo-Saxon countries first of all, although previous 
research has not covered the hospital sector or how similar measures were introduced. This 
chapter deals with the high-low type policy (i.e. high pressure on the medical dimension, low 
pressure on the political dimension) to examine the way in which central government in the 
three countries has been developing nationwide performance measurement in the hospital 
sector, and to what extent institutions affected the responsiveness of government to public 
criticism in the course of the construction of such schemes.
Quality assurance61 system-building covers a wide range of activities from application for 
standards certificates (e.g. IS09000 or BS5750) to the setting up of a national accreditation 
body62. Historically, the main aim of quality assurance was to protect the profession, rather 
than patients, from unexpected events. However, since the introduction of performance 
measurement in the public sector in the early 1980s, the main purpose of the performance 
indicators has become to assess clinical practice for patients and reflect the result in budget 
allocation (OECD 1994; WHO 2000).
61 Quality assurance is a generic term concerning business standards, customer service, best practice 
and evaluation. It is a systematic process of checking the quality of products or services to test 
whether they meet certain criteria. IS09000 and BS5750 is the typical example. The British Standards 
Institute (BSI) is the oldest standards body in the world, stemming from a meeting of various 
industrial institutes in 1901.
62 The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH, now JCAHO, Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, since 1988), an independent, not-for-profit organisation in 
the U.S., is a precursor to such a body, which was created in 1951. The primary purpose was to 
provide voluntary accreditation. Canada set up its own hospital accreditation system, the Canadian 
Council on Health Services Accreditation, in 1953, while The Australian Council on Healthcare 
Standards was established in Australia in 1977. Both were modelled upon the JCAH.
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In large and complex organisations such as hospitals, quality or performance cannot be 
measured merely at the activity level, but also at the output or impact level. The difficulty of 
measuring performance in the hospital sector, and resulting potential room for gaming, has 
been widely recognised by many scholars (0vretveit 1994; Scrivens 1995; Bevan and Hood 
2006; Carter et al. 1992; Garpenby 1999; Pollitt et al. 2007).
Therefore, support and participation of the medical professions is necessary if an effective 
measurement is to be constructed. The technical nature of the issue means that more pressure 
is exerted on the medical dimension, and the politics of quality assurance system may have a 
varying scope for political interventions, depending on the institutional logics of each health 
system or the level of public attention given to the issue.
The following tri-country cases are to examine whether institutional arrangements are 
designed in such a fashion that central government is susceptible to pressure from the public 
domain, or central government has only to react to initiatives from within the formal 
decision-making process. The cases compare and contrast how similar agendas were 
modelled on the concept of ‘performance management’, but ended up on different 
trajectories. The extent to which controversies affected central government’s response will 
be investigated.
6.1 Predictions
6.1.1 Pressure type (high -  low) and predictions based on expert-driven changes 
(Perspective 2)
Medical self-regulation has long been legitimised and protected to varying degrees for its
highly specialised knowledge. When a quality assurance system is nationally standardised,
the performance of the medical professions will be exposed, and therefore the issue
inevitably generates pressure on the medical profession. On the political dimension, while
elected officials may have no special interests at stake in this issue, the government
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department/ministry needs to put monitoring and evaluating systems in place to ensure a 
high standard of services. Therefore the closed policy community could be formed to build 
up such a scheme. Compared to other sectors, service providers in health care are privileged, 
and their power so prominent that if the scheme-building was led by the professions, changes 
would take place in their interest and their autonomy would be maintained. This type of 
policy, with little saliency in the public domain, would lead to quality control by producers. 
A formal policy-making style would be preserved, guiding the reform path. In this case, 
government responsiveness to public criticism would be low (Perspective 2).
Alternatively, government may publicly and successfully intervene in the autonomy of the 
medical profession and set up evaluation schemes or independent inspectorate bodies. 
Therefore, the visibility of the issue and the timing are key to the successful intervention of 
government and the introduction of a new nationwide performance evaluation scheme 
(Perspective 3).
Looking at the institutional arrangements, the central government in England has the 
strongest reliance on special advisors in Downing Street and information provided by 
research think tanks. Especially since the Labour Party came into power in 1997, there has 
been scope for being influenced by other bureaus such as the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit. 
Through these mechanisms, the professionally driven, evidence-based approach had been 
adopted. Yet the political sensitivity of the issue surrounding the NHS exerts pressure on the 
elected officials, and ministers in particular. Although central government in England has the 
capacity to drive policy changes with the help of expert opinion, even from those 
immediately surrounding the Cabinet Office, the effect of this feedback might be costly for 
the wider political circle. In Sweden, the NBHW, a government agency, and a 
quasi-govemmental research institute called Spri (Swedish Institute for Health Services 
Development; Sjukvardens planerings- och rationaliseringsinstitut) until 2000 were in charge 
of gathering data and carrying out a pilot study. These national bodies were able to influence
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legislation put forward by the MHSA. Yet concerning the implementation of policies, central 
players had to collaborate closely with the former FCC (now SALAR). Policies could 
therefore be initiated from the centre, influence from the professions, although the 
implementation of a nationwide practice needs local actors and involves elected politicians. 
Pressure on the political dimension is, unlike in England, exerted at county council level. A 
quality assurance scheme can be gradually developed without any interference or public 
attention. In Japan, government councils are the main machinery of central bureaus when the 
ministry needs expert advice. The close-knit nature of the medical professions in Japan, with 
its strong tradition of autonomy, may resist such benchmarking activities by the government. 
Consumer attitudes among patients put more direct pressure on the medical professions than 
via central government. Under low saliency and pressure, the ministry therefore consults the 
experts, and carries out its plan within the formal procedure. Potential policy provisions for 
each country are set out in Table 15.
Market <- ► Government
Left to 
market/ranking
Mixed system of 
professional 
evaluation and 
government scheme
“Arm’s length” body 
evaluates performance
Government assesses 
performance
Japan Sweden England
Table 15: Potential policy provisions in performance evaluation/quality assurance system
Perspective 2: Predictions based on expert-driven changes_________________________
England: the policy choice should be considered within the context of performance 
management, which was introduced with a series of reforms in the 1980s. Managers (chief 
executives of hospital trusts) were in charge, acting as central government’s agents in 
keeping better contol of NHS costs and professional autonomy. Policy ideas would be 
derived from experts and administrators.
Sweden: initiatives to build a nationally comparable quality assurance system can be taken
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centrally via the government agency, but the involvement of the Federation of County 
Councils must be reckoned with. Incentives of central government are geared more towards 
consensus building between representatives from different levels of government than to 
adopting ideas from experts at the centre.
Japan: the policy option for central goverenmnet is limited, as private practitioners have 
long-held autonomy, and the hospital sector is divided among various types of providers 
overseen by different ministries. Therefore, the medical association’s initiative and support is 
imperative and the ministry also has autonomy in formulating the policy, without paying 
much heed to the general public.
Although the method of publicising the results may vary depending on the logic of each 
institution, i.e. how performance indicators were perceived in each county and applied to the 
hospital sector.
The table below shows the possible policy choice of central government as a response. The 
high-low pressure type suggests gradual and expert-driven policy implementation. The 
options can be classified by the scope of the action, from small (‘decision of no-response’ 
and ‘specific policy amendment’) to large (‘creation of a new agency’). The middle option 
ranges from changes of indicators (whether they should include death rates or not) to 
changes of methods (from a non-mandatory scheme to a mandatory one). These policy 
options can be a good guide for measuring the responsiveness of central government.
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Purposes Types of response Policy details
Demonstration that 
government decision was a 
well-informed one
Decision of no-response No U-tum/no concessions
Demonstration of 
‘responsiveness’
Specific policy 
amendment
Adjustments (inclusion of death 
rates or mandatory publication of 
the results)
Institutionalising evaluation 
system
Specific but broader 
policy change
Founding a new 
agency/organization
Table 16: Possible actions and policy responses by central government
The next section shows the chronology, followed by the alternative prediction based on issue 
saliency and the level of public criticism.
6.1.2 Timeline of each episode
England Sweden Japan
1980s
Occasional discussions about 
possible third-party 
inspectorate in the House of 
Commons Social Services 
Select Committee, modelled 
on the American JCAHO.
Discussions on care quality 
issue begin among 
stakeholders such as NBHW, 
FCC, SHSTF and Spri.
Basic rationalisation plan, as 
well as distinction of hospitals 
by size and function started. 
Study group at the JMA and 
the MHW for hospital care 
quality set up.
1990s
1990: the NHS and 
Community Act. Purchaser 
and provider functions split.
1990: National Consultation 
Committee established. 
‘Quality in Hospital’ booklet 
published. The Medical 
Quality Council set up by the 
SMA.
1991: Patient’s Charter 
introduced.
Private initiatives: King’s 
Fund Organisational Audit, 
the Trent Community 
Hospital etc.
1991: Japan Hospital 
Association publishes 
standardisation manual for 
care quality
1994: Quality Assurance in 
Health and Hospitals comes 
into effect. Eleven new 
specialists registered. 
Discussion starts on the issue 
of the inspectorate agency, 
but proposal opposed.
1993: a consultative 
committee set up by the JHW.
1994: limited use of in-house 
standards by NHS 
executives. ‘Star ratings’ 
announced by the DH.
1995: Steering Committee for 
Quality Registries reformed.
1995: JCQHC founded 
(co-financed by the JMA and 
the MHW).
1998: independent 
monitoring agent proposed
1999: possibility of 
developing league tables
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by the CHI. Insertion of 
mortality rate in performance 
measurement suggested.
raised, but rejected.
2000s
2000: traffic light system 
(later known as star ratings) 
proposed.
2001: Medical Service Law 
amended. Council’s remit 
expanded to include patient 
safety matters.
2002: MHW decides to 
publish surgical records.
2003: CHI’s remit extended 
to take over the assessment 
scheme of hospital.
2003: TV programme 
showing resistance of 
hospitals to publish their 
performance data causes row. 
More freedom of information 
demanded.
2003: Private Hospital 
Rankings published by 
several companies. Based on 
surgical information and 
patient votes.
2004: CHI becomes 
Healthcare Commission.
Table 17: Chronology
Each episode starts with the origins of each performance evaluation system, as they vary 
from country to country (e.g. league tables in England, purely clinical benchmarking system 
in Sweden and third-party inspection and accreditation system in Japan). Different phases 
describe the different trajectories of each evaluation scheme. Each episode ends at the point 
where the most recent government interventions occurred in response to public criticism, 
with the exception of Japan. In the Japanese case alone, a completely private scheme of 
ranking hospitals was launched by several publishing and media companies. As the impact 
of these publications was not negligible, they are included as a parallel development outside 
the government scheme. The cut-off point for all three countries is therefore 2006.
6.1.3 Predictions based on issue saliency and public criticism of central 
government (Perspective 3)
In health policy, this type of technical issue would retain a low profile when presented to the 
general public as a technical matter. However, when some events (e.g. accidents on the 
hospital site or disclosure of the mortality rates) shed light on doctors’ performance or the 
quality of hospitals, saliency may rise. Under heightened attention, central government might 
be faced with pressure to intervene and respond to those concerns, irrespective of its formal
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institutional arrangements. Then, the responsiveness of central government may be 
determined not only by expert opinion but also by institutional vulnerabilities to public 
criticism.
High saliency could tip the balance between the government and the profession by 
successfully persuading the general public, and lead to the foundation of a comprehensive 
quality assurance system. Therefore, it is very important to trace the patterns of issue 
saliency in the three countries and make predictions based on those data.
England  
—b — Sw eden  
—^  Japan
Figure 22: Issue saliency (broadsheet) (Sources: TG/DN/AS)
As predicted from the high/low logics, this accreditation case received only moderate public 
attention. However, by looking at the newspaper archives in the three countries, it is clear 
that patterns differ greatly between the countries. The establishment of new regulators such 
as the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) and Byoin Hyoka Kiko (Japan Council 
for Quality Health Care, JCQHC) generally scored higher than the assessment (rating) 
schemes. In Sweden, the council was set up based on the pre-existing clinical assessment 
records, kvalitetsregister (quality registries). The body is therefore simply called the
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‘executive committee’, and it did not score at all. The aim of setting up a third-party agency 
to evaluate quality was foiled.
England 
• Sweden  
•Japan
Figure 23: Issue saliency (tabloid) (Sources: Daily Mail/Expressen/Nikkan Sports)
Of the three, the English accreditation system (including the body and the indicators) 
achieved the highest share of media attention (both broadsheet and tabloid). On the other 
hand, the Japanese and Swedish systems displayed steady growth in the volume of coverage, 
although recording less than half the number of articles of their English counterpart. Search 
terms used here were either the name of the organisation set up for external monitoring 
( ‘Byoin Hyoka Kiko’ for Japan, and the ‘Commission for Health Improvement’ and the 
‘Healthcare Commission’ for England), or the name of the assessment (‘performance 
ratings’ and ‘star ratings’ for England, and ‘Kvalitetsregister’ for Sweden). The results 
shown in the figures are the total number of articles.
Figure 24 below indicates the proportion of reports critical of the central government of the 
total. The figure reveals a clear difference between publicly-run health systems (England and 
Sweden) and a privately-run health system (Japan). In the former two countries, government 
is viewed more critically in relation to the creation of performance ratings and third-party
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inspection systems. More than 30% of the total number of articles in England and Sweden 
dealt with government negatively, while less than 10% did so in Japan. Given that the issue 
requires collaboration between national government and medical professions, the high 
frequency with which government appears in the articles in England and Sweden 
demonstrates a strong perception of government commitment to the policy (70% England; 
80% Sweden). Even though the Japan Council owed much of its foundation to the MHW, it 
scored just 25%, and the remaining articles refer mainly to the medical professions.
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Figure 24: Proportion of negative reporting vis-a-vis government
Given the policy type and comparative overview of issue saliency and the vulnerabilities 
within institutional designs for each country, we can make estimations based on public 
criticism (Perspective 3).
Perspective 3: Predictions based on issue saliency and criticism_____________________
England: even though attention fluctuated, saliency was fairly high overall. When the 
accreditation body was set up in 2002, both broadsheet and tabloid papers featured the event. 
Negative reports about central government accounted for a large proportion (30%). Given 
that central government appeared in 70% of the total articles, central government is predicted
'///////A
■ Gov-Negative
M Gov-Neutral 
E2 Gov- Positive 
□  NonGovt- Others
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to be responsive at the peak of the criticism.
Sweden: the saliency was constantly low, but grew steadily after 2000. Given that the issue 
was delegated to the local county council, central government could have been saved from 
public criticism. Yet despite the low profile and decentralisation, the proportion of critical 
articles was surprisingly high (more than 30%), tied with that in England. At the peak, when 
coverage in the tabloid papers also increased, central government was expected to respond.
Japan: the saliency was not as high as in England, but higher than that in Sweden. The level 
of public criticism of central government stayed very low (less than 10%), although saliency 
itself rose sharply after 2002 when a series of medical incidents occurred.
The following episodes aim to highlight the extent to which institutional arrangements in 
each health system determined developments of the government-led performance 
measurement schemes. In the course of constructing these, how responsive was government 
to public concerns surrounding safety and service quality? Attention will be paid to how 
external pressure was effectively exerted in some countries, but not in others, and how 
institutional arrangements affected this development.
For all the three countries, the late 1990s and early 2000s marked a crucial turning point for 
launching such a comprehensive and nationwide quality assurance scheme. From the next 
section onwards, each episode follows the same format. Firstly, the three countries’ different 
backgrounds will be introduced, looking at the emergence of an extensive quality assurance 
system. Then analysis of various development processes and their relation to issue saliency 
and government reactions will follow. The last section will compare the results of the 
tri-country cases.
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6.2 England: Commission for Health Improvement and Performance Ratings
Although the English performance ratings system had long been in place, its original aim 
was to gain control over the financial side of the NHS as well as its professional practice, 
rather than to protect patients. Using resources and capacitiy at the centre, the government 
can introduce changes in the direction of its choice without much consultation with the 
general public. This episode examines the responsiveness of central government to public 
criticism expressed in the media.
6.2.1 Background: variety of hospital indicators without an accreditation body
The UK National Health Service was one of the first countries that adopted performance 
measurement for the hospital sector (Pollitt 1985). However, concerning a comprehensive 
accreditation system63, it had been lagging behind other Anglo-Saxon countries. England has 
long shied away from setting up an accreditation body, although the suggestion has been 
made repeatedly, the first being a proposal made in 1944 by the Minister of Health to 
develop a hospital inspectorate (Scrivens 1995: p.28). The only example of third party 
independent assessment of health services was the Hospital Advisory Service, established in 
1969. However, its remit was restricted to the long-stay sector of care in the NHS, and it 
never really developed an explicit set of standards. It was assumed that an accreditation 
system was absent because of the hierarchical control over the hospital system, which made 
the quality and standards issue seem redundant (Day and Klein 1987). Also for structural 
reasons, patients did not have a hospital choice.
63 After the 1990 NHS reform (NHS and Community Care Act), the need for more objective 
performance indicators and a monitoring body was acknowledged. However, the lack of a single 
national system, unlike in the U.S. or Canada, resulted in an incoherent, complex array of 
accreditation systems. Fully fledged accreditation systems included the King’s Fund Organisational 
Audit (which covered hospitals, primary care and community hospitals), the Hospital Accreditation 
Programme, Pathology, Trent Community Hospital, and South Western Health Records.
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Performance indicators on the other hand were introduced into the NHS in 1983. Yet this 
also reflects the institutional arrangements of the NHS, which incentivises government to be 
the central actor of reforms. Therefore, when the first set of health care performance 
indicators was introduced in England and Wales, it was driven by central government, which 
sought to gain better control of NHS costs and subdue some of the consequences of 
professional medical autonomy (Pollitt et al. 2007: p. 152). The use of resources within the 
HCHS (Hospital and Community Health Services) was allowed at district level, but the 
measurement was weighted heavily towards efficiency rather than outcome.
As the aim was to increase efficiency in the hospital sector, market and accounting systems 
from other departments’ programmes were emulated, such as Investors in People 
(Department of Trade and Industry) or private market. Then, in the early 1990s, the need to 
look to patients was finally recognised. With the rise of consumerism and freedom of choice, 
patient care and service delivery came to be emphasised. This led to the Patient's Charter in 
1991, initiated by the DH.
With regard to the accreditation body, a variety of organisations sprang up, based on 
different ideas from providers, purchasers and professional bodies. One example was the 
King Edward VII Hospital Fund for London (King’s Fund), which developed an 
accreditation system named “Organisational Audit”, reflecting the origins of whole hospital 
accreditation. Based on the Australian approach to accreditation, the Organisational Audit 
was launched to promote organisational development and education. It adopted all the 
elements from the Australian version, except for its grading and pass and fail result (Scrivens 
1995: p.32). Nonetheless, where an assessment system, including evaluation of professional 
practice, was proposed, the medical profession never failed to claim that only professionals 
can understand the appropriateness of professional decisions. With strong involvement from 
central government and protected professional autonomy, the English health system 
therefore had challenges in establishing clinical indicators for patients.
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From the early 1990s, calls for nationally-agreed standards came from almost every angle, 
but for different reasons. In 1994, most chief executives (i.e. managers) were developing 
standards in-house for use in their own units, and presumably nationally-agreed standards 
would help in the development and use of such standards. But they were used to improve 
professional practice internally rather than as quality assurance for the external actors to 
evaluate the outcomes. The independent and private health sector requested national 
standards in order to ensure a level playing field for competing with the NHS providers. 
Purchasers were extremely keen to develop such a system. However, the Royal Colleges 
were opposed to the idea of setting up an accreditation institution, as it would pose a threat to 
their autonomy.
Undoubtedly, the DH and the NHS Executive had a strong interest in developing a national 
accreditation scheme to achieve their goals of controlling costs and the medical profession. 
Yet even from the managers’ point of view, the activities of performance evaluation were too 
centrally controlled by the government, and the Health Advisory Service (mental health and 
elderly services) and Audit Commission64 were unpopular (Scrivens 1995; Harrison 1994).
As we have already seen, development of this policy was rather slow up until the mid-1990s, 
and professional self-regulation and government-driven efficiency checks coexisited. 
However, as patients’ dissatisfaction with waiting times and quality of care in NHS hospitals 
are critical to the political dimension of the NHS, the DH as well as the governing party was 
aware of the pressure (Appleby and Alvarez Rosette 2003). In this episode, the degree to 
which the central government was exposed to public criticism will be examined, as will its 
impact on government schemes.
64 The Audit Commission was set up in 1983 in order to ensure compliance with the law and to 
enforce a set o f accounting rules.
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6.2.2 Episode & Analysis
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Figure 25: Number of reports critical of government/medical profession 
(The Guardian, 1993-2006)
(Phase 1: pre-1998; Phase 2: 1998 - 2000; Phase 3: 2001 - 2006)
The figure above demonstrates how the scheme (performance indicators, with varying names, 
and the monitoring body) fared in the newspaper from 1993 until 2006. Only critical, if not 
negative, reports about either government or the medical profession appear. The following 
episode and analysis follows these trends, examining how government responded to public 
criticism.
Phase 1: ‘League table’ for schools and hospitals (pre-1998)
As mentioned earlier, the first attempt, which placed clear priority on patients in the 
performance measurement, came with the Patient’s Charter in 1991, following the White 
Paper Working fo r  Patients, which was published in 1989. Achievements of NHS trusts were 
measured not only by their efficiency, but also on the basis of standards set out in the Charter, 
such as access and convenience. It was also the first initiative to treat patients as customers, 
after the introduction of ‘quasi-market’ reform. In 1994, the Secretary of State for Health, 
Virginia Bottomley, proposed a star ratings system for hospitals, following the model of the
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school league tables (TG, 21 June 1994), which the later Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions, David Blunkett, strongly opposed, claiming that the starring system “is based on a 
commercial view of the NHS, making it akin to the running of a hotel chain” (TG, 23 June 
1994). The Labour Party published its own policy ideas, Renewing the NHS, in which the 
significance of the clear accountability of providers to their performance was emphasised, 
while market competition was strongly rejected (Labour Party 1995). Thus, performance 
evaluation was recognised as a valuable tool by both parties, but their emphasis appeared 
different.
For the first year’s publication of the five-star ratings, in which the performance of trusts was 
measured against the Patient’s Charter, criticism was voiced by the doctors. At its annual 
meeting in Harrogate, the BMA passed an emergency motion, condemning the tables as 
‘misleading and unhelpful’ The Chairman of the BMA consultants’ committee, James 
Johnson, commented: “Frankly, it is scandalous to categorise such great names as 
Addenbrooke’s in the bottom 10 based on limited and largely irrelevant information (TG, 6 
July 1995). The results showed many reputable hospitals, such as St. Jame’s in Leeds and 
Addenbrooke’s in Cambridge, to be ranked at the bottom of the league. Ministers defended 
this by emphasising that the outcomes prioritised the waiting times. The subsequent Health 
Secretary Stephen Dorrell sought to quell widespread criticism that the exercise did not 
indicate the quality of care, including 12 clinical indicators such as death rates65. In 1997, the 
emphasis shifted more towards doctors’ performance, which has long been subject to a 
clinical audit. In February 1997, prior to the general election, there were signs that the 
government, and Labour party in opposition, were beginning to take this point further. The
65 Indicators range from deaths of patients within a month of surgery, wound infection, length of 
hospital stay of stroke patients, recurrence of hernia after surgery, deaths in hospital heart attack 
patients, adverse drug reactions, rates of re-operation among prostate patients, length o f hospital stay 
and death rates among patients with fractured hips, frequency of D&C (dilatation and curettage) 
scrapes among women under 40, organ damage during surgery, bloody clots during surgery and 
damage to the central nervous system while under anaesthetic. The inclusion o f death rates was 
introduced in Scotland in 1994, which caused an outcry from the medical association.
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House of Commons public accounts committee invested £60 million a year for voluntary 
audit exercises, while nearly 15 per cent of GPs and consultants did not participate. Health 
Economics Professor at York University, Alan Maynard, pointed out the defects in a system 
without central direction and local accountability, giving doctors the right to regulate 
themselves, and proposed an NHS-version of Audit Commission. Three months prior to the 
general election, the Shadow Health Secretary Chris Smith pledged that the Labour 
government, if elected, would continue to publish a league table of hospitals, but not of 
individual doctors. At this stage, performance ratings were already out in the public domain, 
and the stakeholders, including the opposition party, expressed their criticism of the 
government. In this phase, party competition affected the emphasis of government’s policy 
over the quality assessment issue.
Phase 2: Under New Labour: setting targets and creating a ‘hit squad’ independent 
body (1998-2000)
When the Labour Party came into power in May 1997, the government pledged 
improvements in care quality, while reducing administrative costs. The manifesto said that 
the new government would “not return to the top-down management of the 1970s” and so 
would “keep the planning and provision of healthcare separate, but put planning on a 
longer-term, decentralised and more co-operative basis” (Labour Party 1997). As a tool to 
manage the purchase-provider split, government kept ‘performance ratings’ and sought to 
develop them further. The beginning of 1998 saw increasing pressure on the medical 
professions and their resistance to the opening up of their self-regulation. On 14 January 
1998, the chief executive of the King’s Fund and member of the General Medical Council, 
Julia Neuberger, wrote in The Guardian, praising the government’s proposal set out in the 
White Paper The new NHS - modem, dependable, published in December 1997 (Secretary of 
State for Health 1997).
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The proposed establishment of a ‘hit squad’ style of monitoring, similar to Ofsted (the Office 
for Standards in Education), was also acclaimed as a step towards reducing ‘inequality of 
quality throughout the country’ (TG, 16 January 1998). The White Paper announced a 
radical breakaway from traditional self-regulation of the health professions. It states: 
“(p)rofessional and statutory bodies have a vital role in setting and promoting standards. But 
shifting the focus towards quality will also require practitioners to accept responsibility for 
developing and maintaining standards within their local NHS organisations”. Neuberger 
pointed out the lack of visibility and transparency of some initiatives by the Royal College of 
Surgeons such as monitoring of peri-operative deaths.
Following up on the White Paper, a number of announcements were made by Ministers 
Frank Dobson and Alan Milbum, which included possible legal actions against failing 
hospital trusts and interventions in hospitals with high death rates and scandals such as 
cancer screening mistakes or excessive costs (TG, 21 January/14 April 1998). The push 
factor for central government to further development of an independent monitoring agency 
came from the malpractice case at the Bristol Royal Infirmary (Chapter 7). Accordingly, the 
quality issue became salient in the media. In July 1998, government published the 
consultation document A First Class Service: Quality in the New NHS (Secretary of State for 
Health 1998a), which promised to establish new national standards, and better monitoring 
and assessment. A package of proposals set out in A First Class Service can be summarised 
as follows: (1) setting clear national standards, through National Service Frameworks and the 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE); (2) delivering high quality care locally 
through clinical governance underpinned by modernised professional self-regulation and 
extended lifelong learning; (3) monitoring quality standards through the Commission for 
Health Improvement, the NHS Performance Assessment Framework and the National 
Survey of Patient and User Experience (NHS Executive 2000: forward). The new guiding 
principle of ‘clinical governance’ (Scally and Donaldson 1998) was enshrined in the 
document. Clinical governance was defined as ‘a framework through which NHS
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organisations are accountable for continuously improving the quality of their services and 
safeguarding high standards of care by creating an environment in which excellence in 
clinical care will flourish’ (Secretary of State for Health 1998a).
The NHS Performance Assessment Framework was designed to cover a wider range of 
assessment indicators, and therefore six domains were selected. They are health 
improvement, fair access, effective delivery of appropriate healthcare, efficiency, 
patient/carer experience and health outcomes of NHS care (Secretary of State for Health 
1998a). As a result, the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) was created in April 
2000 as a statutory body at arm’s length from government. Its main activities are to (1) 
provide national leadership to develop and disseminate clinical governance principles; (2) 
independently scrutinise local clinical governance arrangements to support, promote and 
deliver high-quality services, through a rolling programme of local reviews of service 
providers; (3) undertake a programme of service reviews to monitor national implementation 
of National Service Frameworks (NSF), and review progress locally on implementation of 
these frameworks and NICE guidance; (4) help identify and tackle serious or persistent 
clinical problems (the Commission having the capacity for rapid investigation and 
intervention to help put these right); and (5) over time, increasingly take on responsibility for 
overseeing and assisting with external incident inquiries (Secretary of State for Health 
1998a: p.52). The CHI was given the remit covering all NHS trusts and primary care trusts, 
and greater capacities to monitor quality and act on its findings than its predecessor the 
Hospital Advisory Service66.
In the meantime, the task of measuring performance had been researched by the government, 
in its search for new indicators such as breast cancer mortality, waiting times for A&E 
departments, cancelled operations, hospital admissions and outpatient appointments, further
66 The Hospital Advisory Service was set up by Richard Crossman after the Ely Report of 1969, 
based on the standard improvement for long-stay hospitals.
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added to by complaints against hospitals and care of the elderly in 1998. Yet the 
newly-established CHI also developed its own measurement indicators based on clinical 
governance, which led to peer-review style four-yearly ‘clinical governance reviews’ 
(CGRs) in 2000 (The Times, 8 November 2000)67.
This steady process of building up a monitoring system gained little attention in the printed 
media, although voices were occasionally raised criticising the weakness of the NHS without 
an external monitoring and surveillance system in place. The criticisms were normally aimed 
at the secrecy and club culture of the medical professions. The government scheme of 
performance ratings continued to attract constant criticism both from the NHS managers and 
doctors, and the idea of third-party evaluation was strongly resisted by the medical 
professions (BMJ 1988: 297: 1569; BMJ 1998: 316: 1851). However, the rationale behind 
professional autonomy began to be undermined in favour of strengthening government-led 
performance ratings and the foundation of an external body. The catalyst which precipitated 
the process was intensified by public concern arising from the medical accident at the Bristol 
Royal Infirmary (Bevan and Cornwell 2006: p.3; E-12)68.
Moreover, the government launched patient surveys (the National Survey of NHS Patients) 
in 1998, first covering general practice patients, and followed by those with cancer and heart 
disease and in primary care. According to Chris Ham, these efforts help ‘performance ratings 
move decisively out of the committee room and into the public domain’ (Ham 2004: p. 192). 
In June 1998, the Health Secretary, Frank Dobson, announced the inclusion of mortality 
rates in the performance measurements, not waiting for publication of a new set of indicators 
which the NHS Executive had been committed to since 1997. He also made public that all
67 ‘The review teams consist of clinicians, managers and staff, inviting local people and 
organisations to meetings to comment on issues. They examine not only the formal processes of 
clinical governance and audit, but also how organisational policies work in practice’ (Day and Klein 
2001).
68 Additionally, a series of medical scandals e.g. Rodney Ledward and Harold Shipman (June 2000) 
followed, further reinforcing mistrust in the profession and justifying the cause of such a third-party 
watchdog.
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hospital doctors would be required to participate in a national audit programme, endorsed by 
the CHI. The supporting argument was simple and straightforward: the public have the right 
to know the quality of their hospital care. In the introduction to the 1999 performance tables, 
Dobson claimed that he hoped that the indicators would be “helpful to people working in the 
NHS, such as GPs, to identify places doing really well and to help identify places which 
should be improving their performance”, but not to be used by patients to “shop around and 
travel for better treatment” (BMJ 1999: 318: 1715, 26 June 1999). It was also emphasised 
that the tables were not meant to be applied as a league table of hospitals (TG, 17 June 1999). 
However, voices against conventionally closed and secretive medical institutions gained in 
strength throughout 1998, and resistance to monitoring schemes lost ground. Public 
dissatisfaction with the GMC’s internal inquiry of June 1998 into the Bristol Royal Infirmary 
case (Chapter 7) and the subsequent decision to hold a public inquiry (August 1998) became 
the watershed. In January 1999, The Guardian wrote that if “the profession does not put its 
house in order, then the state will do it for them. ... The need for change and the public 
outcry over bad doctors have allowed the reformers within the profession to take control and 
begin to steer its ancient institutions, with some creaking and protesting, into the modem 
world” (19 January 1999). By October 1999, the BMA publicly supported the idea of the 
commission (CHI) running ‘alongside the medical profession’s own self-regulation 
measures’ (Dr Ian Bogle, quoted in TG, 29 October 1999). In April 2000, the Commission 
for Health Improvement was established and began its operation.
Phase 3: Stronger emphases on patients and efficiency, and more controversies 
(2001-2006)
With regard to performance ratings and hospital ratings, strong intervention by central 
government was also observed. The 1999 White Paper Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation 
announced that a new performance assessment framework would be set up (Secretary of 
State for Health 1998b). A set of indicators were developed with the collaboration of the DH,
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NHS executive, clinicians and managers, to bring performance and clinical indicators 
together in ‘a single, more accessible document’ (NHS Executive 2000: forward). Despite 
heavy criticism of doctors, the BMA’s hesitant attitude towards the hospital league tables 
remained the same. The BMA report assessed the usefulness of the tables as ‘limited’, 
questioning the validity of data collection and outcome measurements (BMJ March 2000: 
320: 808). In essence, the tables were criticised as too complex for patients, and too 
simplistic for doctors. Nonetheless, the government, under the new Health Secretary Alan 
Milbum, further developed the scheme by simplifying performance ratings which were first 
published in 2001 for NHS trusts providing acute hospital services. The NHS Plan: a plan for 
investment, a plan for reform (Secretary of State for Health 2000), published in July 2000, 
proposed a radical shift from process-based CGRs to a ‘traffic light’ system of performance 
ratings. These indicators later became known as ‘star-ratings’. Subsequently, they were 
expanded to assess other types of NHS trust such as specialist, ambulance, mental and 
primary care, and lists of indicators were published in late 2002 and early 2003. In the 
official document, the main purpose of this practice was to “provide patients and the general 
public with comprehensive, easily understandable information on the performance of their 
local health services” (Department of Health 2002c). The real aim was to use the 
performance ratings as a direct control instrument to tackle the problem of worsened waiting 
times, by naming and shaming the chief executives of the NHS organisations (Bird et al. 
2005; E-6). This demonstrated government vulnerability to public cricitism.
Simultaneously, as this star-rating exercise began gaining publicity, more criticism was 
targeted at the government, once the effects of the ‘targets-and-terror’ star rating system69
69 The CHI undertook responsibility for the assessment system in 2003. The four ‘star’ categories are 
defined as follows: (1) trusts with the highest levels of performance are awarded a performance rating 
of three stars (Chapter 4); (2) trusts that are performing well overall, but have not quite reached the 
same consistently high standards, are awarded a performance rating o f two stars; (3) trusts where there 
is some cause for concern regarding particular areas o f performance are awarded a performance rating 
of one star; and (4) trusts that have shown the poorest levels o f performance against the indicators or
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became more apparent (Bevan and Robinson 2005). There was also a further link to the old 
primary agenda of government, namely efficiency. It was announced in 2002 that high 
performers would earn their autonomy and gain eligibility for foundation hospital status 
(Chapter 5). In September 2002, Nigel Edwards, director of policy at the NHS Confederation, 
posed questions on Milbum’s plan to create semi-autonomous foundation hospital trusts, 
based on three-star performance ratings (TG, 25 September 2002). The argument was that 
performance ratings only create unfair and fierce competition, and do not help improve 
quality of care. Under these circumstances, performance ratings became heavily politicised, 
and government became entangled in the scheme. Scepticism was also on the increase 
regarding fiddling with figures to achieve star ratings. St George’s in London fell into a state 
of crisis over the cover-up of budget deficits which were a result of its aim to achieve and 
maintain excellent star ratings (9 January, 19 April, 24 April 200370) This was followed by 
the accusation that Milbum had ‘forced the hospital serving in Tony Blair’s constituency 
upgrade’ to gain foundation status (18, 19 December 2003; 8 January 2004). There was no 
response to this accusation except for denial of such an act. Yet now that the CHI had been 
founded as the arm’s length body, elected officials were supposed to be freed from constant 
media scmtiny.
The establishment of regulatory agencies such as the CHI and its successor Healthcare 
Commission (CHAI, Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection) was given extensive 
media attention. Since the creation of the CHI, the level of public criticism of government 
dropped, and the focus of attention was shifted to the medical professions and trust managers. 
This was precipitated by a shift of approach from the peer-review style inspection to a more
little progress in implementing clinical governance are awarded a performance rating of zero stars 
(CHI 2003) (http://www.chi.nhs.uk/ratings/)
70 St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust had withdrawn its designated centre status for its failures in 
heart and lung transplantation before government intervened in 2000 (Commission for Health 
Improvement 2001: pp.8-10). After the allegations that the figures were fiddled, an independent 
inquiry found the then Chief Executive Mr Perkin innocent (BMJ 2004, 328:310 (7 February 2004), 
BMJ 2004, 329:998 (30 October 2004)).
228
confrontational one. It was exemplified by the sudden departure of the former chief 
executive of the CHI, Dr Peter Homa. He cited the reason for his resignation as ‘differences 
in approach’ (Financial Times, 12 April 2003) from that of the newly appointed head, 
Professor Kennedy, who had previously headed the public inquiry into the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary. On the other hand, performance indicators remained politically controversial, and 
blame was still passed on to ministers. Upon his appointment, Professor Kennedy quickly 
announced that star ratings should be replaced by new indicators, free from political 
interference, so that they would gain credibility (TG, 19 December 2003; 21 July 2004), 
which later generated a row between himself and the new Health Secretary John Reid, who 
wanted to keep simpler star ratings for patients to understand (TG, 29 November 2004). 
Consequently, star ratings were scrapped in 2005, and have been renamed ‘Annual Health 
Check’ since 2006. The new indicators have a broader scope, encompassing issues such as 
patient safety, the superbug MRSA, the hospital environment and the outcomes of operations. 
As a result, the single yardstick was replaced by the CHAI with a double grading, scoring 
trusts on a scale of A to E for their performance and one to five for leadership and the 
potential to improve. The intertwined nature of the development processes of the monitoring 
body and performance assessment exercises demonstrates the great capacity of central 
government to handle the matter, but also its vulnerability to external pressure. 
Standard-setting and expansion of government regulation was successfully promoted and 
carried out amidst growing distrust in professional self-regulation, yet the constant 
involvement of central government, including elected officials, increased political risks and 
vulnerability to public criticism.
6.2.3 Responsiveness in England
For a long time, the performance indicators in England were kept as a financial tool, but with 
the arrival of the ‘Patient’s Charter’, proactive initiatives began to be taken by senior elected 
officials for building up the performance indicators. Although indicators were not
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consolidated into a larger comprehensive regulatory scheme until New Labour came to 
power, the aspect of expert-driven changes was not so strong in England from the outset. 
What should be included in the indicators became a matter for constant political contention.
After patients’ rights became a dominant theme in the language of political parties, the 
government emphasised the importance of performance indicators, primarily for patient 
safety. Therefore, between clinically advanced data and easy-to-access performance ratings, 
the latter became the option favoured by elected officials, although the swing between the 
two choices occurred. This interference demonstrated the high responsiveness of central 
government to the general public as well as to public criticism.
In the process of consolidating the accreditation body, the government successfully 
capitalised on medical malpractice and the subsequent heightened public concern over safety 
at the hospital site. With the establishment of the Healthcare Commission, ‘star ratings’ were 
delegated to this independent body. Government seemed to finally disappear from the front 
line of management of the performance ratings. However, when the Commission decided 
that the star ratings exercise should be replaced by ‘more clinically precise’ indicators in 
2004, the disagreement between the minister and the Commission was still clearly publicised, 
and government continued to receive a certain share of criticism. Strong intervention from 
the centre remained one of the institutional features of the English performance ratings, since 
when the accountability of elected politicians was challenged, further involvement followed.
When performance indicators were still being debated in the first half of the 1990s, the issue 
received little attention, although the level of criticism of government was constantly high. 
However, once the issue was linked to other policy goals (reduction of waiting lists, 
improvement of patient safety and establishment of foundation hospitals), both the saliency 
and level of criticism became even higher. The government and the medical professions 
were apportioned an almost equal share of criticism. What is peculiar is that, with the
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foundation of the Health Commission, public criticism of government actually increased 
rather than decreased.
To sum up, setting up an audit body was carried out by government through strong 
sensitivity to the issue of patient safety. The success was owed to the high responsiveness of 
government to public criticism. Government responsiveness to public criticism was clearly 
shown in the way that the focus of the performance indicators swung between clinically 
precise data and easily readable league tables, while party competition also helped the 
formulation of ideas surrounding performance indicators. However, this also signified that 
the scheme was susceptible to frequent political intervention. Hence, institutional 
arrangements with strong ministerial accountability made the seemingly technical issue 
visible, and shaped the responsiveness of government. The arm’s length accreditation body 
did not reformulate the institutional logics, but continued to exposed government’s 
vulnerability to public criticism.
6.3 Sweden: Gradual expansion of National Healthcare Quality Registries
Although the Swedish quality assurance system had been developed among the medical 
professions, it was intended for clinicians to compare their clinical results and improve 
operations. The original aim was therefore strictly clinical. As the choice of hospitals for 
patients was formerly limited by their residence, there was little incentive for central 
government to intervene and set up a nationwide scheme. The scheme driven by the medical 
professions can continue to thrive at its own pace without much consultation with the general 
public. This episode examines the responsiveness of central government to public criticism 
expressed in the media.
6.3.1 Background: the origin of the professional model
In Sweden, a unique quality assurance system has developed over two decades without 
capturing public attention. This can be attributed partly to the fact that the Swedish health
care system is highly decentralised, but also because, similarly to the NHS, people tend not 
to choose hospitals beyond their catchment area. There has “not been pressure from the 
public, politicians, professions and from financing methods significantly to change Swedish 
health care” (0vretveit 2005: p. 108), which could also explain the overall low profile of the 
issue. With the absence of public interest, the quality registry system has made incremental 
progress, carrying weight within the medical profession. However, when the 
purchaser-provider split was introduced in the early 1990s, the use of the registry began to 
be recognised more widely, yet still mainly among the internal actors. Both purchasers and 
providers needed to establish the contents of service and prices. The quality issue had to be 
taken into consideration. Then, in the mid-1990s, patients were allowed to make their own 
choices based on the quality as well (Socialstyrelsen 1995: p. 13). Gradually, it became clear 
that the registry which had existed since the 1970s could be applied by the government as an 
instrument to gather information, as well as to compare and improve quality across the 
country. However, the process was not made mandatory, and therefore it required a long 
time. As proved by the institutional designs of the Swedish health system, there was no 
direct control from the centre, and moreover, there was no sufficient access to the data by 
the general public at the beginning.
The quality registries first appeared in the 1970s as part of a search for the best surgical 
methods in rather rare specialties such as knee and hip surgery71. Because of its origin, this 
is a highly professionally-driven scheme, in that registries are run by the bodies that treat 
their respective condition or illness, supervised by medical specialty associations, or even 
individuals within the profession. Each registry covers only one group (e.g. heart surgery, 
hip replacement, diabetes), and participation is on a voluntary basis. From the mid-1980s,
71 The National Hip Arthroplasty Register is widely regarded as the flagship for raising national 
standards of care. It was one o f the earliest registries that was launched in 1979 by Peter Herberts and 
Lennart Ahnfelt in Gothenburg, and covers 100 per cent o f cases o f operation performance (Sveriges 
Kommuner och Landsting 2005).
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the NBHW tackled care quality issues in collaboration with the MSAH 
(Socialdepartementet), the FCC (Landstingsforbundet), the Spri and SHSTF 
(Vardforbundet; the Swedish Association of Health Officers). The basic idea of the registry 
was maintained, and a gradual expansion of interest in comparing the results in each 
specialty led to a total of 15 registries by the early 1990s.
6.3.2 Episode and Analysis
National Healthcare Quality Registries
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Figure 26: Number of reports critical of government/medical profession 
(‘Kvalitetsregister’, Dagens Nyheter, 1993-2006)
(Phase 1: pre-1995; Phase 2: 1995 - 1999; Phase 3: 2000 - 2002; Phase 4: 2003 - 2006)
Phase 1: Steady development of profession-led quality assessment for clinical 
innovation (pre-1995)
After a few years of collaboration between the government and relevant agencies, the 
National Consultation Committee for Quality and Safety in Health Care was established in 
1990 (Socialstyrelsen 1990). In the previous year, the NBHW had published a booklet 
entitled ‘Quality in the Hospitals: Supervision and Responsibility’ (Socialstyrelsen 1989), 
which was followed by the Spri report ‘Quality System in the Hospitals: International 
Experiences’ (Spri 1992) in 1992. Instigated by these national-govemment initiatives, the 
two main professional associations, the SMA (Sveriges lakarforbund) and the SSM (the
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Swedish Society of Medicine; Svenska Lakaresallskapet)72 set up a joint body called the 
Medical Quality Council (MQC; Medicinska Kvalitetsradet), which was designed to carry 
out quality assessment. These efforts on both sides, the state and the medical professions, 
resulted in the foundation of the National Health Quality Registry.
In the meantime, the MHSA prepared the central piece of legislation, entitled “Quality 
Assurance in Health and Hospitals including Dental Care” (Socialstyrelsens 
forfattningssamling (SOSFS) 1993:9 1993). The legislation took effect in January 1994. 
This was the very first national guideline for such a quality assurance scheme. Although 
general, the directive says: “all licensed health care and hospital personnel should pursue 
continuous, systematic and documented quality assurance work including preventive 
measures, diagnosis, care and treatment” (Socialstyrelsens forfattningssamling (SOSFS) 
1993:9 1993)73. In the same year, with the government investing in the project and the SSM 
joining the committee, 11 specialists were listed for the registry. (Svensk Medicin nr 38, 
1993)74. In 1995, the NBHW boasted of the initiative, claiming that comparing quality and 
results in each hospital would drive competition among the professions and replace the 
major role of economic means of control in the future (DN, 24 November 1995). This period 
was characterised by subsystem policy-making within the formal decision-making process, 
but without public attention or debate.
Phase 2: Criticism of loose monitoring and resistance towards establishment of an 
inspectorate agency (1995-1999)
72 The Swedish Society o f Medicine is the scientific organisation of the Swedish medical profession. 
Its aim is to promote research, education and development in the healthcare sector. It was founded in 
1807 and has about 18 000 members, (http://www.svls.se/).
73 legitimerad halso- och sjukvards personal bedriva fortlopande, systematiskt och dokumentaerat 
kvalitetssakringsarbete omfattande forebyggande insatser, diagnostic, vard och behandling).
74 “All the National Quality Registries in Sweden have their own data on problems or diagnoses, 
treatment interventions and outcomes, making them useful for multiple purposes. In addition to their 
applications at local level, the registries are being used to a greater extent in general planning and 
management.”(Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting 2005).
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Media attention on the registries was initially limited to a few articles referring to the need 
for quality assessment of medical services. Yet loose control by government with leeway for 
the professions led to some severe criticism from 1996 onwards. In relation to the treatment 
of diabetes and preventive measures for complications, the need was emphasised for a more 
mandatory participation of the registry and direct action by health care authorities (SvD, 8 
November 1996; 27 May 1997). The Dagens Nyheter newspaper also reported the 
possibility that the system can be abused by doctors, concealing the real data of malpractice 
or poor quality care. The article points out the shortcomings of the loose monitoring scheme 
of the registries, claiming that ‘even the responsible NBHW does not know which registry 
exists and which one does not’ (DN, 18 June 1996).
However, managers of the quality registries insisted on the main purpose of the scheme, 
arguing that it consists of quality improvement through oganisational learning. Originally, 
the SALAR (Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting) adopted this idea from industrial quality 
monitoring and assessment systems (S-5). As a result, the key idea is self-learning, based on 
voluntary participation and collaboration, rather than supervision and control by the central 
authority. Therefore, the registries cover both outcome and process measures such as 
postoperative morbidity, complications and relapses as well as the number of haemodialysis 
sessions per week for renal patients. The lack of strong enforcement power, which kept 
professional autonomy intact, could explain why representatives from the medical 
profession have been positive and supportive in developing the registries (S-5). For the 
NBHW, the collaboration of the medical professions was the key to success of the whole 
scheme, since they needed ‘good working relationships’ (S-5) so that the data would reflect 
the real state of affairs in each specialty.
However, this prevailing stance of both government and the medical professions was called 
into question. Accordingly, a need for constructing a third-party accreditation system began 
to gain support. The Swedish health system had no accreditation body, such as the JCAHO
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in the USA, but with the introduction of an internal market, the first accreditation and 
certification was introduced in medical laboratories. Initially, the state-run agency, Swedish 
Board for Accreditation and Conformity Assessment (SWEDAC; Styrelsen for ackreditering 
och teknisk kontroll), under the Ministry of Industry and Trade (Narings- och 
handelsdepartementet), became responsible for this activity. Additionally, in response to the 
EU requirements (EN 45 001), medical laboratories in Sweden became subject to voluntary 
accreditation in 1989. By 1995, the accreditation system was largely embraced within 
hospital laboratories, for most county councils (the largest healthcare purchasers) made it 
mandatory for the laboratories to be accredited. Twenty of the 150 larger medical 
laboratories were accredited, with an additional 50 applying for the certification (Filipsson 
1995).
Nevertheless, the increase of the SWEDAC’s remit into other areas of health care was 
strongly opposed by the major actors, both the NBHW and the medical professions. In 1994, 
the FCC published a report after a two-year assessment of different approaches to 
organisational quality, and expressed its critical view of third-party accreditation 
(Landstingsforbundet 1994). In 1995, the MQC set out their definitions and indicators in a 
brochure entitled ‘Medical Quality Development: guiding principles and viewpoints 
(Medicinsk kvalitetsutveckling: riktlinjer och synpunkter’ (Svensk Medicin nr 47, 1995). 
The MQC was also sceptical of third-party accreditation (Garpenby 1999: p.419).
Although opinions were divided among the departments, the cabinet decision was made 
manifest in 1996 (Regeringens proposition 1995/1996: 176 1996). While the view of the 
NBHW was mainly supported, it presented a compromised position, balancing the two 
opinions: keeping the traditional monitoring style between the NBHW and the medical 
professions and building up a new third-party accreditation system. The government was 
determined to tighten its regulatory function by means of legislation (Svensk 
forfattningssamling (SFS 1998: 786) 1998). In the meantime, the NBHW attempted to
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strengthen its control over the area, by dissolving the original Consultation Committee and 
reestablishing the Steering Committee for Quality Registers (Beslutsgrupp) in 1995. The 
Steering Committee is made up of three representatives each from SALAR, the NBHW and 
the SSM and one from the Swedish Society of Nursing (Svensk sjukskoterskeforening), with 
seven members in the Scientific Advisory Committee (Expertgrupp) reviewing the 
application process. Subsequently, the SWEDAC pursued its own pilot project to obtain ISO 
9000, and sought to procure support from the NHBW. The new regulations took effect in 
1997 (Socialstyrelsens forfattningssamling (SOSFS 1996: 24)) after a decision not to 
prioritise the third-person accreditation based on ISO 9000. In the end, the model which the 
SWEDAC pursued was reduced to a complementary role. The choice of method was left to 
individual county councils and hospitals (Garpenby 1999: p.420)75.
During this phase, the registry was scarcely paid any attention. Even though the lack of teeth 
in the government scheme was criticised, due to the loose monitoring, public criticism did 
not play any role in changing the course of the development of the scheme. Disagreements 
arose as to whether the independent accreditation body should be founded, but they were 
contained within government departments, and overall the status quo was maintained. 
Formal institutions guarded and guided the initial stage of establishing the quality assurance 
system.
75 The SWEDAC, however, succeeded in establishing the ISO 9000 model at national level with 
regard to care of the elderly and disabled (SOSFS 1998).
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Phase 3: Expansion of the registry and resistance to rankings by government 
(2000-2002)
In 1999, with relative success but slow expansion of the registries, government announced 
its plan to put more resources (15 million SEK76) into the national registry scheme, which 
would be applied to ‘softer’ domains such as rehabilitation. Nonetheless, the limits of the 
system became more apparent than its merits (Dagens Medicin, 5 October 1999). On 
another occasion, the DN reported on the unhappy Northerners with situations involving 
non-institutional care, and touched upon the limits of the registries, which could not provide 
real comparative data for the users. In response to this criticism, one member of the 
executive committee of the registry defended its position, by claiming “the scope of the 
registries’ use has been restricted to performance reporting and hospital planning, and is 
therefore relatively small” (DN, 11 January 2002).
As the discrepancy between regions in the quality of services was highlighted, another issue 
surrounding performance evaluation surfaced in 1999. Previously, discussions relating to the 
possibility of ranking hospitals had taken place between the then Social Democratic-led 
government and the NBHW, but voices for and against were expressed by different political 
parties. When criticism of the hesitant government was featured in the Svensk Dagbladet, 
the chief of the Medical Practice Unit of the NBHW, Claes Mebius, was quoted as saying 
that he was convinced that in a few years time, reviews of hospitals would be necessary in 
light of care quality across the country (SvD April 29 1999), but not at that actual moment. 
The following day, the Social Minister Lars Engqvist also commented on this. He argued, 
from the patients’ point of view, that it was a natural development, and he was not 
concerned that a visible difference between hospitals would do any harm to the current 
publicly-run hospital system, as the opposition party claimed. Therefore he believed that
76 15 million SEK (roughly 1.13 million GBP -  as of April 1999).
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‘just like many other countries, the general public in Sweden will be able to use the quality 
list in a few years time’. However, he denied an immediate shift towards rankings, 
underlining the fact that there was a hidden agenda behind the rankings, promoted by the 
opposition Moderate Party. He strongly argued that the Moderates were trying to introduce 
‘the market-based US model’ through the introduction of a ranking system. He went on to 
remark that the Moderates’ approach to this issue diverged even from the other non-socialist 
parties (Moderates’ partner), who were opposed to publication of the rankings. In response 
to this, Ulf Kristersson (Spokesperson for Social Affairs of the Moderate Party) simply 
emphasised the importance of an equal-footing for all providers, as under the obligatory 
health insurance system everyone should be guaranteed the same level of care, be it public 
or private (30 April 1999).
Despite these different party-political agendas in the quality assurance scheme, it was a 
more universal issue surrounding ‘patient’s right to information’ that began catalysing 
changes in issue saliency of the registries. The registry framework started to be seen as an 
alternative to ranking hospitals, but also as a more credible quality indicator for individual 
hospitals. From that point on, the existing registry system began to be criticised. In 2000, 
articles pointed out some defects in the existing system, suggesting there should be a 
comprehensive catalogue on the internet for making a choice of hospital and doctors (DN, 
25 September 2000), and revealing remarkable differences in surgery success rates or 
survival rates of babies between different hospitals (DN, 27 October 2000; 19 February 
2001). Accordingly, pressures began to originate from various comers, including the 
Confederations of Swedish Enterprise (Svenskt Naringsliv), the Association of Private Care 
Providers (Vardforetagama), a former Liberal Party leader and Social Minister, Bengt 
Westerberg, and even a former Social Democratic Minister of Finance, Kjell-Olof Feldt. All 
advocated that ‘the quality of health care should be measured, monitored and made public so 
that patients and public purchasers can make informed choice’ (Levay and Waks 2005: p. 10). 
Their campaigns for more open quality accounts and rankings of hospitals continued
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(Aftonbladet, 4 February 2004) (Lindgren and Soderqvist 2004). In 2002, the publication of 
results drew more criticism of government ‘silence’ (DN, 11 January 2002). Compounded 
with the ever-controversial issue of waiting lists, the lack of information was described as 
‘Russian roulette’ (DN, 18 November 2002). Once this ‘patient right to information’ was on 
the agenda, government could no longer escape criticism as to its loosening grip of the 
matter. The level of negative reports on government’s handling caught up with the number 
on the medical profession, continuing well after 2003.
Phase 4: Media scandals surrounding transparency of registries (2003-2006)
In 2003, an investigative TV programme called ‘Uppdrag granskning’ (Commission 
Review) featured the registries. Reporters asked all the hospitals reporting to the registry to 
hand out information about their mortality rates and other essential methods of diagnosis 
and medication. Most hospitals, especially managers who were in charge of each registry, 
declined to disclose the results. This stirred a public embarrassment, and at the annual 
registry review in December, the decision was made to disclose some of the registries 
(Levay and Waks 2005). Based on the revealed results, the same TV programme (16 March 
2004) broadcasted a follow-up report, showing a list of hospitals with high mortality and 
insufficient treatment. Simultaneously, the tabloid newspaper Expressen published articles 
on the issue, featuring the title ‘the most dangerous hospitals for heart-disease patients’ 
(Expressen, 16 and 17 March 2004). One of the hospitals in Halmstad, the county of Halland, 
reacted swiftly, and in fact received 30 million SEK77 to tackle the problem, though the 
overall budget was cut (Hallandsposten, 12 November 2004). The NBHW publicly 
requested more openness from each hospital about their output data (DN, 26 November 
2004).
77 30 million SEK (roughly 2.34 million GBP -  as of November 2004).
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Furthermore, the issue of transparency continued to drive change. In Sweden, the Freedom 
of the Press Act (Section 1) stipulates that all Swedish citizens shall have the right to access 
public records. However, not all the data in the registries is considered ‘public’, since some 
of it needs to be covered by secrecy according to law. Several legal reviews in the 
administrative courts demonstrated that it depends on the case. Closed registries were 
accepted in some cases, while transparency has been demanded in others. In view of the 
existence of comprehensive processing of highly sensitive personal data in the quality 
registries, the Swedish Data Inspection Board (Datainspektionen) demanded that the 
National Quality Registries should be covered by special legislation. Because the 
preparatory work by the NBHW in 1995 (SOU 1995: 5) and the two acts on health data and 
health service registries (Svensk forfattningssamling (SFS 1998: 544); Svensk 
forfattningssamling (SFS 1998: 543)) stipulated that quality registries in their current form 
are a special category of personal registry within healthcare. The government responded to 
this, and the Patient Data Commission was established (EyeNet Sweden 2005: p.16)78. In 
2005, the NBHW put forward regulations on management systems for quality and patient 
safety (Socialstyrelsens forfattningssamling (SOSFS 2005: 12)), and the registries are now 
conducted in line with this law.
From 2005, the Minister Ylva Johansson took a stronger initiative in expanding the 
registries into psychiatry (DN, 14 October 2005) and elderly care (DN, 14 November 2005). 
A government-commissioned national psychiatry coordinator (the former president of SMA), 
Dr Anders Milton, criticised the NHBW for having failed to establish evaluation for 
psychiatry (20 December 2005). Pushed by the agenda, central government attempts to take 
control over the quality control domain. As of the beginning of 2006, there were more than 
60 registries that received economic support through the Steering Committee of the National
78 The new law requires the registered information, demands no active consent, but the potential for 
active withdrawal from the registry if  the individual so demands.
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Healthcare Quality Registries, and more than 100 registries and several new competence 
centres applying for funding.
Therefore, in this phase, there was more response from central government to public 
criticism. Although the method of using the registry has not been changed, more funding, a 
firmer grip over the registry, and direct intervention were observed. The minister’s 
intervention into the matter of psychiatry was a symbolic departure from the original 
profession-driven management of the registry.
6.3.3 Responsiveness in Sweden
From the institutional design, the publicly-run Swedish health care was predicted to produce 
a government-led quality improvement scheme managed by the agency-type accreditation 
system. Yet the weaker position of central government within the decentralised structure led 
to the gradual development of an existing monitoring system, initiated by each specialty 
within the professional networks. As a result, the concept of registry, which had already 
been established within certain specialties, was expanded in collaboration with the medical 
profession, and the role of monitoring at national level was delegated to the group of 
representatives from each party. Therefore, a new accreditation body was not launched by 
government, and little attention was paid to the issue. Consequently, successful efforts were 
made by regular actors within the institutional design (i.e. the NBHW, the FCC and the 
relevant professional groups) without major disruption. They managed to fend off the entry 
of new actors such as SWEDEC, and some criticisms regarding the loose monitoring 
machinery or the lack of a clear ranking system. Nonetheless, as limited access to the 
registries was revealed, freedom of information became an agenda, in which government 
showed its vulnerability to external pressure. The issue became a driving force to further 
transformation of the national registries into more of an accreditation system. Televised 
media played a significant role in connecting the focus of the quality issue to patient rights.
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Unlike the English star-ratings or establishment of the CHI, this is a case where a series of 
steady changes occurred through a coordinated decision-making process, without radical 
intrusion into professional autonomy. The results proved the resilience of the long-held 
policy coordination style and the difficulty of changing institutional designs, especially in 
the domain that is strongly driven by professions. Yet the expansion of the established 
system was gradually brought under public attention by the media, and challenged by new 
actors. Criticism over the lack of public transparency and government discretion drew 
responses from central government in the last phase, which demonstrated that even such a 
robust health care institution is susceptible to external pressure over such a technical issue.
6.4 Japan: Emulation of US-style accreditation system and emergence of privately 
sponsored rankings
Although Japanese health services had been delivered by different types of providers, of 
which private practitioners were a large proportion, the government did not develop any 
quality assurance system to compare various services. Amid increasing medical costs, the 
government realised the need to intervene and restructure the hospital sector. The 
accreditation system was therefore designed as a benchmark to reclassify public and private 
hospitals, and not meant for patients’ information. The ministry-led policy-making, in 
collaboration with the medical professions, is a predicted result based on the institutional 
features. This episode examines the responsiveness of central government to public criticism 
expressed in the media.
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6.4.1 Background: too many beds, too little control
As mentioned in earlier chapters, private medical corporations are the principal health 
providers79 in Japan, with no clear division of roles among hospitals. By Medical Law 
(Article 1-5), health care organisations with 20 or more beds are designated as hospitals, 
while those with less than 20 are clinics. Consequently, the performance issue was 
problematic for both the medical association and government. As the definition of a hospital 
was vague in terms of roles and functions, there was no benchmark with which the 
performance of hospitals could be evaluated (Hashimoto 1998: p. 166).
The MHW had long wanted to place tighter controls upon private medical corporations, 
especially after free medical care for the elderly pushed up medical costs and cost 
containment came onto the agenda. A long spell of government laissez-faire policy regarding 
the supply side, safeguarded by the strong LDP-JMA alliance, finally had to come to an end. 
As soon as the powerful JMA president Taro Takemi left the post, the then administrative 
vice-minister of the MHW Hitoshi Yoshimura (1984-86) put forward the argument that the 
‘soaring medical costs will bankrupt the country’ (in his article “Irydhi Kokubo Ron”), 
supporting the ministry’s cost-constainment reform80. Public sector hospitals were 
enormously in deficit, with excessive bed provisions in the countryside only worsening the 
balance sheet. An accreditation system for hospitals in Japan therefore emerged out of 
economic concerns in the long-term absence of regulatory tools. It was meant as a process of 
equipping government with the proper tools for controlling entry, monitoring and evaluation. 
In order to achieve its goals, the original catalogue of various types of providers (central 
government, local government, quasi-public corporations, private and individuals) had to be 
reclassified first.
79 There are 41,720 medical corporations as of March 2006, and this accounts for 60 percent of all 
hospitals, 30 percent o f all clinics (with less than 20 beds. 50 percent is run by individuals).
80 The article was published first in the magazine called Social Insurance Bulletin (Shakai Hoken 
Junpo) in 1983 (Mizuno 2005: p.9).
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Before a medical corporation can be opened, it requires a license from the prefecture where 
it is located. When such corporations are to be set up in two or more prefectures, the MHW 
(now the MHLW) must authorise it. Therefore, private hospital chains are under the control 
of the MHLW. However, this licensing process had previously been delegated to the 
prefectural level until the first amendment of the Medical Care Act in 1985, when a 
restriction on the number of beds was imposed. As discussions began, a rapid increase in 
health costs became associated with a lack of planning in health provision. The MHW sought 
to seize this opportunity to redress regional imbalance in the service volume and cap costs 
spent on the elderly (J-2). This incentive was merged with the idea of reclassifying hospitals 
and accrediting them according to their performance. Nonetheless, a series of steps was 
required before this policy was actually implemented.
6.4.2 Episode and Analysis
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Figure 27: Number of reports critical of government/medical profession 
(‘Iryo kino hyoka kiko’ and ‘byoin rankingu’, Asahi Shimbun, 1993-2006)
(Phase 1: pre-1995; Phase 2: 1995 - 2000; Phase 3: 2001 - 2006)
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Phase 1: Economic pressure, redefinition of hospitals by function and emergence of 
performance evaluation (pre-1995)
The first bill drafted by the MHW to the Social Security Committee in March 1981 was 
faced with strong opposition from the JMA as bureaucratic intervention. However, Diet 
members, and in particular those of the Socialist Party, claimed that there was a strong need 
for amendments to the Medical Care Act, in conjunction with the Elderly Care Act. The bill 
was rushed through and re-submitted to the Diet in March 1983 (Furukawa 2005: p. 137). It 
failed again but eventually passed in 1985, and was enacted in October 1986. The idea of 
reorganisation (merger and closure) of national hospitals was included in this plan (Chapter 
5), opening up a pathway to further systemisation of the complicated hospital sector. The 
second amendment proposed the creation of two new categories (‘special-functioning 
hospital’ and groups of beds for long term care). The aim was to control the flow of patients 
and give out signals to physicians and hospital managers that long-stay or a high ratio of 
readmission is no longer profitable or permissible.
Patients who need
long-term care
Patients who need
advanced care
General (incl. acute)
patients
Clinics
Beds for 
long-term 
care <
Beds for
general
-care
Special-functioning
Hospitals
(500 beds and more and 
more than 10 specialties)
Genei al Hospitals
Figure 28: Reclassification of hospitals and clinics by function in the 1990s
The accreditation system started to operate with this second amendment, which came into 
effect in April 1993. Special-functioning hospitals came under the jurisdiction of the MHW
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(called MHLW since 2001), with the emphasis on patients’ rights, transparency of medical 
records, and risk management. Furthermore, the target for patients with referrals is set at 30 
percent (no sanction). The second amendment also relaxed restrictions on advertisement so 
that each medical corporation could more freely publicise its performance, whilst tightening 
regulations on the transparency of information. The third amendment came in December 
1997, with a view to supporting the new long-term care insurance law for the elderly, as 
well as propelling the overdue process of reconfiguring under-performing hospitals.
In parallel to those gradual processes of reclassifying hospitals, performance evaluation 
came onto the agenda. Yet as a mechanism of monitoring and evaluation, no single 
independent body was designed. The original purpose was not external monitoring, as this is 
not congenial to the strong tradition of self-regulation by the JMA. Instead, the JMA had 
produced its own benchmark for conducting hospital evaluation in 1981, publishing a basic 
guideline for hospital management in 1985. In August 1985, the JMA and the MHW set up 
a joint committee to develop a self-check manual for health care organisations, and for 
conducting a performance survey. The outcome was in March 1987, as 100 evaluation items 
were selected in order to assess each provider based on the following four criteria: (1) 
whether the hospital makes efforts to meet special regional demands and conditions; (2) 
whether the hospital provides patients with care in respect of their human dignity; (3) 
whether clinical practice at the hospital is designed to keep up with high medical standards; 
and (4) whether the hospital is rational and efficient in managing its finance, personnel and 
equipments. Although criteria drawn up in the list were vague and ‘hardware’-oriented (e.g. 
minimum numbers for personnel and equipment), the fact that the ministry produced a a 
self-check manual signalled a change of direction to health providers. At the end of the 
expansion period of medical corporations, the JMA began cooperating with the MHW in 
constructing a control mechanism to evaluate hospital performance. However, the idea of 
third-party inspection and external monitoring was not yet included at that stage. All these
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processes were conducted within the formal policy-making arena, with the JMA and the 
MHW. Elected officials were not even involved.
Phase 2: Voluntary study group of third-party evaluation and crystallisation of the 
independent body (1995-2000)
Independently of this move, the Private Hospital Association also launched a study group 
with a few academics, who were interested in the third-party evaluation adopted in the 
JCAHO in the United States. The idea of third-party assessment had not been known in 
Japan until the group conducted its first trial survey (Ito et al. 1998). In 1990, this voluntary 
research group formed the Japanese Hospital Quality Assurance Society (JHQAS, Byoin 
Iryo no Shitsu ni kansuru Kenkyu-kai), later reestablished as the Japanese Society for 
Quality in Health Care (JSQua, since 1995). The founding members included Professor 
Sakae Iwasaki and Professor Atsuaki Gunji81. The JHQAS consisted of 60 hospitals and 50 
individual members from hospital management (executives, nurses and administrators) and 
scholars. The purpose was to establish a set of measurements based on researched clinical 
evidence, and share the results with the members. The JHQAS paid more attention to the 
“soft” aspect, ranging from patient satisfaction, nursing, and administrative management to 
medical records, instead of the “hard” aspect focused on by the govemment-JMA scheme. It 
conducted one-day on-site surveys, with results handed over to the hospitals as 
recommendations for improvement. The first trial results were published as a manual,
81 Before becoming a professor at the University of Tokyo, Professor Gunji had been a civil servant 
at the MHW (Director of Biologies Division, Pharmaceutical Affairs Bureau, August 1982 to July 
1984), during which the HIV-tainted blood products were granted permission for import from the US. 
He was brought to court to testify for his former chief, who was charged with professional negligence 
in 1998.
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setting out standards and scores for hospital care quality by the Japan Hospital Association82 
in December 1991.
Around the same period, the government scheme decided to adopt third-party evaluation. 
The MHW established a consultative committee in 1993, for which members were selected 
from the JMA, hospitals and patients. Based on the proposal put forward by the consultative 
committee, the Japan Council for Quality Health Care (JCQHC) came into being in July 
1995, co-fmanced by the JMA and the MHW, with Professor Ryuichiro Tachi, the former 
chairman of the Central Social Insurance Medical Council (CSIMC), as its head. The five 
main activities of the Council were to (1) assess hospital care quality (general, psychiatric 
and long-term care hospitals) from a neutral, third-person perspective, and issue 
accreditation to the hospitals which made improvements in care quality; (2) support care 
improvements by providing counselling and special advisors and conducting preliminary 
assessment for hospitals; (3) supply special training for hospital managers, nurses and 
doctors to become certified surveyors; (4) conduct research on more effective and efficient 
methods for assessing hospital care quality; and (5) hold seminars to promote awareness of 
the assessment (Jichitai Byoin Keiei Kenkyukai 2003: pp. 168-169).
The Council was therefore established as an accreditation body, independent of government 
and all other public and private organisations. The main objective was to examine the 
quality of hospitals in more than 100 categories and publish results in five grades. Initially, 
about 240 on-site surveys were conducted annually. Nonetheless, the first setback was 
revealed when only a few hospitals applied to be inspected (fifty-eight hospitals in the first 
year). Similar to the Swedish system, participation was not mandatory, but on a voluntary 
basis. Accordingly, scepticism towards the government scheme started to be voiced in 1997.
82 The Japan Hospital Association was founded in 1948, with both public and private hospitals. 
Today it has with 2,691 regular members (hospitals) and 524 supporting members, (as of January 
2006).
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In particular, criticism was centred on the lack of openness of results and the club culture of 
the medical professions. The Council only published the ‘good’ hospitals as they were 
accredited, but did not reveal the names of ‘failed’ hospitals (AS, 3 September 1997). 
Yoshiko Tsujimoto, the President of the non-profit Consumer Organisation for Medicine 
and Law (established in 1990), argued that ‘the Council carries out its inspection with birds’ 
eyes, whereas we do it with those of insects’. She asked ‘how could the medical professions 
in Japan, which had no tradition of even peer review, conduct an external review and assess 
hospitals critically?’ She heavily criticised their general lack of sensitivity to patients’ views 
(AS, 5 May 1998). A vital difference from the JCAHO in the U.S. was also underlined. In 
America, hospitals without accreditation cannot be incorporated into public insurance 
schemes (i.e. Medicare). As a result, 98% of the providers are accredited in the U.S. in 
contrast to the very low participation rate in Japan. In order to incentivise the medical 
professions, the government attempted to amend the rules. Using their single tool of a 
centrally-controlled payment structure, the rules were amended so that hospitals, once 
accredited, could notch up some bonuses in their billing of medical services. Hospitals were 
also encouraged to display their accredited status in any advertising. The number of 
applicants has steadily increased in the past decade. However, by October 2006, the number 
of accredited hospitals totalled 2213, accounting for only 25% of all hospitals83.
Judging from the ratio, the implemented system is far from complete and effective in 
changing actors’ behaviour. It suffered from the dominance of the medical professions, and 
no delivery planning function on the part of government. Thus, the government needed to 
re-equip itself with tools to set clear and official standards for reward and punishment. In 
1999, equally severe criticism was targeted at the government scheme. A series of medical 
accidents occurred, putting pressure on the secretive and hierarchical nature of the medical
83 This number is as o f 16 October 2006 (http://jcqhc.or.jp/html/listindex.htm). The total number is 
as of August 2006, cited in the Ministry’s statistics page online. 
(http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/iryosd/m06/is0608.html).
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professions. Strong pressure came from consumer-minded patients, and for central 
government, this became an opportunity to regain a hold over the discredited medical 
professions.
Behind this, there was dissolution of a long-term alliance between the governing LDP party 
and the JMA after Koizumi took power in 2001. As the Ministry of Health and Welfare was 
merged with the Ministry of Labour, Koizumi’s Cabinet Office took control of the direction 
of health policy, with his committees headed by private sector leaders outside the sphere of 
influence of the JMA. Major reforms on public spending on health, and more private 
competition among providers were carried out against the JMA (Kondo 2005).
Phase 3: Market-led hospital rankings and transparency of medical records 
(2001-2006)
In 2001, three laws (the Medical Service Law, Physicians Law and Dental Practitioners 
Law) were all amended to fulfil three goals: (1) creating an optimal environment for 
long-stay patients; (2) providing more information about the quality of health care; and (3) 
promoting skills and qualities of the medical professions. The intern scheme for clinicians 
was made obligatory, and rules regarding the number of necessary staff were tightened so 
that the quality of care should be the central focus of hospital management (Ministry of 
Health Labour and Welfare 2001). Along with this change, relaxed regulations on hospital 
advertising allowed each hospital to publicise its own clinical performance from April 2002. 
This includes information about whether or not the clinicians at the hospital are accredited 
by their specialty’s board, and the number of operations a year.
Regarding this change, a senior officer of the MHLW commented that even though this 
amendment is not obligatory, “if hospital managers84 were not willing to publicise their
84 A hospital manager in Japan has to be a medical doctor by law.
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performance in their advert, that could now be seen as a barometer of whether or not the 
hospital aspires to be open to its patients” (AS, 21 March 2002). Additionally, the Ministry 
added financial incentives to providers by changing the fee for the schedule. The number of 
surgical cases conducted annually at a hospital was applied as another barometer to measure 
the performance of hospitals. The Central Social Insurance Medical Care Council (CSIMC) 
changed the rule for setting the fee schedule. From April 2002 hospitals were penalised for 
conducting operations (at a 30% reduction of the standard reimbursement) unless the 
regulated number of surgeries (five to one hundred depending on the illness/condition) were 
previously performed in that particular case. This change was implemented as an instrument 
to further differentiate various types of hospitals by function as well as prevent medical 
errors. The idea was that ‘the more surgeries are carried out at a hospital, the more reliable 
and the more advanced doctors of that hospital are’. However, the MHLW decided not to 
publicise the names of those hospitals that could not fulfil the criteria and were downgraded.
In the meantime, while the number of applications for the JCQHC’s accreditation was 
gradually increasing, freedom of access and a plethora of different providers generated 
another movement, though completely outside the government’s control. Given patients’ 
freedom to visit any hospital in Japan as they may choose, a more accessible guide for 
patients was in high demand. In response to such requests, private companies embarked on 
data gathering to publish their own hospital rankings. A number of medical consultancy 
firms (Medical Brain Co. Ltd. 1994) and weekly magazines published by newspaper 
companies such as Sunday Mainichi and Nikkei Medical were among the first of their kind to 
publish league tables in the late 1990s. Oricon Medical, which grew out of Oricon 
Entertainment, Japan’s leading music market data firm, carried out a large patient survey, 
and published its ranking. The first edition of a book entitled “Patients decide: Best Hospitals 
in Tokyo and its neighbouring prefectures” sold 220,000 copies (AS, 15 December 2004) 
(Oricon Entertainment Inc. 2003). Japan’s leading business daily newspaper, Nihon Keizai
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Shimbun (Nikkei) also started to accumulate data and analyses, as well as Asahi Shimbun’s 
weekly magazine branch, Asahi Weekly Magazine (Shukan Asahi).
Various approaches were adopted in these publications, as shown in Table 18. The Nikkei 
uses data about financial management and efficiency supplied by larger hospitals, with a 
strong emphasis on clinical performance. Data on surgeries performed, outcomes and various 
processes aimed at ensuring patient safety were checked. Nikkei Medical asked 
fee-for-service doctors to rank specialist hospitals85. Oricon Medical used internet surveys of 
patients (110,000) to generate data for their rankings. These rankings are meant to reflect 
patients' satisfaction, using indicators such as overall quality of care, waiting time, facilities, 
travel time, staff, privacy, staff hospitality.
These undertakings are essentially independent of government schemes, but some companies 
made use of government reforms. As previously mentioned, when the rule of setting the fee 
schedule was changed, with the emphasis on the number of surgeries in the hospitals, the 
Asahi Weekly Magazine made the most of these changes. Applying the Freedom of 
Information legislation (enacted in 1999), the Asahi Weekly Magazine demanded the 
medical records (i.e. the number of surgeries in specialties at each hospital) from Social 
Insurance bureaus throughout the country, and published them alongside their league tables.
In these three rankings there are obviously overlaps, and the top ten hospitals are mostly 
reputable private hospitals. Among them, a few are former national (now Independent 
Administrative Corporation) and public hospitals (local and teaching hospitals). However, it 
is worth noting that in the Nikkei ranking, the scandal-hit Yokohama City University Health 
Centre (former University Hospital, see Chapter 7) ranked number 9, scoring very high in 
safety measures (Nikkei, 29 March 2004).
85 Note that Japanese hospital doctors, most of them specialists, are salaried (Campbell and Ikegami 
1998).
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Publisher Title 
(First published)
Hospital
sample
Data sources Dimensions
Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun86
Hospital Ranking 
(2001)
> 200 beds 
All-Japan
Hospital 
administrators 
Japan Council for 
Quality Health 
Care
University-based
experts
Patient focus, 
safety, medical 
care quality, 
financial 
management & 
efficiency
Oricon
Medical87
The Patients 
Decide: Best 
Hospitals (2003)
Hospitals &
clinics
Kanto
(Tokyo),
Kansai
(Osaka) and
Kinki
(Nagoya)
regions
Patients aged 18 
years and over. 
Internet survey 
(n~65,000 per 
region)
General 
diagnosis, 
doctor's 
technical skill, 
doctor’s 
explanation, 
staff cheeriness 
& kindness, 
cleanliness & 
usability of 
facilities, 
convenience, 
patient privacy, 
waiting time 
(Also special 
recommendatio 
ns etc.)
Nikkei
Medical88
All-Japan Superior 
Hospital Ranking 
(2004)
All hospitals 
& clinics
Fee for service 
doctors (n=3,465)
Recommended 
hospitals for 12 
disease
specialisations 
(4 types: 
cancer, liver, 
neurology, 
diabetes)
Table 18: Hospital Ranking Publications in Japan
(Tiessen 2005: p.56. amended by the author) 
Despite some criticisms of these ranking exercises, they are, overall, patient-friendly, 
popular, and considered to be a positive development even by the medical professions (J-6). 
Civil servants and the Council members considered that ranking exercises in the market 
should not affect their duty, which was to “measure performance based on a 
clinically-precise method” (J-5). The government scheme therefore was separated from these 
private rankings. Separation did not occur by design, but guided through the institutional
86 http://health.nikkei.co.jp/
87 http://www.oricon-medical.jp/
88 In Japanese, Zenkoku Yuryo Byoin Rankingu (2004).
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logic of strong consumerism in the Japanese health care system. As a result of these factors, 
the government was saved from lots of public criticism, when the issue became salient.
The legitimacy of accreditation activities of the Council was undermined by medical errors 
at Yokohama and other leading hospitals which had held accreditations, but compensated by 
more customer-friendly rankings. As government strengthened its grip, the Council’s remit 
was also extended. Since the outbreak of the medical incidents, issues surrounding patient 
safety and information dominated newspaper articles. The MHLW has obliged large 
hospitals to report their medical errors to the JCQHC since October 2004. It started to 
provide patient information on health care organisations, and took over some of the 
ministerial functions, such as campaigning for safety measures. Throughout the 
development, elected officials were absent from the process, which reflected the Japanese 
health system without political accountability.
However, the credibility of a purely clinical evaluation by the Council was questioned when 
the former JMA president, Eitaka Tsuboi, was appointed as the President of the Council in 
2004. Some concerns were raised that close-knit, collusive policy-making still remained 
powerful. Sceptical voices pointed out that the Council, under the guise of a third-party 
assessment body, conducted only internal checkups on their friends.
Nonetheless, a new set of actors began exerting influence outside the former 
JMA-LDP-MHW triangle. In April 2005, the Council announced the very first results of 
medical errors of large hospitals (276 hospitals as of March 2005). The number totalled 533 
in 6 months, of which 83 cases resulted in death. Following this, the Council for Regulatory 
Reform within the Cabinet Office called for mandatory publication of death rates in 
hospitals. Yet the MHWL was opposed to this, claiming that crude death rates can be 
misleading unless the data is modified to rightly reflect the critical status of patients and 
their disease profiles (AS, 30 October 2005). There is also criticism voiced by prominent 
surgeons and physicians as to the lack of a third-party institution devoted to recording and
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analysing the causes of medical accidents and the division of jurisdictions among different 
ministries (university hospitals under the MEXT, municipal hospitals under the MIAC and 
the remainder under the MHLW) (AS 26 December 2005; J-5). As the issue of performance 
assessment originated in the context of health provision planning, it still points to the 
structural vulnerabilities within the Japanese health institutions, which lack the central 
authority and competence of the MHLW, and political accountability. At present, although 
performance is increasingly transfused into safety issues, the government accreditation 
scheme, complemented by popular rankings, caters for the original objective of creating a 
clearer distinction between providers in the market.
Overall, central government did not show any responsiveness to this criticism regarding the 
coexistence of the third-party accreditation body and private rankings. Nevertheless, as the 
formal policy-making forum has been weakened, new actors such as the Cabinet Office 
began challenging the old style of decision making within the ministerial bureau.
6.4.3 Responsiveness in Japan
As predicted from the institutional arrangements, the Japanese case demonstrated that the 
ministry and the medical association were both essential actors in taking the lead in 
constructing the scheme, not being subject to public criticism. It was an expert-driven 
change without much public attention. However, instead, a number of other players were 
allowed to take action, and began interacting with the government scheme. The 
establishment of a nationwide accreditation scheme required several preparatory steps, and 
the idea of third-party evaluation was infused just before the foundation of the scheme. The 
preparatory process lasted for nearly 10 years after the initial proposal was made by the 
ministry, as an instrument to reorganise and rationalise the whole healthcare delivery system. 
Even though the organisation needed another decade to gain recognition from doctors and 
patients, the joint govemment-JMA scheme finally succeeded in at least setting official 
standards for hospitals. In sharp contrast to the constant presence of the JMA and the MHW,
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the LDP politicians, who formerly played a broker role between the two, were absent during 
the construction of the scheme. Amid widespread public mistrust of doctors in the 
mid-1990s, the government and the medical professions, led by the JMA and some scholars 
at leading universities (medical schools), collaborated in developing instruments for future 
reforms. In the aftermath of several medical error shocks, it was the printed media itself 
which responded and launched ranking systems. They widely consulted government 
accreditation schemes while making the most of their own information resources. This result 
highlighted the interactive dynamics of different policy venues, with the media playing a 
large role in bringing public opinion together outside the government scheme. These parallel 
accreditation systems in Japan: (1) the Council, grown out of cooperation between the 
government and medical profession and (2) private hospital rankings, driven by the response 
of the media and the market to heightened public awareness. This example is a reflection of 
institutional designs within the Japanese health care system, which has no political 
accountability but leeways that could work as pressure-control valves for government. 
Criticism of the government scheme continued to be expressed from within or between 
ministries, rather than from outside in the public domain.
6.5. Comparing results from the three countries
At the beginning of this chapter, predicted results were drawn from institutional 
arrangements and issue saliency in the media. The high-low policy type was a good test case 
to see whether public criticism could lead to a successful transition from medical 
self-regulation to third-party monitoring and performance evaluation. It was demonstrated by 
the three country cases that government responsiveness to public criticism was constantly 
observed in England, but became evident only when the patient right to information became 
an agenda in Sweden. Also in Japan, responsiveness to public criticism was not detected, as 
from the outset, public criticism was not concentrated on government.
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Apart from England, which proved the most responsive of the three, the countries provided 
evidence of strong professional-administrative initiatives and collaboration. Expert-driven 
changes were observed in these countries. The two centralised systems (England and Japan) 
embarked on the construction of performance evaluation initially out of economic and 
efficiency concerns, but the decentralised system (Sweden) did not allow a central 
government agency to control the agenda. Therefore, clinical innovation shaped the national 
registry’s main aim.
England successfully built up a comprehensive third-party monitoring system and published 
varying performance ratings in the course of events. Japan also established an accreditation 
agency, but the original intentions of the evaluations were weighted towards the main 
policymakers, namely government, as it attempted to control the volume of provision, and 
with medical professions performing self-checks. The council’s activities were 
overshadowed by more popular league table-style rankings in the market. It was a series of 
medical accidents that transformed the council into more of a quasi-govemmental watchdog.
Despite the difference between the three cases, such as the fact that the Swedish case did not 
see the foundation of the third-party inspectorate, more frequent political intervention 
became a common feature in the publicly-run hospital systems (England and Sweden). 
Senior elected officials in the Social Democratic Party in Sweden have long dismissed the 
idea of rankings, as it could be a slippery slope to marketisation. Although basic government 
support for pure clinical indicators has been maintained, criticism of government mounted 
high, and central government became more active in expanding the registries, seeking to 
make results more transparent.
By comparing Sweden and Japan, it was confirmed that the construction of quality assurance 
systems was an incremental process overall, during which a higher or at least an equal level 
of pressure was placed upon the medical-collegial dimension as on the 
politico-administrative dimension. As a result, new entrants were kept at bay from the main
quality assurance scheme in Sweden. In Japan, however, although external actors scarcely 
influenced the govemmental/JMA scheme, a gradual expansion of the scheme opened the 
path to the private hospital rankings, as an alternative form of hospital quality assessment. 
Patterns of negative reporting proved that central government in Sweden responded to 
criticism, while central government in Japan kept a low profile. Contrary to these two 
countries, the central government in Britain proved the most responsive and proactive, 
intervening in the profession at the cost of receiving an equal amount of criticism.
The subject of the criticism varies greatly across the three countries. In Japan, it is mainly 
concerned with the effectiveness and authenticity of the accreditation. The credibility of the 
exercise was eroded when medical accidents occurred at the accredited hospitals, which led 
to the publishing of rankings by private companies. In Sweden, critical comments were 
targeted at the inability of central government to make the registry mandatory, and its overall 
protective attitude towards the professions. Central government was also blamed for its 
hesitance to create performance ratings, because of its fear of marketisation. The frequent 
changes of indicators and organisational restructuring were the only features of the English 
system. Nonetheless, the commonality was also remarkable. The lack of information and 
patient rights to information became a political agenda in all three countries. This aspect was 
not featured in any of the health systems before, and therefore not particularly attributable to 
institutional arrangements. Yet when it was exposed, central government in all three 
countries responded.
In conclusion, even in such a seemingly technical domain as quality assurance 
system-building, governments sought to demonstrate their responsiveness to public criticism. 
However, the responsiveness differed greatly, as institutional logics still guided and 
constrained the behaviour of central government. Frequent political interventions in England 
derived from its government with its high sensitivity to public criticism. On the other hand, 
the other two countries had kept the basic structure of quality assurance systems. Neither of
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the central governments was very responsive to criticism of the defects of the schemes. In 
Sweden, central government intervened and made a new registry in elderly care when it 
became heavily politicised. Hospital rankings also became party-politicised, creating a row 
between left and right blocs. In Japan, the flaws of the scheme, pointed out in the printed 
media, were never remedied. Instead, in the private market, the media companies began 
publishing hospital rankings. Thus, under the high-low pressure, a variety of responsiveness 
was observed across the three countries. In England, government was public-responsive, 
whereas in Japan, government was non-responsive, maintaining the expert-driven 
policy-making style. In Sweden, government showed mixed results, both responsive and 
non-responsive. When the contents of the registry (transparency issue or the absence of data 
for elderly care) were raised, government reacted. Nonetheless, when the basic structure of 
the scheme or the lack of government competency was questioned, it was not responsive, 
and even failed to create a new agency devoted to the issue. This creates a puzzle as to 
whether the Swedish case could be better explained by the expert-driven model or 
public-responsive model. However, the trend of central government becoming more 
vulnerable to public criticism, especially when its institutional incompetence is exposed, has 
been demonstrated.
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Chapter Seven Malpractice incidents: media frenzies and disrupted 
institutions?
Clinical errors, alarming events and risks to patient safety, often signal defects in the health 
system, putting individual doctors, hospitals or the medical professions in the dock. In some 
cases, government can also be held responsible for the lack of resources allocated to the 
sector or the absence of an appropriate risk management system. Such highly-charged events 
and their impact on central government’s responses have been studied (Alink et al. 2001; 
Lodge and Hood 2002), but similar cases in the hospital setting have not been given much 
attention, particularly in relation to the policy responsiveness of government. This final case 
chapter deals with the high-high pressure type and examines the extent to which central 
government was responsive to public criticism surrounding malpractice incidents at a 
hospital site.
The term “medical malpractice system” can be defined as ‘a collection of organisations and 
processes for dealing with the relationships between patients, doctors, and society when 
something goes amiss in the medical treatment transaction. This includes, therefore, ways in 
which patients lodge complaints, ways in which complaints are reviewed and addressed, 
protection for doctors, mechanisms for disciplining doctors, use of the court system, 
assistance for doctors who have physical or psychological problems, compensation for 
injured patients, and mechanisms for prevention’ (Rosenthal 1987: p.5). Normally victims 
follow the procedures established in each country, making complaints to a responsible 
agency or filing a lawsuit. Doctors may appeal if the verdict seems unfair. In the three 
countries, these risk prevention and disciplinary systems varied greatly when the biggest 
incident of this kind, both in terms of media saliency and impact on paradigm shift, came to 
light in the mid/late-1990s. Due to the nature of medical injuries and malpractice, the 
conventional procedures within the system may not always be fit to dissolve public disquiet. 
Government needed to respond to ‘crises’ by reviewing and upgrading the system as well as
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installing new preventive measures. A convergence of policy directions could be observed 
under heightened public attention and in response to a popular trend of public loss of trust in 
the medical professions and public hospitals. With this background in mind, malpractice 
crises surrounding hospitals in the late 1990s in England, Japan and Sweden will be 
compared and explored. The chapter analyses the gap between predictions drawn from 
institutional designs and actual government responses. The chapter outlines how each case 
emerged as the most controversial medical event in the decade in its respective country (in 
terms of the media coverage volume in between 1990 and 2000), and then describes the main 
actors’ reactions and policy developments.
7.1 Predictions
7.1.1 Policy (high-high) type and predictions based on institutional 
arrangements
Tragic events like medical errors normally attract great public attention and generate a 
number of articles. Although the initial high volume of public attention may phase out, the 
nature of events undoubtedly creates immense pressure and long-lasting effects on both the 
medical and politico-administrative dimensions.
This type of policy change will potentially cause disruption to the policy domain and open 
up windows of change by altering public perceptions of the medical professions or tipping 
the power balance between government and the medical professions. These may call for 
radical reviews of peer-review type disciplinary mechanisms or lead to slight adjustments of 
the former policy instruments. When tensions arise within the policy subsystem, and outside 
in the macro-political arena, requests for building more visible and secure risk management 
schemes would grow in number. While individual professionals and hospital managers 
inevitably have to face criticism, the politico-administrative class could be accused of
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neglecting systemic defects. If this call is justified, all the actors would be engaged in the 
subsequent process of regaining public trust for the health system as a whole.
It is questionable, however, whether blame could be equally shared between the 
politico-administrative and the medical dimension. In addition, it is highly dependent upon 
each institutional arrangement whether individual cases (doctors/hospitals) would be 
reviewed critically or the whole medical system (the nature of the medical professions or 
malpractice system) would be criticised. Therefore, this is a test of whether the events 
yielded knee-jerk type reactions from government or led to systemic transformation beyond 
the previous institutional arrangements.
Despite the disruptive nature, those actors concerned in the accidents are initially expected to 
resort to conventional procedures such as medical self-disciplinary hearings or lawsuits. 
Government is also expected to react in the awake of such a crisis, following institutional 
setups (Table 19).
Market i Government
Left up to each Left up to medical Public/independent Government council
hospital/court association’s 
regulatory body
authority
Japan England Sweden Japan
(GMC) (HSAN) (MEC generally 
judges based on the 
court rulings)
Table 19: Government involvement in disciplinary procedures
Yet in the face of highly-charged events, governments have to make policy choices to 
redress defects in the system. Possible policy choices range from emulating policy in other 
countries, introducing a mandatory reporting system to radical restructuring of the 
disciplinary mechanisms (Table 20).
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Purposes Types of response Policy details
Demonstration that 
government was not 
responsible
Decision of no-response No policy change
Demonstration of 
‘responsiveness’
Declaration of 
government stance
Involvement of senior elected 
officials: ministerial appeals, 
announcement of legislation or 
public inquiry.
Demonstration of 
‘responsiveness’
Specific policy 
amendment
Raising awareness: circulating 
guidelines on risk management to 
encourage hospitals to implement 
them.
Demonstration of 
‘responsiveness’
Specific policy 
amendment
Resource input: increasing 
medical staff and setting up a 
special team to analyse and 
reduce risks.
Demonstration of 
‘responsiveness’
Specific policy 
amendment
Legislation.
Demonstration of 
‘authority’
Specific policy 
amendment
Data gathering: obliging 
professions to report for 
prevention of risks.
Demonstration of 
‘authority’
Broader policy 
amendment
External review/sanction 
mechanism: setting up a body to 
carry out rigorous checkups 
regularly and decide disciplinary 
measures.
Table 20: Possible actions and policy responses by central government
The table above shows the possible actions and responses of central government. The 
high-high pressure type suggests that government is highly likely to respond. But responses 
may vary, in particular in the choice of policy options. They consist of three broadly-defined 
options: ‘decision of no-response’, ‘demonstration of responsiveness’ and ‘demonstration of 
authority’. In the first option, there is no response, while in the other two categories, there 
are specific policy amendments including legislation, and policy announcements. These 
policy options can be a good guide for measuring the responsiveness of central government.
With regard to predictions based on institutional designs, central government in England is
constantly faced with a struggle between its strong ministerial responsibility and the medical
profession’s autonomy. The responsible self-regulatory body in the malpractice system is the
General Medical Council (GMC). Thus, it would be the medical professions who would
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succumb to strong pressure, but also since the NHS is politically sensitive, the Secretary of 
State is expected to respond. In between political accountability and self-regulation, the 
government, rather than the self-regulatory body, which is not publicly accountable, may 
face political pressure or have an obligation to tackle the problem.
In Sweden, medical ethics issues have been salient, as shown in the introductory chapter. 
The disciplinary system has been highly institutionalised in the public domain with a 
mandatory preventive and post-accident reporting system (e.g. Lex Maria). This is proven by 
the existence of the independent agency which was in place. The Medical Responsibility 
Board (HSAN) is composed of parliamentarians, union and employer representatives and a 
judge. The body is independent, but meets once every week in the Riksdag committee room 
(Rosenthal 1987: pp. 138-149). It is worth emphasising here that the Swedish case in point is 
not a clinical mistake, but negligence of care, where no such system had existed. Publicly 
accountable local politicians and the NBHW government agency might have been blamed 
and had to react, given the high level of public attention. The highly institutionalised welfare 
system can transfer this criticism onto systemic defects and collective failure, passing 
responsibility back to central government.
In sharp contrast to the Swedish case, individual doctors in Japan normally had to face court 
cases on their own, risking losing their licence to practise indefinitely. Malpractice-hit 
hospitals teeter on the verge of losing their reputation once such scandals are broadcast. The 
government’s consultative body, the Medical Ethics Council (Idd Shingikai or MEC), 
normally waits for the court ruling before making its own judgment, and the whole process 
can take a couple of decades before the final settlement. Nevertheless, given the high 
saliency of the issue, and at the time of public apprehension and mistrust, central government 
(the MHW), as the only credible public authority, might respond and come up with some 
new schemes to take control of the matter.
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Perspectives 1 and 2: Predictions based on institutional arrangements
England: since events must create high pressure on both the political and medical systems, 
the relevant Hopsital Trust, the Department of Health and the General Medical Council, as 
well as politicians, would share responsibility, and react accordingly. The opposition parties 
in parliament might criticise the government’s reaction. Policy responses could be 
overrarching, driven by both the political and medical sides. High responsiveness of central 
government is expected.
Sweden: elected officials and administrators are spared day-to-day operations, as the HSAN 
is established. As politico-administrative accountability is also ensured in the Swedish 
publicly-run system, the extent to which central government could react and intervene in the 
affairs may be contingent upon the events. Based on the institutional arrangements, the 
responsiveness of central government can be limited, due to its capacities, and local 
autonomy.
Japan: the predominance of private clinicians and the supremacy of judicial verdicts are the 
customary procedures, and therefore individuals are blamed when things go wrong. Central 
government (and its disciplinary committee, the MEC) played a role in sanctioning them, but 
never took the initiative to tackle the patient safety issue nationally. Preventive measures 
were up to each clinic and hospital. Under hightened pressure, however, these institutional 
weaknesses (e.g. lengthy legal procedure or absence of a risk management system) may be 
revealed and criticised. The institutional arrangements translate into low responsiveness of 
central government.
The next section shows the chronology of each episode, followed by its issue saliency.
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7.1.2 Timeline of each episode
England Sweden Japan
1997 19 Mar: independent expert 
review shows the surgeon’s 
patients were four times 
more likely to die than his 
colleagues’. Health Sec 
announces an inquiry into 
cardiac surgery at the BRI.
14 Oct: surgeons and the 
chief exec of the trust face 
the GMC disciplinary 
tribunal charged with 
serious professional 
misconduct.
13 Oct: Sarah Wagnert, a 
nurse at Polhemsgarden, 
appears on a TV 
programme to reveal 
negligence there.
22 Oct: at the hearing, Dr 
Bolsin reveals that he had 
already expressed his 
concerns to his colleagues 
and the DH in 1991.
14 Oct: Anders Lindblad, 
CEO of the company ISS 
Care, admits 
mismanagement and 
accepts inspection by the 
NBHW.
9 Dec: the NBHW’s 
report criticises 
municipalities for 
contracting a company 
that has staff shortages 
and lacks competency. 
Minister promises that 
national legislation will 
be introduced. 
Polhemsgarden is handed 
over to municipality from 
ISS Care.
1998 29 May: the inquiry finds 
that the surgeons carried out 
the operations ‘without 
regard to their safety’.
16 Jan: another elderly 
care home (in Stockholm) 
is found by the NHBW to 
commit similar 
negligence.
7 June: all hospitals in 
Eng/Wales publish annual 
statistics of death rates.
12 Mar: the third case is 
found also in Solna. 
Leader of the local 
council resigns a few days 
after the tabloids reveal 
he has known about the 
negligence.
18 June: one surgeon and 
NHS trust chief executive 
are struck off the medical 
register.
The minister announces a 
public inquiry.
15 Mar: the Prime 
Minister steps in, 
announcing the additional 
budget will be spent on 
elderly care.
2 Sep: the NHS Litigation 
Authority promises the 
victims’ families
16 Mar: opposition 
Liberal Party leader 
criticises the
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compensation. government’s sluggish 
reaction.
30 Sep: another surgeon, 
sacked by the trust, appeals 
against the decision.
26 Mar: government puts 
forward the bill, Lex 
Sarah, taken from the 
whistleblower’s name.
26 May: national Action 
Plan for Elderly Care 
Policy is submitted.
10 Nov: the NBHW 
claims that doctors had no 
time for patients
1999 11 Feb: reveals that the BRI 
kept the hearts and other 
organs of victims.
19 Feb: another incident 
at Danderyd, Stockholm, 
is revealed by newspaper.
Jan: medical accidents 
occur
18 Mar: public inquiry 
opened.
21 Jan: internal 
committee established
19 Feb: hospital Director 
and Faculty Head resign.
23 Mar: report submitted
28 May: report circulated 
through the Ministry to 
each prefecture
3 June: 31 staff penalised
23 June: MHL 
recommends withdrawal 
of accreditation
7 July: case brought to 
public prosecutor’s office
14 Oct: victim dies
2000 11 May: Prof Kennedy’s 
interim report published.
16 Feb: re-application for 
accreditation
10 Mar: reapplication 
turned down by MHW
21 Mar: deputy Manager 
stepped down
2 May: 2.5 million JPY 
(12,500GBP) paid as 
compensation (from the 
city to the victim)
12 Jul: reapplication 
turned down, with some 
other incidents 
discovered.
27 Jul: a public trial 
opened
24 Sep: minister alerted 
health providers on safety 
issues.
15 Dec: MHL announced 
its tighter regulation on 
Special-functioning 
hospitals.
21 Dec: reapplication 
accepted.
2001 13 Jun: ban on surgeon to 14 Apr: further
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operate on children 
extended for a year.
negligence at 
Polhemsgarden reported.
14 Jul: publication of the 
BRI inquiry report
9 Aug: DH publishes its 
proposals for a regulatory 
watchdog for the NHS 
professions.
3 Sep: DH consultation 
document Involving 
Patients and Public in 
Healthcare published.
8 Nov: NHS reforms and 
healthcare professions bill 
is put before parliament.
7 Nov: ‘safety-awareness 
week’ is announced by 
the Ministry.
2002 17 Jan: DH published 
Learning from Bristol, its 
formal response to the 
inquiry.
17 Apr: report on 
Comprehensive Safety 
Measures is published.
30 Aug: an amendment to 
Medical Act, through 
Ministerial Ordnance.
7 Oct: ministerial 
Ordinance on 
Special-functioning 
hospitals.
13 Dec: MEC guideline 
on administrative 
procedures for 
disciplinary measures.
2003 30 Apr: Safety Support 
Centre is created under 
the JCQHC, to support 
patient-doctor confidence 
building.
Oct: MEC rules that it 
will not wait for the court 
verdict in order to 
discipline doctors.
Table 21: Chronology
Each episode starts with the outbreak of the relevant incident. Given the central importance 
of media frenzies, each episode follows the event up until the level of public criticism of 
central government over the issue dies off. This means that the cut-off point was 2005 for the 
English case, 2002 for Sweden, and 2004 for Japan.
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7.1.3 Predictions based on issue saliency and public criticism of central 
government (Perspective 3)
Under high-high pressure, it is not only the institutional vulnerabilities, but issue saliency, 
and the increasing criticism of central government and medical professions, that may also 
have a large impact on government responses. Figures 29 and 30 below demonstrate how 
often newspaper media referred to each incident. Search terms include the names of hospitals 
where the incident occurred (Bristol Royal Infirmary in England, Yokohama City University 
Hospital (YCUH, Yokohama Shiritsu Daigaku Byoin) in Japan, and in Sweden, 
Polhemsgarden, a care home for the elderly in Solna, a suburb of Stockholm). All three cases 
would be expected to appear in the newspapers in a rather abrupt manner at the point at 
which the event occurred, yet the English case was the exception here, in that the scandal 
went unnoticed initially, but later heightened attention was sustained over a fairly lengthy 
period. The Swedish case is the only case out of the twelve where a tabloid newspaper 
recorded a larger number of articles, having played an ‘informer’ role in bringing the issue 
into the public domain. For all similarly shocking incidents, these profiles demonstrate 
different patterns of public attention concerning the issue in each of the three countries. 
Figures 29 and 30 provide comparative data of public exposure of the accidents through 
newspaper circulation, and are followed by another figure, which indicates the level of 
exposure, to show the average exposure of the events in relative terms.
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Figure 29: Issue saliency (broadsheet) (Sources: TG/DN/AS)
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Figure 30: Issue saliency (tabloid) (Sources: Daily Mail/Expressen/Nikkan Sports)
The Swedish and Japanese cases gained the greatest amount of attention in their respective 
countries, compared to the cases in the previous chapters. As the type of policy suggests, 
there is a high likelihood that the incidents could provoke prompt reactions from the medical
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professions at least, if not central government as well. Formal government procedures can be 
disrupted and affected by intensified media coverage, not just by internal pressure coming 
from institutional setups of health systems, but also by growing concerns of the general 
public.
By looking at the breakdown of article types (positive, neutral and negative treatment of 
government and non-government bodies (including NHS executives, hospital doctors, etc.)), 
the very frequent mention of the government in the Japanese newspapers (government 
referred to in 75% of articles relating to the case) is conspicuous, given the lack of political 
accountability in the country’s health system, compared to the other two countries (35% in 
England, 57% in Sweden).
Furthermore, criticism of government also accounted for 21% in Japan of the total articles, 
compared to 14% in England. The highest proportion of criticism of governmental bodies 
can be found in Swedish newspapers (28%). This is surprising, as the case in Sweden 
occurred at a local care home, for which the local municipality was responsible. The 
government’s frequent appearance in the media in the Japanese case (75%) is also 
remarkable, given that it is normally much less visible. Even the ratio of criticism of central 
government (21%) is very rare. Although this is lower than 33% in the previous chapter on 
local hospital reconfigurations (Chapter 4), considering the sheer amount of media coverage 
as well as the period of high saliency, this case is outstanding.
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Figure 31: Proportion of reports critical of government
Therefore, the predictions based on the negative reports can be summarised as below.
Perspective 3: Predictions based on issue saliency and criticism_____________________
England: issue saliency was not as high as that of the Foundation Hospital, although public 
attention remained relatively high for a longer period. The level of public criticism of central 
government was, surprisingly, not high (14%), as criticism was mostly targeted at the 
medical professions as a whole. Therefore, central government did not receive as much 
criticism as it should have done, as institutional designs might suggest. Both issue saliency 
and the level of public criticism were not high and therefore the responsiveness of central 
government is predicted to be low.
Sweden: saliency was quite high and acute in broadsheet and tabloid newspapers. Contrary 
to predictions based on institutional designs, criticism of central government accounts for a 
quite large proportion (28%). Judging from the level of criticism and public saliency, the 
shockwaves may have disrupted the institutional logics. The responsiveness of the central 
government could be observed, and responses were expected to be large-scale.
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273
Japan: the saliency was also high and acute. Although the level of criticism of central 
government was not as high (21%) as the case of local hospital reorganisation (33%), the 
proportion of articles mentioning central government in total was unprecedented, and highest 
among the three countries and all the other case studies (75%). The responsiveness of 
government is expected to be fairly high, with wide-ranging responses. Some structural 
changes in the hospital sector are predicted.
The next section will introduce each episode and explore how government actually 
responded to the scandals. For this case study, each episode also accompanies shifting issue 
saliency, focusing on the first few months until it reached the peak.
7.2 England: Children’s Heart Surgery at Bristol Royal Infirmary
In disciplinary matters, a great degree of autonomy was traditionally granted to the medical 
professions. The effectiveness of the General Medical Council was critically questioned over 
this incident, as it was discovered that doctors were not sanctioned, but the whistle-blower 
had been cast aside instead. At the initial revelation, the issue did not receive much attention, 
but the saliency gradually increased as the Labour Party entered government. One prediction 
based on institutional designs is that central the government responds to such a case with the 
utmost urgency, as it is politically liable. The other prediction based on public saliency 
shows the opposite. This episode examines the responsiveness of central government to 
public criticism expressed in the media.
7.2.1 Background: whispering limited to the self-regulatory body
The Bristol Royal Infirmary (BRI) case came to be widely known by the public in 1995. 
However, as early as 1990, anaethetist Dr Stephen Bolsin had already noted a high death rate
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in babies at the BRI, and raised his concerns with other colleagues. Yet operations continued 
until Joshua Loveday died in 1995, which first brought the issue to the media’s attention.
In April 1995, the Bristol Royal infirmary, part of Bristol Healthcare trust, admitted that it 
had stopped a pioneering technique for open heart surgery for infants after nine out of 
thirteen babies operated on died over an 18-month period prior to 1993. It was revealed after 
four anaesthetists refused to participate in further operations because of the high likelihood 
that the babies were too young to survive surgery. The deaths happened between January 
1992 and October 1993. The technique, called ‘switch’, was first used in Britain in 1977, and 
at the BRI in 1992, as a last-chance procedure used on 'blue' babies, bom with their 
pulmonary and aortic arteries the wrong way around. It was reported that the mortality rate at 
the BRI was 66 per cent -  six times higher than the national average of 11 per cent. In July 
1993, six cardiac anaesthetists asked for a formal review of the switch technique programme 
among fears of further deaths. However, this never took place. The DH, being informed of 
the situation, had funded the United Bristol Healthcare Trust £2m for paediatric cardiac 
surgery in 1992. Dr Peter Doyle, senior medical officer at the DH, demanded that the cardiac 
surgery department in Bristol should prepare a report.
Dr John Roylance, chief executive of the United Bristol Healthcare Trust (UBHT), set up an 
independent inquiry, which was carried out by a paediatric surgeon and a cardiologist. 
Decisions were taken that a paediatric surgeon was to be appointed and children’s operations 
were to moved to the nearby Bristol Children's Hospital. In October 1993, the Trust also 
decided to stop this particular operation and to refer those cases to another hospital. In 
January 1995, a case conference was held as to whether to conduct a switch operation on an 
older child (18 months). After the operation, the death of Joshua Loveday was announced, 
“additional complications” being given as the cause. Major newspapers, both tabloids and 
broadsheets such as The Times, The Guardian, and Daily Mail, all reported this incident on 
5th April 1995. The following day, the Daily Mail presented broader coverage, including
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stories about the victims, with follow-up reports on compensation for the victims’ parents a 
week later under the headline ‘£12,000 for the parents of heart boy’. However, the issue 
saliency then faded quickly in the printed media for a while, with some reports on other 
incidents at the BRI, such as a piece of steel wire left inside a 16-month old baby after heart 
surgery (TG, 24 July 1995).
Public attention once again was focused on the issue when, in March 1996, Channel 4 
broadcast a special programme covering the record of cardiac surgery on children at the 
hospital. The Times featured an article entitled “Why did they allow so many to die?” (The 
Times, 1 April 1996), questioning whether patients’ safety was at risk because of doctors’ 
professional solidarity. Later in 1996, when medical executives ordered an external review 
of the quality of adult heart surgery in Bristol, surgeon Dr James Wisheart voluntarily 
suspended all his surgery and resigned as medical director of the UBHT. The review of 
2,500 open-heart adult cardiac operations between January 1993 and November 1995 found 
that the quality of heart surgery in Bristol was in line with the national average, but singled 
out Dr Wisheart for "further investigation". Before the inquiry’s final report was due in 
March 1997, he decided to step down. Hence, public disclosure of this case of the ‘BRI 
tragedy’ had already taken place in 1995 (Department of Health 2001; Aylin et al. 2001; 
Kewell 2006).
The figure below demonstrates how these events at Bristol Royal Infirmary were treated in 
The Guardian from 1995 until 2006. All the newspaper articles were coded under three 
categories (positive, neutral and negative reporting), and only negative reports about 
government and the medical profession are counted separately. As shown, the overwhelming 
volume concerns the medical professions, in particular the sluggish response from and closed 
nature of the General Medical Council (GMC). These criticisms overshadowed the 
responsibility of the government, and the DH in particular. The following section will trace
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the episode, examining why and how the government responded to external pressures, if the 
pressures were not exerted upon them.
7.2.2 Episode and Analysis
Bristol Royal Infirmary
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Figure 32: Number of reports critical of government and medical professions
(The Guardian, 1995-2006)
(Phase 1: 1997; Phase 2: 1998; Phase 3: 1999 - mid-2001; Phase 4: mid-2001 - 2006)
Phase 1: Mounting criticism of the medical professions (1997)
As the report was submitted in March 1997, the then Health Secretary, Stephen Dorrell, 
under the Conservative government announced an inquiry into cardiac surgery at the hospital, 
after an independent expert review indicated that Dr Wisheart's open-heart surgery patients 
were four times more likely to die than those treated by his colleagues. The inquiry report, 
Independent Review o f Adult Cardiac Surgery concluded that “the performance of one 
consultant surgeon appeared to be significantly poorer than the other surgeons” (BMJ 1997; 
314: 919, 29 March 1997) An article published in The Times reiterated the same point that 
“surgeons cost lives by denying their failings” (14 October 1997). It suggested that 
controversies surrounding this child heart surgery might change the way that operations had 
been monitored. The Independent also detailed the events, revealing that fact that those
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The Independent 
The Times 
The Guardian 
FT
Daily Mail
Figure 33: Newspaper coverage over a period of 1,260 days after the accident occurred
The Labour government came to power in May 1997. Criticism continued to be 
concentrated on the lukewarm handling of the GMC and its culture of secrecy. As the 
Professional Proceedings Committee of the GMC began in October 1997, the former Health 
Secretary and also the Bristol MP William Wildegrave expressed his concern that the GMC 
should only fulfil its function as the doctors’ own watchdog (The Independent, 10 October 
1997). The same line was adopted by the new Secretary of State for Health, Frank Dobson, 
when he found out that the GMC did not immediately strike the other surgeon, Dr Dhasmara, 
off the medical register (E-2). The GMC was heavily criticised not only by politicians, but 
also by protesters, including parents of the children who died or suffered brain damage after 
the surgery (BBC News 15 March 1999). Dobson promised a public inquiry, finally setting 
it up on 18 June 1998.
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In his statement to the House of Commons, Dobson declared that after the General Medical 
Council’s disciplinary proceedings against the three doctors concerned, the Government 
would establish an independent inquiry into children's heart surgery at the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary. He declared that the government would identify any professional, management 
and organisational failures. “The Government are not going to wait for the outcome of the 
inquiry before taking action to put in place new machinery for setting and maintaining 
clinical standards” {Hansard, 18 June 1998, Column 529-30). Dobson went on, and 
emphasised the government’s future plan, which were to be laid out in the White Paper “the 
New NHS” published in December that year. A range of measures included establishment of 
a national institute for clinical excellence, a commission for health improvement and a clear 
duty of clinical governance on NHS trusts, compulsory participation of doctors in national 
external audits and publication of treatment success rates at local hospitals.
The subsequent disciplinary hearing was reported as the most important medical inquiry of 
the decade. It revealed that by the time of the operation in August 1994, eight of Mr 
Wisheart’s 14 infant patients had already died during or after similar surgery. Nonetheless, 
during the hearings, Mr Wisheart, together with his fellow surgeon, Dr Dhasmana, and Dr. 
Roylance, former chief executive of the Bristol United Healthcare NHS Trust, all denied 
charges of serious professional misconduct. The charges relate to two types of complex 
surgery to correct congenital heart defects performed on babies at BRI between 1988 and 
1995.
At this stage, news media began covering stories such as one highlighting the 
maladministration of the BRI (the BRI sent a regular health check enquiry form to one of its 
former patients who had already died during heart surgery (Daily Mail, 16 September 1997)) 
or another focusing on the aftermath of previous malpractice cases (one father who lost his 
son in a failed heart operation at the BRI committed suicide (The Independent, October 23 
1997)). Yet among them there was still a positive report. A girl praised Mr Wisheart’s
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courage in conducting such high-risk operations, claiming that her life would not have been 
otherwise saved if it had not been for his surgery on her heart twenty-one years ago (Daily 
Mail, 11 October 1997).
Several criticisms were raised in response to the verdict of the GMC inquiry. A former 
government advisor on health, Professor Rudolf Klein, commented that the Bristol case 
shows ‘that the GMC cannot put institutions on trial’ (The Independent, 30 May 1998). The 
health editor of the paper claimed that ‘(t)he case, which began last October, is the longest in 
the GMC's history and has already had widespread repercussions. It has exposed a central 
weakness in the NHS - the absence of clear standards against which doctors' performances 
can be measured. To patients it seems extraordinary that there are no measures forjudging 
whether a doctor is good at the job. Medical organisations have previously argued that 
clinical practice is too complex, and patients too varied, for measures to be meaningful. That 
view is now history.’ (The Independent, 31 May 1998)
Phase 2: Rising saliency, heightened pressure on government and prompt response to 
publish the death rates and establish an independent commission (1998)
The focus was gradually shifted from individual doctors’ malpractice to general structural 
problems in the NHS. The media attention culminated in June 1998. Although primary 
blame was still placed upon the medical professions, the DH’s negligence in the early stages 
was also highlighted. The BBC1 TV programme Panorama (1 June 1998) called into 
question the responsibility of the DH, naming a department under-secretary, Dr Norman 
Halliday, who was in charge of overseeing Bristol and the other specialist children’s units at 
the time (1992), three years before an official investigation was carried out. The programme 
also revealed that a report, commissioned by the department and published in 1989, already 
indicated that, of the nine national children's heart units, Bristol had the highest number of 
deaths. Moreover, it pointed out that concerns had already been raised back in the 1980s.
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Two days later on the 3rd of June, in the House of Commons debates, the Labour MP for 
neighbouring Wansdyke, Dan Norris, pointed out the failure of the minister’s intervention in 
the Bristol Trust matters. He asked the Prime Minister “(w)hat steps does my right hon. 
Friend intend to take to ensure that the medical profession is accountable and controlled so 
that the tragedy in Bristol can never happen again?” (Hansard, 3 Jun 1998, Column 365). In 
reply, Tony Blair promised that an independent commission for health improvement and a 
quality control system would be put in place in every hospital across the country. He also 
ensured the findings of the commission would be made public and acted on, and patients 
would have a voice through the commission. The government responded promptly. Secretary 
of State Dobson declared that from October 1998, new league tables would be introduced in 
the whole hospital sector which would carry an annual chart of the numbers of deaths at 
hospitals treating patients for serious diseases, including cancer and heart problems. This 
move received a welcome from the NHS managers and the Royal College of Nursing, but 
they also voiced cautions. Stephen Thornton, chief executive of the NHS Confederation, 
commented that “the tables would have to be weighted to take account of the age of patients 
being treated, their condition on arrival at hospital, and a variety of other factors” (The 
Independent, 8 June 1998). Christine Hancock, general secretary of the Royal College of 
Nursing, also stressed the importance of “the time and opportunity for an individual patient 
to understand the benefits and risks involved with their particular operation with their 
doctor”, rather than the hospital death rate figures (The Independent, 8 June 1998).
With immediate effect, from October 1998, all hospitals in England and Wales began 
publishing annual statistics showing the death rates of patients, highlighting unusual 
mortality statistics at the BRI. In addition, the inquiry was set up by the Health Secretary 
under Section 84 of the National Health Service Act 1977, and Professor Ian Kennedy, 
Professor of Health Law, Ethics and Policy at University College London, was appointed as 
a chairman. The scope for the inquiry was extended by request from both Labour and Liberal 
Democrat MPs to include cases of adult cardiothoracic surgery. Also, the role played by the
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DH in the course of cardiac surgery failures was questioned on several occasions by Nick 
Harvey MP (Lib Dem).
However, the main criticism continued to focus on the autonomy of the medical professions, 
with some battles between the professions and the government. In June 1998, two weeks 
after the government decided to take decisive action against the medical profession’s 
autonomy by publishing death rates, six senior consultants at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 
(BRI) signed a statement, backed by the Bristol Heart Children Action Group. They 
criticised the "indiscriminate blame" levelled at the hospital's doctors over their alleged 
failure to act. Malcolm Cumow, spokesman for the Bristol Heart Children Action Group 
commented that there were “a large number of people within and outside the medical 
profession who feel that the Royal College of Surgeons, the management and the 
Department of Health have all been instrumental in this corporate failure.” The DH only 
replied to this by acknowledging the need to investigate this, and that for this purpose, there 
would be a public inquiry.
Up until the opening of the inquiry in 1999, there was some progress on the disciplinary 
actions by the GMC. Dr John Roylance, former chief executive of the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary, announced his decision to take his case to the Privy Council. Although he was 
found guilty of serious professional misconduct by the GMC for failing to halt operations, he 
claimed that from his position as a chief executive, it was impossible to intervene into 
consultants’ professional decisions. Raising the point that he was also a medical doctor and 
most chief executives were not, he argued that his licence was irrelevant in this case (The 
Independent, 18 July 1998).
In the meantime, the government stepped up its intervention, and decided that a controversial 
heart surgeon would have his pension drastically reduced (The Independent, 9 August 1998). 
Then, the public inquiry was officially announced by Secretary of State Dobson on 12
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August 1998. A preliminary hearing began in Bristol in the autumn, and full public hearings 
started in Bristol and London from early 1999.
Before the public hearings opened, parents of children who died in the Bristol heart 
operations scandal rejected compensation offers of up to GBP 20,000 proposed by the NHS 
Litigation Authority (5 October 1999). Also, from the professions, there was the very first 
reaction in response to this BRI accident. The Senate of Surgery of Great Britain and 
Ireland89 announced that all consultant surgeons should be subject to regular checks 
throughout their careers to ensure their skills are up to standard. The Senate argued that the 
protection of patients was paramount and that the "public must be reassured we provide a 
safe and appropriate service" (The Independent, 23 October 1998). In the following year, the 
General Medical Council, the profession's disciplinary body, decided that doctors must agree 
to continuous monitoring of their skills to preserve public confidence and to see off 
government threats to intervene in their regulation (11 February 1999).
At the hospital sector level, some efforts were made to demonstrate its transparency and 
pursue government’s new policy of publishing hospital death rates. St Thomas' and Guy's 
hospitals in London decided to further assess individual doctors, not the hospital as a whole, 
on how many patients suffer complications before or after surgery (The Independent, 27 
December 1998).
Phase 3: Public inquiry, further criticism and pre-emptive move by government (1999 
to mid-2001)
The public inquiry was opened on 16 March 1999. Parents of the victims were the first 
witnesses to give evidence, and one after another, families’ personal accounts in the media 
painted the BRI as “a chronically malfunctioning hospital” (The Independent, 17 March
89 It represents the 10,000 most senior surgeons in Great Britain and Ireland.
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1999). It was revealed that the heart ward was known as the ‘killing fields’ and ‘departure 
lounge’ (18 March/19 October 1999), and accused of ‘gambling on heart’ (19 March 1999).
Accusations did not stop at the BRI only. Newcastle, Harefield (Middlesex) and Guy's were 
named as hospitals with questionable paediatric-cardiac unit records by Sir Terence English, 
former Department of Health heart surgery advisory committee member in the hearings in 
May and August.
From June though the summer of 1999, doctors and chief executives (and a doctor struck off 
after the incident), testified at the inquiry hearings. During the hearings, ‘workload’ pressure 
on the surgeons became apparent, and this concern was highlighted. Dobson reacted to this 
by proposing to increase the number of consultants (The Independent, 3 August 1999)
There came a warning about the way all the blame was placed at the door of the medical 
professions and concerns about the effects of too much attention on individual doctors’ 
performances. Nigel Heaton, chief executive of a London teaching hospital (King’s College 
Hospital), stressed that surgeons could refuse to operate on high-risk patients if success rates 
for individual doctors would be overemphasised (The Independent, 7 Septermber 1999). 
However, the direction towards stricter monitoring was not changed by government.
In October, the government announced the launch of a new watchdog, the Commission for 
Health Improvement. Prime Minister Tony Blair professed his strong intentions of risking 
upsetting doctors in order to raise standards. Blair commented that “(n)o government can 
eliminate human error, or remove risk. But we can put in place the right systems, spread the 
best practice and scrutinise performance in far better ways than we have done in the past” 
(The Independent, October 29 1999). The commission was to be given a comprehensive 
remit and the Secretary of State for Health was also given the necessary powers to act swiftly 
on its recommendations. “He can remove a hospital management if it does not respond to
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recommendations, sack the boards of health authorities or trusts, and pass the names of 
individual doctors to disciplinary bodies” (The Independent, October 29 1999).
The Select Committee on Health (chaired by David Hinchcliffe) published its sixth report 
entitled ‘A culture of blame?’ In it, they state: “(w)e consider that there should be a culture 
of organisational responsibility, as well as individual responsibility, within the NHS in 
dealing with adverse incidents and poor outcomes. We recommend that the Department of 
Health reviews and reports on the implementation of clinical governance.” (House of 
Commons, Select Committee on Health, 6th Report, I99990)
In November 1999, towards the end of the public inquiry, MPs in the Select Committee for 
Health quickly drew up a proposal, that relatives of people who die unexpectedly in hospital 
should have a legal right to demand an inquiry by independent experts (The Independent, 21 
November 1999). In the same month, it was also revealed that the purpose of continuing 
baby heart operations at the BRI was to maintain the hospital's status as a specialist heart unit 
for children and to secure the Government funding that went with it, as a consultant and 
whistleblower Dr Bolsin told the public inquiry (The Independent, 23 November 1999).
At the cabinet shuffle in October 1999, Dobson was replaced by Alan Milbum, who had 
already been serving under Dobson. Defending his department against criticism, he adopted 
the same stance as his predecessor, and promised to undertake further systemic reforms on 
patient safety, and redress the health system as well as the medical professions (Chapter 5). 
Overall, the House of Commons showed rather remarkable unity on both benches and 
praised government commitment to put patient safety first.
After the report (Department of Health 2001) was circulated, extensive discussions were held 
in the House of Commons. The Shadow Secretary of State for Health, Dr. Liam Fox,
90 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cml99899/cmselect/cmhealth/549/54902.htm
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congratulated the inquiry team on “all its hard work in producing such an excellent report/’ 
CHansard, House of Commons, 18 July 2001, Column 294) The primary focus of the debate 
was concentrated on two points: the accountability of the NHS, including the public 
involvement, and the structural aspect of the BRI case (i.e. lack of tools for clinical 
governance), rather than singling out the peculiarities at Bristol. The chairman of the Select 
Committee, Mr Hinchcliffe, also underlined the structural problem, particularly the ‘club’ 
culture within the NHS.
In combatting against a failing NHS trust, the Secretary of State promised that clinical 
indicators of death rates following surgery would be published, and patient forums would be 
restructured after the abolishment of the Community Health Councils. Nonetheless, this 
centralist approach met with opposition from several MPs91, as such changes would weaken 
the local monitoring process and undermine the bottom-up system. In July 2001, however, 
on the recommendation of the report, An Organisation with Memory, the National Patient 
Safety Agency was established. Its main task is to ‘co-ordinate the reporting of patient safety 
incidents and to learn from these incidents in order to improve patient safety in the NHS’92.
Phase 4: Legislation, serial shift and strengthening central control (mid-2001 to 2006)
The tone of all these debates started to change, as the National Health Service Reform and 
Health Care Professions Bill was presented to Parliament on 8 November 2001, and reached 
the second reading later in the same month. It did not become an issue for adversarial politics 
between government and the Opposition, but rather an intra-party row between the 
frontbench and backbench of the Labour Party. It was the third legislation that the Blair
91 They include Ms Gisela Stuart MP, Dr. Howard Stoate MP and Ms. Julie Morgan MP.
92 http://www.npsa.nhs.uk/npsa/about.
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government introduced, following the Health Act 1999 and the Health and Social Care Act 
2001. The bill can be summarised in six93 points.
(1) An extension of the remit of the commission for health improvement (CHI) to widen its 
inspection powers, underpin its independence, allow it to recommend the imposition of 
special measures on failing NHS bodies, and require it to publish an annual 
"state-of-the-NHS" report; (2) The replacement of 95 health authorities (HAs) in England 
with around 30 strategic health authorities, and the transfer of most of the functions and care 
commissioning budgets of HAs to primary care trusts (PCTs), which will plan health 
services in their area; (3) The creation of an independent patients’ forum for each NHS trust 
and PCT in England to represent patients, together with a number of more strategic "voice" 
organisations, and the creation of a national commission for patient and public involvement; 
(4) The setting up of a council for the regulation of health care professionals to ensure that 
individual regulatory bodies, such as the General Medical Council and nursing regulator the 
UKCC, "act in the interests of patients". It would have the power to appeal against decisions 
by professional regulators which it felt were not in the public interest; (5) A provision for 
"fitness to practice" professional conduct cases to be transferred from the privy council to the 
high court, and an extension of existing powers to bring the pharmacy profession under the 
auspices of the law governing the regulation of health care professions; (6) The 
establishment of a duty of partnership on NHS bodies and the prison services to provide 
health services to prisoners. This is similar to the partnership provisions of the Health Act 
1999, which allow NHS bodies and local authorities to pool funding and delegate functions. 
(TG, 14 November 2001)
93 The seventh point is related specifically to Wales. The creation of local health boards (LHBs) in 
Wales to take on the functions of health authorities, once they have been abolished. LHB's will extend 
and develop the role o f local health groups, which were created in 1999.
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The DH’s response to the Kennedy report ‘Learning from Bristol’ was published in January 
2002 (Department of Health 2002b). It showed its commitment to its plan to make the NHS 
safer, more open and accountable. However, voices of concern were raised from Labour 
backbenchers, mainly from the chairman of the House of Commons Select Committee for 
Health, Mr Hinchliffe. The amendment was submitted by those who called for new 
community councils in order to safeguard NHS patient rights (TG, 11 January 2002). The 
Labour backbenchers who backed the amendment, John Austin and Doug Naysmith, were 
also members of the select committee. The Liberal Democrat frontbench team, including 
party leader Charles Kennedy, supported the amendment, as did independent Health Concern 
party MP Dr Richard Taylor. The opponents saw the government plan as a centralising 
scheme that would emasculate local voices (Chapter 4). The government had attempted to 
eliminate the community-based body, the "patients' watchdog" community health councils 
(CHCs), but failed due to 26 Labour backbench rebels in 2001. Critics feared that patients' 
forums would have to rely on NHS management for advice, losing its independent voice, 
while proponents noted that the CHCs are now boarded with too many politicians, rather 
than ordinary citizens, constituting a hindrance to effective reforms. Peers in the House of 
Lords also rebelled against the government plan, voting by 227 to 136 to set up patient 
councils, bodies which would have similar remits to community health councils.
Another development, as part of the government response to the report, was discussions as to 
whether the patient death rate of every heart surgeon in the country should be made public 
within two years. Health secretary Milbum announced that it would be ‘a first step to giving 
the public hard information about the performance of every doctor -  and the right to go 
elsewhere if they choose’ (TG, 18 January 2002). It was advocated as “a milestone in the 
development of a more open, responsive and patient-centred NHS”, although surgeons 
expressed concern over negative long-term effects, as surgeons would avoid high-risk but 
necessary operations.
288
However, despite all ‘responses’, the government did not respond positively on every point 
proposed by reports from the public inquiry and the experts. From the 198 recommendations 
in the report, the government showed its reluctance to act, or disagreed on a few important 
issues. The first point of dissent was as to whether to establish a no-fault compensation 
scheme, with a sliding scale of payments for victims of medical accidents, in order to ‘end 
blame culture and persuade doctors to admit their mistakes’. The government disagreed and 
proposed instead a dual system, leaving recourse to the courts as a possibility. Secondly, the 
government was not in agreement over the possible separation of management and medical 
practice, when doctors chose to take on chief executive posts. The report recommended that 
they should not be allowed to practise, as their skills and knowledge in the field could work 
negatively against patient safety, while the government defended the profession’s right to 
choose. The third point was the authority of the agency. Although the report suggested that 
NICE should be the sole organisation to set yardsticks and provide guidelines for doctors on 
treatment, the government rejected the view, claiming that the royal colleges, medicines 
control agency and others, as experts, should also play a major part in the standard setting 
process. The government therefore adopted a more profession-friendly stance than it claimed 
throughout the process.
In the middle of 2002, it was decided that the CHI was to be expanded into the commission 
for healthcare audit and inspection (CHAI) (TG, 31 July 2002). Its wider remit encompassed 
the audit commission’s national value studies as well as monitoring of private hospitals and 
voluntary hospices. Furthermore, both social service inspection and regulation of nursing and 
residential homes were embraced in the planned commission for social care inspection.
Although the issue saliency had decreased by then in early 2003, another policy question was 
put to the government. The review group, based on the recommendations of the Kennedy 
inquiry, was composed of consultants in paediatric and congenital cardiac services, and 
several parents from the Children’s Heart Federation. The group submitted a proposal to
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government. Its main recommendation suggested that in order to maintain surgeons’ 
expertise and skills in children’s complex heart operations, the unit should deal with at least 
300 cases annually, and therefore the government should centralise its unit into 7 or 8 
hospitals, from the current number of 14. However, the health minister, Jacqui Smith, said 
that the government was “not persuaded of the review group’s proposals” (9 January 2003). 
As one consultant commented, politicians were ‘saying there is no need for change. But 
underlying it, I think, is the Kidderminster effect’ (Chapter 4). If government accepted this 
view, they would have to close down local services, which could put MPs jobs at risk. The 
proposal was postponed.
After the publication of the Kennedy report, the agenda became fixed on three major issues: 
(1) centralisation of monitoring functions, (2) publication of mortality rates and (3) 
improving children’s services in the NHS. Concerning the third point, following the 
government’s Green Paper Every Child Matters, published in September 2003, the National 
Service Framework (NSF) for children, young people and maternity services was set out one 
year later. NSF is a ten-year plan to set clear standards and stimulate long-term and sustained 
improvement in children's health. Concerning several incidents involving the death of 
children, the Kennedy report was mentioned as a direct contribution to this specific policy 
development (Department of Health 2005). As for the second point, in September 2004, the 
Society of Cardiothoracic Surgeons announced that they could not find “ways of producing a 
set of results that would be helpful to patients and fair to its members”, and therefore refused 
to publish tables of consultants’ mortality rates (TG, 11 September 2004). As a side effect of 
the BRI case on performance evaluation, Sir Brian Jarman, a member of the inquiry, and 
Paul Aylin, an expert witness at both the BRI and Harold Shipman inquiries, engaged 
themselves in the online based performance evaluation scheme, the Dr Foster unit (Imperial
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College, London) 94. This unit is now a leading independent authority on health care 
performance, investigating methods to explain variations in mortality rates (Chapter 6). The 
first point was successfully carried out by the establishment of the new independent agency.
Overall, the government exhibited an extensive sensitivity and responsiveness to public 
criticism, as institutional designs predicted. Yet, particularly in the fourth phase, once the 
issue was brought into parliament, other political considerations derailed the primary focus 
in the inquiry, and the government did not even take up any of the experts’ recommendations. 
Accordingly, the ratio of criticism of government increased, although the government did not 
fully respond to this criticism.
7.2.3 Responsive in England
The issue received little public attention in 1995, when the news came out for the first time. 
Although the Conservative government announced that there would be an inquiry, it was the 
change of government that brought more shocking facts to light. Senior officials including 
the Prime Minister took the case seriously, and seized the opportunity to demonstrate the 
government’s determination to tackle failures in patient safety and the closed information 
system within the NHS. The English health system in which the institutional vulnerability 
puts the political dimension at risk of public criticism prompted quick response from 
government, and this case exceptionally saw little criticism of central government. More 
proactive responses were given against professional autonomy, and the government 
published individual doctors’ death rates. Government determination to put the case into the 
public domain was shown in its decisions to have the public inquiry and give it a great 
amount of discretion. The initiatives led to the extension of an increased remit of the CHI to 
inspect and publish reports regularly so that failing bodies could be detected and redressed at 
an earlier stage. This incident in particular called into question patient safety management of
94 http://www.drfosterintelligence.co.uk/index.asp
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the NHS. Therefore, unprecedented attention was paid to the malpractice case in the 
macropolitics domain, in which government took the lead but did not have to take the blame. 
As a result, institutional change was brought about to the way in which the professional 
autonomy had previously been protected.
Furthermore, several policy initiatives were taken by government through new legislation. 
These included centralisation of the monitoring function, strengthening of the CHI and the 
establishment of the Children’s National Service Frameworks. However, as the legislation 
was being drawn up, the strengthening of the top-down regulatory body was opposed by the 
Labour backbenchers, who saw the abolition of CHCs as a return to the top-down command 
and control system. The bill was contentious and politically divisive, but with a large 
majority in parliament, the government successfully passed the bill and added a larger remit 
to the function of the Healthcare Commission. The chair of the BRI inquiry, Professor 
Kennedy was appointed as the first director. In this last phase, although the government was 
still responsive to general points, which surfaced during the public inquiry, it refused to take 
concrete recommendations or ideas fully on board. As the issue saliency decreased, public 
criticism of the government increased proportionally. Yet quelling the rebels on the 
backbenches in parliament or concerns over the electoral consequences of closing down 
more hospitals became overriding issues. Nonetheless, the high-high policy type proved that 
it could catalyse institutional change (in this case, the government increased its leverage over 
the medical profession through the establishment of an independent monitoring body). The 
surprising aspect was that public criticism was not geared towards, or even equally shared 
between, the medical professions and central government. Conventional patterns of blame 
shifting were not observed, even in parliament, between political parties. Institutional 
designs, which normally put government at risk, were disrupted, and government made the 
preemptive move by opening up the issue to the general public. Therefore, its vulnerability 
on the political dimension was overcome. With high sensitivity to health care delivery, the 
government succeeded in strengthening its grip over autonomous professionals, while
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displaying its competency to respond and rise to the challenge of patient safety. However, 
when the issue no longer had high-high pressure, it soon resumed the similar patterns of 
majoritarian policymaking, as shown by the previous cases (Chapter 5).
7.3 Sweden: negligence at care home and new Lex Sarah legislation
Although the Swedish disciplinary system for the medical professions had been developed 
over many years and the Medical Responsibility Board (HSAN; Halso- och sjukvardens 
ansvarsnamnd)95 exists, the same degree of discussion had never taken place for the domain 
of elderly care. As soon as the incident at a care home was revealed by one nurse, the media 
frenzies started. Based on institutional arrangements, Swedish elderly care is under the 
jurisdiction of the municipality. The issue could therefore be dealt with at that level. 
However, amid such high saliency, institutional logics might have been disturbed. Under this 
high-high pressure, this episode examines the responsiveness of central government to public 
criticism expressed in the media.
7.3.1 Background: established malpractice prevention schemes
Unlike the English and Japanese cases, the Swedish case is not a medical error, but 
malpractice in an elderly care home96. It was widely publicised and contrasted with a long 
established self-reporting system in health care organisations. This section summarises 
briefly the reporting system for serious injuries caused by medical treatment, which dates 
back to 1937. The system, called Lex Maria, has its origin in an accident that occurred at the 
Maria Hospital in Stockholm (Odegard and Lofroth 1996). Four patients died after being 
injected with mercuric oxicyanide, instead of anaesthetic. The law, enacted the year after the
95 The HSAN’s creation was designed to enhance impartiality, and was welcomed by both medical 
staff and the general public (Garpenby 1989: p.204).
96 “Vard, skola, och omsorg” (health care, education and social welfare) is the “central pillar of the 
welfare state” (Swedish Agency for Public Management, Statskontoret). 
(http://www.statskontoret.se/statskontoret/templates/PageList3136.aspx).
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incident, stipulates that patient injuries should be reported to both the NBHW and the police. 
Since then, three ways of reporting medical errors have been established in Sweden.
Firstly, a patient can report an injury caused by treatment and claim compensation through 
the Patient Insurance System. If the claim is accepted as unexpected, unforeseeable or 
improbable, the patient can receive the compensation. Secondly, there is a freestanding 
national state agency HSAN where a patient and relatives can bring complaints against 
doctors, nurses, dentists and other health sector personnel. The HSAN can give health care 
providers a reprimand, a warning, or revoke their licence to practice. Also, the NBHW can 
report cases for disciplinary review to the HSAN. The third is the aforementioned Lex Maria 
procedure, which was put in place to ensure that an injury or even a risk of injury would not 
be missed, by obliging the health care staff to report the event to the NBHW. The subsequent 
inquiries might lead to criticism of an individual doctor or nurse, or call for procedural 
changes in treatment. If the NBHW found an individual guilty of malpractice or negligence, 
it could bring the case to the HSAN for a disciplinary review. As the NBHW is responsible 
for regulation and inspection to ensure quality and standards in national health care, it can 
also initiate an inspection as to whether or not there are concurrent incident reports.
The second major tragedy occurred at the Linkoping University Hospital in 1983, which 
brought about three casualties and put twelve people in mortal danger following dialysis 
treatment. In the previous year, Lex Maria was amended, in an attempt to shift its focus from 
disciplinary actions to prevention. The aim was to encourage health sector staff to willingly 
report medical errors. However, the inquiries which followed the incidents brought human 
error aspects in focus, rather than the systemic aspects, resulting in a rather negative tone. At 
the end of the investigation, a hospital nurse in charge was found guilty of manslaughter and 
endangering life (Odegard 1999).
In 1991, another change was made to the way cases reported according to Lex Maria were 
handled in conjunction with the NBHW reorganisation. New initiatives were launched to
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achieve more prevention than disciplinary action. Among those, were Risk Database Project 
and Risk Ronden. The purpose of the former project was to detect potential risk factors from 
the gathered data (Lex Maria) and reduce and eliminate them before injuries occurred. The 
latter initiative aimed at heightening awareness of risk analysis and patient safety among 
health sector staff, in particular chief physicians and ward managers.
Odegard observed changes made to the handling of Lex Maria cases between 1989 and 1993, 
and analysed the effects. Results conclude that the number of reported Lex Maria cases was 
on the increase, from 242 in 1989 to 1348 in 1993. However, according to the author, this 
leap in the report number was caused by new responsibility taken by nurses at the 
municipality level, which used to belong to clinical department heads at hospitals. This 
change was also certainly instigated by devolution of responsibility for elderly care from the 
county councils to the municipalities. His results also point out that the way the NBHW 
reports to the HSAN had been changed after 1991. He states that “(t)he proportion of cases 
reported to the NBHW that were forwarded for disciplinary review to the HSAN decreased 
from 31% in 1989 to 5% in 1993. Excluding cases from the municipalities, this proportion 
decreased to 11% in 1993. The type of cases the NBHW forwards to the HSAN changed 
during the period. The authority drastically changed its policy regarding drug errors, and 
these cases were forwarded to a lesser extent than earlier, decreasing from 55% to 17%. For 
the category of diagnostics there was also a change, although in the opposite direction, from 
12% to 28%” (Odegard 1999: p. 8).
The report concludes that regulatory changes had an overall positive effect on how the Lex 
Maria cases began to be reported, though it raised concerns about the difficulty in 
distinguishing malpractice committed by an individual from that caused by organisational 
failure. In addition, only individuals below the management level continued to be reported 
for disciplinary review, suggesting some errors might be harder to discover and report.
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In summary, reports to the Patient Insurance System increased from 6,398 in 1993 to 8,823 
in 1998. The HSAN received 2,000 complaints in 1993, and this also increased to 3,107 in
1998. On the other hand, Lex Maria reports decreased from 1,348 in 1993 to 1,133 in 1998. 
As shown above, the medical malpractice system has long been established in Sweden, with 
government agencies (the HSAN and the NBHW) playing a central part. The reporting of 
medical errors is also strongly institutionalised through law. Against this background, the 
void of such a systematic approach in social care was highlighted.
7.3.2 Episode and Analysis
Polhemsgarden (Lex Sarah)
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Figure 34: Number of reports critical of government and medical professions 
(Dagens Nyheter, 1995-2006)
(Phase 1: 1997; Phase 2: Mar - Dec 1998; Phase 3: 2001 - 2002)
Phase 1: Whistle-blowing on TV: souring relationship between centre and local 
government (1997)
On 13 October 1997, a nurse named Sarah Wagnert appeared on the TV programme STV2 
Rapport and revealed negligence of elderly patients at a private care home (Polhemsgarden) 
in Solna, a suburb of Stockholm. She claimed that patients were left alone for many hours 
without care or attendance, sometimes with cuts and bruises left as they were, or given no
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baths for three weeks. The day following the report, the responsible municipal commissioner 
swiftly reacted and suspended the company ISS Care Service97.
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Figure 35: Newspaper coverage (for 200 days from the incident)
The media first criticised the profit-driven private sector for elderly care, and then accused 
the municipality of its choice and decision to contract those companies (Aftonbladet, 14 
October 1997). The CEO of the company, ISS Care, Anders Lindblad, quickly admitted the 
mismanagement, and accepted the inspection of the NBHW and also the social services 
section of Stockholm County. Some critical comments began to be heard against not only the 
company but also the local authority for this negligence (DN, 21 October 1997). From 24 
October, the running of Polhemsgarden was taken over by the Solna municipality. As soon 
as the news of the incident spread out across the nation, political reactions began, as did 
blame shifting.
97 ISS Care is one of the biggest private elderly care companies in Sweden with its headquarter in 
Denmark. Apart from Solna, the company had contracts in Norrtalje, Vallentuna, Akersberga, 
Vaxholm, Stockholm and Malmo. It had 800 employees in Sweden.
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In Gothenburg, use of the private sector in elderly home care was abandoned by the Social 
Democrats and Leftist coalition, though earlier in June they had agreed to call for bids in a 
more open market (Aftonbladet, 18 October 1997). At the end of November, the NBHW 
handed in the report to the MHSA. The report critically reviewed the municipalities for such 
deals with providers and the company for lack of staff and competency. Yet it turned into a 
blame-shifting game between the NBHW and the Department of Interior Affairs, which 
directs local authorities. The General Director of the NBHW, Claes Ortendahl, was criticised 
by Interior Minister Jorgen Andersson for accusing the municipalities, instead of admitting 
their negligence. In reply, Mr Ortendahl claimed that the NBHW, as a supervisory authority, 
had a considerable amount of evidence to decide whose fault it was98 (Expressen, 8 
December 1997; DN, 9 December 1997). He openly blamed the municipality for malpractice 
at the home. Central government promptly reacted and stepped in. In the Riksdag, the then 
Social Minister for Elderly Care, Margot Wallstrom, promised that national legislation 
would be introduced on this issue. However, this created another source of conflict of 
interest within the government, between the MHSA and the Interior Ministry which 
defended self-governance of local government (i.e. municipalities).
In the NBHW report, it was concluded that the problem arose primarily due to insufficient 
resources at the care homes. However, the government did not dismiss this issue as an 
individual special case, but treated it as a systematic problem. The government then 
proposed several measures to redress the structural problems. One was about the lack of 
monitoring and inspection. The government promised that the NBHW would appoint 15 care 
home inspectors. Yet this was met with disagreement from an opposition party. The leader of 
the Liberal Party, Lars Leijonborg, criticised the SAP-govemment proposal as lukewarm, 
and proposed to designate the third party, the National Pensioners Association 
(Pensionaremas riksorganisation; PRO) for inspection (DN, 22 January 1998). Since the year
98 In this case, he meant that the municipality was to blame.
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1998 coincided with the four-year electoral cycle, the party competition aspect began 
affecting the nature of further discussions and heightening the pressure level on government.
During this first phase, the responsiveness of government was exhibited, although the action 
and blame shifting caused a strain on the institutional arrangements, in particular local 
autonomy. At the central level, government intervention was criticised as not comprehensive 
by the opposition party, and towards the 1998 election, the issue became party-political.
Phase 2: Government failure in focus: financial support and the National Action Plan 
(Mar - Dec 1998)
In March 1998, when the scandal seemed to die down, another incident hit the same 
municipality, Solna. This time, the negligence case was found at a different care home, 
called Lunda Elderly Centre. A dementia patient’s health condition got worse after he was 
admitted to that care centre, and brought into an acute hospital with gastric catarrh. The 
event was covered in the two major national tabloids, Expressen and Aftonbladet, causing a 
row over the responsibility of the municipality commissioner and chairperson for the elderly 
care committee, Anders Gellner (Social Democratic Party), who first refused to resign. He 
was forced to step down a few days later.
Prime Minister Goran Persson announced the government decision to put an additional 16 
billion SEK (roughly 1,200 million GBP) into municipalities to tackle the problem 
(Aftonbladet, 15 March 1998). Liberal Party leader Leijonborg requested an extended 
parliamentary session to discuss the issue, claiming that ‘the care crisis is acute and demands 
swift measures’ (DN, 16 March 1998). Along with the other party secretaries in the 
Opposition, he criticised the delayed National Action Plan for the Elderly Care Policy 
(Nationell handlingsplan for aldrepolitiken), which the Social Minister promised soon after 
the first incident at Polhemsgarden.
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The media began shifting its focus onto the incompetence of politicians and the government, 
in its handling of the situations, and the long-term and structural problems such as 
insufficient resources and staff, diverting from its original question ‘who is to blame: private 
care providers or the municipality?’ (DN, 17 March 1998) This culminated in a media report 
explosion, especially in the tabloid Expressen, which had originally sparked public attention 
by its scoop on the Polhemsgarden incident.
Under pressure, the government put forward the bill, to be known as Lex Sarah, after the 
whistleblower Sarah Wagnert at Polhemsgarden. Lex Sarah obliges care home personnel to 
report a workforce shortage problem, as a preventive measure for such cases. The Social 
Minister Wallstrom pointed out the different stance on this issue between her SAP and the 
main opposition Moderate Party. She said in a Dagens Nyheter column that ‘all non-Socialist 
parties -  except for the Moderates -  defend the collective financing (through taxation) of 
elderly care’, but ‘they also have a huge collective action problem, because they would like 
to be in government with that party (the Moderates)’ (DN, 26 March 1998)". Six months 
prior to the election, the debate became a focal point for partisan battle.
In the parliamentary debate, the government proposition (1997/98:113) National Action Plan 
for Elderly Care Policy (Nationell handlingsplan for aldrepolitiken) was faced with several 
motions (So41-So52). They pointed out the challenges such as the lack of criteria for 
priority-setting, the complex relationship between county councils and municipalities, the 
absence of national targets for care (vardgaranti). The Committee of Social Affairs submitted 
its report (SoU 24) on 26 May 1998, and changes were to be made and incorporated into the 
social service law (1980: 620, socialtjanstlagen 14 kap. 2§) which took effect from 1 January
1999.
99 This could also be seen in parliamentary debates (Riksdagens snabbprotokoll. 1997/98:94 om 
hemtjansten) between Social Minister Wallstrom and Kerstin Heinemann (Liberal Party) (28 January 
1998).
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In addition, as the Liberal Party commanded, the PRO took up the inspection function. In 
response, the state and its agency the NBHW increased its power to intervene in 
conventionally municipal affairs. Although the issue became less salient, media attention on 
the issue increased once again towards the election on all three levels (national, county, and 
municipality) in September 1998. In August, the opinion polls gathered by DN and Temo 
research agency demonstrated that 56% of the electorate thought that the elderly care is a 
very important policy issue. Among political parties, supporters of the Christian Democrats 
were the most sympathetic to this policy area (72%), with their counterpart in the Moderates 
the least (48%). Of the entire electorate, 22% regarded the SAP’s elderly care policy as good, 
while 18% thought that the Liberals had a good policy, while 11% responded “Christian 
Democrats” (DN, 28 August 1998). Despite prompt action by the central government, the 
Social Democrats at municipal level had to pay the price for failing to monitor the care 
homes, and lost its control of Solna at the municipal election.
During phase 2, although party-political competition was part of the drive for government 
responsiveness, this does not explain the unprecedented legislation proposal by central 
government, which intruded on local autonomy. The intervention reveals that the high 
responsiveness of central government was shaped by institutional vulnerability to public 
criticism in the Swedish system. In addition, the spill-over effects from the hospital sector 
(Lex Maria) to the social care sector (Lex Sarah) was also explicable by institutional designs 
which legitimise interventions by the public authority.
Phase 3: Return of medial attention (2001-2003)
In April 2001, after two years of relative quiet, another scandal hit the same care home. An 
80 year-old patient was found neglected at Polhemsgarden (DN, 14 April 2001). A member 
of the municipal committee of elderly care, Lise-Lotte Berthrand (Liberal), criticised nurses 
for neglecting their duties to report. However, the scandal did not stop there. After the 
municipality decided in June to partially privatise the home, in July, the news of an 81
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year-old lady, Tersilla Sottini, left unattended with infected scars, made the headlines once 
again (Aftonbladet, 3 July 2001; DN, 4 July 2001). This time, criticism was targeted at the 
mismanagement of Polhemsgarden. In an interview with the tabloid newspaper Aftonbladet, 
Moderates councillor Anders Gustav suggested that the care home should be closed down (4 
July 2001). The same newspaper article highlighted the number of similar incidents in the 
previous year, citing Lex Maria reports. As previously mentioned, Lex Maria demanded that 
chief doctors or clinically responsible nurses should report any deficiencies or risk-related 
observations to the NBHW. In 2000, 122 reports were made in the Gothenburg area, 63 in 
Malmo, 115 in Jonkoping, 211 in Stockholm, 52 in Umea and 181 in Orebro, totalling 744 
reports (Aftonbladet, 4 July 2001). The following day, the privatisation proposal from the 
Moderate Party municipality chairman received much criticism. The question was ‘why 
didn’t the municipality intervene?’ (Aftonbladet, July 5 2001). The importance of staff 
morale was underlined, but in 2002, a complete privatisaion of Polhemsgarden was decided 
upon, and from October, a company called Carema began operating the home. The four-year 
election cycle also returned in 2002. The SAP-led central government emphasised that with 
Lex Sarah a better and more transparent system had now been put in place, and promised an 
additional 15,000 staff for elderly care. However, the overall increase in demand for entry to 
elderly care homes was also highlighted in relation to the future difficulty in balancing 
budget and quality of care (DN, 19 August 2002). The NBHW published a report, Lex Sarah 
-four years later, review on application of Lex Sarah in 2002 (Lex Sarah- efter fyra ar). The 
review showed that there was a huge variety between regions and localities. Types of reports 
were also varied. A lack of care accounted for 44% of all the reports, the lack of treatment 
23%, physical, psychological and sexual abuse 28% and economic mismanagement 25%100. 
The review concluded that overall, the municipalities were satisfied with the direction of the 
policy and advice. Their requests for improvements include: the definition of ’serious
100 Respondents were allowed to cite more than one reason.
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mishandlings’, boundaries between health and social care, and situations where the county, 
rather than municipalities, should be informed. These points only shed light on the structural 
problems, which have been repeatedly raised over many years. In this phase, the malpractice 
events highlighted in the media did not affect the responsible party in power at municipality 
level, or the central government of the time. In September 2002, the non-socialist party bloc 
maintained its dominance in the Solna municipality, while the SAP bloc formed the 
government once again. Under little saliency, a larger proportion of public criticism of 
central government did not have a substantial impact on either its responsiveness or electoral 
results.
7.3.3 Responsiveness in Sweden
Instigated by sensational media reports (one TV programme and tabloid newspaper in 
particular), deficient procedures at the elderly home were disrupted, forcing structural 
problems out into the public domain. As the government agency NBHW could not resolve 
this issue single-handedly, and because of the timing of the scandal occurring in the election 
year, the matter quickly became party-politicised. The left-wing national government 
stepped in swiftly, passing legislation. Lex Sarah was based on institutional diffusion, 
copying Lex Maria, which had existed within the medical care domain.
National government reacted under heightened public attention, intervened in local issues 
despite criticism concerning the breach of local autonomy and passed legislation. Secondly, 
policy changes occurred in a more adversarial fashion than the usual consensus-based 
approach. Timing (election year) played a significant role in influencing the course of the 
events and blame shifting made an impact as well. Stronger criticism was targeted at 
government bodies rather than service providers, despite efforts by government to downplay 
its responsibility, because the fault lay with the private provider. However, a strong sense of 
public accountability within the system granted no leeway for the government, and 
succeeded in securing a response from central government. As the issue saliency faded away,
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as in the English case, public criticism of central government intensified, but to no avail. 
Central government praised the achievements brought by its own legislation, claiming the 
credit, while some subsequent scandals hit the same municipality.
Overall, under high-high pressure, central government decisively intervened in what is 
normally considered to be a local matter. This action could be explained by the level of 
pressure, shown by public criticism in all types of media. The result proved that 
vulnerabilities in the Swedish health system were hit hard, which provoked unprecedented 
responsiveness for the central government beyond the usual institutional logics. In this case, 
central government demonstrated its capability to override local autonomy, which normally 
constrains its actions. Although electoral competition played a role, popular criticisms 
prompted central government to respond beyond institutional designs.
7.4 Japan: surgeries performed on wrong patients at Yokohama City University 
Hospital
The Japanese health system had long been governed on an ad-hoc basis concerning 
government intervention. Although the disciplinary mechanism was installed at ministry 
level, the decision normally followed court rulings. In contrast to the close relationship 
between the policy experts in the governing LDP party and the JMA, ministers were 
detached from such issues, which constituted the weakness of the Japanese health system. 
There was no channel for the general public which could effectively influence government 
policy. The outbreak of several medical incidents shook the entire political circle and 
medical professions. Institutionally, the responsiveness of central government is expected to 
be weak, although a shift in public saliency and interest could bring about a great change, as 
institutional vulnerabilities might be exposed effectively. This episode examines the 
responsiveness of central government to public criticism expressed in the media.
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7.4.1 Background: case-by-case treatment of malpractice cases
Legal cases related to medical malpractice have captured occasional public attention since 
the 1980s. Taking a complaint to court became the norm, as the Japanese health system had 
never established a malpractice system in the public domain. This is partially due to the 
institutional logics on the medical dimension in Japan. Individual autonomy was prioritised 
over collective autonomy, as private practitioners are the predominant providers, and 
because professors at teaching hospitals controlled the recruitment system (Chapter 3). 
Collegiality has never encompassed the whole medical profession. Divisions and rivalries 
between public doctors and private practitioners, or between different teaching hospitals take 
precedence over collective feeling. As a consequence, when mishandling of medical cases 
occurred, individual doctors and hospitals were always the targets for blame, rather than the 
entire medical profession. Yet there were no strong incentives to systematically tackle the 
issue. In addition, central government never made commitments to devising preventive 
measures for such malpractice cases. The political power of the medical association never 
granted central government the authority to intervene, although the MHW itself had no 
strong incentive either to tighten the sense of public accountability. Medical errors therefore 
were left to the court to deal with as a legal matter. This institutional cycle (malpractice case 
put on trial) spawned different legal concepts for ‘malpractice’.
The term ‘medical incident’101 in Japan is clearly distinguished from ‘medical accident’102 
which refers to both unpredictable and inevitable cases and human error committed on the 
hospital site. The underlying difference between the two concepts is that criminal laws are 
applied to the former (medical incident), as involuntary manslaughter, but not to the latter 
(medical accident). To complicate the situation, ‘medical mistakes’103 is often used in the
101 ‘Iryokago’.
102 ‘Irydjiko’.
103 ‘Iryomisu’.
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media without distinguishing the two concepts, simply criticising the medical profession. 
This represents a swing from one extreme to the other, where doctors are perceived as 
god-like figures but then risk becoming ‘criminals’ without any systematic support. The thin 
line between ‘accident’ and ‘incident’ generally drawn in courts, based on whether the 
mistake was made during purely clinical (and therefore professional) practice (e.g. failure in 
detecting the early signs of a cancer) or simply human error (injection of the wrong type of 
medicine) (Komatsu 2004: p. 20). Article 21 of the Medical Practitioner Law postulates that 
upon discovery of an unnatural death, medical staff are obliged to report it to the police. 
However, since such an act could be extremely harmful to professional lives of individual 
doctors as well as the hospital, there is little incentive to report properly. Only a few cases 
had actually been reported each year, even though voices of concern and apprehension had 
been raised from nurses in the past (Yoshida 2004: p. 20).
As a result, sporadic events were dealt with case by case, mostly in court, and the 
government’s council, the MEC, endorsed the judgement. Structural problems had not been 
paid a fair amount of public attention until the end of 1990s, when a series of serious medical 
malpractice cases captured the headlines, first at Yokohama City University Hospital 
(YCUH) on 11 January 1999, followed by another at Tokyo Metropolitan Hiroo Hospital 
one month later. In the former case, a patient who needed a heart operation was mistaken for 
another patient who required a lung operation. They both underwent the wrong operation, 
and died within the year. This case inevitably sparked huge public concern and media reports, 
which led to the uncovering of systemic failures and ‘hidden’ medical errors. In the Tokyo 
case, a nurse injected a patient with steriliser solution instead of a physiological salt solution 
mixed with heparin. The patient died within 2 hours. In this case, it was later found out that 
the hospital managers and Tokyo Metropolitan government staff initially sought to cover up
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the accident104. As soon as this cover-up was revealed by media reports, the newly elected 
Governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, had to make an unprecedented public apology for this 
scandalous act. Unlike Health Ministers, who are only appointed by prime minister, 
directly-elected governors had to face the strong criticism expressed in the media.
Medical errors in Japan have never been adopted as a party-political matter, primarily 
because the medical professions were hierarchical and closed, but also because the dominant 
LDP, supported by the JMA, had every good reason to protect professional autonomy (i.e. 
individual clinicians’ own activities). It is reflected by the fact that ministers normally were 
the policy experts who defended the interest of the JMA, acting on their behalf, particularly 
at fee-schedule negotiations. As a result, and without intervention from government, a family 
of victims had no choice but to seek justice by filing a suit (both civil and criminal). The 
MHW (renamed Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare, MHLW, in 2001) has been 
consistently opposed to any proposals such as setting up a third-party authority to inspect 
medical errors or provide compensation funds for the victim. Resignation over malpractice 
incidents is extremely rare. One minister, Kunikichi Saito, resigned in 1980 after the 
shocking revelation that non-licenced doctors had undertaken operations to remove wombs 
or ovaries from a number of patients who had come for a sterilisation operation at Fujimi 
Obstetrics and Gynecology Clinic (Saitama Prefecture) (AS, 12 September 1980). Although 
the then Minister resigned, it was not because he was taking responsibility, rather that he 
accepted a bribe from the hospital manager Sanae Kitano in anticipation of less strict 
sanctions by the Ministry. Therefore, it was more of a corruption case than that of ministerial 
accountability. The hospital was closed down in 1987, although trials continued until July 
2004, when the Supreme Court withdrew the appeal and demanded payment of 514 million 
JPY (approximately 2.5 millionGBP) from the four surgeons involved. The Medical Ethics
104 It was revealed that the Health Bureau of the Metropolitan Government demanded that the 
hospital should not report to the police until the reason for the incident was found out within the 
hospital. As a result, the incident was reported to the police eleven days later.
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Council (MEC)105 decided in March 2005 to remove clinic owner Kitano’s licence and 
suspended the other doctors for between six months and two years. This single case indicated 
that it required a quarter of a century before settlement. Moreover, the responsibility of 
public authorities to monitor negligence had never been questioned.
However, ministerial or administrative responsibility was gradually called into question. The 
trend was set with a series of corruption scandals, leading to pubic mistrust in government 
and high raking civil servants. One of the symbolic cases was the scandal of HIV injections 
caused by contaminated blood products, and the involvement of the MHW. Through use of 
unheated blood products on haemophiliac patients, the HTV virus had been passed on for 
many years, while pharmaceutical companies and doctors were conscious of the risk. Civil 
action was taken against both the companies and the MWH for negligence. One clinician 
was found innocent, while a welfare officer was convicted in 2001. In 1996, the then 
Welfare Minister, Naoto Kan, in the non-LDP government prevented the conventional 
cover-up operation within the Ministry. He officially apologised to the public, which was 
later described as the creation of the concept ‘accountability’ in Japanese politics (van 
Volferen 1998)106.
105 The MEC was founded in 1948. The members consist of two Presidents (one for the Japan 
Medical Association and one for the Japan Dental Association) and eight scholars (term 2 years). 
When banning medical practices, the Minister is obliged to consult the MEC. Although it can decide 
on administrative measures, unless there is a serious charge against them, the MEC cannot proceed to 
action.
106 Grass-roots movements also became invigorated by this apparent triumph, and spawned several 
NPOs such as Yakugai (treatment-induced disaster) Ombudsperson “Medwatcher Japan”.
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7.4.2 Episode and Analysis
Yokohama City Hospital
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Figure 36: Number of reports critical of government and medical professions 
(Asahi Shimbun, 1995-2006)
(Phase 1: Jan - April 1999; Phase 2: May 1999 - Feb 2000; Phase 3: Feb 2000 - 2006) 
Phase 1: Shock waves and initial reactions (Jan - April 1999)
When the Yokohama case became public in January 1999, the number of articles soared. The 
shock among the general public was immense, as the mistake (i.e. failure to identify the right 
patient for the right surgery) appeared considerably primitive, and not al all technical matter. 
The initial announcement and public briefing was held at the hospital on 13 January. The 
manager, Dr Tomihisa Koshino, made a public apology for the accident of conducting 
surgeries on the wrong patients. However, he announced that there would only be an internal 
inquiry and the results would not be open to public. He told the press that the decision to 
have only an internal inquiry was because the victims’ families would not give them consent 
to do otherwise. He also admitted that the accident was reported to the city’s mayoral office, 
which managed the university hospital, in the afternoon of the same day, and to the 
prefectural branch of the police the following day, but not to the MHW. The media criticised 
the slow response by the hospital manager and the responsible Yokohama City University, as 
well as its hesitation to make information public. However, the reports’ focus was initially
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concentrated on the question: “how could the nurses mistake their patients’ identities?” Less 
than two weeks late, another mistake related to blood transfusion was discovered at the same 
hospital (Nikkei, 24 January 1999) only worsened the situations.
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Figure 37: Newspaper coverage (210 days from the incident)
The first reaction came from the Japan Nursing Association. President Takako Mito issued a 
circular in protest against the media reports, claiming that the incident was not due to a 
particular individual nurse’s lack of attention, or through the fault of the nursing team at the 
YCUH, but owing to the hospital system in general. The central government had already 
stepped in by 2 February, by announcing that the MHW was planning to set up a working 
group of experts and professionals to establish government guidelines for preventive 
measures. The MHW also alerted every prefectural government on the issue and demanded 
that safety measures be put in place. In parallel, the President of the JMA made a public 
announcement that all the medical professions should take safety measures seriously. The 
issue also started to be discussed in the Diet. In the Diet’s Select Committee, on Health and 
Welfare, and Justice on 10 February, an officer from the MHW, together with representatives 
of the Ministry of Education and the police, explained the situation and possible future
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procedures. The then opposition107 New Clean Party (Komei) Member of Parliament Yutaka 
Fukushima demanded an explanation for the incident in the Budget Select Committee, one 
week later on 18 February. The Minister of Health and Welfare, Sohei Miyashita, replied by 
suggesting a tighter in-hospital management and monitoring. On the previous day, the 
working group (for the establishment of in-hospital management for the prevention of patient 
misrecognition), chaired by Dr Haruhiko Kikuchi108, was officially set up within the Ministry. 
Another opposition party member, the Social Democratic Party Diet Member Kiyoko 
Kusakabe (House of Councillors) raised the issue of insufficient staff numbers, especially 
nurses, as the main cause of this incident, and questioned the responsibility of government. 
The minister denied the accusation, showing the data and pointing out that there had been an 
ongoing improvement, not deterioration (11 March 1999). From March to May, public 
attention on this accident rose again, as concern became widespread and articles began 
focusing on further cases allegedly concealed by the profession. The media was generally 
critical of the medical profession and hospital staff, but also pointed out more structural 
factors such as the lack of a learning culture within the organisation (Yomiuri, 25 February, 
22 March; Mainichi, 17/22 March; AS 22 March 1999). The evidence that the staff at the 
YCUH had never been aware of similar malpractice cases committed in the past (i.e. 
Kumamoto prefecture in April 1993) was demonstrated as an example of the systemic failure. 
One article (Yomiuri, 25 February 1999), drawing a contrast with the UK, where the public 
authority exists and government is engaged in building such a system, stated that a ‘safety 
system must be constructed’. These were indirect criticisms of central government, or its 
long-term absence from the domain.
However, most criticism was targeted at the professions. The group of lawyers who run the 
consultation centre for medical malpractice criticised conventional preventive measures at
107 Eight months later, in October 1999, the New Clean Party would officially join the government 
with the Liberal Democrat Party.
108 President o f the National Cardiovascular Center (Kokuristu Junkankiby5 Senta).
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hospitals as being ‘thirty years behind’ compared to other fields (Yoshiro Shibara, Deputy 
Director of Medical Errors Information Center, Yomiuri, 23 March 1999). Lawyers were 
often quoted as a mouthpiece for patients/victims, accusing the medical profession of its 
secretive nature (Yomiuri, 25 February 1999; Mainichi, 11 April 1999). This was due to the 
lack of a publically accountable system for dealing with malpractice. Having to deal with 
such cases, the lawyers became powerful agents who could mobilise the voices of patients 
and raise their concerns over defects in the health system.
On 22 March, the internal investigation committee of the YCUH submitted its interim report. 
The committee consisted of six members, a deputy mayor as chairman and doctors, a lawyer 
and an expert on medical affairs. The report presented detailed accounts of every stage in the 
two surgical procedures where mistakes and negligence had occurred. As a proposal for a 
preventive measure, the report strongly recommended the establishment of an obligatory 
reporting system and the introduction of a risk management system, similar to the one in the 
aviation industry. The strengthening of the management team of the hospital and the 
curriculum of the medical school were also put forward as a ‘proposal’, but the committee 
was divided over the decision as to whether this should be a rather more nuanced 
‘recommendation’. A member of the committee expressed his concern that the proposal 
would be watered down and may not have any effect at the stage of implementation 
(Mainichi, 23 March 1999).
The working group in the government submitted the blueprint of the guideline to the MHW 
on 16 April. On 12 May, a report109 was completed by the working group and circulated to 
hospitals, clinics, prefectures and concerned organisations.
In June, the City of Yokohama decided to penalise the 31 staff members involved in the 
incident, and to suspend two unnamed professors who carried out the two operations for two
109 http://wwwl .mhlw.go.ip/houdou/1105/h0512-2 lO.html
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months. The city authorities emphasised the fact that the penalty was more severe than any 
previous similar case. It was revealed, however, that the decision was delayed by protests by 
the dean of the city university, the former manager and the former faculty head, who were all 
on the list. They protested on the grounds that they had already stepped down from the posts, 
and therefore sanctions were redundant (J-5).
The responsiveness of central government resulted from a considerably high level of 
‘pressure’, emerging from public concerns over and criticism of insufficient effort made by 
central government. The proportion of criticism of government (20%) was not the highest 
among the case studies, but given the considerable amount of coverage, the role, if not the 
responsibility, of central government was exposed and questioned.
Phase 2: Series of government proposals: reforming the disciplinary system, starting 
data-gathering, ministerial ordinance (May 1999 - Feb 2000)
After almost hundred days had passed, the focus was shifted to how the ministry was dealing 
with the accident. The YCUH had been a government-authorised, special-functioning 
hospital (Chapter 6)110, and therefore granted special fee schedule and tax cuts. The MHW 
decided to ‘advise’ that Yokohoma city should submit the plea to the ministry to have that 
status withdrawn, since the accreditation system had originally no punishment mechanism 
for the ministry to interfere or remove the title. This was a highly exceptional decision. The 
government was accused of having created this loophole in its design of the accreditation 
system.
Media reports also highlighted the fact that the number of medical accident cases (taken to 
the Supreme Court) were on the increase, with the number doubling in a decade (369 cases
110 Hospitals with 500 beds, ICU and more than 10 specialties are allowed to apply for this status, 
which is to be certified by the MHW. They also have to increase their ratio of referring patients by up 
to 30%. As of July 1999, 82 hospitals were accredited, including the YCUH.
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in 1989, 629 cases in 1999, 2703 unresolved cases as of 1999)111. Along with the accident in 
Yokohoma, cases such as Wakayama Prefectural University Hospital112 and Tokyo 
Metropolitan Hiroo Hospital were given as proof that the Yokohama case is just the tip of 
the iceberg. A group of lawyers working on the matter began raising concerns, pointing out 
structural defects within the system, rather than individual doctors’ incompetence or tort, 
where there is no reporting obligation of such cases to the ministry (NK, 28 June 1999). A 
voluntary group, Investigation Committee of Medical Accidents (Iryojiko chosakai), founded 
under the auspice of doctors and lawyers, organised a symposium in Osaka. There, it was 
reported that out of 250 court cases in the previous four years, 195 (78%) fell into the 
category of ‘medical incidents’, not inevitable or unpredictable cases (AS, 15 May 1999).
Another structural defect within the hospital system, surfacing during public debate, was 
insufficient human resources, in particular the number of nurses. By the end of March, the 
Japan Association of Medical Labour Union (Nihon Iryo Rodo Kumiai Rengokai) submitted 
its appeal to the ministry to increase the number of nursing staff. The MHW did not appear 
responsive, underlining the fact that it had already set its goal in line with the level of other 
advanced countries113, increasing the number of nurses by 160,000 to a total of 1,160,000 by 
2004. The working group did not attribute the accident to the shortage of staff either (AS, 1 
May 1999; 26 May 1999).
Six months after the accident, on 1 July, Mayor of Yokohama, Hidenobu Takahide, 
submitted the plea to the Minister of Health and Welfare Sohei Miyashita, to withdraw its 
own status, and the minister accepted the request. By August, public attention on the
111 In the year 2000, the number was 767.
112 In October 1994, a girl died after being injected with milk. The following year, the hospital was 
accredited by the ministry as a special-functioning hospital. In 1997, after the media discovered and 
revealed the ‘accident’ which was concealed from her family, and never existed in the hospital record, 
the hospital promised an internal inquiry. The inquiry was eventually suspended, and the doctor who 
ordered a nurse to change the record was never found.
113 Per 100 beds, the United States had 197 nurses (as o f 1996), Germany 93 (1995), France 67 
(1995), while Japan had only 42 (1996), according to the MHW.
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particular Yokohama case died down, but the demand for the policy responsiveness of 
government continued to rise. In September, a final report came out from the university 
hospital internal inquiry. The report spelled out in great detail new safety procedures as well 
as reforms of the management team. For the first time as a university-affiliated hospital, a 
new hospital manager would be appointed separately from the dean. These reforms were to 
be checked by an external inspection committee. The report was submitted to the MHW as 
well as the Ministry of Education.
The MHW launched its very first three-year pilot study, gathering data on medical accidents, 
including medical incidents and near misses by collaborating with hospitals across the 
country. In October, the external inspection committee was set up for rebuilding public trust 
in that hospital. Committee members were selected, as a new inquiry was launched. This was 
the measure to ensure that the recommended schemes were carried out so that the hospital 
would be given back its Special-functioning Hospital status. The ministry also decided to 
amend the regulation itself, empowering its authority to disqualify its accredited status. In 
November, the Medical Research Council (now part of the Social Security Council, under 
the MHLW) ruled that the there would be an amendment to the ministerial ordinance, 
enacted in April 2000. Under the new regulation, the Special-functioning Hospital is 
required to have a guideline for accident prevention and an internal committee for risk 
management.
In February of the following year, after the external inquiry was completed with the 
publication of its report, the City of Yokohama resubmitted an application for the 
accreditation. The report praised conscientious efforts of the staff and the management for 
the reform, while it recommended that the hierarchical network at the university hospital 
(Ikyoku-sei, medical personnel management system based on clinical department, see 
Chapter 3) should be abolished. The medical institutions, which were long thought to be 
untouchable, were linked to the malpractice cases, and openly criticised.
315
Phase 3: Incessant shocks, and establishment of ministerial risk management team (Feb 
2000 - 2006)
As the issue at YCUH appeared to have been resolved, a further series of scandals appeared 
in the media. The case of the Tokyo Metropolitan Hiroo Hospital was finally brought to the 
public prosecutor’s office under suspicions of involuntary manslaughter after more than a 
year after the accident happened. A dossier of the hospital manager (physician) was also sent 
to the public prosecutor’s office, in violation of “Physicians Law”. This case attracted a fair 
amount of media coverage, as the Tokyo Metropolitan government’s original intention of 
cover-up was revealed (Mainichi, 15 October 1999). The Tokyo government commanded 
that the accident should be brushed under the carpet. Soon after this, another malpractice 
case occurred at the Kyoto University Hospital, where a 17-year old girl died after ethanol, 
instead of distilled water, was injected by mistake into her artificial respirator. What was 
worse, the University Hospital already had a medical accident prevention committee 
installed ten years previously.
On 16 March, at the Medical Research Council of the MHW, a talk was held with regard to 
the reapplication of the YCUH for the Special-functioning status. Against expectations, the 
reapplication was turned down, based on the fact that the deputy director of the hospital 
commented that ‘the operations were not necessarily in vain’ (Yomiuri, 17 March 2000). He 
resigned after this revelation. Despite all this, Mayor Hidenobu Takahide once again 
announced that the city would make every effort to regain the accreditation. The public 
prosecution commenced on 22 March.
Under these circumstances, the ministry stepped up its intervention. The Medical Research 
Council summoned the medical staff from Kyoto University Hospital for questioning. Since 
Kyoto University Hospital is one of the leading teaching hospitals in the country, and under 
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, this was quite exceptional.
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The ministry’s survey revealed that only one third of the 82 Special-functioning hospitals 
had an internal committee for accident prevention and even fewer a quarter, had a manual 
(AS, 28 March 2000). A medical accident consultant and lawyer, Akira Morita, expressed 
his doubt as to ‘whether accreditation for the Special-functioning hospital and everyday risk 
management at each hospital are two separate matters’ (Yomiuri, 7 May 2000). For national 
hospitals (now considered to be all independent administrative bodies), the MHW is in 
charge of management, and can therefore intervene much more directly. The ministry drew 
up its own manual on risk management and attempted to encourage hospitals to embrace its 
recommendations. The Minister of Health, and an influential Welfare politician and expert, 
Yuya Niwa, convened public (national, prefectural and quasi-public), and private clinics, and 
teaching hospitals, in order to circulate the guidance in March. His successor Yuji Tsushima 
followed the same procedure and convened hospital directors in September.
In October, in the House of Representatives, Social Democratic Party Diet Member Nobuto 
Hosaka received answers to his written questions with regard to the patient’s right to medical 
records. In relation to measures to prevent medical errors, it noted the Ministry’s efforts to 
construct a risk management system, also setting up a research team to analyse various 
incidents of medical errors. In December, the YCUH’s resubmission of application was 
finally accepted. Simultaneously, the MHW announced its new accreditation framework. 
The decision included the expansion of the remit of the Medical Research Council (now the 
Social Security Council) to summon hospital managers to their inquiry. Sanctions were 
clarified into four categories according to the level of seriousness of accidents: (1) 
withdrawal of accreditation, (2) supervision needed, (3) observation as interim measures, and 
(4) no guidance needed. The results were also made public on the ministry’s webpage.
In October 2002, the MHLW amended the Ministerial Ordinance to oblige all health 
providers to ensure safety measures by reporting medical errors. In addition, a new 
accreditation system (Specific-function hospital or “Highly-advanced care hospital”) has
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given the MHLW a mechanism to compel health providers to follow the ministerial 
instructions and guidelines (since April 2002). In 2004, the MHLW considered that data 
collection and analysis concerning those medical error accidents would be contracted out to a 
third-party authority, as the Director of the Health Policy Bureau, MHLW revealed (House 
of Councillors Select Committee on Monitor Administration, 29 March 2004).
The responsiveness of central government throughout the process was unprecedented in 
Japan, where public accountability had neither been recognised nor exercised. There has 
been a long spell of government reluctance to set up a publicly-funded malpractice system. 
With neither electoral competition over hospital matters, nor a government forum for real 
discussions, the issue had been neglected. However, at the outbreak of the YCUH incidents, 
the systemic failure was brought to public attention, criticising central government as well as 
individual doctors, nurses and the whole medical profession. A series of accidents kept the 
issue in focus, and under macropolitics, responses of government became more extensive 
and were gradually integrated into the whole accreditation scheme. Issues such as 
recruitment system that had been considered to be in the domain of a closed medical 
autonomy, started to be questioned more openly, and therefore tackled by the Ministry. 
Elected senior officials’ involvement was also unprecedented. The lack of political channels 
(e.g. ministerial accountability) between patients and government finally began to be made 
public due to disrupted institutional arrangements by the accidents.
7.4.3 Responsiveness in Japan
The Japanese case recorded the highest number of newspaper articles of the three countries, 
although as institutional arrangements suggested, at the beginning it seemed that public 
attention was paid to the hospital director’s responsibility, rather than ministerial or 
government responsibility. However, overall media reporting discussed the issue more from 
a structural point of view, not focusing on individual cases or nurses’ responsibility. The 
need for constructing a risk management system was voiced more strongly as a result. This
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represented a great shift in emphasis from case-by-case treatment of malpractice incidents to 
the responsibility of government. Although the case at the YCUH was not the only one, but 
one of several malpractice incidents which spurred public mistrust in the profession, it was 
the very first to underline that individual doctors or nurses cannot be held responsible, and 
some kind of risk management system was inevitable.
In addition, for central government, the timing was important. As central government had 
been engaged in relabelling hospitals, not by their ownership (public or private) or 
ministerial jurisdictions (ministry of health, education or home affairs), but by their functions 
and performances in the catchment area (Chapter 6), the responsibility for having accredited 
the YCUH was strongly felt, when the hospital was found risk-ridden. As a result of 
widespread mistrust in the health providers, welfare ministers had to openly make official 
appeals to reassure the general public about the state of affairs surrounding hospitals. This 
policy outcome was remarkable in that it indicated that a health system without high 
sensitivity to public opinion could force central government to respond to public concerns 
and pressure. The conventional closed policymaking with the limited number of actors was 
disrupted and had to be reconsidered. The former institutional arrangement was 
disproportionately weighted towards the medical professions at the expense of patients and 
victims who had to go through lengthy legal processes against a powerful profession. After 
the incidents, the government embarked on tightening control over health providers. The 
MHW adopted a more proactive role through changes in the accreditation system, and 
introduction of a reeducation system for physicians who are suspended from practice. The 
government also strengthened the power of the Medical Ethics Council, and sought to 
enhance information gathering capability of the ministry. Furthermore, the MHLW 
announced in May 2007 that there would be the third-party body on medical accidents, based 
on the American style (Alternative Dispute Resolution, ADR), consisting of lawyers and 
doctors, which is a radical departure from the conventional approach (Yomiuri, 18 May 
2007).
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Compared to the treatment-induced HIV case under the non-LDP government, the issue did 
not indicate any party-political aspect, with the lack of political accountability in the system 
as well as opposition parties’ feeble reaction. The opposition parties primarily pointed out 
the lack of resources, in particular the number of nurses, but a more fundamental issue such 
as the recruitment system (how to redress closed and hierarchical networks within the 
medical professions) became a major concern, which had perpetuated vicious cycles of 
cover-ups within the medical profession. Instigated by public mistrust in medical institutions, 
the MHW has resumed the task of rebuilding patients’ confidence. Therefore, depending on 
the pressure level, the institutional arrangements can be disturbed, and this could create an 
incentive for central government to be more responsive.
7.5 Comparing three country cases
Judging from the pressure level of this policy type (i.e. high-high), it was predicted that 
political institutions would be disrupted under heightened pressure. Malpractice involving 
deaths and injuries causes controversies as symbolic ‘defects’ in the health system or the 
‘failure’ of government policy in monitoring the safety of public health providers. In 
addition, this type of policy is always abrupt, forcing government to react and take actions, 
with no time for reflection. The results showed that the responsiveness of the central 
government in question was high in all three cases, but in different ways. In Sweden and 
Japan, the institutional vulnerabilities of each health care system were exposed by the media, 
and central government was required to intervene. In England, although the saliency was 
rather low, the responses of central government were extensive and stimulated the redesign 
of the conventional institutions. In England and Japan, professional autonomy was 
scrutinised, while local autonomy in Sweden was overridden by a high level of public 
criticism of central government. This demonstrated how reforms in the hospital sector could 
evolve. In this high-high case, although all three demonstrated high responsiveness, the 
trigger for the responses was different in England than for Sweden and Japan. For Sweden
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and Japan, it was the media and public criticism that stepped up pressure on central 
government, while for England, it was government initiatives to probe into the case and push 
the issue out into the open.
From the institutional designs, it was expected that central government in England would be 
sharing the blame with the medical professions, although it has the capability of intervening 
in the professions. On ther other hand, the effectiveness of interventions by the central 
governments in Sweden and Japan was questioned. It was also assumed for these two 
countries that blame for the incidents might stop at either local level or hospital level, not 
reaching central government. However in reality, all three central governments were to react 
to high pressure, and institutional vulnerabilities were all called into question. It was evinced 
that political accountability in England and Sweden was not the single major force to stir 
public criticism of central government, but its long absence in Japan could also raise concern 
and criticism.
In terms of the saliency, the Bristol Royal Infirmary case surprisingly did not gain much 
attention, even compared to the foundation hospitals case. Instead, it remained in the media 
for a long time (11 years) and criticisms were conspicuously focused mainly on the medical 
professions until saliency of the issue gradually phased out. However, this rather low 
saliency did not stop central government from being responsive. It could be explained by the 
sensitivity of central government in England, which has always been politically vulnerable 
within the English health system. The arrival of the new government also had an impact in 
shedding new light on the incident. On the other hand, the two cases in Sweden and Japan 
were prominent for a shorter period. The effects of acute public attention could be observed 
from the prompt responses from both central governments. The nursing home case in 
Sweden generated a shock wave and recorded the largest number of articles than any other 
Swedish case. The case in Japan generated slightly smaller attention than the case of 
introducing an Independent Administrative Agency (Chapter 5), but the difference in the
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impact on responsiveness could be explained by the ratio of articles referring to government 
(75%).
This high level of public saliency and successive government responsiveness was 
unprecedented in health care policymaking in Japan, as seen in previous chapters, and these 
incidences later led to the emergence of stronger commitments by government and even the 
ruling party LDP, on the issue of staff shortage. New policy initiatives were adopted, with 
the aim of building up risk management teams in each hospital and informing patients of 
accredited hospitals, through strengthening data collection and assessment functions of the 
JCQHC. The incidents had a direct impact on the quality and performance issue (Chapter 5), 
although the JCQHC’s extended mission in the analysis of risk was not paid so much 
attention in the media, unlike the establishment of a Healthcare Commission in England. The 
limit of the JCQHC was also revealed, when it was announced that the regulatees cover only 
the former national hospitals, the accredited (i.e. Special-functioning) hospitals, university 
hospitals, and that reporting was on a voluntary basis only for other types of hospitals. In 
England, despite only moderate coverage in the media, the Bristol case became widely 
discussed, primarily due to the subsequent public inquiry, and strongly associated with 
policy innovations that followed in a systemic fashion (larger remit for independent 
watchdogs and target-setting for health care for children). Even with low visibility, the 
British government stepped in, and effectively intervened in the professional self-governing 
body (E-6). This shows that the English health system has developed a strong mechanism for 
detecting and reacting to crisis, with strong political accountability at the centre.
With regard to alternative perspectives (Perspective 1), there was difference on the 
party-political dimension between England and Japan on the hand, and Sweden on the other. 
The only country which saw partisan elements and party competition was Sweden. In 
England and Japan, the partisan, adversarial aspect was almost non-existent throughout the 
discussions concerning patient safety and the ethics of professional conduct. However, the
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lack of partisan aspect in both countries could be attributed to different reasons. In Japan, 
there was neither strong opposition to the LDP, nor any political accountability, whereas in 
England, the central government preemptively announced the public inquiry and quashed the 
scope for party competition over the issue. In Sweden, even after the central government 
intervened in the municipality affair, public provision (the SAP) versus private actors’ 
delivery (the Moderates) was contrasted in the political debate. General elections heavily 
affected this negligence case. Therefore, political competition between the left and right 
played a role in shaping the responsiveness of government, but this could not explain why 
central government had to intervene, amid criticism for breaching local autonomy.
In England, the arrival of the Labour government in 1997 also played a catalytic role in 
boosting arguments for tightening regulation of the medical professions. However, electoral 
competition could not explain the high responsiveness of ministers, the Prime Minister and 
the DH. In Japan, an institutionally established quick turnover of ministerial posts signifies 
that a stronger administrative role has to be taken by the non-elected officials. In this sense, 
no electoral competition existed to play a part in Japan, but this makes it all the more 
remarkable when the ministers made special written appeals to the general public.
An alternative explanation was based on pressure deriving from the experts. This, however, 
did not play an important part in the three cases. Under macropolitics, the three governments 
were all under pressure to discuss the matter more openly in the public domain. The pressure 
did not come from experts, but rather from the general public, or other professions (e.g. 
lawyers) supporting the popular cause of protecting patient rights. As for the role of the 
actors inside the profession, it is worth noting that the role of whistle blowing was 
highlighted in England and Sweden, but not in Japan. This could also be attributed to the fact 
that there used to be little administrative accountability in health care in Japan, whereas the 
individual medical professions were liable.
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Additionally, it was peculiar that the England case showed that government disagreed and 
ignored some recommendations from the public inquiry and the commissioned working 
group. Governments in the other two countries adopted the ideas from the reports more 
comprehensively.
Lastly, just to reiterate the point, the pressure type (high-high) has some characteristics in 
common in all three countries, overriding different health delivery systems. However 
decentralised or private, national governments in the three countries stepped in immediately 
and passed legislation or changed administrative decrees, all visibly strengthening central 
government’s regulatory power. As the shortage of health professionals became clear, all 
three governments announced their commitment to tackling the issue. These cases proved the 
argument that central governments with any form of funding schemes and political 
institutions have resources, tools and capabilities. When the pressure is on, government seeks 
to respond to popular calls for building a more transparent system and securing safety for 
patients. In this domain of risk management, central government is becoming increasingly 
more sensitive and responsive to public spheres and policy direction is converging 
accordingly. As part of this trend, public criticism of central government plays a crucial role 
in shaping capabilities to respond under highly pressurised circumstances.
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Chapter Eight Pressure types, institutional vulnerabilities and 
responsive government
As the previous four empirical chapters have demonstrated, the responsiveness of central 
government in health policy was determined overall by the institutions in which they 
operated. Yet each problem constellation within the hospital sector brings different types of 
pressure to bear on the political and medical dimensions. This chapter summarises the 
findings of the case study and compares cases by pressure type, analysing them from 
different perspectives. The results show that the responsiveness of central government is 
shaped by institutional logics and pressure type, and not purely by the electoral model or 
strong autonomy of the professional groups. The concluding part highlights the key findings 
of this thesis in relation to some theories in political science, in particular the study of the 
welfare state. In addition, it underlines the merit of analysing dynamic policy changes 
through the search for institutional logics of action in the light of different degrees of 
pressure. The 4x3 method effectively called into question the constraining nature of political 
institutions in health reforms, and explained how policy diffusion and convergence across 
the three countries come about beyond path dependency in this predominantly 
profession-driven policy sector.
8.1. Summary of the cases
8.1.1. Pressure types, predictions and ‘surprise’ responses
When the issue has more to do with redistributive policies (i.e. hospital reorganisations), 
formal institutions filtered the external pressure, and government responses were rather easy 
to predict (in other words, pressure on the medical dimension was low, i.e. low-low (Chapter
4) or low-high (Chapter 5)). Responses were not greatly affected by public criticisms, but 
decided by electoral competition or the internal decision making within the epistemic 
community. Under circumstances where political institutions were challenged, different
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mechanisms which triggered the responses were detected in each of the three countries, and 
there were some unusual reactions from government. In Japan, even when a local hospital 
reorganisation became a local electoral matter (Chapter 4), there was no strong electoral 
competition between government and the opposition. This in itself was foreseeable, given 
that there is no political accountability to the hospital sector in Japan, but the impact of this 
campaign on central government was unique, as the sell-off plans for many other national 
hospitals had to be reconsidered. In sharp contrast to this, in Sweden, when a local acute 
hospital was sold to a private corporation (Chapter 5), that decision agitated the leftist 
government at the centre. Even though the decision was predictable from the previous 
political pledges and preparations by the non-socialist bloc in the past, the response from 
central government was unprecedented. Therefore, within certain parameters, there were 
some ‘surprises’ in the responses of central government.
These ‘surprises’ however have one thing in common, namely, that interventions by central 
government were triggered when institutional vulnerabilities were exposed. In the Japanese 
case, no electoral channel to express local dissatisfaction led to the choice of petition and 
referendum to dismiss local councillors. The low sensitivity of the political class to a matter 
of such importance for the local population was highlighted to the media through the 
campaign. Consequently, the ministry and the medical associations had to collaborate to 
assuage the residents. In the Swedish case, on the other hand, the opposite was the case. 
Since an electoral channel existed, the embarrassment was caused for central government. In 
the Swedish decentralised health system, the local population can give the county council the 
mandate for change in health provision, over which central government has no effective 
control. It became clear that such a radical shift from public provision to acute care service 
delivery by a for-profit corporation was possible at local level. When this structural dilemma 
between local autonomy and central government’s incapacity was exposed, the government 
had to intervene.
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When pressure was exerted on the medical dimensions (i.e. high-low (Chapter 6) and 
high-high (Chapter 7)), formal institutions became more susceptible to changes, according to 
media reports. As a result, institutional vulnerabilities were exposed even more to influence 
by the general public. Although formal institutions still filtered the external pressure and 
guided the trajectories, government responses were more difficult to predict than in the 
previous two cases (Chapters 4 and 5). Once hospital performance evaluation schemes were 
established, government responses became more subject to public criticism, as issue saliency 
increased (Chapter 6). At the initial stage of building the scheme, it was electoral 
competition or the internal decision making within the epistemic community that affected 
government attitudes. After the scheme was constructed, the media played a significant role. 
When the malpractice incidents became public (Chapter 7), the role of the media was also 
very important in exposing the institutional vulnerabilities in each health system. This 
applies to all three countries, although there were also some unpredicted reactions.
In the case of building quality assurance schemes (Chapter 6), ministers in England were 
heavily involved from the outset. This was predictable given the UK’s strong ministerial 
accountability, but there was virtually no competition between political parties over the issue 
until targets began to be widely criticised. In contrast to this, in Sweden, the different party 
stances on hospital rankings were exhibited. In the malpractice cases (Chapter 7), on the 
other hand, health ministers in Japan made public appeals after the incidents, something 
which was unprecedented. Also in Sweden, central government intervened in the affairs that 
the municipality was responsible for, and passed legislation to make incident reports 
mandatory. In all three countries, institutional vulnerabilities were revealed by the printed 
media, and the responses of central government were prompt and drastic in the malpractice 
cases. Hence, it was demonstrated that external pressure on the policy sector was 
transformed into reform initiatives, via the printed media, which exposed institutional 
vulnerabilities effectively.
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8.1.2. Issue saliency and the responsiveness of central government to the general 
public
When issue saliency becomes high, it is believed that the policy debate would be shifted 
from subsystem politics to macropolitics. However, saliency was not enough to make central 
government respond to the general public. Public criticism could have no impact on central 
government decisions, even when saliency was high. Under such conditions, two patterns 
were observed. The first pattern was, as shown by the case of corporatising public hospitals 
(Chapter 5), that once the government proposal was brought into legislatures, regardless of 
the volume of criticism, the bills were successfully passed by a majority in parliament. The 
results showed that legislatures were generally not responsive to public criticism. In England, 
for the two cases, the governing party was split internally, rather than being challenged by 
the opposition. Here, the only exception was the Swedish case, as central government 
‘reacted’ but did ‘not respond’ to public criticism. It reversed the earlier decision made by 
the local county council. Therefore, the action of central government could be regarded as 
unresponsive to the general public, despite its responsiveness to the opposition parties’ 
decision. The second pattern of response from the centre was, as exhibited by the case of the 
malpractice scandals (Chapter 7), that central governments embarked on redesigning the 
institutional arrangements of the sector. Although the degree of redesign varied, all of the 
responses deviated from predictions, based on their respective institutional designs.
8.1.3. Summary of the cases: predictions fulfilled?
The table below sets out the results of the four cases. The English NHS system is
predominantly publicly-run, and the public accountability of central government with regard
to the system has been preserved. Therefore, it is the most politically sensitive to pressure
among the three, although it is also likely to be able to undertake reforms due to the polity
that does not have many veto players. Likewise, the Swedish health system is largely run by
public providers, but funded by local tax and managed by local politicians. Directly elected
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county council politicians therefore can ensure responsiveness to local voices, while central 
government is spared from the micromanagement of each county’s health care system 
operations- On the flipside of this, the government needs to secure a consensus among 
multiple stakeholders at the time of reform. Reform initiatives from local government can 
cause friction with those at the centre. Thus, pressure diverted by central government can in 
turn hinder effective intervention by central government. Similar issues can pose problems 
for central government in Japan, with multiple provider types and different levels of 
government (national/prefecture/municipality). In addition, jurisdiction over hospitals is 
divided among three ministries (Health, Education and Home Affairs). In the predominantly 
privately-run hospital system, the private practitioners have been a consistently powerful 
group in the sector, holding a political card as the largest contributor to the single governing 
party LDP. Contrary to the Swedish system, not only has the authority of the central 
government been fragmented, but also the accountability of the elected officials has never 
been clearly established within the system. Politicians were not held responsible for the 
hospital sector policy. Therefore, political sensitivity to external pressure has been relatively 
low. To reiterate the point, this could be a strong shield for central government from public 
criticism, but this very insensitivity could also be vulnerability when reform pressure 
becomes high. This could yield ‘surprise’ responses from central government, beyond 
conventional institutional arrangements.
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<Case> Case A (Chapter 4) Case B (Chapter 5) Case C (Chapter 6) Case D (Chapter 7)
Protest votes at local 
hospital reorganisation
Corporatising public 
hospitals
Construction of a quality 
assurance system Malpractice incidents
<Pressure ty p o
Medical/Political Low/low low/high high/low high/high
<Predictions based on the institutional arrangements>
England
Party-political, pressure 
from opposition can 
instigate response.
Party political, and would 
be problematic to centre-left 
government.
Experts at the centre, 
involvement of senior elected 
officials might affect 
responsiveness. National targets 
can be set by central 
government.
Shock would be great. 
Responsibility shared by both 
medical and political class. 
Central government would 
respond. Party-political.
Sweden
Party-political, pressure on 
central government would 
be limited.
Party political, and would 
be problematic to centre-left 
government.
Experts’ influence would be 
great, due to the weaker 
position of central government. 
Building national standards 
would be a difficult task in a 
decentralised structure.
Independent agency in place, 
covering medical malpractice but 
not in the domain of elderly care. 
Shock would be great. However, 
the issue is delegated to 
municipality. Central government 
might not respond. Party-political.
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Japan
Non party-political, local 
unease can be channelled by 
directly elected governor.
Not party political, and 
would not be an issue for 
centre-right government.
Experts’ influence would be 
great, due to the fragmented 
nature of hospital provision. 
Building a government scheme 
would be a difficult task. 
Private practitioners have an 
interest in differentiating 
themselves from the others in a 
competitive market.
Shock would be great, but the 
medical professions and managers 
(or even individual clinics) could 
be blamed, but not government. 
Evolved into a legal case. Central 
government’s response would be 
minimal. Non party-political.
<Observations>
England
County council and general 
election (victory)
Kidderminster shock. 
‘Keeping NHS local’ 
published after the 2001 
election. Localisation 
became policy buzzword.
House divided. 
Backbenchers rebelled. Yet 
foundation hospitals 
established.
No challenge from the 
opposition, divided within 
the governing party. No 
response to public criticism.
Performance ratings/CHI. 
Several swings between 
different priorities due to 
political interventions.
Constant reaction from 
ministers to public criticism, 
causing friction with the 
medical professions.
Central government set up public 
inquiry. CHI strengthened. 
National Patient Safety Agency 
established. Non party-political.
Government’s pre-emptive and 
quick move to set up the inquiry 
kept the focus on the defects in 
the medical professions.
Sweden
County councils (successes) 
and national election 
(failure). Abolition of 
county council model?
(Non-socialist) county 
council privatised the 
hospital, to which 
(Socialist) central 
government reacted.
Quality Registries expanded. 
Central government supported 
the scheme, but resisted further 
development towards hospital 
rankings.
Municipality vs. the NBHW over 
local autonomy. Central 
government intervened and 
passed new “Lex Sarah” law. 
Third-party inspectorate installed. 
Party political.
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No direct response from 
central government to 
elections. Effects of local 
party activities gradually 
spread across the country.
The ‘Stop Law’ to prevent 
any further for-profit 
providers from entering the 
A&E sector.
Expert-driven quality assurance 
system obtained political 
approval and was extended.
Yet, government had to respond 
to public criticism.
Central government intervention 
was instigated by the shocking 
revelation in the media. Public 
criticism prompted the proactive 
legislation from the centre.
Japan
County council was 
dissolved. No clear results, 
from the party point of 
view.
Criticism through the 
campaign brought better 
deals. Government plans to 
sell out national hospitals 
foundered.
Bill passed. National 
hospitals system 
transformed into one 
Independent Administrative 
Corporation.
No response to public 
criticism. Politicians vs. 
bureaucrats, not the 
responsibility of national 
health service provisions.
The JCQHC established. Rules 
were changed in response to 
malpractices at the accredited 
hospitals. Hospital rankings 
published in magazines.
Expert-driven accreditation 
scheme was kept. No impact of 
criticism on government. Yet, 
private hospital rankings were 
published.
Central government tightened 
accreditation rule, setting out to 
collect data and compelling 
accredited hospitals to report 
incidents. Non party-political.
Public criticism of the medical 
professions and inaction of 
government led to unprecedented 
measures. Ministers made public 
appeals.
<Comparing predictions and observations> (Predictions met/partially met/not met?) 
Perspectives > (Election-conscious/expert-driven/public-spirited government?)
England
Met
Election-conscious
Not met 
Elite-driven
Partially met 
Public-spirited
Partially met 
(Public-spirited)
Sweden
Met
(Election-conscious)
Partially met 
Election-conscious
Partially met 
Elite-driven
Not met
Election-conscious/Public-spirited
Japan
Partially met
Public-spirited
(Election-conscious)
Met
Elite-driven
Met
Elite-driven
Not met 
Public-spirited
Table 22: Summary and findings of the cases
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8.2. Comparison of cases by pressure type
These results demonstrated a certain pattern in the reforms surrounding the hospital sector. 
Each pattern will be detailed below, case by case.
8.2.1. Low-Low type (Case A)
When pressure has only a local character (and is therefore low) on both the political and 
medical dimensions, institutional disruptions seldom occur, with resulting policy changes 
and impact therefore relatively small in the whole sector. This case concerned electoral 
campaigns and their results surrounding the issue of local hospital reorganisation. Thus, the 
political dimension of the institutional designs was challenged more strongly. As a result, it 
was expected that political parties would compete over the issue, and put pressure on central 
government to respond to the local population. Predications were based on the 
election-conscious model. For England, with strong party competition and a clear 
accountability to the sector, hospital closure is expected to become a party-political matter. 
Pressure is exerted on central government, either from the opposition parties (most probably 
the Liberal Democrats) or even from an MP within the governing party. For Sweden, 
hospital closure is also a matter for political parties. Yet as decisions over local hospitals are 
under the jurisdiction of the county council, competition among political parties might be 
contained only within the level of county council, not affecting central government’s policy 
stance. Dynamics under the multi-party system in a decentralised polity should differ from 
that in England. Judging from the institutional arrangement, hospital reorganisation in Japan 
would not become a source of party competition. Therefore, the responsiveness of central 
government was contingent on the way local government and a directly elected governor 
became involved in the decision making.
Having selected the three cases where local hospital reorganisation became an electoral 
matter, the results demonstrated that electoral revolt by local people could make a
considerable impact on central government, though with varying degrees. As predicted by 
the election-conscious government, the government in Britain reacted to the electoral result 
in Wyre Forest, which ejected the former junior minister and elected an independent 
candidate. Subsequently, the government adopted a more iocalist’ agenda in the hospital 
reorganisation plan. The political vulnerability of the English health system was fully 
exposed by this electoral result. Local hospital reorganisation could bring the central 
government into conflict with local people’s wishes, in particular by putting local MPs into a 
difficult position. As a consequence, politicians became more cautious, and united against 
local hospital closures irrespective of their party affiliations. Elected officials in the 
governing party were placed in the most difficult position, and had to balance the tasks of 
representing the interests of their local constituency while supporting the government’s 
position.
In Sweden and Japan on the other hand, where the main electoral contests were held at local 
level, the direct effects on central government’s policy were somehow more subtle and 
intangible. In the Swedish case in particular, as pressure was exerted through formal 
institutional (electoral) channels, electoral shock at local level was ironically mitigated, 
rather than propagated, before reaching central government. Despite disruption to coalition 
formation at various county councils, electoral successes of local hospital parties did not 
have a direct impact on central government policy. The results demonstrated that formal 
(electoral) institutions can function as a shield, deflecting pressure at central government, 
rather than as a transmitter of voices from the electorate. Instead of affecting policy options, 
the emergence of the chain of similar parties posed a question about the future governance of 
health care. The agenda of abolishing county councils was discussed in parallel with the 
development of single-issue parties. Therefore, pressure on central government was diverted 
from hospital issues (policy) to regional governance (polity). The successive attempt to form 
a national party based on the hospital issue, although it failed to make an impact, revealed
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the need to signal direct message to central government, even within the Swedish 
quasi-federal county council health system.
From a purely party-political point of view, the emergence of healthcare parties had brought 
in another potential cleavage, as they claimed to belong to neither political camp. As the 
game of forming coalition partners at the county council became fiercer, the effect of 
emerging new parties was similar to the English case. All political parties are now more 
cautious of their proposals for hospital reconfigurations. Regardless of party affiliations, 
elected politicians are more pressured into supporting the majority of local people who were 
sceptical of local hospital reorganisation. In England and Sweden, where party politics was 
entangled with local hospital issues, the visibility of the issue in the media did not play a 
central role. The elections, not the effect of the campaigns on the hospitals, became the 
primary focus. Campaigns were summarised as a revolt by ‘dissatisfied voters’, with no 
specific attention to the peculiarity of the policy or the sector. When attention was shifted 
from the policy issue per se to electoral campaigns, election-conscious government did not 
necessarily produce responses, directed at the electorate. As exemplified by the Swedish case, 
institutional vulnerabilities were exposed (little control of central government over county 
councils), and central government responded. Election-conscious government does not 
always guarantee responsiveness, as electoral institutions can even divert attention away 
from the policy.
With its institutional designs, with no political accountability or strong opposition parties, 
the third case (in Japan) precluded party competition as a major trigger for a response from 
central government. Nonetheless, the local campaigns calling for dissolution of the city 
council turned out to be effective in securing a response from the government. Irrespective of 
the failure to create a platform surrounding the local hospital issue during the electoral 
campaign, the event came as a shock to central government, and a setback to its national 
hospitals restructuring policy. It was a rare case of a successful campaign garnering enough
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support for dissolution of the council, which sent out a strong signal of dissatisfaction to 
central government, which for its part made a deal with the JMA against the wishes of local 
people. Public criticism prompted central government to re-negotiate with the local JMA to 
provide better services after the transfer of ownership. Therefore, public criticism, in 
conjunction with local political agitation, proved effective in bringing about policy changes, 
even in the absence of party competition and large-scale media coverage, as institutional 
weakness was exposed (i.e. the lack of a formal channel to influence government policy for 
the electorate).
8.2.2. Low-High (Case B)
When extreme pressure was exerted on political rather than medical institutions (see Chapter
5), the results were within the parameters of expectations, with the exception of a strong 
reaction from central government in Sweden. Although the selected cases exhibit a variety of 
methods of corporatising public hospitals, this set of problems converges on one common 
aim and goal. That is, in order to improve the efficiency and services of public hospitals, 
they need to be remodelled by emulating practices in the private sector. As privatisation is a 
politically divisive issue, and the implications are nationwide, the political dimension is 
therefore much more strenuously challenged, compared with the previous case of local 
hospital reorganisation.
Based on electoral competition, predictions were made for the three countries. For England, 
the policy choice would be considered as a path towards privatisation, generating fierce 
political debate. The Labour government’s electoral pledge to modernise hospital services 
heightened the pressure, as accomplishing this task through privatisation may clash with the 
enshrined principle of public provision. The opposition parties are expected to contest the 
government plan. For Sweden on the other hand, this is a matter of local discretion at county 
council level. When the Social Democratic Party was in power at every tier of government, it 
was inconceivable that the traditional approach of public provision could be reviewed. Thus,
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tensions may arise when party compositions may differ at national and county level. In 
contrast to the previous case, where central government was spared direct impact from the 
results of local elections, local autonomy may cause trouble for central government, as local 
decisions could contradict the preferred option of central government. Again, it was very 
difficult to predict how central government would react to electoral competition at county 
council level. However, unlike the English case, the left-right divide on the issue of 
privatisation is much more pronounced in Sweden and this clash may develop into a great 
public debate.
In contrast, the Liberal Democrat-led coalition government in Japan would see the policy of 
corporatising national hospitals as favourable to their agenda of slashing bureaucratic 
dominance. The LDP government has never officially been a great supporter of the national 
hospitals, as their primary clients are private practitioners, whose interests could clash with 
those of the national hospitals. As public hospitals accounted for a small proportion of the 
total provision, popular support for retaining public hospitals would be narrowly confined to 
the socialist and communist parties, and trade unionists. Their level of input/influence was 
negligible in the legislative process. Agencification of the national hospitals and universities 
was also not as controversial as selling them off, as in the previous case. Therefore, 
government was expected to proceed without many obstacles.
Although the English case (foundation hospitals) became a hotly debated issue, especially 
within the pro-NHS Labour Party, majoritarian politics swept away the rebels and enabled 
the government to push ahead with the plan. In Sweden, the gradual process of corporatising 
St. Goran’s Hospital in Stockholm was completed when the non-socialist government was 
voted in. The marginal position of the national hospitals within the whole hospital sector in 
Japan meant virtually no turmoil for government. The only effective opposition to reform 
came from the ministry, fearing a loss of power and direct control. The absence of
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ministerial accountability and debate with regard to the role of public provision paved the 
way for such reform, in spite of great public attention.
All three cases had one result in common: a cautious approach to the issue of privatisation. 
None of the three proposed a radical plan for privatising public hospitals. Some 
compromises were made to water down the ‘radical’ ideas in the course of creating 
foundation hospitals in England, and the National Hospital Organisation (Independent 
Administrative Corporation) in Japan. Even St. Goran’s Hospital in Sweden was not wholly 
privatised, as it adopted the county-owned corporation style. Nevertheless, the comparison 
highlights the paradox of the ‘lean’ (Huber and Stephens 2001) welfare state in England and 
Japan, where a radical departure from public provision seems to be more difficult than in the 
‘generous’ welfare state in Sweden, where its quasi-federal structure enabled this 
unprecedented measure of selling a public hospital to a for-profit corporation. Certainly the 
subsequent reaction from the centre left central government was ascribed to the fact that the 
social democratic tradition of pro-public provision is still alive, and a left-right division 
activated responses from central government. Given that central government reacted against 
Stockholm council’s decision (i.e. local democratic institutions with a clear mandate to carry 
out such reforms), it is questionable whether the response of central government could be 
termed ‘responsive’ to the general public. The responsiveness was observed in Sweden, but 
it was triggered by electoral competition between the left and the right, rather than public 
criticism. All three legislatures proved rather unresponsive to the views expressed in the 
printed media.
8.2.3. High-Low (Case C)
When the agendas were more medical than political (i.e. quality evaluation or safety of 
medical services), central government proved more susceptible to media reports, since these 
medical issues would create pressure, as well as opportunities for political actors to intervene 
in the medical institutions. Predictions were made, based on the assumption that the overall
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development of each scheme in the three countries did not deviate from institutional setups 
and profession-led policy-making. In England, the policy choice could be considered within 
the context of performance management, which was introduced with a series of reforms in 
the 1980s. Managers (chief executives of hospital trusts) would be in charge of this, acting as 
central government agents keeping better control of NHS costs and professional autonomy. 
Therefore, policy ideas would be derived from experts and administrators, and the 
responsiveness of central government would be dependent on those actors. On the other hand, 
in Sweden, initiatives to build a nationally comparable quality assurance system could be 
taken at central level by a government agency, although consensus among different 
stakeholders would be necessary, including from the FCC. Thus, expert-driven decision 
making at the centre would have input from locally elected representatives, who would seek 
to meet local people’s demands. In Japan, the policy option for central government would be 
constrained by the strong autonomy of private practitioners and professors at teaching 
hospitals as well as the fragmented structure of hospital service delivery. Therefore, the 
medical association’s initiative and support was imperative. The ministry, with no direct 
accountability to the general public, has no incentives to respond to external pressure, and 
thus the scheme could be driven by experts and administrators at the centre.
In England, as central government has the capacity to intervene and enforce new rules and 
regulations, frequent changes were made to the design of the performance assurance scheme 
in response to reviews and criticism, whereas the Swedish and Japanese cases laid more 
stable foundations in the course of building up a national system, initiated by experts and 
central administrators. Nonetheless, in both countries, after the establishment of the schemes, 
the media reports on malpractice cases in Japan or the lack of transparency in the scheme in 
Sweden opened up debates over the issue. In particular, a stronger awareness of patient 
safety combined with frustration among the general public with official accreditation in 
Japan led to the publication of hospital rankings in mainstream magazines. This development 
was however congenial to its predominantly privately-run health system, which spares
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central government direct responsibility for managing the accreditation system. Compared to 
the low-low and low-high cases, the visibility of the issues in the printed media also 
influenced the way in which central government (re)acted. The main criticism pointed out 
the weaknesses of each system. In England, high sensitivity and susceptibility to sensational 
media coverage resulted in frequent interference from the centre. In Sweden and Japan, the 
voluntary participation of doctors in the scheme and the failure/reluctance to publish results 
were criticised.
The differences between England and the other two countries are embodied in two 
phenomena: (1) the involvement of senior elected politicians in England in developing the 
schemes and the lack of involvement in the other two; and (2) an adversarial stance of 
government officials towards the medical profession in England, in contrast to a cooperative 
(sometimes criticised as collusive) relationship in Sweden and Japan. This last point led to 
frustration among patients’ groups, and came to dominate the media as a criticism in both 
countries. A major difference existed between Sweden and Japan, however. The emergence 
of ‘hospital rankings’ in Japan, but not in Sweden, was a result of the plurality of service 
providers in the former, finding an information outlet that bypasses the formal institutional 
arrangements, especially without posing direct criticisms to central government. Resistance 
to ranking hospitals in Sweden, on the other hand, reflected the strong tradition of public 
provision. Publication of differences in quality across the country should be politically risky 
and unacceptable. The involvement of county council representatives also supported the 
gradual development of the national registry, rather than a radical breakaway from this.
8.2.4. High-High (Case D)
Finally, when pressure to respond was high on both dimensions (i.e. medical malpractice 
incidents), institutional vulnerabilities all came to light, and central governments in Sweden 
and Japan were subject to public criticism, despite the fact that in both cases, jurisdictions 
were at municipality level. As a result, the conventional institutional arrangements were
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reviewed. Central government in all three countries reacted promptly, irrespective of 
institutional variations.
From institutional arrangements, it was predicted that in England such a malpractice event 
must create high pressure on both the politico-administrative and health care systems. There 
would be no doubt that the relevant Hospital Trust (and its manager), the DH, the GMC and 
politicians would all act. The opposition parties in parliament might criticise the 
government’s reaction. Policy responses of central government could be comprehensive and 
strong, driven by both elected/non-elected officials and medical professions.
In Sweden, elected officials and administrators were spared day-to-day operations, as the 
HSAN had already been established. Although politico-administrative accountability was 
established in the Swedish publicly-run system, the extent to which central government 
could react and intervene in the affairs might be restricted by a high level of local autonomy. 
Therefore, the responsiveness of central government could be limited.
In Japan, the predominance of private clinicians and the supremacy of judicial verdicts were 
customary, and therefore individual cases were blamed. Central government (and its 
disciplinary committee, MEC) could play the role of sanctioning them, but never in the past 
tackled the issue or took preventive measures. The lengthy procedure of legal cases and 
long-term negligence of government to set up a risk management plan might be criticised 
and reviewed, as much as the weakness of the institutional arrangements.
The malpractice case in Sweden, which attracted very much media coverage, did not occur at 
a hospital site, but at an elderly care home. Risk management in medical care had been 
firmly placed in the public domain in Sweden, with compulsory reporting and compensation 
schemes undertaken by the arm’s length body. This negligence scandal hit local and central 
government hard, because of the void where such systems should have been (i.e. social 
services). Similarly, in England and Japan, serious medical errors rang alarm bells at central
341
government level, and prompted them to tackle the problem in a more systematic fashion. 
Yet the reactions from the three governments took different forms: swift legislation in 
Sweden, establishment of an agency in England and ministerial appeal and the setup of a 
mandatory reporting system in Japan. In all three countries, stronger commitments were 
forthcoming from central government on the matter.
Disrupted institutions were observed in various ways. In Japan, responsiveness and 
sensitivity was remarkably high, despite the low level of criticism levelled at central 
government. Yet frequent reference to central government (75% of all the articles), negative 
or positive, was unprecedented, as the government had long adopted a laissez-faire approach, 
successfully dodging its accountability issue. The criticism also resulted from the newly 
created accreditation system, in which government was engaged. Although the hospital was 
under the jurisdiction of the municipality, it was accredited by the third-party agency 
JCQHC, established by the MHLW and the JMA. Several other hospitals that were hit by 
malpractice scandals were also accredited. Even without ministerial responsibility and public 
accountability, immediate intervention from the centre was clearly summoned. In England, 
on the contrary, central government was spared severe criticism or even attention, as the 
main focus of the argument was built around dysfunctional self-regulation of the medical 
professions and the effective intervention of central government. The central government’s 
usual vulnerability to criticism was overcome by the incoming Labour government’s 
patients-first approach and effective intervention to announce the establishment of the public 
inquiry as well as an independent agency. In Sweden, the government response was swift 
after the revelation of the incident, and central government’s strong commitment overrode 
blame shifting inside government between two departments (the Solna municipal 
government, backed by the now-defunct Ministry of Interior Affairs and the government 
agency, supervised by the MHSA). In spite of the nature of the events, the way public 
criticism expressed in the media instigated reactions from central government, in particular 
in Japan and Sweden, underlined the effects of exposed institutional vulnerabilities on the
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responsiveness of central government. Interestingly, the responsiveness of central 
government in England, without much saliency, points to the same fact, that the response of 
central government was driven by exposed institutional vulnerability (i.e. the great autonomy 
of the medical professions and the lack of effective intervention by central government). 
Under heightened pressure, institutional vulnerabilities were highly likely to be overcome by 
central government’s intervention. In England, long-term vulnerability to public criticism on 
the political dimension was turned around, not only by the nature of the event, but also by 
the government’s proactive measures to push the cause of patient safety against the secretive 
culture of the medical professions. In Sweden, local autonomy was overcome by central 
government’s determination to intervene and set up a mandatory reporting system in elderly 
care, copying the previously existing system in the medical sphere. Lastly in Japan, the 
introduction of a mandatory reporting system was an unprecedented measure taken by 
government, let alone ministerial appeals. Different ministries (Education, Health and 
Internal Affairs) also began to collaborate.
The next section compares and contrasts different perspectives and shows which perspective 
best explains the responsiveness of government.
8.3. Finding the patterns: what shapes responsive government?
England Sweden Japan
Perspective 1
Election-conscious government
(responsive to voices expressed through ballot box)
A (A) B D (A)
Perspective 2 
Elite-driven government 
(non-responsive to the general public)
B C BC
Perspective 3
Public-spirited government 
(responsive to public criticism)
C(D) CD A D
Table 23: Findings from the four empirical cases
Throughout the thesis, the explanatory power of each of the three perspectives was compared 
(election-conscious, expert-driven and public-spirited government). Was the policy
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responsiveness of central government to different types of pressure better explained by 
electoral competition or public criticism of central government? Or simply, were government 
responses drawn up by experts (i.e. the medical professions and government officials) 
without much democratic scrutiny or input from the general public? From the results above, 
it was proven that the central government in England was not necessarily the most 
responsive to external pressure for all its institutional features such as high political liability 
and ministerial accountability. Although the majoritarian political system such as that in 
England is considered to exhibit severe party competition, due to plurality electoral rule, the 
competition did not always draw responses from central government. Instead, it was 
demonstrated that policy responsiveness depended on the type of pressure and how the 
pressure was channelled through by institutions, in which vulnerabilities were embedded and 
came to light. The central government in England responded clearly to public criticism in the 
case of performance indicators (England-C). Moreover, with regard to the malpractice case 
(England-D), it proactively fended off criticism by promptly setting up a public inquiry and 
deflecting nearly all attention onto the faults of the medical professions. Both cases 
confirmed the main finding of this thesis. Namely, when institutional vulnerabilities were 
exposed by the printed media, central government responded and intervened, rearranging the 
institutional design of the health system. In the malpractice case in Bristol, high political 
liability built up within the NHS helped the new incoming government to pick up the issue 
and proactively act upon it, even though the saliency was low at the time. Also, in the case of 
the local hospital reorganisation (England-A), institutional vulnerabilities were exposed by 
the electoral result. Yet central government responded in the aftermath of the electoral 
disaster, and by then the stable two-party system had already been reinstalled. The event just 
reminded elected officials of their vulnerable positions. Thus, the lesson was quickly learned 
within the specific institutional logic, and most MPs became firm supporters of local 
hospitals in their constituencies. In the establishment of free-standing foundation hospitals 
on the other hand (England-B), the executive pushed through the bill against the wishes of
344
the rank and file in its own party, albeit with some compromises during the legislative 
process. Public criticism was reflected in the opinions of the members of parliament on the 
backbench, but did not have an impact on the decision of government. There was a 
subsequent revelation that the Department had an alternative means of achieving the aim of 
the government’s plan in case of failed legislation. This was an indication of non-responsive 
government within a formal institution.
Overall, on several occasions, the dilemma of the English health system was exposed. That is, 
that the strong public accountability of central government with regard to the entire health 
system could create a hindrance to reform, because of high political risk at the centre. This 
endorses the idea of new politics of the welfare state by some political scientists (Pierson 
2000b). However, case England-A displayed the robustness of formal institutions, and case 
England-B also showcased that central government could find ways to carry out the flagship 
projects. Unpopular policies would therefore be avoided, but different forms of similar 
policies can be adapted and forced through by those actors who know the rules of the game. 
These findings highlighted the interactive aspects of institutional logics vis-a-vis different 
types of pressure.
In contrast to this, the other two health systems have a higher degree of delegation and scope 
for avoiding blame at the centre, through decentralisation or privatisation. The common 
feature is that senior politicians (i.e. ministers) at the centre have been saved from the trouble 
of daily micro-management of hospital policy-making and intervention. A typical example 
of the absence of elected representatives was found in Case C (Sweden-C / Japan-C). 
Performance evaluation schemes were built by formal collaboration between the civil 
servants (the NBHW government agency in Sweden and the MHW department in Japan) and 
the professional associations. This result is in sharp contrast to the English case, where 
ministerial involvement was constantly present.
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But there is also a great difference between Sweden and Japan, in that they have both been 
governed by a single dominant party for most of the post-war years, the Social Democratic 
Party in Sweden, and Liberal Democratic Party in Japan. A sense of public health provision 
remained strong in Sweden, while a laissez-faire practice of private practitioners pervaded in 
postwar Japan (Kato and Rothstein 2006).
The difference could be observed in the way hospital rankings were accepted in one country 
(Japan), but rejected in the other (Sweden). In the 2000s, hospital quality assurance schemes 
in both Sweden and Japan were increasingly vulnerable to media controversy, with serial 
malpractice incidents in Japan and the resistance of the professions to open up access to 
information in Sweden. Yet, while the Swedish government showed resistance to hospital 
rankings, a wide circulation of hospital rankings emerged in Japan, outside the government 
scheme. Officials in the JCQHC were aware of this, claiming that parallel development 
would be beneficial to patients. Nonetheless, they also insisted that ranking hospitals is not 
their role, as their inspection is more expert-oriented. This exemplified a peculiar 
institutional logic, which occasionally diverted the blame from central government to other 
actors in the Japanese health care system.
However, there were cases where the two strikingly different systems provoked similar 
levels of responsiveness from central government. In the malpractice cases (Sweden-D / 
Japan-D), the central governments in Sweden and Japan were both responsive to pubic 
criticism. In both cases, they reacted shortly after the outbreak of the events and acted 
beyond their normal capacities. The Swedish central government intervened in the 
municipality and passed a bill which was to be applied across the country. The Japanese 
central government also intervened in the municipality/university hospital and withdrew its 
accreditation, which was not originally in the rule at the introduction. Both cases represented 
disrupted institutions and the exposure of respective institutional vulnerabilities. Central 
governments were called in to address the weaknesses and retrieve public trust in the system.
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The only difference between the two countries was that in Sweden the issue also became 
party-political, whereas in Japan, the partisan aspect was non-existent, as usual.
Of the three countries, Sweden best fitted the electoral competition model (Perspective 1). 
Party political logics were observed in every case for Sweden, which was a surprise given 
that electoral competition is considered to be tighter in England. Electoral competition was 
also underlined in Sweden (Sweden-A). Although a direct link between the successes of 
local healthcare parties and the response from central government was the most difficult to 
establish, central government’s interest in abolishing county councils meant that it continued 
to press for a fundamental overhaul of three-tier health governance. The second tier (county 
council, responsible for health provision) has been prone to such protest parties’ attacks, 
which have undermined the traditional support for two-bloc politics.
From the perspective of election-conscious government (i.e. party competition shaping the 
responsiveness of central government), the politics of hospitals in Japan was not sufficiently 
attractive. Party competition hardly existed there and if any, it did not effectively contribute 
to policy-making in the hospital sector. Yet some responses were successfully drawn from 
central government, for instance, by calling for the sacking of the local council in 
Kagoshima (Japan-A). Local campaigns and public criticism exposed the deal struck 
between the MHW and the JMA. To worsen the situation, the local council made a U-tum to 
acquiesce to government, which stoked up the anger of local campaigners. They decided to 
gather petitions to hold a referendum, which led to the subsequent dissolution of the council 
and re-election. Though the election did not have any long-lasting effects on party politics, 
the shock to central government and the JMA was such that they increased the volume of 
medical services in the newly-opened (and JMA-owned private) hospital.
In fact, this case was the very first “privatisation” of a national hospital in Japan, as well as a 
curtailment of direct service provision by central government. Having failed in selling off 
one national hospital after another, the central government came up with the idea of
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“agencifying” them in the late 1990s (Japan-B). The agencification plan for national 
hospitals and universities was then justified by the slogan of streamlining the bureaucratic 
state. As in the English case (England-B), central government was neither responsive to 
public criticism (e.g. that it was a new addition to an already existing myriad of government 
agencies) nor to electoral pressure, and carried out the reform. The only actors who resisted 
reform were civil servants in the relevant ministries (i.e. Health and Education).
Another case in Sweden (Sweden-B) was much more contested politically, as the issue had 
already been discussed over some years, and generated schisms between the left and the right 
blocs. The privatisation of St. Goran Hospital in Stockholm was mooted over a period of 
time, and was finally realised by the non-Socialist bloc, which came into power in 1998. In 
response to this, the SAP-led central government intervened and passed a bill called the 
‘Stop Law’, which made further sellout of acute hospitals to a for-profit organisation illegal. 
This vehement reaction itself stirred public criticism, but the central government instead 
advocated the cause of action, by insisting on protection of equal rights to equal care across 
the country. The action of the central government was prompted by long-term political 
battles between the two blocs.
In some cases, policy responses of central government were better explained by combining 
different perspectives (Sweden-C or Japan-A), and in others, the responsiveness was simply 
not observed (England-B and Japan-B). Yet all in all, the responsiveness of central 
government was secured when institutional vulnerabilities in each health system were 
exposed effectively by either electoral competition among parties or more directly by public 
criticism in the media. Therefore, it could be argued that institutional logics shaped different 
types of responsive government, and reforms were made possible in each case as these logics 
were effectively called into question. Different logics in the three health systems created 
distinct institutional vulnerabilities to external pressure, and this point was illuminated by 
examining twelve cases from three perspectives. For Perspective 1, party politics mattered in
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the hospital sector reforms only when two-bloc politics had been well-established in 
electoral battles as a means to provide policy alternatives, rather than in the simple 
majoritarian aspect. In this sense, the severe electoral competition in the English system was 
not a sufficient condition for supporting the election-conscious responsive government, as 
electoral pledges of the two major parties were identical on the point of ‘improving the NHS 
while protecting it’. In contrast, there is a clearer distinction in the manifestos between the 
left bloc (government) and the right bloc (opposition for many years). Therefore, it was not 
proven that the alternating two-party system is better equipped to respond to the general 
public through electoral competition in hospital sector reforms (Jones and Baumgartner 
2005; Richards and Smith 2002).
Also with regard to Perspective 2, it was revealed that expert-driven decision making did not 
always hold true, even in the field where high medical expertise was required (i.e. evaluation 
of hospital performance). On the contrary, highly charged issues such as privatisation or 
agencification were decided among the few elected officials in government, and were not 
affected by public criticism. The capacity of central government to shape its environment, 
rather than respond to it, was demonstrated in those cases (Olsen 1991).
Furthermore, it was largely in the technical issues (Cases C and D) that the responsiveness of 
central government to public criticism was observed. This signified that, irrespective of 
conventional institutional constraints, central government intervened in the medical 
institutions, either demonstrating its capacity to respond to public concerns or redesign the 
institutional arrangements. Although this may not be the ordinary reform process, and 
‘accidental’ (Tuohy 1999) when events meet institutional logics, it certainly should not be 
overlooked as a critical juncture for each health system and its reform paths.
By differentiating the types of pressure and examining the level of public criticism of central 
government, it was demonstrated that the responsiveness of government is largely
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determined by distinct institutional logics, but occasionally shows convergence when 
institutional vulnerabilities come to light.
8.4. Conclusion: institutional logics that shape responsive government
As the findings of the thesis demonstrated, it is the institutional logics that shape the policy 
responsiveness of government. The study of transformation of the welfare state has 
emphasised the constraining aspects of the political institutions, with vested interests and 
veto points embedded in the structure. Although this thesis also recognises the nature of 
retrenchment politics, its findings display more dynamic aspects surrounding the actions and 
reactions of central government. Welfare states are in constant transition, and the changes are 
often incremental and path-dependent, as radical changes are avoided. Nonetheless, these 
paths, supported by country-specific institutional logics, are not a one-way stream, because 
these logics can be called into question under heightened pressure. By examining hospital 
sector reforms, which are normally carried out in subsystem politics, this thesis has 
discovered that issue saliency itself does not guarantee any reform initiatives by central 
government. It is institutional logics, and exposed vulnerabilities in particular that cause 
central government to act.
As the institutionalist school often emphasises, the thesis has also highlighted the robustness 
of formal political institutions, in particular the effective filtering of external pressure by 
them when the political dimension is charged. Thanks to this ‘majoritarian’ attribute of 
legislature, government flagship projects were pushed through, irrespective of public 
criticism, once they have been placed into the formal legislative process (England-/Japan-B). 
Elected officials may be fearful of party competition or voters’ revolt, but they can force 
through the issue solely by securing the majority in the legislature. In those cases, no 
interaction between the legislative body and the general public was observed. The thesis 
questioned the validity of the proposition that unpopular changes to the welfare state are 
avoided, as they were in fact possible, circumstances permitting. Political actors, knowing
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the rules and structural obstacles within the institutions, sometimes prefer not to back down, 
but to scrape through against a backdrop of severe criticism, under the banner of strong 
leadership or a reform-minded political force. This echoes the argument advocated by some 
scholars (Olsen 1991; Czada et al. 1998), highlighting the capacity of government to shape 
the environment and bring about policy changes.
The rigidity and robustness of the formal institutions was further revealed in some of the 
case studies here. If successful, the formation of a political party based on local hospital 
reorganisations could make an impact on the policy ideas of government. However, this 
tends to be short-lived, as it falls into the politics of formal institutions, once the parties enter 
the formal arena (parliament/county councils). The politics of formal institutions here means 
that their original intentions were re-shaped after the first shock, as the established parties 
readjusted their own positions. This was exemplified by one case (Japan-A), where the least 
formalised, petition-style campaign produced the greatest impact on the hospital matter in 
question, squashing the sellout plan of central government afterwards. Nevertheless, it is 
worth noting that local voices expressed through the formal ballot box attracted negative 
responses overall from central government rather than proactive ideas for further reform 
(England-/Sweden-/Japan-A). On this point, the new politics of the welfare state has been 
proven right, as hesitation to introduce further reform subsequently grew on the part of 
politicians after such electoral shocks. Inertia or non-decision might be the response from 
central government.
As for the impact of electoral competition on the responsiveness of central government, 
contrasting results were found in Sweden. In the case of local hospital reorganisations 
(Sweden-A), electoral competition seems only to affect politicians at the level of the county 
council, which functions as a shield for central government. The pressure was not directly 
inflicted upon the centre. On the other hand, in the case of privatisation of a local acute 
hospital (Sweden-B), central government intervened and made a law prohibiting further
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actions of a similar kind. The two contradicting results suggest that changes to the welfare 
state could be facilitated through the democratic process of electoral competition at any level 
of government, but at the same time, competition at local level could only ‘signal’ voters’ 
dissatisfaction to the centre, without having much direct impact.
Observation of these examples demonstrates that in order to understand the way the welfare 
states change, one has to examine the interaction between government and different types of 
pressure with particular attention to institutional vulnerabilities. Thus, the more technical 
aspects of the policy domain were examined, considering the elite-driven perspective 
(Perspective 2) as a test against a proposition that central government was responsive to 
public concerns or electoral competition. There is plenty of evidence to show that the 
epistemic community shapes ideas in such a profession-oriented policy area as health. 
Concerning the English health system, a body of literature suggests that decision-making in 
health policy has been regarded as dominated by doctors (Alford 1975; Mohan 1995). 
Another strand of literature has shown the opposite, but emphasises that the professions 
(economists and accountants) still rule the policy sphere after the introduction of market 
reforms in the 1980s (Day and Klein 1987; Fimister and Hill 1993; Harrop 1992). Now with 
the strengthening of the prime minister’s power and the Cabinet Office and advisory 
committees setting the direction of policy change (Jasanoff 1990; Parsons 2001; Barber 
2007), the influence of “experts” remains considerably strong. Throughout interviews in the 
three countries, it was repeatedly heard from interviewees that the involvement of hospital 
directors and qualified doctors is a necessary condition, if doctors were to comply with the 
new rules (E-l, E-2, J-5, J-15, S-13, S-17). From these observations, whether or not central 
government responds to the general public seems to have a minimal effect on policy change.
On the other hand, this thesis produces results which recognise the general tendency that 
central government responds to public concerns expressed in the media and intervenes more 
frequently and more forcefully under the banner of patient rights. Even in technical issues
such as accreditation systems, political interventions were more common when institutional 
vulnerabilities were exposed. Moreover, the government’s capacity to respond to those 
concerns is constantly scrutinised by the general public. Examination of the hospital 
performance case (England-/Sweden-C) illustrated this point very clearly.
The 4x3 (twelve) case study shed light on the characteristic of responsive government from 
different angles from the previous study of the same subject (Blomqvist and Rothstein 2000; 
Hobolt and Klemmensen 2005; Jennings 2005; Lodge and Hood 2002). Analysing four 
distinct problem constellations in three countries, it was shown that central governments in 
all three countries were more subject to public criticism over the handling of medical (and 
therefore seemingly profession-driven) policy (cases C and D). This appears paradoxical, 
given the previous propositions by proponents of the epistemic community or the policy 
community, yet confirms the claim in this thesis. Institutional vulnerabilities are likely to be 
more exposed to the technical issues, in which government tends to lack expertise and 
interest under normal circumstances. On the other hand, institutional arrangements proved 
robust in privatisation cases as well as local hospital cases. For the latter, policy makers and 
politicians were hit by short disruptions (electoral shocks), but soon rebuilt confidence. 
Formal institutions structured the interests of each actor, which makes predictions easier. On 
the other hand, hospital regulations and prevention of malpractice incidents are the area 
which is less stable and open to discussions and ideas.
In triggering a government response, the issue evolution (Carmines and Stimson 1986), with 
serial shift in public attention (Baumgartner and Jones 1993), had a great influence. To 
illustrate this point, the most interesting case among the four was about performance 
evaluation of hospitals (case C), with more fluctuation, sometimes open to influence from 
the media, but sometimes closed up within the professional model of decision making. The 
role of the media cannot be emphasised enough in exposing the institutional vulnerabilities 
of each health system to central government. Although this thesis extensively used the
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printed media coverage (liberal broadsheet newspapers) as an effective instrument to observe 
twelve cases, the power of different media should not be overlooked (e.g. public opinion 
polls, investigatory TV programmes in Sweden, tabloids in the UK and magazines published 
by the main newspapers in Japan). The extent to which these media are embedded in each 
political institution is a matter for another investigation, however.
Central government intervened or proactively took action to reform the hospital sector, when 
the institutional vulnerabilities were exposed by media or electoral campaigns. The latter 
factor is more country-specific, part of the formal political institution, but the former factor 
is based more on a universal mechanism, free from institutional constraints, which therefore 
could directly affect the policy responsiveness of central government.
The findings of the thesis proved that the responsiveness of central government is mostly 
shaped by the institutions in which they operate. Under heightened pressure, central 
government can overcome institutional constraints and actively engage itself in redesigning 
the institutions. This could explain why the regulatory activities of central government in 
welfare states have increased rather than decreased, especially in the domain of patient safety 
and risk, while government may seem to gradually retreat from direct welfare service 
provision. The process of welfare retrenchment involves not only the new politics of the 
welfare state, but the emergence of this responsive government to public concerns. Welfare 
reforms may be path-dependent, as formal institutions are robust and hard to change. 
However institutional logics are increasingly more subject to external pressure, in particular 
in the formerly profession-dominated field such as the hospital sector. This public-spirited 
government perspective could be applied more widely in future research on the 
transformation of welfare states.
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Appendix 1: List of interviewees
Coded
name
Interview date Function
England E-l 5 December 2005 Retired general practitioner/Health policy 
researcher
E-2 25 July 2007 Member of parliament/Former secretary of state 
for health
E-3 14 December 2005 Health policy researcher (academic)
E-4 19 July 2004 Chief executive, NHS Primary Care Trust
E-5
(telephone)
21 July 2004 Member of parliament
E-6 20 July 2004 
16/22 May 2007
Health policy researcher (academic)
E-7 7 June 2004 Health policy researcher (BMA)
E-8 13 June/21 July 
2004 -  8/April 
2005
Health policy researcher (academic)
E-9 12 July 2004 Chief executive, NHS foundation hospital trust
E-10 12 July 2004 Health policy researcher (NHS management, 
Foundation Hospital Trust)
E-ll
(telephone)
13 July 2004 Chief executive, NHS Primary Care Trust
E-12 28 October 2005 Health policy researcher (academic/government 
advisor)
E-l 3 9 November 2005 Health policy researcher (academic)
E-14 11 July 2007 Health policy researcher/medical 
doctor/government (Cabinet Office)
E-l 5 10 August 2007 Civil servant (Cabinet Office, Delivery Unit)
Japan J-l 7 March 2005 Civil servant (Health Policy Bureau, MHWL)
J-2 12 August 2005 Former deputy chief cabinet secretary/Former
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permanent secretary of health and welfare
J-3 4 March 2005 Director/Surgeon at (accredited) private 
hospital
J-4 29 August 2005 National Health Insurance Bureau (prefectural 
level)
J-5 8/12 March 2007 Health policy research (academic)/Japan 
Council of Quality Health Care
J-6 13 March 2007 Health policy research (academic)/Former 
President of the Science Council of Japan
J-7 27 January 2005 City councillor (municipality level)
J-8 22 February 2005 Health policy researcher 
(academic/government)
J-9 5 March 2005 Journalist (health policy at prefectural level)
J-10 7 March 2005 Civil servant (Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications (MIC); Cabinet Secretariat, 
Strategic Office for Special Zones)
J-l 1 10 March 2005 Paediatrician (Director, private clinic)
J-12 10 May 2005 Director/Surgeon at public hospital (prefectural 
level)
J-l 3 10 May 2005 Chief business officer at public hospital 
(prefectural level)
J-14 20 August 2005 Chief executive, (accredited) private hospital
J-15 19 August 2005 Health and Medicine Bureau (prefectural level)
J-16 29 August 2005 National Health Insurance Alliance (prefectural 
branch)
J-17 30 August 2005 Head of secretariat, public hospital (prefectural 
level)
J-l 8 10 October 2005 Governor of a prefecture
J-l 9 10 October 2005 Health and Medicine Bureau (prefectural level)
J-20 24 October 2005 Civil servant (Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications (MIC); Manager, Local 
Enterprise Management Office)
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J-21 8 February 2005 Health policy researcher (academic)
Sweden S-l 12 June 2006 Former secretary of health and social affairs 
and member of Riksdag
S-2 9 August 2006 Member of parliament (former councillor, 
county council)
S-3 30 March 2005 Health policy researcher (academic)
S-4 23 May 2006 Civil servant (Director of Association of Local 
Authorities and Regions)
S-5 19 June 2006 Surgeon/Health policy advisor (county council 
level)
S-6 18 May 2006 Councillor (former commissioner of county 
council)
S-7 12 June 2006 Councillor (commissioner of county council)
S-8 26 June 2006 Former minister of health and social affairs
S-9
(telephone)
9 June 2006 Former minister of health and social affairs
S-10 6 August 2006 Civil servant (former undersecretary of state for 
health, 1991-94)
S-ll 13 June 2006 Chief business officer, private clinics chains 
(now councillor)
S-12 5 June 2006 Councillor (commissioner of county council)
S-13 28 April 2006 Civil servant (Department of Health and Social 
Affairs)
S-14 8 May 2006 Health policy researcher (academic)
S-15 30 April 2006 Deputy regional secretary of a political party
S-16 14 June 2006 Health policy researcher (academic)
S-17 20 June 2006 Chief executive, University Hospital
S-18 9 August 2006 Former member of Riksdag (Governor of a 
county council)
S-19 1 April 2005 Councillor (county council)
S-20 18 May 2006 Surgeon (St.Goran’s)
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Appendix 2: Survey on Health Policy in Your Prefecture
* Compulsory question
<1> Your Profile
[Q1 ] Age: which age group do you belong to?*
□ Under 20 □ 2 0 -2 9  □ 3 0 -3 9
□ 4 0 -5 9  □ 60—69 □ 7 0 -7 9
[Q2] Sex*
□ male □ female 
[Q3l Education: in which field of study did you obtain your highest qualification?*
□ Social Sciences □ Humanities
□ Natural Science and Engineering □ Medical Science
[Q4] Occupation: current employment* (you may select more than one)
Public □ MP (House of Representatives) □ MP (House of Councillors)
Office □ Governor (Prefecture) □ Mayor (Municipalities)
□ Local Councillor (Prefectural Assembly)
□ Local Councillor (Municipal Assembly)
Civil □ Central Ministries □ Local Authorities
Service □ Others
Doctors □ Private Hospital □ Clinics
□ Local Authority Hospital
□ Other Type of Hospital □ Hospital Management 
If none of the above, please select your current job sector from the list below.
□ 4 0 -4 9
□ 80 +
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□ Mining □ Construction □ Electricity/Gas/Water
□ Transport and Telecommunications □ Manufacturing
□ Education/Research □ Pharmaceuticals and □ Finance/Insurance/Real_Estate
Medical Goods
□ Broadcasting/Advertising/Consulting □ Other ( )
[Q5] Occupation: previous employment (only if it applies to you; you may select more than
Public □ MP (House of Representatives) □ MP (House of Councillors)
Office □ Governor (Prefecture) □ Mayor (Municipalities)
□ Local Councillor (Prefectural Assembly)
□ Local Councillor (Municipal Assembly)
Civil □ Central Ministries □ Local Authorities
Service □ Others
Doctors □ Private Hospital □ Clinics
□ Local Authority Hospital
□ Other Type of Hospital □ Hospital Management
If none of the above, please select your current job sector from the list below.
□ Mining □ Construction □ Electricity/Gas/Water
□ Transport and Telecommunications □ Manufacturing
□ Education/Research □ Pharmaceuticals and □ Finance/Insurance/Real Estate
medical goods
□ Broadcasting/Advertising/Consulting □ Other ( )
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<2> On Health Policy
[Q6] Select policy issues that you think are important in regard to your prefecture. Two points
for most important, one for important issues* (you may select more than one)
Education ( )
Employment ( )
Public safety ( )
Natural disaster prevention ( )
Health/Welfare ( ) 
Environmental protection ( )
International exchange ( )
Decentralisation ( )
Rural affairs/depopulation ( )
Industrial development ( )
Fiscal reconstruction ( )
Urban development ( )
Infrastructure improvement ( )
Widening economic disparity ( )
Ageing and declining birthrate ( )
Cultural enterprise ( )
Equal participation by men and women ( )
[Q7] Rate health delivery in your prefecture using a 0-10 scale.*
( )/10
[Q8] In your opinion, what is the most serious health issue at stake in your region?*
[Q9] Choose issues that you think require urgent reform with regard to your region’s health
policy.*
□ Overhaul of National Health Insurance
360
□ Building networks between hospitals
□ Provision of highly advanced medical care
□ Medical service in depopulated areas (insufficient resources)
□ Measures to tackle lengthy stay in hospital
□ Fiscal reconstruction of municipal hospitals
□ Easier, more transparent access to information
□ Improvements in paediatrics, obstetrics and gynaecology
□ More comprehensive elderly care
□ Decreased mortality rate for specific diseases
□ Others ( )
[Q10] To what degree are you involved in health policy in your current position?*
□ Large □ Relatively large □ To some degree
□ To a lesser degree □ Not at all
[Q ll]  Select three actors who you think play a very important role in health policy in your
prefecture.*
□ Medical Association
□ Medical Care Corporations
□ Governors/Mayors
□ Civil societies (NGO/NPOs)
□ MPs
□ Private Corporations
□ National Health Association Organisation
□ Others (
□ Doctors □ Hospital Managers
□ Medical Schools/Teaching Hospitals
□ Local Authorities (Health-related division)
□ Min. of Internal Affairs and Communications
□ Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
□ Ministry of Finance
[Q12] To what extent do you have influence over health policy in your prefecture?*
□ Very great
□ None
□ Relatively great
□ Do not know
□ Little
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[Q13] If you answered either ‘very great’ or ‘relatively great’, at which stage do you feel
your influence is exerted most?
□ Policy Planning (e.g. deliberative council, advisory committee)
□ Policy Implementation (e.g. through efforts to bring about more efficient provision 
and better coordination among hospitals)
□ Others ( )
[Q14] Do you think there are problems to be solved in health your region, especially in terms 
of health delivery?*
□ Yes □ Status quo is ok □ No
[Q15] (If you answered ‘yes’ to Q14, what is the greatest problem?
□ Excessive provision
□ Choice has to be made with no access to proper information
□ Insufficient provision for necessary specialisms
□ Concentration of patients in specialized hospitals
□ Others ( )
[Q16] (For those who answered Q15 only) What would be the best solution to tackle such
problems?
□ Competition among hospitals/clinics
□ Co-existence of hospitals/clinics through division of labour
□ Construction of new hospitals for specific specialisms in need
□ Renovation of public (national/municipal) hospitals
□ Reconfiguration of services according to Regional Health Planning
□ Others ( )
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[Q17] Concerning municipal hospitals in your prefecture, do you think there is room for
improvement with regard to their relationship to private hospitals?*
□ Yes □ Status quo is ok □ No
[Q18] If you answered ‘yes’ to Q17, what is the problem you see at the moment?
□ Vague division of labour □ Unfair competition
□ Difficulty in quality distinction
□ Others ( )
[Q19] Do problems arise when health districts and administrative units coincide (or do not
coincide)?*
□ Yes □ No
[Q20] If you answered ‘yes’ to Q19, why?
□ Stumbling blocks to reform □ Unclear accountability
□ Difficulty in measuring ‘local needs’
□ Others ( )
[Q211 Concerning municipal hospitals, with which of the following statement would you
agree?*
□ Their mission has already been accomplished.
□ Different future roles from that of private hospitals.
□ Important even as local employers
□ Other ( )
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[Q22] How do you perceive the regional gap in health across the country?*
□ It is a problem □ Cannot see any significant gap □ No problem
[Q23] If you replied ‘It is a problem’ to Q22, do you think the gap needs to be rectified at
prefecture level?
□ Yes □ Doctors and those in charge should take care of it
□ No □ Central government should take care of it
□ Some regional gap is inevitable
[Q24] Concerning recent developments in health provision, and hospital mergers, closures and 
reconfiguration in particular, do you think local people’s voices are heard and reflected in these 
projects?*
□ Yes □ No
[Q25] If you answered ‘no’ to Q24, why do you think is the case?
i
l
i
i
[Q26] If their voices are to be heard more effectively, what would be the best and most 
appropriate channel?*
□ Direct appeal to doctors or hospitals
□ Use of mass media
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□ Complaints to and lobbying administration (both central and local)
□ Politicisation for electoral campaign
□ Other means ( )
[Q27] How would you describe your role in regional health policy? Choose the closest
category from the list below.
□ Politician □ Administrator □ Manager □ Entrepreneur
□ Consultant □ Service recipient □ Other ( )
[Q28] Select a political party whose stance is closest to your own views in relation to health 
or welfare policies *
□ Liberal Democratic Party
□ Clean (New Komei) Party
□ Japan Communist Party
□ Others (
[Q29] Feel free to add any comments here.
This is the end of the questionnaire. Thank you for your participation
□ Democratic Party of Japan
□ Social Democratic Party
□ Local Parties ( )
)
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Survey Results
<1> Your Profile
[Q l] Age
Age Group Persons
30-39 1
40-49 12
50-59 18
60-69 9
70-79 4
Among all the respondents (a total of 45), 
nearly 70% (30 persons, 68.2%) was 
concentrated in two age groups (40-49 and 
50-59). This may be due to the fact that the 
questionnaire was mainly dispatched to 
each prefecture, and addressed to 
governors.
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70-79  30-39  
9% 2%
50-59
42%
[Q2] Sex
Male 42
Female 3
As shown, respondents were predominantly male.
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[Q3] Educational background (at the time of obtaining highest qualification)
Highest qualification Number of persons
Social Sciences 22
Humanities 9
Natural Sciences and Engineering 3
Medicine and Pharmacology 10
Total 44
Those with degrees in Social Sciences account for half, with an especially high ratio
among politicians and administrators, while all medical officers obtained degrees in
Medicine or Pharmacology.
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Medicine, 23%
Social Sciences, 
50%Natural Sciences 
and Engineering, 7%
Humanities, 20%
[Q4] Occupation: current employment
Governors
Local Authorities
Local Councillors (Pref.)
Clinics
MPs (H.Reps)
Local Councillors (Mun.)
Phamaceuticals
Hospital Management
Private Hospital
0 5 10 15 20
no. o f persons
369
Out of a total of 47 prefectures in Japan, 16 governors replied to this questionnaire 
personally. Ten questionnaires were completed by the governor’s staff in the welfare 
section of each local authority. As a result, data was obtained from 26 different 
prefectures altogether (55.3%). In this result, 48 answers have been counted, because 
of those concurrently serving as clinician and MP, or hospital manager and governor.
[Q5] Occupation: previous employment
Central Ministries 
Local Authorities 
MPs (H.Reps.)
Construction 
Services 
MPs (H.CIr.)
Local Councillors (Pref.)
Mayors 
Private Hospital 
Transport/Comm.
Education/Research 
Hospital Management 
Municipal Hospitals 
Clinics
Local Councillors (Mun.)
Doctors (Other Types)
Others (Civil Service)
0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8
no. of persons
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Whereas nine job types were cited in response to the previous question, here the 
number jumps to almost double (17), pointing to the fact that governors had diverse 
career tracks before holding current public office. The majority served as civil 
servants in the central ministry.
<2> Health Policy
[Q6] Select policy issues that you think are important in regard to your prefecture. Two 
points (□) for most important one point (o) for important issues.
H ealth and w elfare 
Education 
Greying soc ie ty  
Fiscal reco n s tru c tio n  
Industrial developm ent 
Natural d isas te r  
Employment 
Environmental p ro tection  
D ecen tralisa tion  
In fras tructu re  
Public safe ty  
Depopulation 
Widening econom ic gap 
Cultural en te rp rise  
Equal participation 
Urban developm ent 
In ternational exchange
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The votes have been calculated and shown in the diagram (D=2 points, o=l point). Given that
respondents are selected from among those who are deeply involved in health policy, it is
natural that top priority has been given to ‘health/welfare’. Therefore, it is worth noting the
categories that followed, such as ‘education’ and ‘ageing and declining birthrate’. Conversely,
‘depopulation and rural affairs’ and ‘widening economic disparity’ did not score high. Although
‘health and welfare’ are deeply affected by these elements, the results demonstrate that each
issue, when posed separately, is dealt with as an independent concept, falling into different
jurisdictions.
Once the number of votes is recalculated, disregarding the difference between ‘most important’
and ‘important’ matters, ‘education’ and ‘environmental protection’ stand out. Both categories
were given high priority in prefectures with urban areas, in spite of the age or current job type
of the respondents.
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‘Natural disaster prevention’ were chosen mainly among those who reside in Tohoku (North
East), Tokai (Pacific Mid-Japan), Shikoku and Kyushu (South West). ‘Fiscal reconstruction’
was selected by most governors and some local councillors. Not surprisingly, ‘decentralisation’
gained most votes (9 out of 12) from governors or MPs, but interestingly not from local
councillors or administrators. The issue of ‘economic disparity’, was given high priority by
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respondents from the periphery (Tohoku, Shikoku and Kyushu regions), affected also by their 
ideological stances (i.e. partisanship). Lastly, ‘cultural enterprise’ and ‘equal participation by 
men and women’ were both popular among governors (11 out of 16 chose these issues).
[Q7] Rate health delivery in your prefecture using a 0-10 scale.
Scores Votes
1 0
2 0
3 2
4 2
5 4
6 6
7 11
8 11
9 0
10 0
Average 6.5
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As a whole, respondents were satisfied with their local health delivery. However, those
who gave less than 5 points come either from areas with an excessive number of beds or
from depopulated areas. MPs tend to give lower ratings.
[Q8] In your opinion, what is the most serious health issue at stake in your region?
This question was optional, nonetheless 44 out of 45 wrote comments. No less than 29
votes were concerned with ‘how to secure doctors’. In particular, maintaining doctors in
isolated islands, remote or mountainous areas, doctors in paediatrics, obstetrics and
gynaecology; nurses; doctors working for municipal hospitals; doctors in primary care;
recruitment of young doctors; concentration of doctors in metropolitan areas.
Others touch upon (1) cost containment with the increasing number of the elderly and
‘social’ hospitalisation (i.e. lengthy in-patient care), blurring the distinction between
health and care; (2) strengthening of specific specialisms such as cancer care, acute care,
ob/gyn., mental health; (3) enforcement of prefectures’ role in risk management
(emergency care) in times of natural disaster, municipal hospitals reform, division of
labour between public and private hospitals; (4) raising public awareness by educating
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residents as to access to family doctors and when to call an ambulance, disclosure of 
patient information, preventive care.
[Q9] Choose issues that you think require urgent reform with regard to your region’s 
health policy.
Medical service in depopulated areas
Improvements in paediatrics, obstetrics and 
gynaecology
Building networks between hospitals 
Fiscal reconstruction of municipal hospitals 
Measures to tackle lengthy stay in hospital 
More comprehensive elderly care 
Other
Provision of highly advanced medical care
Overhaul of National Health Insurance
Decreased mortality rate for specific diseases
Easier, more transparent access to information
0 5 10 15 20 25
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‘Others’ include prevention of adults’ diseases, municipal hospital reforms, stabilisation of
national health insurance, re-definition of public hospitals. Some answers point to the fact that
these issues are deeply interrelated. As in Q8, answers are centred around ‘securing doctors’ and
‘strengthening specialisms.
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[Q10] To what degree are you involved in health policy in your current position?
Degree Votes 
(Total=44)
Large 22
Relatively large 15
To some degree 3
To a lesser degree 3
Not at all 0
Relatively
large
34%
84 % (37/44) of all respondents answered 
positively.
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[Q ll]  Select three actors who you think play a very important role in health policy in 
your prefecture.
J a p a n  M edical Association 
M edical schools 
M in. o f H ea lth , L ab o u r a n d  W elfare  
Local a u th o r itie s  
G overnors/M ayors 
D octors 
H osp ita l m a n a g e rs  
M in. o f F in an ce  
O th e r
N a tio n a l H ea lth  In su ra n c e  orgs.
M Ps
M in. o f In te rn a l  A ffairs a n d  C om m unications
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
l^llllllllllillllllllll
Given that three votes were allocated to each person, 126 votes (42 respondents) were
counted. ‘Others’ (2 votes) include ‘public health centre’ and ‘do not know who is
influential’. Predominant answers were ‘medical association’ (32 votes), ‘medical
schools’ (24 votes), ‘Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare’ (20 votes).
Only 4 votes were cast in favour of ‘governors/mayors’ among governors themselves,
but most voted for ‘medical schools’ (10 out of 16) and also for ‘medical association’
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(12 out of 16). If we look at the data collected from 26 prefectures, practically half of
them (13 out of 28) chose the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. Practitioners
and hospital managers named also the Ministry (5 votes), but some listed Ministry of
Finance as well. Remarkably, there was merely one vote cast in favour of MPs.
[Q12] To what extent do you have influence over health policy in your prefecture?
Votes (Total = 45)
Very great 6
Fairly great 22
Little 10
None 2
Do not know 5
Compared with Q10, in which nearly 85% said they are involved to a relatively large
or large extent in medical policy, for this question only 63.6% (28/44) gave an equally
affirmative response.
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[Q13]If you answered either ‘very great’ or ‘fairly great’, at which stage do you feel your
influence is exerted most?
Votes (TotaI= 28)
Planning 11
Implementation 11
Both 4
Others 2
‘Others’ include the following answers: ‘as a representative of grassroots campaigners’
and ‘lobbying at the centre’. Answers are split clearly into two camps. 3 out of 4
respondents who answered ‘both’ were governors. Excluding those 3 governors, only 4
think that their roles are at the planning stage, rather than implementation. Staff in local
authorities, on the other hand, tends to see their role in planning. Eight governors and
doctors replied that they are involved at the implementation stage.
This reflects governors’ conception that they have a supervisory and managerial role as
figureheads of each prefecture.
[Q14] Do you think there are problems to be solved in health in your region, especially in
terms of health delivery?
Votes (Total= 45)
Yes 42 (93%)
Status quo is ok 3 (7%)
No O(-)
Except for 3 votes (from metropolitan areas), all respondents perceive problems.
[Q15] If you answered ‘yes’ to Q14, what is the greatest problem?
The largest greatest number of votes was cast in favour of ‘others’, beating the
second, namely insufficient health resources (including doctors) in specific areas.
‘Others’ include more than one item, thereby bringing the total number of votes to 49
(42 respondents).
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However, ‘others’ refers mainly to ‘insufficient doctors’ (10 votes). In addition,
‘uneven distribution of doctors’ (6 votes) could be read as ‘insufficient doctors’ in
remote areas, which underlines the main concern of the respondents. Few think there
is excessive provision or there is difficulty in making choices amid restricted access
to information.
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[Q16] (For those who answered Q15 only) What would be the best solution to tackle such 
problems?
20 out of 42 did not tick the listed items and wrote down their own answers in ‘others’.
Co-existence of hospitals/clinics through 
division of labour
Other
Reconfiguration of services according to 
Regional Health Planning
Competition among hospitals/clinics
Construction of new hospitals for specific 
specialisms in need
Renovation of public hospitals
0 5 10 15 20 25
Again, ‘others’ centred around the issue of ‘how to secure doctors’: ‘Securing doctors’
(3 votes), ‘building a new system for securing doctors’(l vote) and ‘fundamental 
measures need to be taken by both central government and doctors’(l vote). ‘Training 
doctors who are willing to devote themselves to care in rural and remote areas’(2 votes), 
‘reward system for those who serve in remote areas’ (1 vote), ‘establishing a
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compulsory system to ensure all doctors serve in remote areas’(1 vote), and ‘financial
aid from central government to local government’ (1 vote). Stemming from concerns
about similar issues, this result exhibits a difference in tone or proposed measures to
tackle problems.
Regional disparity aside, there are some issues relating to the uneven distribution of
doctors within different specialisms. ‘Changing reward structure for attracting young
doctors into paediatrics or gynaecology’(2 votes) and ‘concentration of hospital
functions and enhancing collaboration schemes across different specialisms (1 vote). In
terms of the increase in the number of staff, ‘expansion of medical school programmes
and intake of students’ was proposed.
Interestingly, on the subject of public/municipal hospitals, there are sharply opposing
views, ‘re-definition of municipal hospitals’ and ‘abolition of state subsidies to public
hospitals’. Also there are comments calling for patient empowerment and patients’ rights
(2 votes).
[Q17] Concerning municipal hospitals in your prefecture, do you think there is room for 
improvement with regard to their relationship with private hospitals?
Votes (Total= 45)
Yes 38 (84.5 %)
Status quo is ok 6(13.3%)
No 0 (0.0%)
n.a. 1 (2.2%)
Respondents were predominantly in favour of the statement that there is room for
improvement. Those advocating the ‘status quo’ come not only from areas with
sufficient private provision (i.e. large cities), but also from a few prefectures in the
Tohoku region, where municipal hospitals play an important role.
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[Q18] If you answered ‘yes’ to Q17, what is the problem you see at the moment?
Vague division of 
labour
U nfair competition
Difficulty in 
quality distinction
O ther
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Unfair competition (6 votes) was cited mainly by respondents in prefectures where there are
many municipal hospitals, and also by private hospital owners or doctors. Some respondents
raised the difficulty in differentiating their roles. ‘Others’ include claims that ‘private
practitioners in this prefecture are getting older and no-one can take their place, other than
municipal hospitals’ and that ‘inevitable collaboration between public and private hospitals
in the future will necessitate facilities that function well, regardless of type’.
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[Q19] Do problems arise when health districts and administrative units coincide (or do 
not coincide)?
Votes (Total = 45)
Yes 16(35.6%)
No 29 (64.4%)
Health districts do not necessarily coincide with administrative units. In particular, since
the Japanese health system is based predominantly on private provision, unlike Britain or
Sweden, more flexible boundaries can be drawn. However, with ‘free access to any
medical institutions’ with individual insurance schemes, more than 60% of respondents
found that the status quo is acceptable. This issue seems to play a certain part in the
accountability of politicians.
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[Q20] If you answered ‘yes’ to Q19, why?
Votes (Total= 16)
Stumbling blocks to reform 3(18.7%)
Unclear accountability 2(12.5%)
Difficulty in measuring ‘local needs’ 7 (43.8%)
Others 4 (25.0%)
As a single item, “difficulty in measuring ‘local needs’” gained the most votes (7 out of
16). Nevertheless, 25% of all the votes went to ‘others’ once again.
Other comments are as follows. ‘Financial calculations rather than medical concerns take
priority’, ‘if health districts do not coincide with administrative units, that poses no
problem for medical collaboration although controls on the number of beds are strictly
tied to the administrative unit (i.e. prefecture by prefecture), thus health districts cannot
be defined beyond that boundary’, ‘health units are drawn in the same manner as
administrative units, but prefectures are in a weaker position vis-a-vis municipalities and
central government in terms of information-gathering and dissemination to its citizens.
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Therefore, a void is created in which MPs can intervene’, and ‘public heath is under local
authorities’ jurisdiction, where health policy proper is not, which complicates the issue
and makes collaboration between the two policy domains difficult.’
Furthermore, in relation to the recent amalgamation of municipalities, concern is raised
over the different needs of municipalities now joined together, which may potentially
give rise to problems. Very detailed comments came mainly from the Tohoku, Shikoku
and Kyushu regions.
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[Q21] How do you view municipal hospitals?
Votes (TotaI= 45)
Their mission is already accomplished 3 (6.7%)
Still important even as local employers 2 (4.4%)
Different future roles from private hospitals 34 (75.6%)
Others 6(13.3%)
Three quarters of the respondents answered positively with regard to the role of
public hospitals, while two from areas overwhelmingly dominated by private
hospitals pointed out that there are ‘no more needs except for some remote areas’
and ‘different degrees of need depending on the ratio of private provision’.
Advocates all emphasise the fact that public hospitals are required in rural areas
where there are no prospects for profit, especially in some specialisms. Overall, 80%
agreed that the importance of municipal hospitals should not be denied altogether.
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[Q22] How do you perceive the regional gap in health across the country?
Votes (Total= 45)
It is a problem 37 (82.3 %)
Cannot see any significant gap 5(11.1%)
No problem 1 (2.2%)
n.a. 2 (4.4%)
Six Votes (‘cannot see any significant gap’ and ‘no problem’) all came from
prefectures surrounding the Tokyo metropolitan area. Also, one vote was cast from
each of the Tohoku and Kyushu regions.
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[Q23] If you replied ‘it is a problem’ to Q22, do you think the gap needs to be rectified 
at prefecture level?
Votes (TotaI= 37)
Yes 33 (89.2%)
Central government should take care of it 2 (5.4%)
Some regional gap is inevitable 2 (5.4%)
Doctors should take care of it O(-)
No O(-)
Two votes in favour of ‘Health gap is unavoidable’ derived from areas with private
provision and ‘central government should take measures’ came from governors in
Tohoku and Kyushu. One respondent who did not answer Q22 yet responded to this
question, ticked ‘central government should take measures’. Furthermore, one
governor in Tohoku region conceded that prefectures should not be overburdened by
the state and share the responsibility with them, when it comes to nationwide issues
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such as rectification of uneven distribution of doctors and pay.
[Q24] Concerning recent developments in health provision, and hospital mergers,
closures and reconfiguration in particular, do you think local people’s voices are heard
and reflected in these projects?
Votes (Total= 45)
Yes 18 (40.0%)
No 24 (53.3%)
n.a. 3 (6.7%)
In response to this question, 60% of governors (10/16) answered in the affirmative,
claiming local people’s voices are heard. Another governor commented that voices
are not fully heard when central government makes decisions. It is worth noting
nonetheless that a response of ‘no’ does not necessarily mean that the respondent
believes that ‘they should be heard’.
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[Q25] If you answered ‘no’ to Q24, why do you think is the case?
There are two camps: (1) those who think voices are not heard and they should be, and
(2) those who think they are not heard and do not have to be. For the former, reasons
given are as follows. ‘Difficulty in finding a consensus between local people’s requests
and administrations’ financial considerations’ and ‘proceeding with rationalisation as
part of neo-liberal reforms without presenting a vision for the future’. These criticisms
were aimed at priority being given to finances rather than health for local people, ‘the
will of local people is ignored, and the right to life is overshadowed by financial
considerations’, ‘a concept such as management by local people does not exist, when
health institutions should be regarded as social common capital’. Priority being given to
owners (e.g. doctors/financiers), rather than to patients, also comes in for criticism.
‘Decisions on closures or mergers are made primarily by owners or financiers’.
Problems with embedded power structure were also mentioned. Other comments
include ‘top-down decision making is the norm in the Ministry of Health, Labour and
Welfare’, ‘the hierarchical structure of metropolitan areas over rural areas is here to
stay’ and ‘no sufficient accountability is ensured’.
Moreover, some refer to the lack of an arena in which to discuss these issues, and the
lack of information given to local people. There are two sides to the coin however, as
one group criticises local people for raising their voices without making an effort to
gather information or give long-term commitment to the issue: ‘If local people had to
finance local hospitals out of their own pocket, they would agree with rationalisation,
but in reality, they know that the government will subsidise them if they raise their
voices’.
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[Q26] If their voices are to be heard more effectively, what would be the best and the 
most appropriate channel?
Votes
(Total=44)
Direct appeal to doctors or hospitals 3 (6.8%)
Complaints to and lobbying administration 7(15.9% )
Use of mass media 11 (25.0%)
Politicisation for electoral campaign 9 (20.5%)
Other means 14(31.8%)
■  D ire c t a p p e a l to d o c to ra  o r  h o s p ita ls
■ C o m p la in ts  to and  lobby ing  
a d m in is t r a t io n
■ Use o f m ass  m ed ia
x P o lit ic is a t io n  for e le c to ra l  cam p aig n
■ O th e r  m ean s
‘Other means’ accounts for 30% of all the answers, followed by ‘use of mass media’
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and ‘politicisation for elections’. ‘Complaints and lobbying administration’ attracted
slightly more than 10 % whereas ‘direct appeal to doctors or hospitals’ gained only 3
votes (7%). Those who selected ‘other means’ based their proposals on making use of
the ‘prefectural assembly’ (6 votes). It also includes ‘making more use of residents
committees’, ‘deliberative council’, ‘public selection for a health committee panel’,
‘direct dialogue with residents’ and ‘use of public polls’. There were also comments
about how to ameliorate the issue of the lack of a negotiating arena: ‘more action from
local authorities via public relations’ and ‘more arenas for discussion and deliberation’.
In addition, some suggest that ‘local people should be proactive and stand up on their
own’. Furthermore, there were negative reactions such as ‘there is no point in listening
to such voices of ignorance’.
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[Q27] How would you describe your role in regional health policy? Choose the closest 
category from the list below.
■ P o litic ia n
■ Administrator
■  Managemenet
■  Policy entrepreneur
■  Consultant
■  Service recip ient
■  Others
Votes (Total=45)
Politician 21 (47.8%)
Administrator 17 (36.4%)
Hospital manager 2 (4.5%)
Policy entrepreneur O(-)
Consultant 2 (4.5%)
Service recipient 1 (2.3%)
Others 2 (4.5%)
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Those who answered ‘politicians’ account for half. Ten out of sixteen governors
identify themselves as politicians, while 5 think of themselves as ‘administrators’. One
ticked both. Others (2 votes) include ‘activist (grassroots campaign)’ and ‘lobbyist
(through all possible channels)’.
[Q28] Select a political party whose stance is closest to your own views in relation to
health or welfare policies.
Votes (Total= 45)
Liberal Democratic Party 5(11.1%)
Democratic Party of Japan 10(22.2%)
Clean (New Komei) Party 1 (2.2%)
Social Democratic Party 2 (4.4%)
Japan Communist Party 4 (8.9%)
Local Parties O(-)
Others 15 (33.4%)
n.a. 8 (17.8%)
Tricky as the nature of this question may be, most of those who replied ‘others’ (11 out
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of 15) declined to provide a specific answer. In total, nearly half were unclear about who
they support. Even among those who did respond to this question, some qualified their
answers with conditions such as ‘I support ... only in relation to health and welfare’.
The category of ‘others’ included the following comments: ‘no party has ever
comprehensively made their policy stances clear on pensions, health and care of the
elderly’ and ‘I treat my own people in the prefecture as my own ‘party’
(‘prefecture-party’)’. Among the 16 governors, only 3 made clear their affiliation to a
particular party. MPs who answered this questionnaire were all Democratic Party
members, which contributed to a high ratio of support for the party. Note: substantial
numbers of questionnaires were dispatched to LDP MPs.
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[Q29] Feel free to add any comments here.
Here, opinions were divided once again.
‘The Constitution of Japan and the Local Autonomy Law clearly stipulate that the state 
and local authorities carry responsibility for protecting the lives of citizens and residents. 
However, recent reforms have shown the opposite tendency and deny rights, especially 
those of the elderly who have endeavoured to reconstruct the country in the post-war 
period. Leaving the uneven distribution of medical resources as it is, and favouring 
metropolitan areas, means that the right to healthy lives in rural area is too much to ask 
for’. From the other point of view, ‘given the current situation in Japan, it is inevitable 
that cost be contained and thus necessary that we transform our mentality from “too 
much dependency on state aid or subsidy” to “self-reliance, self-sufficiency”. If we are 
ever to change, it would be so much better to change in line with the direction in which 
society is going, and therefore, it would be foolish to oppose everything it stands for, 
just as the Medical Association (= the Communist Party) has been doing.’
MPs raise their voices, criticising a situation in which no real argument takes place on 
fundamental health reforms across different political parties, and also proposing that 
efforts should be made to create social consensus about what would be the best way
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forward in regional health planning, taking heed of what universal service means.
Furthermore, administrators also point out the difficulty of putting professional 
knowledge into practice, hindered as they are by administrative jurisdiction. ‘Health 
policy today should be considered as consisting of two totally different categories: one is 
acute and the other is more long-term. The former can mostly be dealt with using fair 
distribution and cost containment (staff, beds, instruments), whereas the latter needs 
more comprehensive consideration beyond the scope of the current “medical policy 
domain”, because long-term illness can be affected by patients’ total environment, such 
as family, assets, and living space’. Long-term care insurance was in part established in 
response to the need to tackle the latter aspect, but only falls within the jurisdiction of 
the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, which hinders effective problem-solving 
mechanisms.
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